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GOVERNMENT AND PRESS IN FRANCE DURING THE ALGERIAN WAR

Martin Harrison
University of Manchester

None of the classic definitions of the liberty and responsibility of the press is more eloquently simple than the Declaration of Rights of 1789: "The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the most precious rights of man. Every citizen may therefore speak, write and publish freely, except to answer for abuses of that liberty in conditions duly determined by law." Despite many vicissitudes France has remained one of the handful of countries where these phrases are more than empty rhetoric. Even there though, they were unable to prevent freedom of information from becoming one of the earliest casualties of the Algerian war.

This was scarcely surprising. Historically, most countries have tried to condition the image of reality reaching their citizens at periods of domestic and international tensions. In France the temptations were particularly pressing. The gulf between official myth and Algerian reality was exceptionally broad. Governments wanted the public to believe first that the rebellion was the work of a handful of terrorists, then that the "last quarter of an hour" had come, and later that peace could be achieved without political negotiations with the Algerian nationalists. To sustain these beliefs they inevitably "managed" the news. When their version was challenged—often unscrupulously and violently—they came increasingly to argue that, in M. Mollet's word, traditional liberties were a "weakness." Moreover, soldiers and politicians, fervently laying the blame for the Indo-China débâcle on the *presse de la trahison,* were determined to prevent any recurrence. As outright military victory became less likely, vocal sections of the armed forces became preoccupied with "conditioning" the people of both Algeria and France. "En guerre révolutionnaire," wrote Argoud, "la conquête des coeurs et l'adhésion des esprits dont le résultat amène l'engagement de tous, constituent l'objectif principal." Finally, the Algerian problem was thankless and intractable; certain controls of information were relatively easy to operate. Notoriously such situations encourage administrators to take what actions can be taken, irrespective of their intrinsic value. Such, summarily, were some of the main considerations leading to attempts to limit dissent in the media of communication.

The signs of nonconformity were in fact rare. Despite the overtones of a *Séquestrés d'Altona* and Jean Vilar's pointed classical revivals, the theatre was firmly wedded to nonpolitical fare. The handful of film producers who set out to tackle controversial subjects had to contend with commercial hostility, censorship and a subsidy system which could be employed for political ends. Usually the result was mutilation or outright prohibition. Newsreels were firmly under official influence. Few publishers would accept an outspoken book on Algeria, and these paid dearly.[1] From 1956 on, rights of public meeting were stringently limited if Algeria was involved. Most important, Radiodiffusion-Télévision Française was subordinated more inflexibly than ever to governmental policies.[2] Most of the newspaper industry followed the government as readily, or preoccupied itself with less serious matters than the Algerian war.

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[1] In the period 1954–63 about thirty-five books were seized, two-thirds of them published by Maspero or Editions de Minuit. All but a few discussed torture or presented the FLN case; the rest came from activist sources.

[2] RTF has a television monopoly except in frontier areas. Its national radio monopoly is broken by commercial stations in neighboring countries, Europe I (Saar) and Radio Luxembourg. These have captured the bulk of the

Yet there was always opposition. Some left-wing papers were violently criticizing the techniques of "pacification" as early as 1955, while right-wing dissidence mounted after 1959. The problem this dissenting press posed for successive governments must therefore be seen against a general background of conformism and control elsewhere. This article explores the extent of repression, the methods employed and their effectiveness. Finally it turns to the underlying question: by what standards should press freedom have been governed in a civil war which cost a quarter of a million lives, uprooted three million people from their homes, created bitter conflicts of loyalty, killed one régime and challenged its successor?

I

The most publicized of all the weapons used against the press was seizure. This is a long-established practice of the French executive. Without going back to the nineteenth century, one may recall the harrying of Clemenceau's *L'Homme Libre*, seizure of *L'Action Française* between the wars and the closing of communist papers in 1939. After the Liberation there were seizures during the insurrectionary strikes and the Indo-China war, while Algerian nationalist journals were confiscated even before 1954. But with the outbreak of the rebellion the exceptional became commonplace.

The technique is simple. Papers must deposit signed copies of each edition at the local prefecture. There, and in several ministries, they are rapidly scanned for objectionable material, whether an article, cartoon, headline or caption, even a few isolated sentences. Sometimes ministers have ordered seizures personally; occasionally the order has come from a *juge d'instruction*. But as MRP deputy André Diligent, put it, "Seizures are usually the fruit of a nocturnal decision, improvised and precipitated by a civil servant, whom the minister is subsequently obliged to cover."[3] Effective power rested therefore with members of ministerial *cabinets*, officials of the prefectures, or duty officers in the defense ministry, to a large extent reflecting their personal idiosyncrasies and prejudices. Police thereupon confiscated the paper in the *messageries* (Paris distributors), on arrival at provincial railway stations or, when they were unusually slow off the mark, in the news kiosks. Control over books, for which there is no such *droit de regard*, was never as efficient: 60,000 copies of Henri Alleg's *La Question* were sold before it was seized.

The status of seizure at law is both contentious and obscure.[4] Almost all the seizures on the French mainland were *saisies judiciares*, resting on article 30 of the code of criminal procedure, which authorizes officers of the *police judiciaire* to take "all measures required to determine whether a crime or misdemeanor has been committed against state security." Originally intended to facilitate the collection of evidence, this article has plainly to be stretched considerably to cover the seizure of a paper's entire printing. The *code* further requires the police to send the file to the local *parquet* within twenty-four hours, initiating the process which normally leads to indictment and trial.

Technically seizure is the initial stage in mounting a prosecution for a crime against the state—sedition, incitement to desertion or demoralization of the army. Not surprisingly, M. Pierre Messmer, when he was defense minister, claimed that seizures were normally followed by prosecutions, and that "the prosecutions we engage are almost all followed through to the end. In a proportion of at least fifty per cent they are followed by conviction." Unfortunately the facts are very different. The letter of the code was normally observed by formally opening an enquiry, but this was almost always pigeon-holed. At most, fifteen per cent of seizures in metropolitan France were followed by indictment; the proportion in Algeria was negligible. No more than five per cent of seizures eventually led to a trial; for the entire period 1955–62 I succeeded in tracing only six convictions consequent on seizures.[5]

The low percentage of prosecutions is partly explained by the liberal views of M. Michelet, Minister of Justice in 1959–61. He blocked many demands for prosecution, particularly from the defense ministry. But the chief reason

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audience. Though they enjoy a reputation for greater objectivity they, too, are vulnerable to official pressures.

Gaullists have often argued that exploitation of the official radio simply balances a hostile press, but even if this were justification it was not true during the Algerian war, when the press was overwhelmingly pro-governmental.

[3] *Journal Officiel, Assemblée Nationale* (*Débats*), Nov. 8, 1961, p. 3969.

[4] For fuller discussion see R. Pinto, *La Liberté d'Opinion* (Paris, 1955), useful though now dated.

[5] *Le Monde*, June 10, 1960 (Messmer). Of the fifty papers I questioned, almost all replied that they had not been brought to trial. Figures derive from them, *Le Monde* and the trade press.

was unquestionably the inability of the authorities to make their charges stick in the courts. Seizure became in fact an act of political coercion and reprisal in the guise of criminal investigation. This is clearly what M. Pompidou was confessing when he promised in 1962, "I am determined that there shall be seizures only where there is ground for prosecution, and I have given instructions to that end, so that prosecutions will follow on seizures in conformity with the law, and that such prosecutions shall be promoted actively and not symbolically as if to justify seizure with an appearance of legality."[6]

Yet redress proved almost impossible. The difficulties of successfully challenging the excesses of the *police judiciaire* are a long-standing problem of French justice, which is too complex to develop fully here. Essentially, a paper which was seized but not prosecuted, was caught in a no-man's-land between the regular and the administrative courts. Deprived of a chance to complain of irregularities at a trial, the paper found the administrative courts normally barred from intervention in what remained technically a criminal investigation.

The chief hope lay in a civil action against the official responsible, alleging commission of one of the various *fautes* recognized in French law. But it is extraordinarily difficult to muster the cast-iron proof required to convince a skeptical court that a prefect has exceeded or misused his powers or that his action had no reasonable justification. Since French sedition laws are as studiously vague as those of most states, prefects could usually point to something which might conceivably have been an offense. Even in the face of procedural irregularities and a mounting list of seizures without prosecutions, the courts remained reluctant to find bad faith.[7] Thus when *L'Express* and *France-Observateur* sued two ex-Prefects of Police after a long series of seizures which had not led to prosecutions, the court nevertheless accepted the claim that the officials had acted as genuine agents of *police judiciaire*.[8] It was only in 1960 that the Conseil d'Etat ruled that two particularly scandalous seizures of *France-Soir* in Algeria in 1956–7 had been a *détournement de pouvoir* because the prefect had employed article 30 to block the paper's sale and not to investigate crime.[9] But the *arrêt* had little practical consequence, for the authorities found it simple enough to concoct the semblance of an investigation to preserve appearances.

Judges were also receptive to the argument that the police were duty-bound not only to seize a statutory four copies as evidence but to confiscate "everything which appeared to have served or have been destined to commit a crime"—*i.e.*, every copy. Thus when several organizations sued the Prefect of Police for seizing a pamphlet on torture the court held that "M. Papon could judge that the massive distribution of printed matter accusing French troops of atrocities constituted a crime."[10]

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[6] *La Presse Française*, May–June 1962. French legal practice authorizes *saisie administrative* when it is indispensable to "ensure the maintenance or re-establishment of public order." Damages can be awarded in case of abuse. This presumably explains why such seizures were made rarely, if ever, in 1954–63.

A succession of laws has also authorized *saisie judiciaire* of *all* copies of obscene or anarchist publications, or of material insulting foreign heads of government or inciting to physical violence—but not of seditious material.

[7] *Cf. Charivari c. Préfet de Police.* The paper was seized for criticism of Mr. Khrushchev's visit to France. But the 1834 law authorizing seizures for *offenses* against a foreign head of government requires a formal complaint from that government. *Charivari* demanded restitution of the seized edition because the government had acted without this protest. In court, however, the representative of the prefecture declared that seizure was due to another article, damaging to military morale. This could not be rebutted (and the case failed, according to *Charivari*) because the officials carrying out the seizure had refused to issue the statutory *procès-verbaux* specifying under which law they were acting.

Although over three months had elapsed since the seizure and no *information* had been opened, the Tribunal refused to order the return of seized copies, commenting that "the fact [that no enquiry has begun] must be proved, and if it were, since the code of penal procedure fixes no time limit for opening such an enquiry [the prefect] can still act if he wishes." It also insisted that a restitution order would be a decision on the merits. *L'Echo de la Presse et de la Publicité* (hereafter *L'Echo*) June 5, 1960.

[8] *Le Monde*, Jan. 13 and Feb. 18, 1960.

[9] *Soc. Frampar*, C. E. June 24, 1960; *Rec. Sirey*, 1960, J. 348 ff.; *Rec. Dalloz*, 1960, J. 744 ff. The story for which one issue was ostensibly seized did not even appear in the Algiers edition. See also the incisive judgment of the Rouen *tribunal administratif* annuling for *excès de pouvoir* a 1961 seizure of *Témoignage Chrétien*, *Le Monde*, Dec. 8–9, 1963.

[10] *Le Monde*, Nov. 27 and Dec. 25, 1959.

The tide turned exceedingly slowly. However, in 1961 the Paris Cour d'Appel allowed *Libération*'s appeal against the refusal of a *juge d'instruction* to restore seized copies, explicitly rejecting the argument that the crime lay in the distributing as well as in the actual text.[11] Thereafter papers occasionally won return of their copies—now so much waste paper—weeks or months later. But moral victories were small consolation for their lost revenue. The war had been over for more than a year when at long last a paper obtained damages: *Libération* won $300 from the Prefect of Police for a seizure in 1960—the first such successful action since Jean Chiappe improperly seized *L'Action Française* in 1934.[12]

Looking back, the total failure of the courts to provide adequate and timely redress remains slightly puzzling. Some French jurists always contended that remedies were open through both the regular and administrative courts.[13] There was in fact nothing in the *Libération* case to distinguish it from others which were, or might have been, brought earlier. The explanation of the decision lies less in the law itself than in the political and judicial climate. Earlier it was plain that many judges were unsympathetic to the press, some became executive-minded under the influence of the war, and others were simply uninterested in examining the possibilities of redress which the law might offer. For whatever cause the French judiciary scarcely enhanced its reputation as a bulwark of freedom. On the other hand, the press itself was oddly slow to challenge seizures. This strange lethargy went beyond suspicion of the judiciary, and the pessimism about winning damages. A prominent editor admitted to me, "Frankly our reactions became blunted. We failed to resist by every means. We didn't fight—and we paid for it."

II

Almost from the beginning, the Faure government responded to criticism of the war or of the techniques of "pacification" by seizing the offending papers. From March 1955 successive "special powers" laws granted the authorities in Algiers almost total discretion to control the communications media. All nationalist organs were banned, while the list of publications forbidden in Algeria was extended month by month to include almost every major Arabic paper in the Mediterranean countries. The trickle of seizures while M. Jacques Soustelle was Governor-General (1955), swelled into spate under M. Robert Lacoste, Minister Resident 1956–8. *Alger Républicain*, the *progressiste* daily sequestered by the Faure government when the Algerian Communist Party was dissolved, was barred from reappearing after its closure had been ruled illegal. Unofficially, the entire communist and *progressiste* mainland press was banned from Algeria until the end of the war, and the left-Catholic *Témoignage Chrétien* was seized almost every week.

Even such moderate papers as *France-Soir*, *Le Monde* and *La Croix* were not immune, while *L'Espoir*, the tiny organ of the Algiers liberals, was seized to extinction.[14] At the close of 1956 Algeria had no independent publications in the languages of eighty per cent of its population. Instead, the authorities left a local monopoly to papers committed completely to *Algérie française;* this was to cost both them and the European community dear.[15]

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[11] *La Presse Française*, March 1961.

[12] *Le Monde*, May 17, 1963. The Dec. 13, 1960 issue was seized for "demoralizing the army" by three headlines about the grave riots in the Casbah: "encore 7 morts (tous musulmans) à Alger"; "la Casbah toujours encerclée par l'Armée"; "bilan officiel des deux jours: 90 morts, dont 84 musulmans." The court noted that "it is not presently contended that the facts advanced were false, or that they were related in such a way as to demoralise the army." However the Court dismissed a claim for damages for the seizure of the previous day's edition.

[13] Y. Galmot, "Le Contrôle Juridictionnel des Saisies d'Ecrits Imprimés," *Etudes et Documents*, 1960.

[14] *L'Espoir* was not subversive even in an Algerian context; it was a rare attempt to bridge the gulf between Europeans and Moslems—the Mollet government's professed policy. It reappeared briefly in 1960, had to give up again, and resumed publication after independence. *Communauté Algérienne*, another liberal organ, also suspended publication. M. Lacoste told the 1956 Socialist congress, "The press is totally free in Algeria, as in France, to express the ideas which seem right to it and to attack what it wishes."

[15] The mainland press was on sale but vulnerable to seizure and vigilante action. Radio Alger became almost wholly infiltrated by diehards and did little to compensate for the reactionary views of the local press. A parliamentary delegation commented in 1956, "We have been struck, even horrified, by certain layouts, calculated to stir terror and hatred, surprised at the abundance of details given, of a kind to favor permanent and sometimes unhealthy excitement in a public gripped by disquiet." *J.O.* (*A.N.*) *Documents*, No. 1977, May 29, 1956.

TABLE I. SEIZURES OF NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS: FRANCE, 1955–62

Year	Political Orientation						Total
	Ext. Left	Left	Centre	Right	Ext. Right	Unknown	
1955	4	3	—	—	1	1	9
1956	12	5	—	—	—	—	17
1957	22	12	—	—	—	—	34
1958	13	15	—	2	—	—	30
1959	3	8	—	—	7	—	18
1960	22	20	—	2	22	—	66
1961	26	21	—	2	10	1	60
1962	9	5	1	11	8	1	35
Total	111	89	1	17	48	3	269

Five years later a respected provincial daily reflected that "in a large measure the despair of the Europeans of Algeria is explained by the fact that they are not honestly informed."[16] They never had been.

Meanwhile the pressure increased in France by a familiar pattern: first came action against the extremes, then it spread to the democratic left, notably *France-Observateur* and *L'Express*.[17] Seizures on the mainland rose from nine in 1955 to 17 in 1956; 34 in 1957 and 23 in the last five months of the Republic in 1958. The new régime was resolved to be more liberal and coherent. In Algeria the local administration and the parallel authorities which had been seizing papers at will since May were brought to heel. From November 1958 to November 1959 there were few seizures in Algeria and only eighteen in France. At first the occasional seizures significantly coincided with the absences of de Gaulle from Paris. Later he tolerated them, possibly considering them—like torture—inadmissible but secondary. Once the liberal direction of Algerian policy became unmistakable with the offer of self-determination in September 1959, and the threat of activist subversion and military treachery intensified, good resolutions were abandoned. Ministers declared candidly that seizures would continue as long as the war. The practice of the Fifth Republic rapidly became indistinguishable from that of the Fourth—except that seizures multiplied. From 18 in 1959 they rose to a record 66 on the mainland in 1960, 59 in 1961, and 31 in the six months of 1962 preceding Algerian independence. Thereafter they fell sharply. It looked as if once the embers of activism were extinguished, seizure would again be a rare exception.[18]

TABLE II. SEIZURES OF NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS: ALGERIA, 1955–62

Year	Political Orientation					Total
	Ext. Left	Left	Centre	Right	Ext. Right	
1955	11	4	2	—	—	17
1956	1	15	1	1	—	18
1957	2	47	10	1	3	63
1958	5	46	18	2	6	77
1959	—	6	—	—	7	13
1960	—	34	22	28	4	88
1961	—	14	9	31	13	67
1962 (Jan–June)	61	2	4	18	—	85
Date Unknown	—	100	33	25	—	158
Total	80	268	99	106	33	586

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[16] *L'Est Républicain,* Dec. 12, 1961. These remarks refer most strongly to Algiers. The Oran and Constantine papers were less violent; *Oran Républicain* took courageously moderate positions.

[17] Sources: *Le Monde, Presse-Actualité, Cahiers de l'I.I.p. L'Echo* and fifty of the publications affected. Totals are believed almost complete for the mainland but not for Algeria, where they have indicative value only. Publishers often never heard of seizures there; some lost count. The ban on extreme-left papers there was a prior seizure which cannot be quantified; nor can occasions when papers were "blocked" for hours or days rather than formally seized. As Algeria sank into anarchy it became increasingly difficult to distinguish official seizures from those of a host of self-styled authorities.

[18] Arbitrary ways die hard. As seizures rapidly diminished, the number of journalists charged

During the war newspapers and periodicals were seized on some 265 occasions in France, and at least 586 more in Algeria. Some ninety publications of all political hues were affected; every political journal of any consequence suffered at least an Algerian seizure.[19] Yet the policy of seizure and the criteria governing it are still not wholly comprehensible. They were in fact never coherently explained; ministers tended to refer to seizures simply as an inherent facet of war. M. Louis Terrenoire, however, when he was information minister, claimed that seizures were limited to grave cases where laws had been broken or "complicity with the FLN had been recommended or exalted." He contended that "if the government did not react to such aberrant activities, what would be left of the elementary disciplines without which there would no longer be a State, but merely ruins and the call to the Cossacks."[20] This picturesque justification would have appeared more plausible if the initial factual premise had not been so flagrantly incorrect—as we shall see. Even individual seizures were rarely explained publicly; ministers often declined all comment. (After 1959 the Algerian authorities almost invariably refused all explanation.) Editors who wished to know what had offended had to tap the professional grapevine or pump their friends in the ministries.[21] More than once publishers were given to believe a particular passage had caused offense only to have their expurgated editions seized on other grounds. The obvious intention—for reasons which can only be guessed—was to prevent the papers appearing at all that week. Sometimes all attempts to discover reasons for a seizure were unsuccessful.

One is obliged, therefore, to reconstruct the authorities' intentions from the seized material itself. First, they were obviously seeking to deter papers from publishing certain facts, discussing certain themes. Thus at least thirty-five seizures on the mainland related to three *causes célèbres* involving torture—the cases of Henri Alleg, Maurice Audin and Djamila Boupacha.[22] Altogether about forty per cent of seizures seem to have been associated with allegations of torture, summary executions or bad conditions in prisons or internment camps. Editors therefore knew that they referred to such matters at their peril—though many circumspect references did get through. Similarly *L'Humanité* doubtless knew the risks of splashing certain Communist Party proclamations; seizure for publishing manifestoes of activist organizations or of the Algerian communists was also predictable. A calculated risk

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with insulting the President of the Republic reached unprecedented proportions. M. François Mitterand, apparently referring only to press cases, speaks of ten prosecutions between 1875 and 1958 and over 150 since 1958. *Le Monde,* July 16, 1963. In the French Antilles there were still seizures for "separatism," for which the pro-Peking monthly *Révolution* was seized on the mainland in March 1964.

Algeria celebrated independence by imposing general press censorship, banning nine right-wing French papers, seizing issues of others which gave offense, suppressing opposition periodicals and closing nearly every French-language paper, in violation of the Evian agreements.

[19] The most frequent victims on the mainland included: *L'Humanité,* 25; *Témoignages et Documents,* 22; *Rivarol,* 17; *La Marseillaise,* 15; *Libération,* 11; *France-Observateur,* 14; *L'Express,* 8. *Fraternité Française* (Poujade) claims the record with over fifty, but I have traced only six. In Algeria approximate figures were: *Témoignage Chrétien,* over 100; *Rivarol,* 50; *L'Express,* 52; *France-Observateur,* 50; *Carrefour,* 25; *Aux Ecoutes,* 22; *La Croix,* 33; *Le Monde,* 22; *Le Populaire,* 20. Many of these were purely token consignments.

[20] *Le Monde,* Sept. 15–16, 1960. M. Lacoste once seized *Le Monde* for "accusing parachutists of a murder they did not commit." The paper had mentioned, in a sober account of a punitive expedition following an FLN terrorist outrage, that a "girl was killed by stray bullets." The defense ministry later confirmed this. Lacoste's covert aim was probably to undermine the paper's reputation among readers, depriving them of the chance to read what it had actually said. *Le Monde,* Jan 8 and 9, 1957.

[21] Consider the revealing overtones of this letter from the information minister to an editor, "It does indeed appear legitimate to me that directors of a publication which is the object of a seizure should, one way or another, be informed of the reasons for the seizure." In this case he did not himself know.

[22] Audin was a communist university teacher arrested for sheltering an Algerian Communist leader; officially he escaped from custody; unofficially he was murdered by his jailers. Alleg, editor of *Alger Républicain* described tortures he allegedly suffered in prison in *La Question.* He escaped, returning eventually to edit the paper again after independence. Djamila Boupacha alleged she confessed to planting bombs for the FLN under torture and was raped and otherwise mistreated. In all three cases the government or army prevented legal investigations to establish the full truth.

was also involved in printing attacks on soldiers who were frustrating de Gaulle's policy or plotting subversion (or, alternatively, were failing to do so); interviews with rebel or activist leaders; discussions of desertion or conscientious objection; or attacks on public servants or the President of the Republic.[23]

Second, seizures were intended to keep the political temperature down. The authorities therefore often reacted to the "play" given a story rather than to its content. During the 1961 putsch the communist dailies were seized for splashing the Party's call to action over their front pages; almost every other paper printed the essentials, with impunity. The "scandal" of a striking *mise en pages* or polemical presentation might provoke seizures of *Rivarol* or *L'Express*, while the same facts appeared freely in *Le Monde*. Tone and layout were naturally watched most vigilantly in insurrectionary periods. Seizure accordingly was a matter of political context as much as of content.

Some papers were more vulnerable than others in comparable situations. In 1960 *L'Aurore* interviewed a fugitive activist with impunity. Then Georges Arnaud secured a much publicized interview with Francis Jeanson—who was sought for aiding the FLN—for the "governmental" *Paris-Presse*. The paper was left undisturbed; Arnaud was convicted of "non-denunciation." When *France-Observateur* and *L'Express* discussed sympathetically but negatively Jeanson's views on conscientious objection, desertion and aid to the FLN they were seized. "A nation which tolerated such writing," Terrenoire said, would be "committing suicide."[24]

Many seizures arose from trivial matters. *L'Humanité* was seized for publishing on a "non-customary day" during the 1958 insurrection. The September 1961 *Esprit* was seized for a brief note about mistreatment of a draftee in Germany (though the C-in-C issued revised orders and the culprits were court-martialled as a result). The seizure of *L'Etudiant de l'Afrique Noire* in March 1957 was attributed to the "tone" of certain articles. *Libération*'s July 9, 1955, issue was confiscated for a one-inch paragraph carrying no headline. The March 25, 1959, edition of *Salut Public* was apparently seized for a picture of de Gaulle captioned, "Allons! enfants du Maghreb uni!" adding, "Algerians ask de Gaulle, the man from Colombey, to approach such friendly powers as Alsace, Brittany, Vendée, Savoy, Picardy, Corsica and other lands possessing an incontrovertible personality, with a view to forming with Algeria a new union which might perhaps be called France."

As the war progressed seizure in fact became less and less a means of controlling information or ideas, and increasingly a contribution to the besetting problem of military loyalty. Many officers were convinced that the "treasonous press" was sapping morale, giving aid and comfort to the rebels, and compromising victories won in the field (*L'Express* was frequently alleged to be staple reading in FLN hideouts). Even moderate officers were, not surprisingly, bitter to find intellectual weeklies discussing whether to aid the FLN. The Algiers High Command was consistently urging exemplary action against decadent and defeatist organs, including *Le Monde*, *La Croix*, and *Le Figaro*. Any government which failed to stamp out their subversion became suspect itself. The defense ministry echoed these preoccupations in less immoderate terms. Seizures therefore became a useful way of appeasing the suspicious military, and ostentatiously demonstrating the government's confidence in the army and police against their critics. Indeed when once a weekly which exposed police excesses was not seized this was widely interpreted as a public warning to the police by the government. Eventually M. Debré perfected the practice of *un coup à droite, un coup à gauche.* As the government was obliged to intensify the repression of right-wing subversion it showed that it was not in league with the communists and defeatists by seizing left-wing papers. Since the aim was to propitiate the military, content became a secondary consideration. This explains many of the more trivial seizures mentioned, and why *L'Echo* could write of its bitter enemy, *France-Observateur*, that "the most finicky exegetists have not been able to discover what article, what passage or what line of an article has provoked this seizure."[25]

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[23] In other matters there was complete uncertainty. *Le Monde* once published the same facts on successive days: it was seized in Algeria on the first day but not the second.

[24] *Le Monde.* April 23, 24–25 and June 19–20, 1960; *France-Observateur* and *L'Express*, April 22, 1960. Terrenoire singled out these passages: "Between 1957 and 1960 desertion has been, one might say, an affair for the individual conscience"; "What in my eyes nullifies [Jeanson's] action is not the romanticism which accompanies it, nor the fact that it is an avant-garde action necessarily misunderstood by the great majority of people . . . [but] that it rests on a completely false vision of the relationship which should establish itself between socialism and Algerian nationalism. *France-Observateur* was indicted, but for quite different comments in its literary criticism; neither paper came to trial.

Against this background the incidence of seizures on the various sections of the press becomes more clear. For although the régime was throughout threatened primarily from its Right, the left-wing press suffered most in every year until 1962. This was partly because the war's repressive phase lasted longer than the liberal dénouement, but it also reflects the sizeable element first of "propitiation" and later of conscious "balance" noted above.

III

Seizure was supplemented by other weapons which can be outlined more rapidly. In addition to the *de facto* exclusion of many publications from Algeria, special powers were invoked to ban 102 more.[26] Under a convenient 1939 decree-law governing "publications of foreign origin," 108 publications published abroad or printed in France in foreign languages were banned throughout the Republic by *arrêté* of the Minister of the Interior against which there was no appeal.[27] The defense ministry banned at will the sale or reading in military establishments of publications "of a nature damaging to discipline"—including *L'Express*, *La Dépêche du Midi*, and *La Vie Catholique Illustrée*.[28]

Le Monde, which escaped seizure on the mainland, incurred the Mollet government's sustained hostility. It was threatened with withdrawal of official and semi-official advertising and struck from the list of papers supplied to diplomatic missions on "economy" grounds. Its financial stability was jeopardized by blocking a much-needed price rise of two (old) francs (then about one-half cent). Successive defense ministers instigated and sustained a wholly spurious legal action which threatened the paper's finances. Supported throughout by an impressive array of domestic and foreign opinion the paper refused to submit, and the authorities eventually ceased their harassment.[29]

Under the Fifth Republic even more sweeping measures were contemplated. In 1960 M. Debré personally led an attempt to block the re-election of the President-Director General of Agence France-Presse, insisting that as sixty per cent of the agency's income came from official sources, the government was entitled to a majority on the *conseil d'administration*, with officially nominated members exercising *contrôle permanent* over its operations. Convinced that this would lead irresistibly to editorial interference in its basic news service the industry closed ranks. Debré backed down.[30]

Another measure contemplated about this time was the sequestration of any paper of which a legally responsible director was *charged* with a crime against the state. The first victim was to be *L'Echo d'Alger*, whose editor Alain de Sérigny was awaiting trial for sedition, but no paper could feel safe if such a weapon existed. The furious protests of the entire industry led to official denials that such action was contemplated. Then another leak revealed that an official working party had drafted a "reform" of the basic 1881 press law. Seizure was to be legalized under stringent safeguards, with the right to compensation for abuses. However, punishments for almost all press offenses were to be increased drastically, the test for conviction for publishing false news changed to *imprudence* rather than the stricter *mauvaise foi*, and a new crime created of "discrediting the armed forces."[31] Again a violent outcry resulted in a confused and contradictory ministerial retreat: there had been no draft; the press would be able to discuss the draft before its promulgation as an ordinance; it would appear as a parliamentary bill not as an ordinance. There seems little doubt that a draft did exist, though it had not obtained de Gaulle's assent. Debré and Messmer were the most enthusiastic protagonists in a divided cabinet of using emergency powers, granted by parliament to deal with the barricades affair, to impose the changes by ordinance. Like the AFP incident, the episode cast a revealing light on Debré's approach to press problems.[32]

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[25] July 1, 1958.

[26] Countries of origin were: Tunisia, 24; France, 20; U.A.R., 15; Morocco, 10; Lebanon, Algeria, West Germany, 5; Sudan, Czechoslovakia, 4; Switzerland, 3; East Germany, Spain, Belgium, Communist China, Italy, Kuwait, United States, 1. Fourteen recordings were also banned. Source: *Journal Officiel de l'Algérie* (later *Receuil des Actes Administratifs*), Jan. 1, 1955 to July 3, 1962.

[27] There were 37 in Spanish; 13 in Polish, 7 in Vietnamese dialects; 5 in Italian; others in Arabic, Chinese, English, German, Georgian, Portuguese, Belorussian, Russian; also French originating in Belgium, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Spain, Cameroon, Portugal, and Indo-China. Source: *J. O.* (*Lois et Décrets*), 1955–62.

[28] *Cf. Le Monde*, June 21, 1963.

[29] French newspapers require official permission to increase prices. The government argued that the proposed rise would upset the price index. *Cf. Le Monde*, Nov. 8 and 14, 1956. The suit arose from an unhappily prescient article by Prof. Duverger on the dangers of increasing the administrative and political role of the military in Algeria. M. André Morice persuaded a parachutist organization to sue for libel, and his successor launched a fresh action when the parachutists were held to lack standing; it failed. *Le Monde*, July 20 and 30, Sept. 28, 1957.

[30] The Mollet government had granted AFP a relatively liberal *statut*, which without entirely freeing it from official pressures went far to remove suspicion that it was "governmental" like the old Havas. *Cf. L'Echo*, April 5 and 20, 1960; *Le Monde*, April 10–11, 12, 16, 27, 1960.

In the wake of the 1961 putsch Algerian special powers were used to close *L'Echo d'Alger* and its associated papers, and the *Dépêche Quotidienne* (reauthorized subsequently as *La Dépêche d'Algérie*). The only other Algiers daily, *Le Journal d'Alger*, was temporarily suspended. No appeal was permitted. At the same time de Gaulle's exceptional powers under Article 16 of the Constitution were used to suppress a number of newsletters, also without appeal or explanation.[33] Most of these *lettres confidentielles* which retailed "inside dope" to subscribers showed strong activist sympathies, and a few were little better than blackmail sheets. However, a long history of administrative hostility makes it likely that the authorities now seized the chance to do something they had been itching to do for many years. Both *L'Echo d'Alger* and the newsletters had incurred such powerful antipathies that protests were muted and quite ineffective.

Usually the earliest targets of repression tend to be the journalists. While apparently nothing could deter the Paris police from beating up reporters covering political demonstrations, they suffered relatively little at the government's hands (though many were *plastiqués* by OAS). From time to time, inevitably, correspondents were declared "undesirable" in Algeria. In 1955–6 a few journalists were arrested and others harassed for reporting from the rebel *maquis*. In 1961–2 several journalists were interned as activists. Since few were indicted and their detention was never formally explained, it was not clear how many were victimized purely as journalists. Though their case was not universally popular, press criticism may have hastened the release of some and discouraged further arrests.

IV

The effects of these various repressive acts on the press, the public and the course of the war are necessarily problematical. Yet it seems unlikely that a policy which was so haphazardly conceived and erratically executed could have borne much fruit. As a means of information control seizure could never be efficient as long as *Le Monde* and *Le Canard Enchaîné* were untouched (on the mainland). Careful readers could invariably glean the gist of what the government was trying to suppress. Not only were few seizures complete, but two semi-clandestine papers, *Vérité-Liberté* and *Témoignages et Documents*, distributed banned material widely despite repeated seizures. After prolonged reading of seized material the author is skeptical whether a single significant fact was suppressed for more than a day or so. Rather, seizure alerted an informed public to the facts they were intended to conceal. If much of the French public remained ignorant and misled, the explanation lies less in seizures than in a deeper failure of the press itself, to which we will return.

Seizure became a wholly arbitrary system of inflicting fines on papers which had displeased the authorities. At best the paper had to bear reprinting costs; at worst it lost sales and advertising revenue for the seized issue. *France-Observateur* put the cost of a single seizure at $1,500; *L'Humanité* at $5,300 and *L'Humanité-Dimanche* at $28,000. No paper has publicly revealed its total losses, but at least three are estimated to have lost over $100,000. The industry's total out-of-pocket losses probably fell in the range of $600,000–$900,000. Few French papers have substantial resources and the $200 needed to reprint the tiniest *feuilles* probably hurt more than the $30,000 this cost *Le Parisien Libéré*. At one time the authorities apparently hoped that *L'Express* and *France-Observateur* would bleed to death, but (with the two Algerian exceptions) no paper was actually forced to close by seizures, though several blamed seizures, on suspending publication, rather than admit their sales were negligible. More remarkable, while some papers undoubtedly became more circumspect, it would be hard to find one which was coerced into suppressing facts or changing its policies.

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[31] "Serait puni d'emprisonnement de 1 à 5 ans quiconque aura cherché à jeter le discrédit sur l'action de l'armée, en rapportant des faits, actes ou propos de nature, à nuire à l'honneur de l'armée." that is, even the most strictly factual and sober report of military excess would be criminal.

[32] *Le Monde*, Aug. 2, 4, 6, 7–8, 12 and Sept. 17, 23, 25–6, 1960.

[33] See my "French Experience of Exceptional Powers in 1961," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 25 (Feb. 1963). The presidential Decision authorized suppression of "certain writings" supporting subversion or revealing secret military or administrative information. At May 31, 1963, when the powers lapsed, twenty newsletters had been banned, including several which reappeared under slightly differing titles.

The contribution made by repression to the government's relations with the military may be assessed skeptically in the light of the régime's subsequent troubles. Doubtless occasional seizures appeased the High Command from time to time, but many soldiers would have been satisfied with nothing less than total suppression of everything to the left of *L'Aurore* and the imprisonment of many journalists. The transparent calculations in Debré's policy of balance can scarcely have disarmed any of the more vocal critics.

The record of repression and attempted repression during the Algerian war must be seen in perspective. Taking them fully into account France (though not Algeria) kept a basically free press. The most extreme and indiscriminate systems of repression and control were in the end avoided. No newspaper was closed or mortally injured on the mainland; outside Algeria prior censorship was imposed only for a few days in May 1958. Even seizures inherently arose from the existence of an otherwise uncontrolled press: at the least they were a lesser evil than the discreet prior censorship operated in so many countries—outright suppression of opposition papers. Moreover, libel laws and official secrets legislation were enforced less stringently than in, say, peacetime Britain. Even the keenest critic of French governments would concede that the most casual inspection of a newspaper kiosk provided ample evidence that every shade of opinion could be expressed, often violently and unscrupulously. However caustically one surveys the French record one may legitimately wonder how many countries could have passed through the strains France experienced without even greater encroachments on press freedom. (The British writer can reflect that despite exceptionally high consensus in wartime Britain *The Daily Worker* was suspended; the experiences of *The Times of Cyprus* during the "troubles" are not entirely reassuring either.)

V

The most sombre element in the struggle between the press and government was the extent to which the press stood alone. Almost to the last, politicians were pressing for more seizures and more draconian legislation; only a handful publicly defended the press. There were scattered protests in the Assembly but not a single full-dress debate. Among the judiciary too many judgments in press cases revealed little sympathy, even antipathy to the press.[34] Except when *Le Monde* was in danger few of the distinguished figures who raised their voices against torture would lift even a pen for the press. Among intellectuals arbitrary treatment of the press seemed a matter for apathetic resignation rather than organized protest.[35] Perhaps distaste for the outrageous behavior of *L'Humanité* and *Fraternité-Française* obscured the lesson of history that the greatest causes must often be fought for highly unattractive victims. Almost the only sustained protests from outside the industry came from the "professional" libertarians of the *Ligue des Droits de l'Homme*.

The press was not only isolated, it was divided. The antagonisms aroused by the war were such that papers condoned and even applauded the repression of their opponents. They never learned that the defense of the diehard *Echo d'Alger* began with the fellow-travelling *Alger-Républicain*. *Le Figaro* welcomed seizures of left-wing weeklies in 1958, "One understands that the government wished to give some appeasement to the indignation and exasperation of the combatants against those in France who ally themselves consistently with the rebellion." *L'Echo* roundly declared press freedom did not extend to "those who betray France while she is at war."[36] The *Fédération Nationale de la Presse Française* was never so intemperate. However, its leader Albert Bayet, one of the "patriotic left," blocked discussion of seizures of *Alger Républicain* at the 1954 Algiers congress because protests might "wound an important section of Algerian and French opinion." The FNPF organ, *La Presse Française*, contrived to ignore the sequestration of *Alger Républicain* and the imprisonment of members of the staff. Even in 1956 Bayet almost stopped the congress from voting a mild motion on seizures.[37] Not until 1960 did the rising torrent of seizures and the rumors of legislation produced limited solidarity. Even then *L'Humanité* demanded suppression of "L'Assassin Libéré" (*Le Parisien Libéré*) for implicitly supporting OAS; and the Right reciprocated in kind. FNPF was now voting angry motions and dispatching anxious delegations to ministers, but the government could gauge their value by the way they were buried on the inside pages. Seizures themselves were reported rarely and obscurely "How few protest!" complained a chastened *Echo*. "Hardly anyone but *Le Monde* raises a voice. The others camouflage the news between two juicy crimes . . . or horoscopes for *midinettes*."[38] Proposals were made for a common front, with the entire press agreeing to reprint seized material across their front pages, but they foundered on the suicidal enmities of the extremists and the chilling indifference of the moderates—notably the provincial press.

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[34] The record of the superior courts in press cases was generally more liberal. See notably, cases involving *L'Echo du Centre* (*Le Monde*, May 11, 1956); a Guadaloupe paper (*ibid*, Sept. 23, 1959); *Rivarol* (*ibid*, Nov. 5, 1959); *C'est à dire* (*L'Echo*, July 5, 1960); *Le Canard Enchaîné* (*Le Monde*, Jan 11, 1963.)

[35] Notable exceptions: protests by Malraux, Mauriac, Sartre and R. Martin du Gard at seizure of *La Question* (*Le Monde*, April 17, 1958); academic criticism of the harassing of Prof. Marrou for an article in *Le Monde* (*ibid*, April 14, 1956); protest meetings at the arrest of Roger Stéphane (*ibid*, April 8, 1955).

[36] *Le Figaro*, quoted by *L'Echo* March 15, 1958; *L'Echo*, March 15, 1959. However, *L'Echo* was an early critic of some seizures and defended *Le Monde*.

The press made a graver contribution to its misfortunes. The widespread self-censorship practiced particularly by the solid, respectable *presse d'information* left dissidents isolated and vulnerable, and encouraged governments to resort to seizure rather than broader controls. Prudence and patriotism led many papers to promote official versions of reality and to sustain the wishful thinking which persistently jeopardized the emergence of intelligent opinion about Algeria. The extent of self-censorship cannot be convincingly documented here, but its importance is not seriously challenged. The author found journalists and outside observers in France almost unanimous in believing that conformism and suppression had compromised the freedom and integrity of the press more than seizure. Unpalatable facts and opinions tended to be smothered and pertinent questions went unasked. Early in the war the FNPF encouraged its members to support "pacification," declaring that "no less imperious is the duty to recall that a rupture between France and Algeria is something unthinkable"—although it was just because rupture was thinkable that there was a war. Even when 400,000 troops were in the field many papers considered the war a "police action," and the rebels as "outlaws" who were "slaughtered" like animals rather than "killed" like soldiers. As evidence of torture grew, Mauriac declared "Parler ou taire, nous n'avons plus le choix," but many papers thought otherwise. They apparently believed that it was more dishonorable to expose torture than to commit it. Reports were dismissed as communist propaganda, buried, misrepresented or ignored; there were references to "so-called tortures," or to persons being "jostled" or "mishandled" by the police.[39] Sensational papers splashed stories of teenage hooliganism but had no space to report similar behavior by Moslem auxiliaries in the heart of Paris. Conversely, pro-nationalist papers rarely reminded readers that the FLN was financed by extortion enforced by murder, and that terrorism and atrocities were its deliberate policy. Outside the Right there was a marked reluctance to look too closely at the massacre of the Plateau des Glières in 1962, or the techniques employed against the Secret Army. For years the refusal to examine rationally the nature of Algerian nationalism misled the public; later the terms of a possible settlement and the problem of the European minority were considered belatedly or in stereotypes.

Suppression of news, excessive bias, patriotic silences and a preference for triviality are certainly not vices peculiar to the French press. But French experience after 1954 illustrates graphically the consequences of these failings—of newspapers ceasing to be *news*papers. The extent of official influence over the other media laid an unusually heavy responsibility on the free press; with a few notable exceptions it failed to respond. However one may judge the preoccupation of some papers with entertainment and the excessive discretion of others in normal times, the lamentable public ignorance about Algeria during these years was sombre evidence of the price a society at grips with grave problems may have to pay when the press fails to do its job.

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[37] *Cf. La Presse Française*, Oct–Nov. 1954; Oct. 1956. *Cf. Le Monde*, Feb. 13, 1960.

[38] April 10 and March 25, 1962. The tribute should have included *Le Canard Enchaîné*, the only other paper which consistently criticized seizures of friend and foe. For an extraordinarily petty victimization of *Le Canard's directrice*, see *Le Monde*, July 4, 1963.

[39] For analysis of press coverage of certain events see *Presse-Actualité*, Dec., 1957 (internment camps); *ibid*, Jan. 1961 (de Gaulle in Algeria); *ibid*, June 1961 (putsch); *ibid*, Apr.–May 1962 (Paris demonstrations); *Les Temps Modernes* Dec. 1959 (Audin trial). An example: *Le Parisien Libéré* is reported to have written, "Maître William Lévy, secretary of the Algiers socialist federation was killed yesterday. His son had already been killed by the FLN." But Lévy was murdered by OAS.

The counterpart to an incurious *presse d'information* was a section of the *presse d'opinion* which was either unscrupulous or irresponsible. On the mainland some papers sent reporters to spend periods with the rebel *maquis;* others blamed such atrocities as the Melouza massacre on France rather than admit the nationalists capable of them; others, at a tense moment, splashed the story of an exceptionally horrifying murder of a family by *fellagha,* though elementary checks would have revealed it to be a child's invention. Some papers alleged that the gendarmes involved in the January 1960 *fusillade* were doped or drunk; at least one hinted that the murderous *plasticage* at Issy-les-Moulineaux was perpetrated by official *provocateurs* rather than by OAS ("The Fifth Republic's Reichstag Fire"), just as another paper had attributed FLN machine-gun attacks on Paris police stations to the police themselves. *L'Express* became such a tireless campaigner for Algerian independence that opponents branded it, not wholly unfairly, the organ of the FLN in France. Later the *Parisien Libéré-Carrefour* combination gave aid and comfort to treachery by identifying the Secret Army leaders with the wartime Resistance.

The Algiers press behaved even worse. During the 1961 putsch, for example, *L'Echo d'Alger* told its readers that "censorship is suppressed in Algeria, and in consequence they may have confidence in our news." Like other Algiers papers it did not even mention de Gaulle's address to the nation, or the token general strike against the putsch on the mainland, or the visit of de Gaulle's emissaries to Algeria, M. Joxe and the new C-in-C Algeria—it did not even disclose that there was a new C-inC. The news columns were filled with references to "the liberation of patriots" (*i.e.,* activists accused of murder) and phrases like "We joyfully learned late today of the rallying of Oranie and the Constantinois to General Challe"—a statement as inaccurate as it was biassed. *L'Echo d'Alger* year after year employed such practices as suppression or burial of important unwelcome news; sustained alarmism; highly colored and selective reporting and determined exploitation of layout technique to promote editorial policy. These failings are found in committed papers everywhere, but they obviously become particularly grave when combined with a near monopoly in the ill-informed and unstable atmosphere of a city like Algiers.[40]

VI

This survey of government-press relations seems therefore to lead to a dilemma. On the one hand is the need for a free and unfettered press, which has been argued so often and so eloquently that it surely need not be re-stated here. Confronted by the policies pursued by French governments during the Algerian war the liberal's reaction would not be in doubt. For arbitrary procedures were employed against the press, often for trivial pretexts. Obscure journals with negligible circulations were zealously hounded while larger circulation papers with more skilful editors were doing far greater damage (from a governmental viewpoint) with impunity. It is doubtful whether these policies were finally justified by that most basic pragmatic criterion—success.

Yet when all the impeccable liberal sentiments such actions arouse have been uttered, a real problem remains. (That the problem, arising from misconceived policies, was largely of the régime's own making is beside the point.) Between 1954 and 1962 France was fighting a civil war and was threatened by extremism and subversion which found supporters in the press. This led to many instances of press behavior to which no government could be expected to remain indifferent. In criticizing the procedures adopted to meet this challenge, the liberal cannot avoid considering what restraints would be appropriate for such a situation.

Such a question plainly exceeds the bounds of this article, going as it does to the heart of the old dilemma about the balance between the indispensable freedom of the press and the need of the state in the last resort to defend itself. In some democratic societies the "civilized" solutions are thought to be self-restraint by the press, censorship or resort to the courts. But none of these would have been wholly satisfactory in the Algerian war. Self-restraint is inherently unlikely to operate generally in such a situation—and to the extent it did, the outcome, we have seen, was scarcely happy. The results censorship would have produced can readily be imagined: the censors' taboos would have suppressed far more than ever seizure did. Control of many abuses may normally be confided to the courts where there are enlightened press laws and independent, unprejudiced judges. But such a combination is rare at the best of times, while—despite the persistence with which the lawyers see the judiciary as a bulwark of freedom—the dangers of executive-minded justice during major crises cannot be discounted, certainly not in France.

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[40] The *Journal* was always the most reserved: the *Dépêche* the most enthusiastic. *Cf.* these headlines: ETAT DE SIEGE EN ALGERIE où l'armée a pris le pouvoir (*Journal*); L'ARMEE PREND LE POUVOIR POUR GARDER L'ALGERIE FRANÇAISE (*Dépêche.*) *Dernière Heure's forte* was false news.

Moreover, while the courts may be a risky refuge for the press, they do not necessarily solve the problems of the state. Algerian experience suggests that mass circulation papers, with skilful editing and technical control can be persistently subversive without actually violating sedition laws.[41] The slow processes of the law also provide no effective answer to the editor who publishes inflammatory reports, false news or even invitations of murder at moments of exceptional tension. Once the edition reaches the streets the damage is done, whatever the courts may subsequently do. For example, *L'Echo d'Alger* reported during the barricades insurrection that the Delegate-General and the C-in-C had pledged that the troops would not open fire on the insurgents. The psychological impact of publishing this pure invention need scarcely be emphasized; it became unthinkable that the troops should fire.

Against this background an alternative press policy for metropolitan France might have been: to ignore many abuses *de minimis;* to leave others to the courts, and to deal with a very tiny hard core by administrative seizures subject to judicial scrutiny and the right to damages.[42] The limitations of these suggestions are self-evident; one can have few illusions that they would have produced an ideal balance between freedom of the press and the security of the state; they might, however, have proved a lesser evil.

Even these suggestions may be considered too compromising to freedom to contemplate. But can one really burke, as so many libertarian bodies do (particularly those associated with the press itself), the issue of how to handle a press which is subversive or corrupt while remaining within the law? So many discussions rest either on the easy assumptions of a "responsible" press in a "stable" society, or rely on methods of control which may not be appropriate to modern mass-circulation newspapers. Yet in today's world many regimes are notoriously unstable, and there are newspapers with little conception of "responsibility." When the press is threatened, as French experience confirms, it must be defended wholeheartedly lest the contagion of repression spread: governments which are conceded an inch will take a yard. But once the crisis is over, as it seems to be in France, one may suggest that the ritual incantation of libertarian slogans is not enough. It is easy to make absolutist defenses of press freedom; the French example described here suggests that there is also a need for painful thought and debates about its legitimate limits.

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[41] Alain de Sérigny was tried for fomenting sedition in 1960. He was acquitted—rightly—for several reasons. The prosecution based its case on 185 articles from *L'Echo d'Alger*, mostly published in January 1960. No single article directly constituted *provocation*. The prosecution was reduced to reading article after article, expounding amateurishly the significance of headlines, type, page position and other make-up details. The attempt was clearly impossible; the success of such a prosecution would have had highly alarming implications for press freedom. FNPF rejected the notion that "guilty intent" might "appear independently of the text of an article, in the presentation or the size of headline," but its derision is unlikely to convince anyone acquainted with modern propaganda techniques or who has read the issues of *L'Echo d'Alger*. The trial is reported in *La Presse Française*, March 1961 and in Sérigny's *Un Procès* (Paris, Table Ronde, 1961).

[42] I propose no alternative for Algeria. Theoretically the response to the quasi-monopoly of the diehard press was tighter censorship, strict limitation of seizures of the mainland press and a competing government paper. But by the time governments were prepared to stand up to the diehards they could probably not have executed such a policy. Thus many military censors were notoriously sympathetic to the diehards, and Radio Alger was heavily infiltrated by activists throughout the war.

PATRONAGE IN NEW YORK STATE, 1955–1959

DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN
Department of Labor

AND

JAMES Q. WILSON
Harvard University

When Averell Harriman became Governor of New York on January 1, 1955, the Democrats assumed power in Albany for the first time in twelve years.[1] With Harriman came his newly appointed Secretary of State, Carmine G. De Sapio, leader of Tammany Hall, Democratic National Committeeman, and widely described as the architect of the Democratic resurgence. Harriman, however, had only barely won the election, and such unity as the party had achieved during the campaign was evanescent at best. The Democratic Party was very much alive, but its energies were woefully centripetal. The cleavages ranged from the most primitive thrusts of tribal warfare between Italians and Irish to the most elegant ideological concerns of middle- and upper-class liberal Protestants and Jews. The election had deepened some conflicts, raised others, and settled none. The ancient Irish hegemony was giving way before pressure from Italians within the regular party organization and reform liberals as yet outside it. The very ticket on which Harriman ran was symptomatic of the times—for the first time in decades it had no Irish Catholic running for a major executive office and, at the same time, a magic name in New York politics—Roosevelt—had been relegated to a subordinate place on the list after a bitter, clamorous effort by young liberals (who later were to be the backbone of a major reform assault on Tammany) to win the gubernatorial nomination for the son of the former President.[2]

Under any circumstances, the allocation of jobs by a new state administration is a matter of keen interest to party members; under these circumstances, however, patronage was of crucial importance. Not, of course, because Democratic voters or rank-and-file party workers were standing hungrily in line. In New York, as elsewhere, low-paying state jobs were no longer attractive to most voters or to many party workers; in any case, not very many such jobs were available at the state level. Rather, patronage was important because those selected for the top offices would set the tone for the entire administration and thus significantly affect its chances for success in both its legislative program and its bid for re-election, and because the awarding of jobs could possibly alter the distribution of power within the party, rewarding some party leaders favored by the administration and penalizing others.

From the outset, then, at least two goals were to be served by the allocation of jobs—staffing the government with competent and attractive administrators, and acquiring and consolidating power over the party apparatus. These goals were obviously not always compatible, particularly when there was a chronic shortage of men whose qualifications would make their appointment contribute to the attainment of the first of these ends.

In a sense, the first goal could be looked upon as voter-serving and the second as party-serving.[3] In those bygone days in which the mass of voters, at least in the big cities, had a personalistic and localistic view of politics, there may have been little conflict between these two goals. If the immigrant voter judged the party as a whole largely in terms of a local party leader who offered him friendship, service and favors in exchange for his vote, then more patronage for the party leader meant more opportunities for "buying" (with either tangible or intangible gratifications) the loyalty of the voter. Assuming that the local leader was rational and that he was usually threatened by intra-party competition, the greater his success in extracting influence and patronage from the party, the greater the largesse he could and would distribute to his constituents. As voters abandoned the immigrant political ethic, they began to judge the party in terms of issues, community-wide or state-wide programs, and the quality (honesty, efficiency, "glamour" and impartiality) of its elective officials.[4] The allocation of jobs that was voter-serving (*e.g.*, appointing "blue ribbon" officials and "expert" administrators) was often an allocation which was no longer party-serving as well. A job given to a blue-ribbon bureaucrat would often (though not always) be a job taken away from a county or district leader.

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[1] One of the authors of this article, Moynihan, served as an assistant to Governor Harriman throughout his administration. We wish to express our thanks to Professor Frank Munger of Syracuse University and to Mr. Judson James of the University of Illinois for their comments on an earlier draft.

[2] On changes in the Democratic party in New York with special reference to the rise of the "reformers," see James Q. Wilson, *The Amateur Democrat: Club Politics in Three Cities* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1962). It should be noted that Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., might have had the nomination for lieutenant governor in 1954 but he refused because that would have made him Harriman's running mate, and therefore automatically the recipient of exactly the same vote as Harriman (under New York law, the voter votes for governor and lieutenant governor as a team). This would have made it impossible for him to prove what he thought was his own strength at the polls. As it turned out, of course, he became the only statewide Democratic candidate to lose, defeated for attorney-general by Jacob Javits.

[3] On the functions of patronage, see James Q. Wilson, "The Economy of Patronage," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 69 (August, 1961), pp.

This study is an analysis of the efforts of one administration to discover and apply guidelines for patronage decisions which would optimize the attainment of two potentially conflicting goals. It can be argued that stating the problem in this way exaggerates the element of rationality in the process. In part this is deliberate: for purposes of analysis, we postulate two goals and seek to discover to what extent action was "rationally" directed at their attainment. If we can account for all the acts of the patronage-dispensers on the (perhaps false) assumption that they acted "as if" they intended to maximize certain goals, then no other "explanation" of their behavior is (we argue) necessary. But in part there are good grounds for asserting that to some extent a quest for rationality was *in fact* a motive for much that was done. From the personal involvement of one of the authors in the patronage process, we are left with little doubt that the principal participants deliberately sought to use patronage both to staff the government competently and to acquire and maintain control over the state party. Their efforts in this direction were perhaps even more deliberate than one might ordinarily expect because at least one key participant had a quasi-intellectual approach to the problem: by habit and style, he sought to systematize the process and to make it bureaucratically rational (*i.e.*, to settle specific cases by reference to general rules). This, of course, makes the New York case somewhat atypical. Furthermore, maintenance of the party organization in the face of competing claims for very scarce resources led the job dispensers to formulate general rules and to keep detailed records in order to defend their actions. Rationality (or what could plausibly be described as such) was not only intrinsically important (the dispensers wanted to maximize certain goals), it came to be extrinsically important as well (the dispensers wanted to be able to settle arguments and justify their discretionary acts by "objective," superficially non-arbitrary decision rules).

This study does not deal with all forms of patronage. Judicial patronage—particularly the selection of judges—was of great interest to the party; however, it was not handled by Governor Harriman's patronage aide, but by his Counsel. The patronage of the Attorney-General's office was no doubt substantial, but we have no direct knowledge of it. Finally, the awarding of contracts—particularly highway contracts—was potentially of enormous importance, but however political considerations may have influenced it, no records were kept.[5]

I. THE ORGANIZATION OF PATRONAGE

The allocation of patronage was a joint effort of public and party officials, among whom

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369–380; Frank J. Sorauf, "Patronage and Party," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 3 (May, 1959), pp. 115–126; and David W. McCoy, "Patronage in Suburbia," Ph.D. thesis in Political Science, University of Chicago (1963).

[4] On changes in the electorate related to differences in political ethos, see Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, *City Politics* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1963).

[5] The choice of New York State for a case study can be justified on substantive grounds: it is an important state and the Democratic party there was undergoing rapid and fundamental changes. Needless to say, however, the choice was dictated by the fact that the authors happened to have access to almost all the relevant records—a comparatively rare circumstance in the study of party politics—and also to the prior and probably equally rare fact of the existence of such records. The patronage staff of the Harriman administration was characterized by a high level of education and intellectual energy. These qualities, combined with a measure of self-awareness that often accompanies them, led to the establishment in the first days of the administration of detailed and sophisticated records of the patronage process.

the governor was preeminent. He almost always had the formal authority to appoint (or, where legislative confirmation was required, to nominate) and thus his agreement was essential. Governor Harriman did not, at least in the area of job patronage, abdicate his authority and thus he was something more than a "titular" head (although something less than an undisputed head) of the state Democratic party.

As liaison with the party organization, the governor assigned a lawyer, Milton D. Stewart, who was on the payroll of the office of the Governor's Counsel. He was a clearance point for administration officials dealing with the party and party leaders dealing with the administration. Although he had other duties as well, allocating patronage became his chief responsibility. As he told an interviewer,

> it is hard to believe how much *time* goes to patronage—more time on that than on any other single thing. And that was about as true for the governor as it was for me. It is simply nondelegable—for constitutional, legal, or political reasons.

The process of awarding a job began either with a candidate or a vacancy. It did not begin *de novo*, however, but rather on the basis of some hastily learned behavior. To a great extent the uncertainty which afflicts a new administration in handling patronage (or any other important matter) is reduced by trying to learn how the previous administration did it—in this case, the Republican administration of Govern Thomas E. Dewey. Harriman's staff thus inherited, willy-nilly, many of the procedures for handling patronage left to them by the Republicans. By and large, they found these procedures reasonable.

If the process began with a vacancy, the commissioner (*i.e.*, the cabinet-level department head) would first discuss the matter with Stewart. If the commissioner had some one in mind for the vacancy, if he were strong-willed and persuasive, and if he had a plausible candidate, he would often get his way, even against party pressures. Stewart was the "litmus paper": if the commissioner's arguments could stand up against Stewart's pressure on behalf of party regularity and the party nominee, the commissioner would usually prevail.

If the commissioner had no candidate, or had a poor one, or if the party was advancing a candidate for whom a place had to be found, Stewart would consult the party leaders. Each of New York's sixty-two counties had a county Democratic leader; to deal with all of them individually would have been difficult. More importantly, it would have been destructive of certain principles of hierarchy deeply cherished by party officials. Two key party leaders were selected for the handling of all patronage matters. For the five counties comprising New York City, Carmine De Sapio was the channel; for most of the fifty-seven counties outside New York City, State Chairman Michael Prendergast was the channel. This arrangement was modified by the right of each county leader to appeal a patronage decision directly to the governor and by the fact that the most powerful upstate leaders bypassed Prendergast and went to the Governor's office directly. Another modification was even more important: Prendergast was selected for the post of State Chairman by Harriman. He had little authority beyond what the other would grant him and thus was the junior partner within the party leadership. Stewart, on behalf of the governor, negotiated appointments with De Sapio and Prendergast who in turn negotiated with the county leaders—and often with many other souces of nominees.

De Sapio's special role in the process was only partly due to the fact that he was Democratic National Committeeman (after all, the governor—with some effort—could probably have replaced him in that job if he had wanted to); more important, it was the result of the fact that Harriman owed him his nomination, respected his judgment, and acknowledged the fact that among New York City Democratic leaders he was *primus inter pares*.

To get a job in the Harriman administration a man or woman had first of all to be capable of performing it. In the higher posts the standards of performance attained were considerable, an achievment made possible in part by the supply of political executives who had served in Washington under Presidents Roosevelt and Truman. A sustained effort was made, however, to extend these standards throughout the government. Thus letters regularly went out to Democratic county chairmen stating, *e.g.*, that such and such a member of the Board of Visitors of a local state hospital had been recorded absent in a number of recent meetings of the Board, and that this was not the understanding on which the appointment, albeit honorary and unpaid, had been made. Similarly it was made explicit with many who might think otherwise that a full forty-hour week was expected of all appointees. Unless he were a lawyer, the appointee had to give up outside jobs and—in cases of doubtful merit—he had to submit in advance a signed but undated letter of resignation.[6]

There was no strong tradition of corruption in New York State government, but it did exist. In general, the Harriman administration knew enough about the political process to know where the greatest dangers of corruption were to be encountered and what could best be done to prevent it. As an example, the State Liquor Authority was given particular attention. It had been corrupt under the preceding Repbulican administration and became corrupt again under the succeeding Republican administration.[7] With great care Harriman chose as Chairman of the Authority, not a "good government" type, but a Tammany judge who combined the highest ethical standards with a native understanding of the occasions of sin. Whatever the reason (and good luck was surely an important factor) the administration survived four years without scandal in the upper reaches of the S.L.A.—or elsewhere.

II. PATRONAGE AND SPONSORSHIP

Every patronage appointee has a "sponsor" who makes or approves the applicant's claim on the job and to whose account the job is "charged." Generally speaking, the Harriman administration made a determined effort to make the Democratic party the chief sponsor for patronage. There was little "anti-patronage" feeling evident among his aides; even among the young liberals, a strong sense of loyalty to the party prevailed.

TABLE I. PATRONAGE APPOINTMENTS IN NEW YORK STATE, 1955–1959, BY SPONSOR

Sponsor	Appointment	
	Number	Percent
Democratic Party		
Nominated	1,190	61.8
Cleared	214	12.1
Total Party	1,304	73.9
Personal, nonparty	281	15.9
Republican Party	81	4.6
Labor unions	55	3.1
Liberal Party	28	1.6
Other, miscellaneous	16	0.9
Total	1,765	100.0

By and large, the Democrats fared well. Table I shows the distribution of jobs by primary sponsor.[8] In some cases an applicant had more than one chief sponsor (for example, both the Democratic State Committee and the A.F. of L.) but in general the records of Harriman's patronage office list only one primary sponsor for each job dispensed. The table shows, not surprisingly, that the Democratic Party received the bulk of the jobs—nearly three-fourths of the total of 1,765. Personal, non-party appointments were the second largest group, amounting to nearly one-sixth of the total. All other sources accounted for scarcely more than one-tenth of all jobs. Among these other sources, however, there were some interesting relationships. Republicans accounted for more jobs than either organized labor or the Liberal Party, despite the fact that the latter two groups were, in general, strong supporters of Democratic party nominees (Governor Harriman polled 264,093 votes on the Liberal line). Liberal party jobholders were outnumbered by Republicans by almost three-to-one and by labor union jobholders by almost two-to-one.

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[6] The issue of Communism—a matter essentially of fitness—was of special concern to the patronage officials of the Harriman administration. As liberal Democrats in the McCarthy era, allied with a resurgent Tammany, they could expect to be, and were, harassed by the opposition on both counts. A standard requirement for any important appointment in the administration was a "Confidential Long Form Personnel Investigation" by the Bureau of Criminal Investigation of the New York State Police which would produce a full personal history of the applicant, and would normally turn up any hidden blemish on a record. At this time the subversive file of the State Police contained 500,000 names, and information in startling detail turned up on an astonishing number of prospective appointees. Most of this was at best tangential, some was absurd. (It was noted of a suburban housewife, for example, that her father had consistently voted for the American Labor Party, and of a Harriman cabinet officer that "files list a ***** ***** as mentioned in the Curriculum of the New School of Social Research.") The State Police however, made no effort to evaluate their data. It was simply turned over to the administration for the information of knowledgeable political executives. It does not appear that any serious involvement in subversive activities ever came to light, at least with regard to appointees of any status.

[7] See *New York Times*, December 2 and 3, 1962.

[8] This table, like all others in this article, has been computed from the records maintained by the patronage office under Governor Harriman. We wish to express our appreciation to Milton D. Stewart and Laura H. Davis for their invaluable help. The records are now part of the Harriman Papers Collection of the Syracuse University Library.

The dominance of the Democratic party in the patronage process is exaggerated by these figures, however. In many cases, party clearance by the local county leader was purely *pro forma.* Many appointees—often ex-federal administrators available as a result of the Eisenhower victory of 1952—were asked to obtain the approval of their Democratic county leader even though they had never before met him, had not lived in their home county for several years, and had done little or nothing for the party in their county. This "*post facto* clearance" was usually granted—if for no other reason than that the local leader had nobody else to recommend for the job who would meet the qualifications laid down by the administration in Albany—because he liked the idea of being "consulted" about seemingly important matters, and because he feared appearing powerless if the job went anyway to the man he refused to clear. The prospective appointee would, in the typical case, have to be an outspoken critic of the local leader in order to fail of clearance except in those cases where the leader had his own favorite whose candidacy he was actively pressing.

About one-sixth of all Democratic party jobs (214 out of the 1,304) were of this character. As Table I indicates, "party cleared" (as opposed to "party nominated") candidates accounted for about one-eighth (12.1 per cent) of all state jobs under Harriman. This means that appointees who were actually the *nominees* of Democratic party leaders were about three-fifths (61.8 per cent) of the total. The rather empty formality which often characterized "party clearances" was not without its consequences, however. Not only did it make it easier for Harriman's patronage office to "recognize" many county leaders who otherwise would have felt left out of the new administration, but it frequently placed young jobholders in contact with their local party leaders for the first time. A certain premium often attached to an appointee's ability to speak with an air of political sophistication of "my leader"; many young and able workers were first recruited into the party organization by this otherwise token clearance.

A further qualification is introduced into this picture of Democratic party strength when the dollar value of the jobs distributed among the various primary sponsors is indicated (see Table II). Although the Democratic party nominated or cleared between half and three-fourths of the appointees in each job category, the 1,304 jobs it was given were concentrated

TABLE II. PATRONAGE APPOINTMENTS IN NEW YORK STATE, 1955–1959, BY SPONSOR AND JOB VALUE

Sponsor	Salaried Posts				Honorific Posts		
	Agency Head, Department Head, Board Member, (Over $12,000)	$9,000 to $12,000 per year	$5,000 to $9,000 per year	Under $5,000 per year	Major	Minor	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Democratic Party (Nominated and Cleared)	12.1	5.9	19.6	12.7	14.1	35.5	100.0
Personal and Nonparty	15.1	4.6	14.9	2.5	30.6	32.4	100.0
Republican Party	9.9	0	1.2	2.5	44.4	42.0	100.0
Labor Unions	7.4	1.9	44.4	3.7	33.3	9.3	100.0
Liberal Party	31.0	10.3	13.8	0	31.0	13.8	100.0
Other, Miscellaneous	6.3	6.3	0	75.0	0	12.5	100.0
All Sponsors	12.6	5.3	18.5	10.7	18.9	34.0	100.0

Total number of appointments = 1765.

in the lower-paying and minor honorific categories. Nearly half of all party jobs either paid less than $5,000 each per year or were lesser honorary appointments which paid nothing. By contrast, Liberal party jobs were concentrated in the higher pay brackets. Nearly one-third of its total paid more than $12,000 a year and two-fifths paid over $9,000 a year; none of its jobs were in the lowest pay category and, of its honorific appointments, over twice as many were major as were minor. The distribution of jobs given to organized labor was similar to that the Democratic party, the heaviest concentration being in the $5,000-to-$9,000-a-year category. It had the smallest percentage of jobs in the highest pay bracket (7.4 per cent as compared to 12.1 per cent for the Democrats and 31.0 per cent for the Liberals) but, unlike the party, had its honorific appointments concentrated in the more prestigious posts.

This Table also indicates the reason for the surprisingly large number of Republicans in the Harriman administration. Of their 81 jobs, only eleven paid any salary. The vast majority —over 86 per cent—of all Republican jobs were honorific. These honorific posts were typically on various boards and commissions where, by law or custom, Republican representation was required or where the governor felt a Republican appointment would enhance his "voter-serving"—even nonpartisan—image. Thus, although the Liberal Party was outnumbered by both the Republicans and the unions in the ranks of the Harriman administration, its jobs were—in pay terms at least— the most desirable.

The personal, non-party appointments of the Governor were, generally speaking, either high-paying staff, cabinet, and subcabinet posts (15 per cent) or honorific posts (63 per cent). He made fewer low-paying appointments than any group except the Liberal Party.

Despite all these qualifications, however, the position of the Democratic party in the patronage process was still very strong. Although the distribution of Democratic jobs, to a greater extent than the jobs of other sponsoring organizations, was skewed in the direction of lower-paying and lesser honorific posts, the Party still nominated or cleared from 70 to almost 88 per cent of the appointees in every category except one (major honorific). From one point of view, this distribution was probably quite rational. Party patronage was greatest in the least visible jobs; among the more visible cabinet and major honorific posts, the party "gave away" a considerable number (nearly one-third of the cabinet posts and nearly one-half the major honorific appointments) to the personal appointees of Governor Harriman and to the Liberal and Republican parties. If we assume that personal and non-Democratic party appointments could as a group be more easily justified (regardless of the merits of individual appointees) as appointments based on "merit" and "nonpartisan qualifications," then such appointments could be looked upon as a measure of the extent to which the Democratic party was willing to meet "voter-serving" expectations at the price of "party-serving" expectations. Whether such sacrifices were subjectively experienced as "rational" by party leaders is, of course another matter. In all likelihood, all but the higest leaders most closely identified with the Harriman administration resented every job that went to a non-Democrat.

III. PATRONAGE, PARTY AND REGION

The question of organizational sponsorship was only one of the problems for the patronage dispensers. Another of comparable importance involved geographic distribution. Particularly within the Democratic party, but to some extent within other sponsoring organizations as well, the jobs had to be distributed around the state so as to satisfy all major regions. In its simplest form, the choice was between New York City and "upstate"—the latter referring broadly to any of the fifty-seven counties outside the five which comprise New York City. Upstate, of course, is far from being a homogeneous area. It includes several subregions: the four suburban counties near New York City, the upstate Democratic strongholds (such as Albany, Erie, and Monroe counties, which contain important industrial cities), and the heavily Republican rural and small-town counties which make up the largest part of the total.

Upstate versus Downstate. Table III shows the percentage of each sponsoring organization's jobs which were given to people from New York City, arranged by job category. In total the City is greatly under-represented. Although it produced 54.8 per cent of the Democratic vote in 1954, the City received only 32.5 per cent of the 1,765 jobs dispensed by the Harriman administration. The under-representation was even worse for appointees sponsored by the Democratic party. Even though the party structure in New York City dominates the statewide party (New York City Democrats control both the Democratic state convention and the Democratic delegation to the state legislature), it received only 27.1 per cent of the Party's jobs; nearly three-fourths of the Party's jobs went to Democrats living elsewhere in the state.

An examination of this regional distribution by job value indicates where the City's losses occurred. Table III shows for the Democratic party a consistently positive correlation between the value of the job and the probability that it would be awarded to a New York City resident: the higher the salary of the job (or the higher the prestige of the honorific appointment), the greater the percentage of those jobs which went to City Democrats. Candidates sponsored by one of the five county organizations in New York City got 58.2 per cent of all cabinet and subcabinet posts paying over $12,000 a year; similarly, they got 23.1 per cent of all major honorific appointments but only 13.6 per cent of the minor honorific posts. Yet though City Democrats lost out primarily in the competition for lesser jobs, even among the best paying posts they barely won a share comparable to their share of the Harriman vote. On the other hand, over half of Harriman's personal and nonparty appointments went to New York City; in the two highest-paid categories, the City got between two-thirds and three-fourths.

Almost all the Liberal party appointees were from the City, and with good reason: the party scarcely exists outside the metropolitan area. Republicans, by contrast, were almost entirely from upstate even though the City produced 30 per cent of the statewide Republican vote. To the extent that this distribution of Republican jobs was the result of calculation by the Harriman administration, it probably made good sense. Giving most of the Republican jobs to upstate counties where, in most cases, the Republican party was firmly entrenched anyway probably did less damage to the Democratic party organization (and more importantly, to Democratic party morale) than would have been done if the Republicans were appointed from New York City where they would have been both more visible to most Democratic workers and more likely to help strengthen a weak but potentially dangerous Republican organization.

One reason why New York City Democrats failed to obtain a proportional share of the lowest-paying jobs was that such jobs were, on the whole, less attractive to party workers in the City than to workers elsewhere. The lowest-paid jobs are often not located in or near New York City, but in the state capital (Albany) or in scattered locations through the state (on highway and other construction projects, for example). Few New Yorkers are likely to move to another part of the state to accept a patronage job worth less than $5,000 a year. In addi-

TABLE III. PERCENTAGE OF PATRONAGE APPOINTMENTS FROM NEW YORK CITY, BY SPONSOR AND JOB VALUE*

Sponsor	Salaried Posts				Honorific Posts		Total
	Agency Head, Dept. Head, Board Member (Over $12,000 per year)	$9,000 to $12,000 per year	$5,000 to $9,000 per year	Under $5,000 per year	Major	Minor	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Democratic Party (Nominated and Sponsored)	58.2	40.3	35.9	9.6	32.1	13.6	27.1
Personal and Nonparty	64.3	77.0	59.5	71.5	52.3	41.8	53.5
Republican Party	37.5	0	0	0	25.0	17.2	21.0
Labor Unions	60.0	100.0	16.7	100.0	50.0	40.0	93.1
Liberal Party	100.0	50.0	100.0	93.0	100.0	100.0	38.2
Other, Miscellaneous	0	100.0	0	9.1	0	100.0	60.0
All							32.5

* In each cell, the number represents the percentage of all jobs in that category which were given to New York City residents. The percentages thus do not add to 100, either across or down.

tion, better jobs are likely to be available from local patronage (jobs in the Democratic city administration or in the Democratic-controlled local judiciary).

Elsewhere in the state, however, the demand for such jobs was significant. The last old-fashioned political machine of any consequence in New York State was the O'Connell organization in Albany. In 1960 Albany had the highest ratio of municipal employees to inhabitants (16.3 per thousand population) and the lowest average monthly pay ($203 per city employee) of any city in the state. Enough people lived off non-merit municipal employment in Albany to support a flourishing and powerful political machine. To the members of such a machine, a job paying less than $5,000 a year was often quite attractive: furthermore, since they lived in the state capital, many of the jobs were within easy reach. As a result of these considerations, Albany county (which includes the city) received a disproportionately large share of all jobs, but particularly of low-paying ones.

There were other reasons for upstate dominance, particularly among low-paying jobs. Although the five New York City Democratic leaders—so long as they are united—can afford to ignore upstate Democratic leaders, they can never be certain they will be united. Indeed, Democratic leaders in the City fight among themselves almost as often as they fight the Republicans. Thus, each county leader from the City has an interest in developing and maintaining upstate allies. Furthermore, there are many areas in upstate New York where the Democrats have been out of power since the Civil War (they are still paying the price of the Copperhead opposition). In addition, they had been starved by twelve years of Republican domination in Albany. Harriman and De Sapio wanted to build up party strength in those areas (both had statewide and national ambitions which led them to act differently from county leaders); to this end, patronage was deliberately awarded upstate in order to recruit attractive candidates for local office, strengthen party organization, and undercut party leaders whose compromises with Republican power were deemed excessive.

Allocation Among Counties. To the Harriman administration, the problem of finding a way to distribute Democratic party jobs among the sixty-two county leaders was of great importance. How these jobs were distributed was crucially relevant to the distribution of power within the party, the prospects for party unity, the allegiance of party leaders (and their legislative representatives) to the Governor and his program, and the extent to which Carmine De Sapio would be able to maintain his position as *de facto* party leader.

Depending on the goal sought, several decision rules were possible. If the Harriman administration had wanted, for example, to reward the party faithful and punish the heretics, it could have decided to give jobs to those party leaders must important in winning the nomination for Harriman or (what was often the same thing) those likely to be most influential in insuring his renomination. If the administration sought to use patronage to maximize its vote, it might have given the most and the best jobs to county leaders whose organizations were most likely to be stimulated by patronage and whose Democratic voters were most likely to respond at the polls to the local activities of an energetic organization. Or, to take a third possibility, if the administration wanted to improve the prospects of its legislation, it might have given its jobs to county leaders whose assemblymen and state senators were most influential in the legislature—including, if need be, to Republicans.

Perhaps because it wanted to do all these things (and more) at once and thus could do none entirely, or perhaps because it did not know exactly which of these ends it most wanted to attain, the administration attempted to balance the many and conflicting claims of county leaders for a share of the patronage. As in many such cases, it is more important that the principle be plausible than that it be reasonable. Since both population and Democratic voting strength were very unequally dispersed throughout the state, jobs would be "fairly" distributed if they were allocated in accordance with each county's contribution to the statewide Democratic vote for governor in 1954. Stated another way, the chief concern of the patronage dispensers was not in "economizing" but in "equity." That is, they were less preoccupied with discovering the proper allocation of resources to maximize the attainment of some goal than with adjusting competing claims "fairly." In the words of one aide to the governor, the chief task in patronage allocation was to "equalize dissatisfaction" and "minimize the number of complaints." The elaborate statistical records (described below) were kept to prove to county leaders that the administration was being "fair" and (what was more important) to enable the county leaders to "prove" to their followers that they were getting all the jobs to which they were entitled. No county leader wishes to appear weak and ineffectual to his organization; the patronage records were useful "cover" to forestall challenges to his authority within the county.

Whatever was wrong with the allocation rule developed, it served the needs of organizational maintenance because it appeared to be nonarbitrary and susceptible to statistical precision.

Not all jobs could be handled in this way, in part because (as previously noted) not all counties had any use for the lowest paying jobs. Thus, the distributional rule was applied, for the most part, only to jobs paying $6,000 or more a year. Finally, and most importantly, *all* jobs—whether party jobs or not—were made subject to this geographic rule, in part because it often enabled the administration to make a virtue out of a necessity (if a job had to go a certain county anyway—perhaps to meet the residence requirement of a particular board or commission—then it was advantageous to "charge" that job to the local leader's quota).

Table IV is based on the allocation of *all* jobs, party and nonparty, paying over $6,000 a year, among the state's counties. Of the sixty-two counties (fifty-three upstate, five in New York City and four which were New York City suburbs), only ten received no jobs at all, and these were among the very lowest in Democratic votes. The rank-order coefficient of correlation (Kendall's *tau*, corrected for ties) between votes and jobs for all counties is +.818.

In general, as already noted, New York City was underrepresented; the suburban and upstate counties were overrepresented. Overall, this under-representation was not great and could perhaps be explained by random factors. Within New York City, however, the disparity was much greater. Manhattan (*i.e.*, New York County) had far more than its share of jobs; Brooklyn and the Bronx had far less. These relationships can be conveniently expressed by dividing each county's percentage of all jobs by its percentage of Democratic votes in 1954. The resulting ratios, if less than 1.0, indicate the extent to which the county was underrepresented; if greater than 1.0, the extent to which it was overrepresented:

Manhattan	1.44
Staten Island	0.92
Queens	0.85
Brooklyn	0.68
Bronx	0.55

The two New York City counties which were (and are) the most heavily Democratic and which had the strongest Democratic party organizations—Brooklyn and the Bronx—received the least return in terms of patronage jobs. One reason for this may be that Carmine De Sapio, the *de facto* party leader in the state under Governor Harriman, was also, of course, the leader of the Manhattan Democratic party organization (*i.e.*, Tammany Hall); he might be expected to favor appointees from his own county. Of equal or greater importance, however, was that Manhattan undoubtedly harbors a disproportionate share of the wealth, talent and prestige in New York City. One would expect Manhattan to be heavily overrepresented among personal, nonparty appointments where talent or prestige is the chief consideration (although we have no direct evidence, this seems to be the case); what is interesting is the extent to which, even among *party* appointments, the need to meet voter-serving expectations resulted in costs being imposed on certain strong party organizations.

One cannot, of course, assume that Manhattanites were any more likely to be "qualified" in any technical sense than, say Brooklynites. Indeed, if by "qualified" one means prior knowledge of and experience in state administration, practically no appointee was "qualified" (only *one* cabinet member, the Commissioner of Correction, had had any previous experience in state government). "Qualified" in fact meant something broader and vaguer than experience—it meant professional stature, a reputation for probity, success in business or other levels of government, a "clean" record, and the like. People with these attributes are, it is reasonable to believe, somewhat more concentrated in Manhattan than Brooklyn.

We have no detailed information on how jobs were allocated *within* the various counties except that the Democratic party county leaders did not hesitate to take care of themselves. By the end of the Harriman administration, one-third of all county leaders were on the state payroll in one form or another.

Almost all the 1,304 party-sponsored appointments we have discussed so far were "exempt" jobs, free of civil-service restrictions and therefore legally available to the party, or "non-competitive" jobs for which examinations are not feasible. Exempt jobs, mostly to be found at the policy-making level, were only a tiny fraction—about 1 per cent—of all state jobs. Two other classes of jobs were more numerous but, in many ways, less valuable: laborers and the regular competitive civil service.

Most of the laborer jobs were in the Department of Public Works (DPW) which had (in June, 1958) 3,083 fulltime laborers. As much as possible, these were given to Democrats through regular party channels. This was a limited possibility, however, for the jobs simply were not in great demand—they were not sinecures, the pay was low, and they were often inconveniently located. As a result, Republicans were not laid off wholesale. For example, in 1956, two years after the Harriman election, fifty-six laborers were employed in the Binghamton area by the DPW, of whom fewer than half (twenty-three) were Democrats; of the remainder, eleven were avowed Republicans and twenty-two were not enrolled in any party.[9]

TABLE IV. COUNTIES OF NEW YORK STATE, SHOWING PERCENTAGE OF 1954 DEMOCRATIC VOTE FOR GOVERNOR AND PERCENTAGE OF ALL PATRONAGE JOBS PAYING OVER $6,000 PER YEAR

County and Region	Percentage of Democratic Vote	Percentage of Jobs Over $6,000 (N = 556)
New York City:	*54.84*	*47.53*
Kings (Brooklyn)	18.79	12.83
New York (Manhattan)	12.70	18.30
Bronx	11.57	6.41
Queens	10.65	9.05
Richmond (Staten Island)	1.13	0.94
Suburbs of New York City:	*11.24*	*13.01*
Nassau	5.28	5.28
Rockland	0.55	1.32
Suffolk	1.66	1.13
Westchester	3.75	5.28
Upstate:	*33.63*	*39.27*
Albany	3.32	6.60
Allegany	0.14	0.00
Broome	0.79	1.13
Cattaraugus	0.38	0.38
Cayuga	0.44	0.18
Chanango	0.13	0.38
Chatauqua	0.71	0.00
Chemung	0.49	0.38
Clinton	0.31	0.56
Columbia	0.26	0.56
Cortland	0.13	0.75
Delaware	0.18	0.18
Dutchess	0.69	0.94
Erie	6.40	5.09
Essex	0.15	0.00
Franklin	0.20	0.56
Fulton	0.28	0.18
Greene	0.20	0.18
Genesee	0.23	0.38
Hamilton	0.02	0.00
Herkimer	0.38	0.38
Jefferson	0.37	0.00
Lewis	0.10	0.00
Livingston	0.22	0.18
Madison	0.19	0.38
Monroe	3.87	3.39
Montgomery	0.47	0.38
Niagara	1.07	0.75
Oneida	1.62	1.88
Onondaga	2.14	1.83
Ontario	0.28	0.00
Orange	0.78	0.94
Orleans	0.13	0.00
Oswego	0.39	0.56
Otsego	0.26	0.18
Putnam	0.18	0.38
Rensselear	1.10	2.64
St. Lawrence	0.44	0.38
Saratoga	0.46	0.75
Schenectady	0.97	1.13
Schoharie	0.15	0.18
Schuyler	0.06	0.18
Seneca	0.15	0.00
Steuben	0.38	0.18
Sullivan	0.34	0.18
Tioga	0.11	0.38
Tompkins	0.19	0.56
Ulster	0.57	0.56
Warren	0.18	0.18
Washington	0.22	0.75
Wayne	0.22	0.00
Wyoming	0.14	0.18
Yates	0.05	0.38
Total	99.71	99.81

Note: This table does not correspond precisely to Tables I, II, III. The Harriman records were kept in such a way that, for calculating mode of sponsorship, ethnicity, religion, and other factors, the dividing line between low-paying and better-paying jobs was at $5000. In this table, the dividing line was $6000. No significant error is introduced by this discrepancy. For example, New York City had 44 per cent of all jobs over $5000, but 47.5 per cent of all jobs over $6000: *the lower the cutting point, the greater the difference between jobs and votes.* In this table, the higher cutting point has been used. (Totals do not add to 100.0 because of rounding.)

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[9] This is similar to the findings of Sorauf who interviewed highway workers in rural Pennsylvania after a change of administration. See Frank J. Sorauf, "State Patronage in a Rural County," this REVIEW, Vol. 50 (December, 1956), pp. 1046–1056.

In the competitive civil service were found the great majority of state jobs. Here administration policy was complicated. In general, the rule was to favor Democrats in every way possible in those departments in which favoritism had "traditionally" been shown by the party in power and where it could be done without violating any explicit regulations or impairing the competence of the service. Many familiar techniques were employed to this end: Democrats were favored with "temporary" appointments (where no examinations are required), with provisional appointments (where no eligible list exists and examination is eventually required), and with the discretion permitted by the "rule of three." This last rule permits supervisors to select from the top three eligible applicants on the civil service list; where possible, an effort was made to select Democrats.[10]

In all this, the Civil Service Commission and its staff were willing participants, so long as no great violence was done to the general principle of "fitness." Nine departments were subject to this kind of political interference, the most important of which were Public Works, Taxation and Finance, Correction, and Conservation. The others were Agriculture and Markets, Labor, State, the Division of Veterans' Affairs, and the Rent Control Commission. Other departments were emphatically not subjected to such intervention, including Education, Health, Social Welfare, Mental Hygiene, and the State Police, even though the administration was often under considerable pressure from party leaders to relax these restrictions.

The reason for sacrificing party interests in some departments and not in others was complex. Generally speaking, party intrusion into a department is most likely to cause an adverse popular reaction when the department is the province of a well organized profession which is able and willing to resist intrusion publicly on the ground that it violates "professional standards." Educators, doctors, psychiatrists, social workers, and public health officers effectively control their departments and these departments, in turn, are perceived by voters as being agencies in which "neutral competence" and "expertise" ought to prevail. The Harriman administration could (and did) justify to party leaders its decision to respect these expectations on the grounds that "this is what the Republicans did." In one sense, the struggle between the professions and the party for control over (or influence in) certain departments was resolved by the administration in favor of the professions and justified to the party on grounds of party competition—to intrude where the Republicans had not intruded would create an "issue."

IV. PATRONAGE AND "RECOGNITION"

"Recognizing" certain groups in the community by appointing some of their members to office has long been thought to be a principal function of patronage. Such recognition supposedly binds members of various racial, religious and nationality groups more closely to the party, or wins them away from a rival party by conferring on them the symbolic and vicarious satisfaction of seeing "one of their own" given prestige, power, and income. It is at the very least debatable how relevant today such "recognition" is to the groups of voters who are supposed to be benefitted. It seems to us quite likely that the principle of racial and religious balance was more important to the Harriman administration than it was to the electorate; some few votes may be changed, or some loyalties reinforced, by "recognition," but—in the absence of any evidence one way or the other—we assert they are few indeed.[11]

This raises the question of why the Harriman administration acted as if such recognition was important. That it did so act is beyond question—great efforts were extended to "recognize" certain groups and careful records were kept of the racial and religious identity of the appointees. To a great extent, of course, claims for nationality recognition advanced by party leaders are simply cover for their own claims. When an Italian county leader, for example, complains that a recent appointment should have gone to an Italian, what he often means is that it should have gone to him or his organization. Some nationality groups demand jobs directly (the Poles were a conspicuous example during the Harriman administration); more typically, such claims are made on behalf of nationality groups by politicians who may or may not have any real commitments to the principle of ethnic recognition.

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[10] It should be noted that the "political pressures" and requests for "special favors" with which the administration had to deal often came, not *from* politicians, but from career civil servants *via* politicians. Many a state prison warden in the frozen north became a Democrat on January 1, 1955, and promptly looked up "his" Democratic county chairman to ask a favor. Unaccustomed as many of the chairmen were to being looked up about anything, they generally tried their best to behave the way politicians are expected to behave and pass the request along as their own.

[11] On this compare Duane Lockard, *New England State Politics* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1959), ch. xi.

Despite their use as "cover," ethnic claims were often taken seriously by the patronage dispensers for several reasons. First, county and assembly district leaders were themselves faced with struggles for power which in turn were motivated by (or masked as) claims for ethnic recognition. Italian or Negro insurgents challenging an Irish district leader created a problem which the Irish leader would often attempt to deal with by asking for a job for the Italian or Negro insurgent (or one of his backers) to "keep them happy."

Second, certain groups least assimilated politically (notably the Negroes and the Poles) made organized demands on politicians for symbolic recognition. When a Negro or Pole was appointed, there was no doubt in anyone's mind that it was *because* he was a Negro or Pole (albeit hopefully an able one) that he got the job.[12] By contrast, Jews are least likely to claim jobs for persons *qua* Jews; indeed, Jewish liberals in the Democratic party often are at pains to make clear their belief in the impropriety or even immorality of ethnic recognition as a basis for personnel decisions. Between these two extremes, claims for jobs for Irish and Italian candidates were most likely to come from politicians, not from ethnic organizations, and to be "cover" for their own interests.

Third, ethnic claims are a kind of political shorthand use to convey a sense of general political identity even when ethnicity is not the most important component of that identity. When a post in the field of mental health is to be filled by a brilliant, politically liberal, Vienna-trained psychoanalyst from Manhattan, it is inconceivable that the candidate would turn out to be anything but a Jew. Thus, when professional politicians—for whose vocabularies ethnic labels are extremely important—say that the job must go "to the Jews," they often mean not to a Jew *qua* Jew but to a person with "Jewish" professional, intellectual, residential and ideological attributes. Similarly, filling a prison warden's job with an experienced man means, almost invariably, filling it with an Irish Catholic conservative because men experienced in law enforcement and prison work are largely of that sort; as a result, politicians tend to regard such posts as "belonging" to the Irish.

Finally, ethnic and religious recognition was of great importance, not so much because of the maintenance needs of the party or of ethnic pressure groups, but because of the maintenance needs of agencies of the state government. Each of the various departments, boards, and commissions which are responsible for substantive policy areas is obliged to appear legitimate in the eyes of the special constituency which it serves. To forestall organized opposition, to anticipate possible vetoes, and to win consent for its policies, almost every agency organizes itself in such a way as to co-opt at least one representative of every significant group likely to be affected by its policies. A kind of syndicalism comes to envelop virtually all these agencies, and once established, it becomes sanctified by tradition. In this "agency syndicalism" three categories of interest are typically represented: regional, occupational, and ethnic.

Ethnicity and occupation became critically important considerations to Harriman's patronage dispensers, in our view, as much because of agency syndicalism as because of party pressure. Several examples could be offered. For instance, the Department of Social Welfare sent a letter to the patronage office two weeks after Harriman took office in which it described in the frankest terms the "qualifications" (*i.e.*, the occupational and ethnic identities) which should govern any appointments to the fifteen-member State Board of Social Welfare:

> There are longstanding traditions as to the composition of the membership of the Board. For instance, the members are divided religiously as follows: 7 Protestants, 5 Catholics, 3 Jews. There is always one Negro member of the Board. It is customary to have 10 men and five women on the Board. There has been a longstanding custom of having two doctors on the Board; presently one of these is a psychoanalyst. . . . It has been the

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[12] A vivid example of clear ethnic demands for recognition by Negroes came during the Rockefeller administration. An NAACP leader in New York charged that there were only twelve Negroes among the 671 policy-level officials in the state government. Further, "Negroes . . . spend twice as much [as whites] per capita in purchasing alcohol. Yet no Governor from the inception of the State Liquor Authority thirty years ago has found it politically expedient to name a Negro as a full commissioner of the board." (Quoted in *New York Herald Tribune*, June, 26 1963.) Although 60 per cent of the boxers in Madison Square Garden are Negroes and Puerto Ricans, the governor "has never found it important enough to appoint a black man as a full commissioner." (Quoted in *New York Times*, June 26, 1963.)

custom for Governors to reappoint members to enable them to serve the full extent of their 10-year legal period.

Accordingly, Harriman decided to retain as chairman of the Welfare Board a Buffalo Protestant Republican whom Govern Dewey had appointed a few weeks earlier. With regard to the three vacancies on the Board (one of which had been filled with a recess appointment by Dewey), Harriman deferred to the organization constituencies of the Board. Two vacancies "belonged" to Catholics. Almost immediately after the inauguration, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Albany, in his capacity as Chairman of the New York State Catholic Welfare Committee, recommended to Harriman that the two Catholic vacancies be filled with a Catholic woman from Albany and a Catholic grain merchant from Buffalo. (The latter had the additional, perhaps not coincidental, attraction of being the son-in-law of a former Democratic county chairman of Erie County.) The proposals of the Bishop and his Committee were quickly accepted.

The third vacancy caused considerable difficulty and was not filled for a year. One woman from upstate was proposed by the Democratic State Committee and endorsed by the Business and Professional Women's Clubs of New York. The Commissioner (the professional director) of the Department of Social Welfare objected on the ground that the vacancy should go to a male Protestant; the candidate was a female Catholic. Further inquiry showed that, although indisputably female, the candidate was not quite a Catholic: she was married to an Italian Catholic, but was herself a Protestant. She was shunted aside (the following year she was made a member of the Mental Hygiene Council) in favor of an upstate male Protestant lawyer who was nominated by his Democratic county chairman.

Competing ethnic claims, like others, had to be balanced. These claims were seen primarily in terms of five categories, which, in rough order of preference, were Irish, Protestant, Jews, Italians, and Negroes. Table V shows the number and percentage of all jobs awarded to each of the five groups. It should be noted that the largest single group consists of people who either were not identified by ethnicity or were members of very small groups—*e.g.*, Puerto Ricans, Hungarians, Greeks, etc.

This Table is obviously based on a combination of racial, nationality, and religious identifications; in this it reflects the perceptions of the politicians themselves. Each category might be thought of as consisting of a dominant and a recessive trait—although everyone had both a nationality (or racial) and a religious identity, one or the other was perceived as the dominant one. Thus, Irish always meant Catholic as well, the Protestants from Ireland having for the most part ceased to think of themselves as Irish in view of the, to them, more fundamental distinction of religion. Protestant usually meant English or Scottish, although Scandinavians and Protestant Irish might also be given this label. For Jews, the distinction is religious and cultural; nationality differences tended to be overlooked by the party leaders (although perhaps of great importance to the Jews themselves). German Jews and East European Jews are generally treated as one category for patronage purposes. Italians are identified by nationality, not by religion; as a result, many prominent Italian politicians (such as Judge Ferdinand Pecora, whom De Sapio backed for Mayor in 1949, and Charles Poletti, who was once Lieutenant Governor and briefly Governor) are in fact Protestants. Negroes of course are identified by race, although in New York City at that time a certain preference could be discerned for Negro Catholics (*e.g.*, Hulan Jack, formerly Borough President of Manhattan).

As one would expect, the largest single ethnic group in patronage offices was the Irish; as one might not expect, however, their dominance was far less than is often supposed. They held less than a quarter of all jobs, and nearly four-fifths (78.2 per cent) of those went to upstate Irish. The New York City Irish were outnumbered two-to-one by the Jews and pressed hard by the Italians, despite the fact that during most of this time four of the five Democratic county leaders from New York

TABLE V. PATRONAGE APPOINTMENTS IN NEW YORK STATE, 1955–1959, BY ETHNICITY AND RELIGION OF RECIPIENT

Ethnicity or Religion	Appointments	
	Number	Per Cent
Irish	415	23.5
Protestants	313	17.7
Jews	284	16.1
Italians	107	6.1
Negroes	41	2.3
Miscellaneous and unclassified	605	34.3
Total	1,765	100.0

TABLE VI. PATRONAGE APPOINTMENTS IN NEW YORK STATE, 1955–1959, BY ETHNICITY AND JOB VALUE (MISCELLANEOUS AND UNCLASSIFIED OMITTED)

	Salaried Posts				Honorific Posts		
Ethnicity	Agency Head, Dept. Head, Board Member (Over $12,000 per year)	$9,000 to $12,000 per year	$5,000 to $9,000 per year	Under $5,000 per year	Major	Minor	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Irish	14.5	5.8	21.9	16.4	13.0	28.4	100.0
Protestants	12.9	4.3	12.9	9.8	18.8	41.2	100.0
Jews	18.3	9.9	22.9	6.7	20.1	22.2	100.0
Italians	21.5	8.4	34.6	13.1	6.5	15.9	100.0
Negroes	12.2	4.9	41.5	7.3	19.5	14.6	100.0

City and the Democratic minority leaders in both houses of the state legislature were Irish. None of the really important political figures in the administration was Irish (none, certainly, who had the influence of Paul Appleby, the Director of the Budget); a few able commissioners were Irish, but these tended to be men like Edward T. Dickinson, who was a Yale man and part Italian anyway. As one chief Harriman aide, himself an Irishman, phrased it, "the Irish appointees tended to be nice fellows, but neither hungry nor energetic, living rather too much on a reputation other men had won for their breed." The ablest Irish had gone on to other things.[13]

The Italian applicants were not lacking in energy but they were often deficient in experience. Italians were above all cohesive, often without regard to party lines, and they had in Carmine De Sapio a kinsman whose rise in the party had been in great part due to his support among Italian district leaders. But not only did their lack of experience in government reduce their numbers in the administration, they were also probably hindered by their own leader. De Sapio was assured of Italian support anyway; he had to use his scarce resources to buy support elsewhere (chiefly, it appears, among the Jews), and in any case, he had no wish to encourage competitors for dominance in the Italian community.

Table VI summarizes the ethnic composition of the patronage appointments by kind of job and job value. It suggests the standing of the various groups in the party (and perhaps in society). The Italians and Negroes were much more heavily concentrated in the lower-paying jobs (under $9,000 per year)—nearly half the jobs for these two groups were in that category. By contrast, only about a fourth of the Jewish and Protestant jobs were in that bracket. The Protestants particularly were concentrated in the honorific jobs (60 per cent of their appointments paid prestige but no money); only 22.4 per cent of the Italian and 34.1 per cent of the Negro jobs were of this kind. In part the Protestant (and by that we mean, of course, white Anglo-Saxon Protestant) concentration in honorific jobs reflects the fact that such people are more likely to be Republicans; and Republicans, for reasons already mentioned, were given a disproportionate share of these posts. We suggest that it is also due to the fact that Protestants are perceived as more likely than Italians or Negroes to confer legitimacy, in the eyes of the community, on the board or commission.

One interesting case is that of the Germans, who in these tables are classified under 'miscellaneous," not because their numbers were small (there were 94 "German" appointments, more than twice the number of Negroes) but because they were not perceived by the politicians as a relevant category. There were no "German" politicians in evidence during the Harriman administration and no "German" demands were made either from within the party or by outside groups. An indication of this lack of political identity is the fact that the official patronage records listed only sixteen Germans when in fact our independent count shows ninety-four of probable German extraction. Much has been written about how ethnic groups *acquire* a sense of political identity; little, if anything, has been said about why a group, such as the German-Americans, either fails to acquire such an identity or, if it is acquired, then loses it. Undoubtedly, the explanation would involve a consideration of the relatively early period of German migration to this country, their very rapid socioeconomic progress, their religious heterogeneity, and the enormous and divisive impact of two world wars.

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[13] On the Irish in New York politics, see Moynihan, "The Irish," in Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot* (Cambridge, M.I.T. Press, 1963).

V. PATRONAGE AND POWER

Patronage has many functions—indeed, it was precisely the great number of such functions that led the Harriman administration, inevitably, to attempt to serve many and often conflicting goals in the allocation of jobs. One function—that of using patronage to win votes from voters—which might be appropriate to a big-city political machine was obviously irrelevant here. There were simply too few jobs and too many voters, most of whom were not interested in working on, say, a state highway project. Another function—that of supporting rank-and-file party workers—was relevant, but not directly to the Harriman administration. Supporting workers who would ring doorbells was a job for county and district leaders; to Harriman's staff, the problem was not to "spend" patronage in a way that would maximize the vote such paid workers would produce, but to spend it in a way that would (in part) satisfy party leaders, most of whom had no organization and no workers to speak of. One important function remains: that of assembling power, within the government and within the party.[14]

Whatever else he may have wanted, Governor Harriman surely desired to have enough power over the state government to have a reasonable chance of putting into effect the policies he favored and of making certain that the routine business of government was carried on with reasonable efficiency and honesty. Patronage was one means of attaining these objectives, but a limited means. Many important programs were in the hands of boards and commissions and, although Harriman might have been able to wield considerable influence over many of them if he had been willing to accept the costs, the costs were high. Most boards had well organized constituencies and clientele groups which saw the boards as in fact if not in law agencies independent of the governor. The professional staffs of these boards usually concurred in this view. *De facto* independence was protected by informal but rigid representational formulas—"agency syndicalism"—which could only be violated at great risk of organized opposition to the administration from prestigious groups who would have a convenient anathema, "political meddling," to pronounce on Harriman's efforts. Patronage under such circumstances had only a very limited utility as a means of assembling power.

Despite these limitations, Harriman and the party leaders intended to use patronage (as well as other means) to assert control over the statewide party and to a certain degree they succeeded. By the judicious clearing of appointments through one leader rather than his rival, the men in Albany were able to influence the choice of local candidates for elective office. In several upstate cities, men now prominent in state politics were given important nominations because the Harriman administration used its patronage power to eliminate or mollify local leadership objections to these nominations. In a curious way, these patronage appointments were important as much for their symbolic as for their practical value: a bypassed leader not only loses control over the income of a particular person, he also (and perhaps more importantly) loses legitimacy in the eyes of his followers.

Harriman used patronage in this way because he wanted attractive, vigorous candidates on the ticket with him when he ran for reelection; De Sapio supported him because he wanted to consolidate his influence with county and district leaders. Two things prevented these two men from retaining control of the party: certain claimants for a share in the party's leadership could not be dealt with by patronage, and at a crucial moment the two leaders could not agree between themselves.

Harriman's election in 1954, like Mayor Robert Wagner's in 1953, was the product of a complicated alliance among the Democratic county leaders of New York City (of whom De Sapio was only one), the Liberal party, certain trade unions, and a wide variety of liberals and "reformers," most of whom were only beginning to organize. Once in office, the regular Democratic party organization was unrepresentative of this electoral coalition. The county leaders throughout the state were still for the most part the heirs of Al Smith; there was little in common between these men and the other, newer elements in the alliance. Although Harriman and De Sapio worked together, they represented these contrasting elements (however little either may have wished it!). This latent tension was revealed by the composition of the administration. The personal staff and chief aides of the governor were, to a considerable extent, young men who were Harriman's personal, nonparty appointees—party cleared rather than party nominated. Ethnically, they were Protestant and Jewish; ideologically, they were of the liberal left.[15] The cabinet, by contrast, consisted largely of men who were party nominated, who were Catholic or Jewish, and who were ideologically either neutral or conservative.[16] The cleavage in both political style and political goals was considerable (*e.g.*, the insistence of the Insurance Commissioner—a cabinet level party nominee—that insurance license applicants have a security clearance was utterly incomprehensible to the liberals on the Governor's staff). Many of the heads of line departments and bureaus, as a result, did not always attach overriding importance to the necessity of working with the Governor—much less with his staff. Given both their background and their sponsorship, such men found themselves more comfortable working with the legislature and were easily distracted by matters of importance to the locality from which they came. The governor's staff, in turn, often failed to appreciate the importance of such matters.

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[14] On the problem of assembling power, particularly in city governments, see Banfield and Wilson, *op. cit.*

This dichotomy persisted and grew more serious as the activity of the newer, nontraditional elements within the alliance increased. These newer elements—particularly New York City liberals who were beginning to organize reform clubs in the Manhattan assembly districts—could not be dealt with effectively by patronage even if the party leaders had been so inclined. (Certain reform leaders might have welcomed the jobs and assumed the constraints that accompanied them, but in most cases their followers in the reform clubs would have regarded such behavior as an intolerable "sellout.")

The crisis in the Democratic party might have been postponed (in the long run, it could not have been avoided) had Harriman and De Sapio acted in concert. But at the disastrous 1958 state convention in Buffalo, the alliance collapsed. After Mayor Wagner refused to run, the regular leaders favored as the Democratic nominee for United States Senator the esteemed District Attorney of New York County (Manhattan), in part to get an Irish Catholic back on the statewide ticket (there had been none in 1954) and in part to repudiate what they regarded as the presumptuous claims of the Jewish and Protestant reform groups in New York City. Harriman, seeking to have on the ticket with him a candidate of national stature, and recognizing the pivotal power of the new groups, backed Thomas Finletter, a Protestant reform leader.

In the convention balloting that followed, the regular party leaders—the beneficiaries of Harriman administration patronage—easily overwhelmed the governor in the convention voting. Whereupon the Democratic ticket was just as easily overwhelmed at the polls. Patronage has increased the cohesion of the regular party, but that party did not yet contain all the elements of the electoral alliance on which it depended for victory.

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[15] Of Harriman's original seven principal staff aides, five were Protestant, two Jewish. None was Catholic and only one was a regular party man.

[16] Of Harriman's original fourteen department heads, seven were Catholic, five Jewish, and only two Protestants, including one holdover from the previous Republican administration. Five of the Catholics, three of the Jews, and one of the Protestants—nine out of the fourteen total—were also party regulars.

MEASURING MALAPPORTIONMENT*

GLENDON SCHUBERT AND CHARLES PRESS
Michigan State University

In addition to the legal and political implications of the case, the United States Supreme Court's decision in *Baker* v. *Carr*[1] brought sharply into public focus the technical problem of how to measure legislative malapportionment. The case itself exemplifies these various dimensions of the issue, for the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Clark and the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan disagree not only regarding the law and the public policy of judicial intervention; they are also in manifest disagreement concerning "the facts" of malapportionment in Tennessee as of the time of the decision in March 1962. Our survey of the scholarly literature on the subject of apportionment, during the past decade, convinces us that the contributions of political scientists (and other commentators on the question) have made less than satisfactory progress thus far in the direction of devising an adequate metric to assist in the evaluation of what all concede is today a major problem in the theory and practice of democratic politics. In the absence of a reliable and valid method for measuring differences in apportionment along a common dimension, it is difficult to see how rational consideration of the normative aspects of the issue may be possible.

We are quite aware that the normative dispute hinges upon the question which factors *other than* population ought to be deemed relevant, and how much weight should be assigned to each of them. There appears, however, to be no substantial support for the proposition that population should not be considered a relevant factor in at least one house of all of the fifty state legislatures and of the Congress. Population is, therefore, the most common factor, and it cannot be ignored in either normative or empirical consideration of the apportionment of either the federal or the state legislatures. We propose, therefore, to confine our discussion to the measurement of apportionment in terms of this common factor; and the results should be of interest equally to those liberals who take their stand on the principle of "One Man—One Vote"[2] and those conservatives who favor the *status quo* and the representation of geography in addition to—or to some extent in lieu of—people.[3]

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In order to make our data available to other scholars, a set of our data, which include (as of March 26, 1962) population and representation totals for all legislative districts of both houses of the American national and fifty state legislatures, has been deposited with the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, P. O. Box 1248, Ann Arbor, Michigan 41806.

[1] 369 U. S. 186 (March 26, 1962). For a summary of measures developed prior to this decision see extension of remarks of Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois, *Congressional Record*, Vol. 102, Part 4, 84th Cong., 2d sess., March 26, 1956, pp. 5536–48. For a similar discussion subsequent to the decision, see Arthur L. Goldberg, "The Statistics of Malapportionment," pp. 90–106 in "The Problem of Malapportionment: A Symposium on Baker *v.* Carr," *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 72 (November, 1962). For an excellent article which focuses upon the normative question how simultaneously to maximize the three criteria (population equality, compactness, and contiguity) in order to produce optimally fair reapportionment, see James B. Weaver and Sidney W. Hess, "A Procedure for Nonpartisan Districting: Development of Computer Techniques," *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 73 (December, 1963), pp. 288–308.

[2] Conference of Research Scholars and Political Scientists, *One Man—One Vote* (New York, Twentieth Century Fund, 1962).

[3] Alfred de Grazia, *Apportionment and Representative Government* (Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1963).

I. CRITERIA

Before discussing any of the various measures of apportionment that have been proposed thus far, we shall first specify the criteria in terms of which we shall try to evaluate their adequacy. In the first place, we assume that what is to be measured is deviation from the ideal of equal representation for populations of equal size. Although we are aware that other definitions of "population" are not only possible but also the specified legal standard in some states, we mean here by population the gross number of human beings enumerated in the most recent decennial national census, irrespective of how many of them may be "legally qualified voters," "adults," "civilians," or otherwise members of restricted subsets of the general population. It is quite possible to use any of the measures that we shall discuss, and the one that we shall propose, to measure apportionment in relationship to whatever popular base may be posited. But it is desirable that we be explicit about the universe of raw data that we purport to observe.

In addition to observing general population differences among legislative representation districts, we must consider how many legislators are apportioned to each district; for as Klain demonstrated, in 1955 over 80 per cent of the states used multi-member districts in at least one house (as is also true, of course, of the United States Senate of the National Congress), and almost half of all seats in the lower houses of American state legislatures were apportioned to multi-member districts.[4] Our data show that multi-member districts are still widely used.

The precise boundaries of legislative districts must also be observed, in order to ascertain the subsets of the general population of any state that are represented by the legislator or legislators apportioned among the districts of either house of the state legislature. We have found that a common practice, in calculating urban district size, has been to divide county or city populations by the number of districts in the county or city. For a number of states we calculated some district populations from block census data. To secure maps, descriptions or published information, we wrote academic specialists, legislative service agencies, legislators, defeated candidates, city clerks, county clerks, county boards of supervisors, party headquarters, local newspapers and local librarians. Major problems occurred where apportionment was made by local agencies or where official descriptions used political boundaries such as wards, precincts, magisterial districts, etc., rather than county or township boundaries. However, we shall not be concerned in this article with gerrymandering, which is a question related to but quite independent of malapportionment. Gerrymandering consists of establishing district boundaries in relation to existing demographic patterns in such a way as to discriminate on the basis of some special parameter of the general population, such as political party, racial, or ethnic affiliation. Assuming equal proportions of Republican and Democratic voters among the general population of a state, a state legislature dominated by the Democratic Party—perhaps because of existing malapportionment—might redistrict the lower house in such a way as to concentrate large numbers of Republican voters in a minority of the districts, while at the same time establishing narrower but safe Democratic electoral majorities in a majority of the districts, or *vice versa* if Republicans were in control; and this might be done with strict adherence to the principle of equal *general* population subsets for all house districts in the state.

The raw data for the measurement of malapportionment consist, therefore, of the frequencies of general population and of representatives assigned to each legislative district, for both houses of a legislature. With such data in hand, one might entertain either of two somewhat divergent objectives in seeking to measure malapportionment. We shall call these Types I (intrastate) and II (interstate) objectives and indices.

The Type I objective might be to focus upon the relationships within a single jurisdiction (*viz.*, a state or the United States) in order to be able to specify the extent to which each resident of a subunit of government such as a city or a county (or, alternatively, all residents collectively of such a subunit) is over- or underrepresented in each house of the legislature or in both houses combined. The realization of this objective requires an index that measures for each subunit the deviation between the observed population/representation ratio, and the expected ratio under the assumption that each legislator represents an equal number of people. Such a measurement problem is a relatively simple one, and an appropriate index requires little mathematical sophistication, either to derive or to apply. However—and we underscore this point because it seems not to have been noticed heretofore—such an index is of slight value for making *inter*state comparisons of malapportionment.

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[4] Maurice Klain, "A New Look at the Constituencies: The Need for a Recount and a Reappraisal," this Review, Vol. 49 (1955), pp. 1105–1119. Klain's findings were confirmed, and his data brought up to date, by Table 2 of David and Eisenberg, *State Legislative Redistricting: Major Issues in the Wake of Judicial Decision* (Chicago, Public Administration Service, 1962).

The reason why a Type I index has little utility for measuring Type II relationships is that for the latter objective, we require not a set of discrete observations of particularistic deviations from a state-wide norm, but rather a summary statistic which will characterize what is most important about the general pattern of malapportionment in each state. A Type I index which is a function of the unique general population total and of the disparate sizes of legislative chambers in each state cannot validly be employed to make interstate comparisons, because such an index may have the same value but different meaning for different states—or different values of the index may have the same meaning for different states. Alternatively, the simple ratio or percentage measures of deviation (which we shall describe below) sum to unity or zero for each state, and thus can hardly be used to make any meaningful statement about the degree of malapportionment in the state as a whole. There is also the question of bicameralism. This does not need to be resolved when the objective is intrastate measurement, because one can simply report the degree of malapportionment of subunits in each chamber. Some scholars, however, have attempted to devise a combined House and Senate measure of representation for each county. But the common assumption that, because equality of representation is posited as the ideal for fair apportionment, it is therefore appropriate to assume also that representation in the two houses of a legislature should be assigned equal weights, is even more dubious in the case of Type II indices. Our primary concern in the present article is to propose and to exemplify the use of a better Type II index, since this is the more interesting question from both a theoretical and a methodological point of view.

We would require two qualities in either type of index: objectivity, and comprehensiveness. By "objectivity," we mean that the method of employing the index be specified in operational form so that any researchers who possess some minimal level of professional competence ought to be able to observe the same raw data and report the same measurements on the basis of the index. By "comprehensiveness," we mean that the index can be used to measure the degree of malapportionment for all people living in districts represented in each house of any legislature.

In addition, we would make four other requirements of Type II indices: bicameral integration, interstate comparability, political realism, and statistical adequacy. By "bicameral integration," we mean that the index must lend itself to the computation of a single summary statistic which will describe the degree of malapportionment for any legislature. By "interstate comparability," we mean that such a single summary statistic will make it possible to scale all fifty state legislatures plus the Congress along a common metric which will measure the common dimension of representation of population that we have specified. An index that meets both of these requirements must be a pure number which is not affected by differences in the sizes of state populations or legislative chambers.

By "political realism," we require that the index should *not* be based upon arbitrary assumptions, which defy both our theoretical and empirical knowledge about the inequality of lower and upper chambers, or the way in which legislative majorities are formed, or the single and multi-member district systems. We reject as utterly unrealistic the legalistic assumption that lower chambers in American legislatures are either equal to or greater in power than upper chambers, because they are "closer to the people," or because "appropriation bills must originate in lower chambers," or because they are 'larger" than upper chambers. Typically, upper chambers are more important, in part because they share (as lower chambers generally do not) in the gubernatorial appointment power, thus exerting considerable influence over policy-making and implementation in the other-than-legislative governmental—including frequently, if indirectly, judicial—decision-making processes. A recognition of differential status is found in the thirty-three state and federal constitutional provisions that specify a longer term for members of one house: in all such cases, the longer term is for the upper house. Moreover, precisely because upper chambers are without exception smaller than lower chambers in American legislatures, senators typically represent (within any state) larger constituencies than members of the lower house, and their broader power base tends to assure that senators generally will be more influential politicians than members of the lower house. Therefore, we think that Type II indices ought to weight malapportionment in the upper chamber more heavily than malapportionment in the lower chamber, in most legislatures; and of course, in the absence of more precise empirical knowledge about the relative degrees of upper- and lower-chamber power in all states, it seems most reasonable at the present time to apply the same weighting formula to all states (and to the Congress).

As an example of an arbitrary assumption about the formation of legislative majorities, we can consider the Dauer-Kelsay[5] index, which is based upon a ranking of all districts (for a given house) from least to most populous, and then a summation of the population of the number of least populous districts equivalent to a minimal majority of representatives in the house. Such an index of the "minimum proportion of the state population necessary to control" the house in question is so patently unrelated to the relevant political characteristics of both district populations and their representatives that we must consider what significance can be attached to the numbers that it produces, for any particular set of empirical data. The assumption (which necessarily underlies the Dauer-Kelsay index) that the representatives from the districts with smallest populations—by no means necessarily rural districts—will frequently combine to vote in opposition to the remaining legislators who represent the districts with larger populations is contradicted by all of the recent empirical research in legislative voting behavior with which we are familiar.[6]

Political realism about the single-member district system requires that we adjust population differences among legislative districts according to the number of representatives apportioned to each district; we cannot, in other words, simply *assume* the prevalence of the single-member district system, and make comparisons between states on the exclusive basis of the (unweighted) populations of their legislative districts. Most students who recognize this problem have calculated persons represented by a representative in a multi-seat district by dividing the district population by the number of representatives in the district. We shall do the same, recognizing, however, that it is not politically realistic to treat the equal popular representation shares of the twenty-one members elected at large from one city within a single *county* (as was once the case in the Detroit area) as though they were the same as for representatives elected from single-member districts. Problems of representation raised by this type of gerrymander, devised to deprive sizeable popular minorities of their preferences in representation, are beyond the scope of this study.

By "statistical adequacy," we mean that a Type II index should describe the entire frequency distribution of representational-unit population differences, giving consideration not only to the location of the mean, but also to the general shape of the curve, the direction and degree of its skewness, and the extent of its kurtosis or "peakedness." (We shall discuss these technical considerations in greater detail, below.) Again let us take the Dauer-Kelsay index as an example. It does tell us something about the difference between the mean of the population of representatives, and the mean of the general population. If 20 per cent of the general population of a state elects 51 per cent of the representatives in the lower house, this informs us that one or more representation districts are considerably overpopulated (*i.e.*, underrepresented) in terms of the norm of equality of representation that we have posited. The norm would require that 51 per cent of the general state population be the minimax proportion which can elect 51 per cent of the representatives. We can infer that some other districts must, therefore, be overrepresented. But only the relationship between the two means is observed. Yet an infinite number of frequency distributions can have the same mean. The information that the Dauer-Kelsay index can convey about the nature of malapportionment in any house for any state is, therefore, slight. A Type II index satisfying the statistical requirements that we have specified would do a much better job of identifying patterns of malapportionment in the various states, according to what they have in common and the ways in which they differ.

II. TYPE I INDICES

The simplest kind of Type I index consists of a listing, in parallel columns, of the proportion of the population of the state living in each district (or other governmental subunit), paired with the proportion of representatives apportioned to that district or other subunit in relation to the size of the house. This is calculated separately for each house. (In order to speak more precisely about the various indices that we shall discuss, we shall define each in mathematical terms.) Let X equal the population of any district or other subunit, and Y equal the number of representatives apportioned to the district from either chamber of the legislature. Let N equal the number of districts (or other subunits) whose sum is equal to the total territory of the state, and let sigma (Σ) denote the summing of all the items in a set, such as the population of all districts for a chamber. The arithmetic average or mean population for all districts of such a chamber can then be denoted by the symbol M, and defined as follows: $M=\Sigma X/N$. The simple proportion of the population of each district to the total population of the state may then be defined either as $P_a=X/\Sigma X$ or as $P_a=X/NM$. Similarly, the simple proportion of representation for the district may be defined as: $R_a=Y/\Sigma Y$. Frequently such ratios are multiplied by 100, and thus reported as percentages. This is the type of measure reported, on a selective basis, in Baker's early study of the rural-urban dimension of malapportionment.[7]

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[5] Manning J. Dauer and Robert G. Kelsay, "Unrepresentative States," *National Municipal Review*, Vol. 44 (1955), pp. 515–575, 587.

[6] David A. Derge, "Metropolitan and Outstate Alignments in Illinois and Missouri Legislative Delegations," this REVIEW, Vol. 52 (1958), pp. 1051–1065; John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan and LeRoy C. Ferguson, *The Legislative System* (New York, 1962); John C. Wahlke and Heinz Eulau (ed.), *Legislative Behavior* (New York, 1959); Gilbert Steiner and Samuel Gove, *Legislative Politics in Illinois* (Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1960); Murray C. Havens, *City vs. Farm* (University, Alabama, Bureau of Public Administration, University of Alabama, 1957), 57 pp.; and Thomas A. Flinn, "The Outline of Ohio Politics," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 13 (September, 1960), pp. 702–21.

A slightly more complex index is the proportion of the population of any district to the mean population: $P_b=(X/M)-1$. The reason for subtracting unity is that an index value of 0 will then signify the ideal of population equality, while all positive values will signify overpopulation (underrepresentation), and all negative values will signify underpopulation (overrepresentation). It should be noted that this index approaches the negative limit of -1, a value which—if empirically attainable—would indicate a district with no population and therefore, logically, a non-resident representative. On the other hand, there is no fixed limit to the positive value that the index might attain, since the most populous district in a state might be several times as large as the mean. To convert to a percentage measure, one merely uses the alternative formula: $P_{b'}=(100X/M)-100$. Tyler has attempted to make interstate comparisons, by reporting the $P_{b'}$ values for the most and least populous *congressional* districts in each of the states.[8] Of course, there is no reason why this index could not be used to measure *all* of the districts, for each house, of the legislature for any state: what it permits one to observe is the proportionate population deviation of each district from the mean population for all districts.

A very similar kind of index, which has attracted somewhat more attention, is that of David and Eisenberg. Actually, from a mathematical point of view, the David-Eisenberg index of "the relative value of the right to vote" (or, as it has been called, of "vote-values") is no more complicated than the Tyler index discussed in the preceding paragraph; for it is basically the inverse ratio, without the subtraction of unity in order to produce negative values: $P_c=M/X$. In the percentage form in which David and Eisenberg have reported their empirical data, and for class intervals of counties ranging in population size from i to j,

$$P_{c'}=\frac{100M\sum_{i-j}Y}{\sum_{i-j}X}.$$

As the average size of county populations *increases* (in relation to the general mean), $P_{c'}$ will approach zero, and all index values of less than 100 signify varying degrees of underrepresentation, while all values of greater than 100 signify increasing degrees of overrepresentation. A value of 100 represents, of course, an ideal apportionment. David and Eisenberg used this index primarily for *intrastate* measurement of (initially) population class intervals of counties, for which they made historical trend comparisons. Subsequently they reported discrete rather than grouped county data, on the same basis.[9] But they also attempted to make interstate comparisons on the basis of this index, both for the largest standard metropolitan areas[10] and for the largest and smallest class intervals of counties that they had defined.[11] For these purposes, they averaged the house and the senate index values, in order to compute a single index value for any category of counties in relation to the legislature of a given state. They also computed "national averages" of "the relative value of the right to vote," for each of their four population class intervals for counties, by calculating the mean value, weighted by population, for the set of fifty state index-value averages. The national index values for the class intervals are thus averages of state index values, which are in turn averages of the separate index values for each house of the state legislature, which are based upon values for the groups of counties included within the class intervals. It is apparent that such averages cannot convey valid information about apportionment differences *among* the ninety-nine state legislative chambers. In any event, the focus of the David and Eisenberg national index values is upon comparing population categories of counties, rather than states; and their comparison of states is limited to the index values for the largest and smallest population category of counties found within each state.

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[7] Gordon E. Baker, *Rural versus Urban Political Power* (New York, 1955), pp. 16–17.

[8] Gus Tyler, "Court versus Legislature; The Socio-Politics of Malapportionment," *Law and Contemporary Problems*, Vol. 27 (1962), p. 402.

[9] Paul T. David and Ralph Eisenberg, *Devaluation of the Urban and Suburban Vote* (Charlottesville, Virginia, Bureau of Public Administration, University of Virginia, Vol. 1: 1961 and Vol. 2: 1962).

[10] *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, pp. 12–13.

[11] *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, p. 15. This table incidentally, does not consistently compare the *same* class intervals.

A variant approach, which focuses upon an attempt to measure the overall differences in the malapportionment of counties within individual states, has been proposed by Clem.[12] Clem's paper is very much concerned with the methodological aspects of measuring malapportionment, but his primary interest is in developing a Type I index. His discussion includes an evaluation of the criteria for valid and reliable indices, a brief critique of alternative indices to the one which he proposes, and an empirical exemplification (with data from five selected states) of the use of his own index, which he called the "County Ratio" index. Apart from his formula, the antecedent procedures for processing the raw data are identical to those employed for the use of the David-Eisenberg index; in fact, he proposes as an alternative to the County Ratio Index another formula which *is* the David-Eisenberg index, expressed in ratio rather than percentage form. (Clem wrote after the publication of the first of the David and Eisenberg volumes, with which he was familiar, but prior to the publication of the second volume which reported their data for individual counties; Clem's recommended "alternative procedure" was in fact the David-Eisenberg index divided by 100.) The mathematical equivalence of Clem's alternative and the David-Eisenberg index is readily demonstrated by comparing their formulae; and for the empirically rather than theoretically inclined, such a demonstration is no doubt reinforced by the observation that the index values reported by Clem for selected counties in five states[13] are identical to one per cent of the "vote values" reported for these same counties in David and Eisenberg's second volume, which was published less than two months after Clem's paper was given.

Clem's County Ratio index is the percentage of the algebraic difference (*i.e.*, retaining plus and minus signs) between the ratio of the county population to the total state population, and the average of the county's proportionate representation for both houses. In cases where a county is part of a multi-county district for purposes of representation in either house, Clem assigns to each county a fraction of representation equivalent to the ratio of county population to district population. Hence, if Y_h equals the number of lower house seats assigned to the house district of which a given county is a part, and Y_s equals the number of upper house seats assigned to the senatorial district of which a given county is a part, and $i-j$ designates the counties in multi-county district, then

$$P_d' = 100\left\{\frac{X}{\sum X} - .5\left[\left(\frac{Y_h}{\sum Y_h}\right)\left(\frac{X}{\sum_{i-j} X}\right) + \left(\frac{Y_s}{\sum Y_s}\right)\left(\frac{X}{\sum_{i-j} X}\right)\right]\right\}.$$

An index value of zero indicates the ideal of exact equivalence between county population and representation; negative values denote underrepresentation and positive values denote overrepresentation. There are no fixed limits to the values attainable by the index, in either direction. It should also be observed that basically, this is a very simple formula, for it is essentially:

$$P_d = P_a - R_a, \quad \text{or} \quad P_d = \frac{X}{\sum X} - \frac{Y}{\sum Y}.$$

Clem suggests the conversion of his Type I index into a Type II index by dividing the total number of counties in a given state into the number of counties whose over- or underrepresentation falls within proposed limits of maximum allowable deviation. The difficulty with this measure is that county units are treated as equal. For example, Michigan has 31 of its 83 counties outside the limits of maximum allowable deviation. Four of these 31 contain 52.88 per cent of the state's population. Treating counties as if they were of equal importance seems to us to lead to gross distortion of the very factors we are attempting to measure—the degree to which population is the basis of representation.

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[12] Alan L. Clem, "Legislative Malapportionment and the Mathematical Quagmire," a paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Conference of Political Scientists, held at the University of Notre Dame, South Bend, Indiana, April 27, 1962; mimeo., pp. 1–33. See also by the same author, "Measuring Legislative Malapportionment: In Search of a Better Yardstick," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 7 (May, 1963), pp. 125–44.

[13] *Ibid.*, Appendix Table G.

As a final example of Type I indices, we might consider the formula suggested by Mr. Justice Clark, in his concurring opinion in *Baker* v. *Carr*, together with the modification for this formula advocated by Mr. Justice Harlan in dissent in the same decision.[14] Clark purported to evaluate differences in the apportionment of Tennessee legislators on the basis of what he described as an index of "total representation." Under the then existing Tennessee apportionment system, a county might be assigned both exclusive representation and a share of a representative as part of a multi-county district (called floterial seats) for either the lower house or the senate of the state legislature, or for both houses. There were 99 members of the lower house and 33 senators; and Clark proposed that a county's apportionment be evaluated as the *sum* of its shares of representation for both houses, the latter being defined as the integer or fraction of representatives assigned weighted by the size of the houses. The difference between Clark and Harlan related to the calculation of county representation shares for the multi-county districts; Clark assigned shares of representation proportionate to the number of counties in the same district, while Harlan (like Clem) assigned proportionate shares according to population in each county of a multi-county district.[15] To put this algebraically we shall need, in addition to the symbols previously used, some further terms defined as follows: let Y_a = the number of seats assigned exclusively to a county, and let Y_b = the number of seats assigned to a multi-county district, while N_h = the number of counties in a multi-county house district, and N_s = the number of counties in a multi-county senate district. Then Clarks' formula is:

$$R_b = \left(Y_{ah} + \frac{Y_{bh}}{N_h}\right) + 3\left(Y_{as} + \frac{Y_{bs}}{N_s}\right),$$

while the formula with Harlan's adjustment becomes:

$$R_b = \left[Y_{ah} + (Y_{bh})\left(\frac{X}{\sum_{i-j} X}\right)\right] + 3\left[Y_{as} + (Y_{bs})\left(\frac{X}{\sum_{i-j} X}\right)\right].$$

An index value of 2 would signify—and according to either formula, since their difference lies in conceptualizing how fractional shares of representation *ought* to be weighed—that a county had joint representation in both houses equal to the average representation in each house. (Of course, such an index value could be produced by a combination of underrepresentation in one house and overrepresentation in the other house, as well as by an average representation in each house.) The index was used by Clark in the following way: all counties were listed according to the rank order of their populations, and the index values of "total representation" were reported in a parallel column. His assumption was that if the apportionment pattern were "rational," there would be a high positive rank correlation between the sizes of county populations and index values, at least when counties were partitioned into rural and urban subsets. Mr. Justice Clark did not compute rank correlation coefficients to make the comparison upon which, as he said, he based his judgment; instead, he relied upon "common sense" inferences based upon observations of selected portions of the data.

The seeming complexities of the Clark and Harlan formulae should not be permitted to obscure the fact that the underlying relationship that both these Supreme Court justices purported to observe is really the simplest of all of those we have considered thus far: $R_b = Y$. However, the other Type I indices measure underlying relationshps that are not much more complicated: Baker measures $X/\Sigma X$ and $Y/\Sigma Y$ while Clem measures their difference; and Tyler measures X/M while David and Eisenberg measure M/X. In other words, the Supreme Court justices simply count how many representatives are apportioned to each county; Baker and Clem compare the proportions of population and representation for the units of government that they observe; while Tyler, and David and Eisenberg, compute ratios of unit populations and population means. Questions of sampling procedure aside, all of these Type I indices are capable of being used objectively, and comprehensively for all of the districts or units of government of a state; so they meet the criteria that we specified for this type of index. None of them, however, are suitable for measuring interstate relationships. They all fail to meet two or more of the four criteria that we have posited for Type II indices, to a consideration of which we now turn.

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[14] 369 U. S. 186, 255n. 7, 262–264, 342–343.

[15] Clark's procedure for attributing representation in multi-county districts seems to be similar to that followed by David and Eisenberg, who apparently computed their index on the basis of an assignment of the *total* district population to each of the included counties; Clark, however, assigned equal shares of the total district population to each included county. Evidently, David and Eisenberg's procedure involves even more distortion than Clark's, as we shall exemplify with Michigan data. The 14th Michigan Senatorial District consists of two counties, Ingham and Livingston, whose populations are 211,296 and 38,233. David and Eisenberg assigned a vote value of 92 to each of these counties for the upper house of the Michigan legislature (*op. cit.* ftn. 9, *supra*, Vol. 2, pp. 76–77); using his formula for Tennessee, whose chambers of 33 and 99 are about the same as Michigan's 34 and 110, Clark would assign an index value of 1.5 to each county, while Harlan would assign 2.54 to Ingham and only 0.46 to Livingston. Moreover, and because of the not inconsiderable population differences, David and Eisenberg assign these two counties—with identical vote values for the senate—to different class intervals for purpose of their grouped county data analyses: Ingham is in the "100,000–499,999" category, while Livingston is in the "25,000–99,999" category.

III. TYPE II INDICES

We are familiar with two Type II indices that others have proposed, and we shall suggest a third. Tyler has reported extremity ratio measurements for each house in all of the states, and for congressional districts in each of most of the states;[16] Tyler, Dauer and Kelsay, and the National Municipal League have computed an index which measures the least population which can elect a majority of the members of a state legislative chamber;[17] and the index that we propose is a function of the coefficient of variation, which is a standard measure in parametric statistics. We shall first explain each of these, and then we shall evaluate them in terms of our criteria for Type II indices.

The formula for Tyler's extremity ratio is: $TE = X_{\max}/X_{\min}$; that is, the population of the most populous district divided by the population of the least populous district of the same house in any given state. The minimal value of the index is 1.0, signifying that all districts are equal in size; and there is no fixed limit to the maximal value that the index can attain—Tyler reported maximal values of 1081.3 for the lower house in New Hampshire, and of 4.5 for congressional districts in Michigan. The defects of the index, as the basis for making interstate comparisons of malapportionment, are readily apparent. The only one of our six criteria which it satisfies is the first, objectivity; it is clearly not a comprehensive measure for all districts in a chamber; it does not permit bicameral integration; it should not be used for interstate comparability, because the ratio is meaningful only in relationship to the particular chamber of the particular state from which the sample of two districts is drawn; it is not politically realistic; and as for statistical comprehensiveness, it provides no information about the mean, the variability of the distribution, skewness, or kurtosis. All that it does is to compare the most extreme cases in the two tails of the distribution.[18] It is a dramatic but essentially vacuous measure.

The Dauer-Kelsay index is computed as follows: all districts of a legislative chamber are listed in the rank order of their populations, from least to most populous, and the representation apportioned to each district is listed in a parallel column. If the size of the chamber is odd, the median item in the representation column is selected; otherwise, the $(N/2)+1$th item: this step identifies the district which elects the marginal member of the minimal majority of the chamber. The column of populations is then summed for the set of districts consisting of the first through the marginal member's district; that sum is then divided by the total state population, and the quotient is multiplied by a hundred in order to express it as a percentage. If j is defined as the marginal district with rank r in the second column such that

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[16] *Op. cit.* ftn. 8, *supra*, pp. 393, 402.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 391; *op. cit.* ftn. 5, *supra;* and William J. D. Boyd (ed.), *Compendium on Legislative Apportionment* (New York, National Municipal League, 1962 ed.), pp. iii–iv.

[18] Tyler's extremity ratio is only one step of complexity—since division is a slightly more complex mathematical operation than subtraction—removed from the *range*, the measure of dispersion deemed most appropriate (to characterize population differences among congressional representation districts in the states) by Mr. Justice Harlan, in the "Appendix" to his dissenting opinion in *Wesberry* v. *Sanders*, 32 L. W. 4142 at 4156–4157 (February 17, 1964). A typical sample of statisticians' comments upon the adequacy of the range as an index of variance follows; and these comments appear equally applicable to Tyler's ratio. Robert E. Chaddock, *Principles and Methods of Statistics* (Boston, 1925), p. 153: "*While this is the simplest measure of variability it is also the least informing.* It gives no idea of the nature of the distribution within these extreme limits. It is very unstable since by cutting off a single . . . item at either end of the scale or adding one the range may be entirely changed. It fails to characterize in a useful manner the series as a whole if stated alone, and ignores the degree of concentration almost entirely. It offers no basis for judging the typical character of the average itself." [Italics in the original.] Quinn McNemar, *Psychological Statistics* (New York, 2d ed. 1955), p. 19: "One may doubt whether the *range* (highest to lowest score) is of sufficient value in psychological research to justify its use as a measure of variation. It is, obviously, determined by the location of just 2 individual measures or scores and consequently tells us nothing about the general clustering of the scores about a central value."

$$\sum_{i-j}^{\min} r_y > \frac{Y}{2}, \qquad \text{then } DK = \frac{100 \sum_{i-j} X}{\sum X},$$

which is the minimal population equivalent to a majority of representatives. The theoretical limits of the values attainable by this index are zero (signifying that a majority of the districts have no population) and >50 (indicating that all districts are of equal population). If legislative chambers were of infinite size, the maximum value would approach the limit of 50.00; but with the relatively small chambers that exist in American state legislatures, the theoretical maximal value is a function of the size of the chamber. For example, it is 50.25 for the lower house in New Hamsphire, which has 400 members; and it is 55.00 for the upper house in Alaska, which has 20 members—both Delaware and Nevada have smaller senates of 17 members, but the maximal value for these is only 52.94 because the N is odd. For the same reason, the maximal value for the lower house in Georgia in 1962 was 50.24, slightly less than that for New Hampshire, even though the Georgia lower house had only about half as many members (205). For the United States Congress, the maximal values are 50.11 for the House of Representatives and 50.50 for the Senate.

David and Eisenberg, on the basis of an articulate assumption about the substantial equality, in general, between the lower and upper chambers in bicameral legislatures,[19] have suggested that the index values for both houses of any state legislature simply be summed to produce a single value to measure the degree of malapportionment for the state. (It should be noted that Dauer and Kelsay also considered such a combined index but concluded that it probably would have validity only for states at the top and bottom of the scale.) The theoretical range of such a composite index would be from 0 to >100; for independent observations in the three years 1937, 1955, and 1962, the empirical minimal value was 24.0 for Florida in 1962, while the empirical maximal value was 100.8 for New Hampshire in 1937. In the case of Nebraska, the value for the unicameral legislative chamber was doubled. Apart from the question whether lower and upper chambers *should* be weighted equally—a point that we already have disputed—it is apparent that the summation scores may reflect very different kinds of malapportionment in individual states. Consider, for example, the 1962 chamber and composite Dauer-Kelsay values for the following states:

State	Lower House	Upper House	L+U	L−U
Louisiana	34.1	33.0	67.1	1.1
Washington	35.3	33.9	69.2	1.4
South Carolina	46.0	23.3	69.3	22.7
Missouri	20.3	47.7	68.0	−27.4

It is misleading to say that South Carolina and Missouri are equally malapportioned, or that the degree of malapportionment in either of these states is about the same as that in Louisiana or Washington. When one chamber is grossly malapportioned, it can function as a perpetual block to political changes favored by a majority of the population of the state, as the situation in Michigan throughout the decade of the 1950's exemplifies; the 1962 Dauer-Kelsay chamber values for Michigan are 44 and 29. Moreover, we are confident that gross malapportionment of the senate creates more blocking power than gross malapportionment of the house, and we expect that studies of political change, comparing states like Michigan and South Carolina with states like Missouri, would provide empirical support for this hypothesis.[20] Of course, the preceding discussion has assumed the validity of the Dauer-Kelsay index values for individual chambers, which is a question that we must now examine.

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[19] *Op. cit.* ftn. 9, *supra*, Vol. 1, p. 6.

[20] We have considered the possibility that one might rank the states according to the lowest Dauer-Kelsay index score observed for *either* chamber in each state. It might be assumed that this would rank states according to the maximal blocking power of minorities. Such an assumption is questionable on the grounds of political realism, because it omits one house from consideration. A state in which D-K indices for both houses are 17.0 and 17.0 certainly is different politically from one in which the two houses are 17.0 and 47.0, respectively. In the second state one would expect the activities of the malapportioned house to be spotlighted. We are not aware that any comparative empirical studies have been made of such

The Dauer-Kelsay index is objective, and it meets the criteria of comprehensiveness, bicameral comparability, and interstate comparability. But it fails to meet our criterion of political realism for two reasons. We have no empirical knowledge which suggests that legislative majorities typically—or, indeed, ever—combine in the manner specified by the D-K index. To the contrary, the available studies of legislative voting behavior indicate that the *ad hoc* majorities that typically form are complex functions of such variables as political parties, general interest group activity, specific constituency interests, and regional (sub-cultural) differences.[21] Urban as well as rural districts can be considerably less populous than the state mean for district populations. In Michigan, for example, and for both the House and Senate, most of the largest and several of the smallest districts (including the smallest) are Democratic, while Republican districts (which include the most populous Senate district) also range from gross under- to gross over-population (in relationship to the mean). So what the D-K index measures has little relation to the empirical realities of legislative voting behavior. Moreover, the imputed equality of power for lower and upper chambers is not, in our opinion, empirically justifiable, for reasons that we already have explained. From a statistical point of view, the D-K index identifies a cutting point somewhere on the curve for the frequency distribution of district population sizes for a chamber. We have already questioned the empirical significance of the identification of such a point; we now question its theoretical significance. The D-K index provides no information about the population mean, or the variability of the curve, or its skewness or kurtosis. If the D-K index value *were* compared with the mean value for such a curve, then it might provide a rough measure of skewness; but there are better ways than this to measure skewness.

Our own approach is premised upon the assumption that since the basic problem of measuring malapportionment in state legislatures is a statistical problem, political scientists and lawyers and other social scientists who are concerned with this problem would be well advised to consider the use of standard statistical measures before trying to devise *ad hoc* indices. There has been an immense accumulation of experience in the use of most of the standard parametric measures, and their properties have been studied by mathematicians and statisticians who, generally speaking at least, are expert in such matters to a degree far beyond what can be the reasonable aspirations of most political scientists and lawyers. Moreover, other social sciences—such as psychology and sociology—long since have based much of their empirical research upon the assumption that the standard measures of both parametric and non-parametric statistics will be invoked, where appropriate, as a matter of course. Perhaps one reason why wider use of such methods has not been made by political scientists and lawyers in their attempts to measure apportionment relates to sub-cultural factors such as the traditions and methods of graduate training for these professions.

David and Eisenberg commented in a footnote[22] that:

> Statistical purists will recognize that other methods of categorizing the counties might have been possible, based on average county size and a computed standard deviation for each year studied. Unfortunately, the results of an analysis based on this kind of an approach would have been relatively inaccessible to all except professional statisticians—not to mention the increases in computation time and labor that would have been involved.

We think, to the contrary, that it is worth the extra time and labor and costs necessary to undertake an adequate measurement of state malapportionment. As we shall discuss in greater detail below, the really costly aspect of empirical research in this subject is the collection of the raw data; the difference in the costs for the computation of precise and crude indices is, by comparison, minimal. (Our computer time, for the basic calculations of the indices reported in Table 2, *infra,* was three minutes.) We also reject the conclusion that only professional statisticians can understand

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situations. It is reasonable to hypothesize, however, that the combined pressures of a governor and a well-apportioned house might force political concessions from the malapportioned chamber. Where both houses are badly malapportioned, we hypothesize that still a different political situation would exist.

Cf. the discussion of the blocking power of legislative chambers, in L. S. Shapley and Martin Shubik, "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," this Review, Vol. 48 (1954), pp. 787–92.

[21] See note 6 *supra.*

[22] *Op cit.* ftn. 9, *supra,* vol. 1, p. 10n. 9.

such matters as chi squares and standard deviations. To the extent that readers of this article do not employ elementary statistical concepts as part of their workaday professional tools, only a slight effort will be required to follow the discussion below in which we shall explain our Inverse Coefficient of Variation (ICV), which combines such common statistical measures as the mean and standard deviation.

IV. THE INVERSE COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION; SKEWNESS; AND KURTOSIS

ICV also is a Type II index. It is computed as follows:

1. List the population for each district of a state legislative chamber, in the sequence of the assigned district numbers.
2. Partition the population of multi-representative districts into representational units of equal size, by dividing the district population by the number of district representatives. (Each single-member district has its population divided by one, and therefore becomes a representational unit.)
3. List all representational units in rank order from least to most populous. (This step can be omitted for computer processing, for which special data coding and format will be required in any event; but it is a convenience when operations are to be performed with a desk calculator.)
4. Let X, M, and N have the same meanings as in the previous examples; *i.e.*, X = the population of any representational unit; N = the total number of representational units = the size of the chamber; and M equals the mean, or $M = \Sigma X/N$.
5. Let $x = X - M$, the algebraic difference between the population of any district and the mean population; list these x values in a column parallel to the X column; and calculate x^2, x^3, and x^4 for each representational unit and list these values in subsequent parallel columns. (To calculate x^3 for any representational unit, multiply x and x^2, and to calculate x^4, square the x^2 value.)
6. Sum the x, x^2, x^3, and x^4 columns. (The x column should sum to zero, within rounding error. The x^2 and x^4 sums must be positive—negative sums are impossible; a sum of zero for these columns would indicate absolute population equality among all representational units of the chamber. The x^3 sum may be either positive or negative, and will be zero when the distribution is symmetric.)
7. Calculate the standard deviation (sigma):

$$\sigma = \sqrt{\frac{\sum x^2}{N}}$$

8. Calculate the inverse coefficient of variation:

$$\text{ICV} = \frac{1}{1 + \frac{\sigma}{M}}$$

9. Calculate the index of skewness (g_1), so that

$$g_1 = \frac{\sum x^3}{\delta \sum x^2}$$

10. Calculate g_2, the index of kurtosis (*i.e.*, the degree of peakedness of the distribution):

$$g_2 = \frac{N \sum x^4}{(\sum x^2)^2} - 3$$

The mean (M) defines the average population for all representational units, given the total population of the state and the size of the legislative chamber. Under our assumption that equality of population among all representational units is the norm that provides our criterion, then the mean represents the ideal apportionment, deviations from which signify varying degrees of malapportionment. The greater the deviation from the mean, the greater is the malapportionment in regard to any particular representational unit. Obviously, units that are underpopulated will have negative deviations from the mean, indicating that they are overrepresented; while units that are overpopulated will have positive deviations from the mean, indicating that they are underrepresented.

The x scores provide an absolute measure of variation, but their direct use as a measure of malapportionment has certain obvious disadvantages—the fact that their sum is zero, for example. As Guilford notes,[23]

> The standard deviation, or σ, is the most commonly used indicator of degree of variability, and . . . it is usually the most reliable. That is, it varies least from sample to sample drawn at random from the same population. It is therefore more dependable and, as an estimate of the dispersion of the population, it is more accurate.

From one point of view, of course, we are measuring the entire population, in a statistical sense of that word, but it seems more realistic to conceive of our operation as a kind of sampling, since the census data are themselves really an estimate of the true population of any state or district thereof, and even these estimates (in the form of the decennial "enumeration" data commonly employed in malapportionment studies) are static while population growth is dynamic. In any event, we require the sums of the second, third and fourth powers of the deviations in order to relate the variance to the mean in a summary statistic which will measure the entire series of representational unit deviations, and also in order to measure skewness and kurtosis. We divide sigma (the standard deviation) by the mean in order to compute the coefficient of variation because "Measures of variability are not directly comparable unless they are based upon the same scale of measurement with the same unit."[24]

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[23] Joy Paul Guilford, *Fundamental Statistics in Psychology and Education* (New York, 1956, 3d ed.), p. 85.

We are justified in using CV with malapportionment data, because our measuring scale is one of equal units (the individual human beings who comprise a state, district, or representational-unit population are given equal weight in the census count) and it has an absolute zero point: no population (one New Hampshire town, which constituted a representational unit—indeed, a district—for the lower house in 1962, had a population of 3). The formula for the direct coefficient of variation is: $CV=\sigma/M$. Since sigma is a general measure of the variance, while M defines the apportionment ideal, the smaller the sigma, the better the apportionment; and the larger the sigma, in relation (of course) to its own mean, the worse the malapportionment. The effect of dividing sigma by the mean is to produce a pure number which is directly comparable with other CV's, irrespective of the differences in the sizes of the state populations or legislative chambers upon which they are based.[25] Therefore, CV provides a measure which will permit us to compare the two houses of the same legislature, or houses of legislatures in different states. For a perfectly apportioned state chamber, the value of CV would be zero, signifying no deviance. But for a state whose chamber was badly malapportioned, the value of CV could exceed 1—in fact, the value of CV for the United States Senate in 1962, using 1960 census data, is 1.04—because sigma can be greater than the mean. CV has the slight disadvantage, from the point of view of interpretation in relation to common-sense intuitions, that low values of CV indicate good apportionment, while high values indicate malapportionment. Therefore, it seems desirable to invert the CV index, so that it will range only between 0 and +1.00 and so that low values will indicate malapportionment (when our criterion is the single dimension of variance) while a value of +1.00 will indicate perfect apportionment. This is precisely what the ICV does, and this is the interpretation that we associate with ICV scores.

Even with a normal curve,[26] there could be discrimination in favor of a few and against a large number of persons, due to variance. Let us assume a hypothetical distribution for which the ordinate is a measure of the frequency, ranging from zero upwards, of representational units of any given size; and the abscissal axis is a metric, ranging from left to right, of population size of units. Since the curve for this distribution is normal, it is mesokurtic (*i.e.,* it shows neither positive nor negative kurtosis) and it is not skewed; and about a third of the units lie within a range of one standard deviation from either side of the mean.[27] Since our ideal of absolute equality of population among representational units has no possibility of realization in the empirical world, there will always be some variance around the mean of any empirical distribution of units; and there might even be substantial agreement that a normal curve with a CV of .20 (and therefore an ICV of .83) is the model[28] for the closest approximation of the ideal that offers any realistic possibility of being attained for any American legislature, at least for some time to come. Even so, up to a sixth of the representational units, under a normal curve, will fall in the left (or negative) tail of the distribution: these will be thinly populated units which are *over*represented in the hypothetical legislative chamber; while another sixth of the units will fall in the right (or positive) tail, and these will be densely populated units which are *under*-represented. Since many more persons reside in the units that lie in the right tail, as compared to the units that fall in the left tail, the discrimination against the overpopulated units that are underrepresented is—in terms of our postulated ideal of equality of popular representational shares—a much more serious form of malapportionment than the discrimination in favor of the underpopulated units of the left tail which are overrepresented. The many persons who receive less than equal representation constitute a much more important deviation from the ideal than do the relatively few persons who get much more than equality of representation. These are characteristics, we repeat, of a *normal curve*, which has relatively little to moderate variance, no skewness, and moderate kurtosis. Our point is that there will be a not insubstantial amount of both kinds of discrimination under the criterion curve which will function, in the following evaluation of empirical data for American legislatures, as our model of a *relatively*-well-apportioned chamber. Evidently, to the extent that the coefficient of variation (the proportion of the standard deviation to the mean) exceeds about .67, one or the other or both kinds of discrimination must also be greater than that which obtains with a normal curve.[29] There is, however, a better way than the measurement of relative variance to test for normality in the form of distributions: the use of the indices of skewness and of kurtosis.[30] The skewness index will inform us which kind of discrimination is increased, and the kurtosis index will inform us by how much such discrimination is increased, as well as the extent to which an empirical distribution deviates from its best-fitting normal curve.

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[24] *Ibid.,* p. 101.

[25] *Cf.* McNemar, *op. cit.* ftn. 18, *supra,* p. 29: "the ratios [for g_1 and g_2] are pure numbers, *i.e.,* are not inches or pounds or IQ's or minutes. If we have the distribution of the weights and of the heights for 1000 individuals, the measure of skewness for the height distribution may be compared directly with that for the weight distribution. This is true by virtue of the fact that for each we are expressing the third moment relative to the amount of variability, both in inches for one distribution, both in pounds for the other. Likewise, it can be reasoned that the measures of kurtosis for different distributions are comparable, although the distributions involve different measurement units."

[26] For good introductory discussions of the normal curve, see Margaret J. Hagood and Daniel O. Price, *Statistics for Sociologists* (New York, rev. ed., 1952), ch. 14; or Helen M. Walker and Joseph Lev, *Elementary Statistical Methods* (New York, rev. ed., 1958), ch. 12.

[27] In theory, the tails of a normal curve extend to infinity, but this assumes (in terms of our problem) a legislative chamber that consists of an infinitely large number of members. In practice, the range of empirical approximations of the normal curve is limited by the size of the chamber, and with an N of 400 to 500 usually will extend over ±3 standard deviations; with an N of 100, the mean range drops to about ±2.5 standard deviations; for 67 it is about $\pm 2.4\ \sigma$; and with an N of 35 the mean range is only about ±2.1 standard deviations, while with an N of 17 the range averages about $\pm 1.8\ \sigma$. See George W. Snedecor, *Statistical Methods: Applied to Experiments in Agriculture and Biology* (Ames, Iowa, The Collegiate Press, 4th ed., 1946), p. 98. For our own empirical analysis, based upon the sizes in March 1962, none of the "lower" chambers of state legislatures was smaller than 35, although 17 of the state senates included between 17 and 33 members. Conversely, none of the "upper" chambers was larger than 67, although three-fourths (37) of

The index of skewness[31] (g_1) indicates whether the variance for units on one side of the mean is less than that for units on the other side; and if imbalance exists, the index identifies which side has the greater variance. For a normal curve, g_1 is zero. If g_1 is within the limits ±1, this shows that the distribution is

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the lower chambers were larger than 67.

[28] McNemar, *op. cit.* ftn. 18, *supra*, p. 33: "In order to write the equation of a particular normal curve, i.e., one which corresponds to a particular distribution, we need to know N, M, and σ. This is the basis for the fact that, when we have the usual bell-shaped distribution, we need only the mean and standard deviation to describe it adequately. But in order to say that a given distribution is really normal, it is necessary to show that the g's . . . are zero or approximately zero."

[29] With a normal curve for which the abscissal value of sigma is 5% of the mean, ICV would be .95; but with a sigma equal to two-thirds of the mean, ICV would drop to .60. Obviously, an ICV of much less than .60 (which is equivalent to a CV of .67) would not be associated with a normal curve, because an ICV of .50 implies a CV of 1 (with sigma equal to the mean); and with a symmetrical distribution and an absolute zero point for abscissal values, this would signify a range of ±1 standard deviation; but the expected minimal range for any of our empirical distributions—if they are normal—is ±1.8 sigma (when $N=17$).

[30] We are not unaware of McNemar's admonition that "The nature of the research, the type of variable being studied, and also the size of the sample are factors which need to be considered in making a decision as to the necessity for computing measures of skewness and kurtosis. It is seldom advisable to compute these measures when N is less than 100." *Op. cit.* ftn. 18, *supra*, p. 30. *Cf.* Hagood and Price, *op. cit.* ftn. 26, *supra*, p. 214: "The reason that higher moments [than the second] are not frequently computed for distributions observed among only a small number of cases is that they are summarizing measures less stable than the mean and standard deviation." As our footnote 27, *supra*, suggests, over a third of the lower and all of the upper chambers of the fifty state legislatures each had fewer than 100 members at the time for which our empirical data were collected. But all except 3 of the lower chambers each had more than 50 members, and 90% of the senates had at least 25. Consequently, we think that more confidence ought to be reposed in the g scores for the lower chambers than in those for the senates.

[31] For an excellent elementary discussion of the g indices and their formulas, see Hagood and Price, *op. cit.* ftn. 26, *supra*, pp. 210–17; and *cf.* McNemar, *op. cit.* ftn. 18, *supra*, pp. 27–31.

generally symmetrical, although such distributions might well include a number of cases of extreme variance in one tail which are offset by an equivalent number of cases of equally extreme variance in the other tail, as we shall exemplify in a later discussion of cutting points for deviations in variance, using hypothetical distributions in which all items lie in the tails. The index of kurtosis will inform us, however, whether or not such an extremely platykurtic (flat or rectangular) distribution obtains. Any negative g_1 index value shows a distribution which is humped to the right, and a value of -1 or greater would signify that a few (probably rural) units are very much overrepresented. Although theoretically possible, negative skewness is not to be anticipated for apportionment data on American legislatures, for in order for this to occur empirically, a majority of the representational units must be relatively (for the particular state) densely populated, and the minority of rural units are then given equal representation with the more populous urban and suburban units. This implies a state in which there are no extensive metropolitan areas, and in which there is no sharp contrast between densely populated urban units and thinly populated rural units. Most of the American states are quite to the contrary, so we might anticipate that, when representational unit distributions are skewed, they are going to be positively skewed.[32] Positive skewness constitutes the more serious kind of discrimination referred to above, which results from a distribution under which the bulk of the units are thinly populated and lie therefore in a hump to the left, and with a small variance to the left side of the mean; while there is considerable variance to the right or positive side of the mean, where there are a few underrepresented units in which reside the bulk of the population of the state. It is only through distributions that are quite positively skewed that a rural-based minority can really dominate a state legislative chamber.

For the purpose of evaluating apportionment distributions, we suggest that skewness index values be given the following interpretation:

(1) if g_1 is greater than $+1.0$, this signifies relatively serious malapportionment, in the form of underrepresentation of overpopulated units;

(2) if g_1 is more negative than -1.0, this signifies a less serious form of malapportionment, under which there is over representation of underpopulated units;

(3) if g_1 is within the range from -1.0 to $+1.0$, this signifies a relatively normal or symmetrical distribution, and not much greater discrimination of either type than has been described above as inherent in the postulated criterion curve.

The index of kurtosis (g_2) tells us whether the distribution is relatively flat or peaked, in comparison to the normal curve, for which g_2 has a value of zero. A negative kurtosis value indicates a flat or twin-peaked or rectangular curve; there is no single peak signifying a concentration of many units of similar size. Positive kurtosis indicates that there is such a peak, and the greater the concentration of a higher proportion of the units comprising the sample, at or near the same population size, the higher will be the positive kurtosis index. Evidently, the peak of a curve with a high positive g_2 index is likely to lie close to the mean of the distribution of representational units; and it is also apparent that the evaluation of g_2 indices, in relation to apportionment curves, must depend upon where the peak is in relation to the distribution. If a distribution is not skewed, then a high positive g_2 index shows that most of the units are of average size and they are given equal representation; and as we remarked earlier, although we must reject such an ideal as unattainable on empirical grounds, a perfect apportionment would have neither variance (*i.e.*, it would have an ICV of $+1.0$) nor skewness, ($g_1 = 0$), so its kurtosis would approach positive infinity. In relation to the interpretation that we have suggested for the skewness index, if skewness is normal (*i.e.*, g_1 is within the range ± 1.0) then the higher the positive kurtosis value, the better the apportionment; and with either negative or positive skewness, the higher the positive kurtosis value, the greater the malapportionment. With a skewed distribution, a high positive kurtosis value indicates that the concentration of units in one or the other tail—depending upon the direction in which the distribution is skewed—is relatively extreme. Since we anticipate that, for apportionment distributions, skewness will be positive, we can infer that high positive g_1 values are likely to be associated with high positive g_2 values; and that their joint occurrence signifies relatively extreme malapportionment. We think that when an apportionment curve has high positive index values for both skewness and kurtosis, this means that a rural popular minority is dominating the legislative chamber, irrespective of the degree of variance, because the indicated relationships could obtain even when the range of differences, among the size of population of representational units, was relatively small—corresponding, let us say, to a deviation of 25% from the mean. But we expect that empirically, high positive skewness and kurtosis are likely to be positively correlated with variance: that is, that g_1 and g_2 will both be positive and higher in value, as ICV becomes smaller.

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[32] As Hagood and Price point out, "For a distribution to approach normality closely the range of its possible values must extend several standard deviation units on either side of the mean. For many characteristics, the measures of which can take only positive values, the range is cut off on the left side within two or three standard deviation units of the mean, causing a skew to the right." *Op. cit.* ftn. 26, *supra*, p. 270. For some of our empirical distributions for representation in state legislative chambers, the range is cut off at less than two standard deviations on the left or negative side of the mean.

We are now in a position to suggest an operationalized definition of an ideal apportionment which maximizes the principle of equality of representation, and also one for the antithetical ideal of malapportionment. The affirmative ideal is a legislative chamber for which the distribution of representational units is characterized by zero variance, zero skewness, and maximal positive kurtosis: $\text{ICV} \rightarrow +1$, $g_1 \rightarrow 0$, $g_2 \rightarrow +\infty$. The negative ideal is characterized by maximal variance, extreme positive skewness, and extreme positive kurtosis: $\text{ICV} \rightarrow 0$, $g_1 \rightarrow +\infty$, $g_2 \rightarrow +\infty$.

We have not yet considered the question of bicameralism, and the use of ICV values in order to make interstate comparisons. We shall suggest two alternative ways of proceeding, both of which will be illustrated in the empirical exemplification which constitutes the latter section of this article. The first approach is to prepare a two-dimensional scattergram, using the lower house ICV values for each state (and for the national House of Representatives) as a set of abscissal coordinates, and the upper house ICV values as coordinates for the ordinate dimension. Each state (and the Congress) will then be represented by a single point in the two-dimensional space. (The scattergram procedure could also be used, of course, substituting either g_1 or g_2 values in place of ICV values; and the resulting graphs of the distribution of legislatures, according to skewness or kurtosis, could be compared with the graph of the distribution according to variance such as we shall exemplify in Figure 2.) We can then superimpose a set of orthogonal axes in the space, using the median value of the distribution of upper house ICV values to locate the horizontal axis, and the median value of the distribution of lower house ICV values to locate the vertical axis. These two axes will then divide the space into quadrants, and we can then characterize in a general way the apportionment of all fifty-one legislatures, according to the quadrant in which their points fall. The design for such a scattergram is shown in Figure 1.

We would justify this characterization of quadrants on the following basis. In order to fall in the A quadrant, both the upper and lower house of the legislature must be in the upper halves of their respective distributions, so that on a relative basis, this set includes the most consistently (for both houses) well apportioned legislatures. Conversely, those legislatures, both of whose houses are in the lower halves of their respective distributions, are relatively those which are most malapportioned, and are found in Quadrant D. We distinguish between the second and fourth quadrants, and the first quadrant, on the ground that no matter how high the ICV value for one house, if the corresponding value for the other house is below the median, the relatively malapportioned house will have the blocking power that we previously have discussed; and hence, legislatures with one poorly apportioned house must be considered to be less well apportioned than those which fall in Quadrant A. We distinguish between the second and fourth quadrants on the ground, previously discussed, that malapportionment of the upper house of a legislature (Quadrant C) should be evaluated as a greater handicap to fair representation than malapportionment of the lower house (Quadrant B); therefore, the states that fall in the second quadrant, with relatively well apportioned upper houses but poorly apportioned lower houses, are considered to be better apportioned than the states in the fourth quadrant, where the converse relationship holds. There is an additional historical consideration: Quadrant B legislatures ought to result from the "silent gerrymander," *i.e.*, the failure to reapportion over a long period of time; while Quadrant C legislatures are apt to be the result of deliberate affirmative acts (such as that of the Philadelphia Convention of 1787) to create malapportionment in the Senate. We can also observe that in the B Quadrant, the house blocks the better-apportioned Senate; while in the C Quadrant, the Senate blocks the better-apportioned House.

The scattergram also can readily be used to classify legislatures according to which of their chambers is the more malapportioned, and the extent of difference between the degree of malapportionment in each chamber of the legislature. If the diagonal is drawn from the origin



FIG 1. Design for measuring joint variance in apportionment of Houses and Senates of American Legislatures.

to the opposite corner of the space, then the points for all states in which the lower house is more malapportioned than the senate lie above the diagonal, and the points for all states (and, of course, for the United States), in which the senate is more malapportioned than the lower house, lie below the diagonal. The farther away any point is from the diagonal, the greater the difference in the relative degree of malapportionment of the two chambers.

An alternative approach consists of the assignment of weights for lower and upper house ICV scores. Although any set of weights, based upon subjective inferences from the inadequate empirical knowledge presently available, necessarily reflects an arbitrary judgment, we think that an assignment of 1.5 to the senate and 1 to the house is probably more realistic than the assignment of equal weight to each. It may be that, at some future time, empirical investigations of the relative power of the two chambers of the legislature, in each state, corrected for developmental change by repeated observations, will make it possible to apportion weights, for purposes such as ours, on a more discriminating and better-informed basis; for there is no reason to assume that the same weights should apply to each legislature, and there is certainly no technical reason why different sets of weights could not be substituted for the constants in our formula below. But for the present, we prefer the arbitrary assignment of greater weight to the senates, to the equally arbitrary assignment of equal weight to both chambers.[33] In the case of unicameral Nebraska, we shall assign a value of $+1.0$ for the ICV_h, both for the computation of the summary apportionment score (to be discussed presently) and for the plotting of an abscissal coordinate value in Figure 2, and we shall consider the unicameral ICV to be a senate value; a non-existent house cannot be malapportioned, nor can it block the decisions of the unicameral chamber which performs the usual functions of an upper chamber—and is called "the Senate"—in Nebraska.

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[33] We do not insist upon the validity, but only upon the plausibility of our political assumptions; any reader who disputes them is free, of course, to take our ICV and *G* score data and assign any weights he chooses. It was quite laborious to produce the data, but it is only a matter of simple arithmetic and an hour or less at a calculating machine to compute another set of apportionment scores, based on different weights.

In constructing a scale of apportionment scores, we could use only the weighted ICV indices for each legislature, or we could also take skewness and kurtosis into consideration. Even though we expect these three attributes of representational distributions to be positively intercorrelated, there is in theory a considerable difference—and there is likely in practice to be a considerable difference as well—between two legislatures, both with senate ICV indices of .5, if the one senate has low negative skewness and kurtosis and the other has high positive skewness and kurtosis. Certainly, we require all three indices for an adequate description of the curve for the apportionment distribution of a chamber.[34] One way to measure the legislatures along all three dimensions simultaneously would be to construct a three-dimensional space, with one of the reference axes representing variance, another skewness, and the third kurtosis. We could either plot the two chambers of the legislatures as separate points in such a space; or we could compute a composite score, for the two chambers of each legislature, which could then be plotted as a single point in the space. A somewhat simpler approach, which better serves our present objective, is to combine the ICV, g_1, and g_2 scores for each chamber, and to weight the composite scores for the two chambers of each legislature, in order to summarize in a single index value the essential characteristics of the curves for both chambers of each legislature. A set of such weighted composite indices would permit us to rank all American legislatures along the single dimension of apportionment.

Although we knew that for apportionment distributions, negative values could not be large for either skewness or kurtosis, there was no way of anticipating how large positive values might be for either index. We could and did postulate ±1.0 as the limits of the normal range for both g_1 and g_2, but we were able to establish an upper cutting point, between large and extreme values, only after observing the empirical data reported in Table II. On the basis of these observations, we defined a *G* score matrix, which would permit us to weight skewness and kurtosis jointly, for each chamber of each legislature. As Table I shows, we distinguished three segments of the continuum for each distribution of index values: normal, considerable, and extreme; the normal range is the same for both indices, and was defined in advance of the analysis of the empirical data, while the ranges for the other two categories reflect the differences between the two *G* score distributions. Our assignment of weights to the cells of the *G* matrix is arbitrary in detail, but not in principle: we already have stated our theoretical reasons for assigning positive weights to positive kurtosis when it is associated with normal (*i.e.*, minimal) skewness, and also for assigning increasingly negative weights to positive kurtosis which is associated with increasingly positive skewness. Actually, it makes little difference what weights we assign, so long as they differentiate consistently between the various combinations of skewness and kurtosis on the basis of the principle stated above, and so long as the weights chosen will establish, in relation to ICV scores in the apportionment index formula, a weight for skewness and kurtosis and a weight for variance that reflects the relative importance of these three characteristics of representational distribution curves. We have assumed that variance is more important than either skewness or kurtosis; in fact, we have assumed that variance is more important than both skewness and kurtosis together. Since the range of our ICV indices is from 0.0 to +1.0, we have assumed that the *G* (joint) scores for g_1 and g_2

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[34] McNemar states that "a typical frequency curve (or polygon) or a frequency distribution can be roughly characterized as one which shows 4 chief features: a clustering of individuals toward some central value, dispersion about this value, symmetry or lack of symmetry, and flatness or steepness. Many variables or traits yield distributions which are said to be approximately bell-shaped, but such a description is not adequate for scientific purposes. One wishes to know about what particular value and with how much scatter the individual scores are distributed, to what extent the distribution is symmetrical, and to what extent it is peaked or flat. That is, we need measures of central value or tendency, measures of scatter or dispersion or variability, and measures of skewness (lack of symmetry) and of kurtosis (peakedness or flatness.) With such measures, one can describe the distribution mathematically, and in such a way that a statistically trained contemporary, say in Melbourne, can picture to himself the frequency distribution." *Op. cit.* ftn. 18, *supra*, p. 13. Hagood and Price are in accord: "In a thorough analysis and description of a quantitative distribution, the aspect of form must be treated just as the aspects of central tendency and dispersion are treated, and if there is to be a generalization of the results, tests of hypothesis about form must be made." *Op. cit.* ftn. 26, *supra*, p. 270.

TABLE I. *G* SCORE MATRIX FOR SKEWNESS AND KURTOSIS

SKEWNESS :

KURTOSIS :	Extreme	Considerable	Normal	(g_2 scores)
Normal	-.3	-.1	+.1	-1.00* to 1.00
Considerable	-.4	-.2	+.2	1.01 to 8.99
Extreme	-.5	-.3	+.3	≥ 9.00
(g_1 scores)	≥ 3.00	1.01 to 2.99	-1.00 to 1.00	

* As explained in the text, the range for the normal category was defined in advance of the empirical analysis. Included in the Normal/Normal (or the +.1) cell of the empirical *G* score matrix (Table III) are the lower houses of three states for which the skewness scores were positive and less than .65, and the kurtosis scores were as follows: North Carolina, −1.02; Wyoming, −1.03; and Akansas, −1.05. We decided to classify these three with the normal kurtosis scores, rather than to complicate the analysis by almost doubling the number of cells in order to define a four-by-four matrix with a new category, "considerably negative."

ought to have somewhat lesser weight in the apportionment score formula; and as Table I shows, *G* scores are confined to a range of .9 that of the ICV scores.

Our formula for combining ICV and *G* scores. for both chambers of each legislature is:

$$\text{Apportionment Score} = 60(\text{ICV}_s + G_s) + 40(\text{ICV}_h + G_h).$$

By using the constants 60 and 40, to bring about the 1.5 to 1 weighting of senates and houses, we convert the decimal indices for ICV and for *G* into a set of apportionment scores with an approximate range from about zero to about a hundred.

V. AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF VARIATION IN MALAPPORTIONMENT

Table II reports the means and standard deviations, and the ICV, skewness, and kurtosis indices for both chambers of all fifty state legislatures and for the United States Congress. We used 1960 census data, and the apportionments as of March 26, 1962, the date of *Baker* v. *Carr*. So many changes have occurred since that date, and the prospects for further changes seem so likely with another major Supreme Court decision pending in the late spring of 1964 or during the 1964 term, that we think the most useful function our empirical study can perform—in addition to that of exemplifying the use of the suggested indices—will be to report the base-line of malapportionment on a nationwide basis; this can then serve as the criterion against which subsequent changes, in any individual state or group of states, can be measured.

Table II reports seven-place decimals, not because we think that such detail would change our own present interpretation in the least from that which we would make with two-place decimals, but rather as a possible convenience to others who might wish to use these data in subsequent analysis. For similar reasons, we report at the end of this table the indices for certain hypothetical distributions with criterion coefficients of variation, because quite a few scholars have shown an interest in postulating norms of "maximum permissible variance" from the ideal of equality of representation. We illustrate the method of procedure with eight such norms; anyone who wishes to extend the analysis to other norms can readily do so, as we shall explain presently. We used a hypothetical sample of ten million voters divided among one hundred representational units.

There were two subsets of fifty representational units each. All units in the same subset were equal in population; but the total populations for the two subsets varied according to the percentage of maximum variation. The stipulated percentage of variation is precisely equivalent to the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean: *i.e.*, the CV is .05, for a maximum variation of five percent; it is .10 for ten percent; and so forth. Thus with a five percent maximum variation

$$\left(\text{and with } CV = \frac{5{,}000}{100{,}000} = .05\right),$$

the population of half of the representational units would be 5,250,000; and the population of the other subset of 50 units would be 4,750,000. The calculation of the ICV for thirty-five percent (for example) reduces, therefore, to

$$\frac{1}{1 + .35} = .741,$$

approximately. We know that these distributions cannot be skewed, so the g_1 index value has to be within rounding error of zero. Similarly, we know that our hypothetical distributions are maximally platykurtic, so the g_2 index value has to be within rounding error of minus two.

In Figure 2 we present the graph, based upon the design of Figure 1, which results from the joint plotting of senate and house ICV indices. In terms of the criterion values for maximum variation (as specified in Table II), none of the chambers was within the 15 per cent range, but ten senates and six lower houses were within 35 per cent. Among the senates, Massachusetts and Arkansas were within the 20 per cent range; Wisconsin, 25 per cent; Ohio, 30 per cent; and New York, New Hampshire, Vermont, Oregon, Maine, and West Virginia were within 35 per cent. None of the lower houses was within the 20 per cent range, but South Carolina was within 25 per cent; Oregon, 30 per cent; and Massachusetts, Illinois, Wisconsin, and the United States House of Representatives all were within 35 per cent. In only three states were both houses of the state legislature within the 35 per cent range: Massachusetts, whose senate ranked first and lower house third; Wisconsin, whose two houses ranked third and fifth; and Oregon, eighth and second. In terms of the criterion of variance, it is clear that Massachusetts ranked as the best apportioned legislature in the country. The remaining 85 chambers fall short—and mostly by a considerable margin—of a "maximum permissible variation" of thirty-five percent. Either that norm is unrealistically high, or else American legislatures generally had a long way to go, in order to realize it, at the time the Supreme Court decided *Baker* v. *Carr*.

Tennessee was the subject—or object—state in that decision; and Figure 2 shows that Tennessee then had an exceptionally well balanced legislature as between its house and senate, though at a very high level of variance in the population of representational units, with an ICV of about .5 in both chambers. So far as we are aware, all of the notorious examples *au courant* in the literature on reapportionment assume in Figure 2 the positions that have been attributed to them: the California senate is indeed the worst in the country, as is the Vermont house (in terms of the stipulated criterion), with Connecticut a close second. If the Senate of the United States showed no more variance than the House of Representatives, the point for the Congress would be located up near Maine, instead of near the center of the C quadrant. Incidentally, the effect of the "federal analogy" argument can be seen in Figure 2 in the proximity, to the United States, of three states which have recently written or revised their constitutions: Alaska, Hawaii, and New Jersey. In the constitutional conventions of the forty-ninth and fiftieth of these United States, the United States Senate was pointed to as a model for emulation, by conservatives who sought to checkmate the "popular" lower house, in strict accord with the precedent established by the

TABLE II. SCORES FOR AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CHAMBERS ON APPORTIONMENT INDICES OF CENTRAL TENDENCY, DISPERSION, VARIATION, SKEWNESS, AND KURTOSIS

State	Chamber	Mean	Standard Deviation	ICV	Skewness	Kurtosis
Alabama	S	93,335	106,513	.4670299	3.9555078	16.6654127
	H	26,497	18,088	.5942976	2.0111584	5.2508747
Alaska	S	10,396	10,299	.5023477	2.3280182	4.1848776
	H	3,679	1,690	.6851541	1.0663697	0.8958056
Arizona	S	46,505	85,034	.3535464	2.7200651	6.1425738
	H	16,272	8,781	.6495123	1.0338302	1.4462045

TABLE II. (*Continued*)

State	Chamber	Mean	Standard Deviation	ICV	Skewness	Kurtosis
Arkansas	S	49,024	9,771	.8338126	1.5577501	2.4211067
	H	15,926	7,082	.6921997	0.2136530	−1.0504671
California	S	392,780	938,308	.2950822	5.4394092	29.7892981
	H	195,478	79,322	.7113456	0.8873093	0.1960401
Colorado	S	46,176	32,288	.5884998	1.4120893	0.8372165
	H	22,070	14,390	.6053289	1.6462569	1.9114613
Connecticut	S	70,423	41,320	.6302255	1.3263635	0.6923563
	H	7,830	12,722	.3809758	3.7416749	16.0875521
Delaware	S	26,252	21,308	.5519821	0.8990674	−0.8467880
	H	12,751	13,497	.4857966	1.8861561	2.7897886
Florida	S	131,881	177,165	.4267358	2.7307594	8.7673628
	H	36,951	51,968	.4155573	2.9664300	10.4490350
Georgia	S	73,022	85,985	.4592377	3.7847716	16.8197286
	H	14,666	17,134	.4611929	6.9471428	61.6739954
Hawaii	S	22,567	20,943	.5186621	1.1141456	−0.3873740
	H	11,687	5,122	.6952620	1.1366190	0.0982799
Idaho	S	15,163	17,925	.4582692	2.4660653	6.7240682
	H	9,578	5,966	.6161703	0.5557035	−0.5172573
Illinois	S	173,810	108,724	.6151829	1.4598226	2.4230950
	H	56,872	18,127	.7582984	1.7462971	3.0916962
Indiana	S	111,758	109,131	.5059454	4.4688159	22.3989337
	H	65,963	105,932	.3837412	5.0122232	26.2384827
Iowa	S	55,149	39,820	.5807067	3.2766471	3.6299987
	H	22,676	16,816	.5742019	3.4766969	17.4060922
Kansas	S	54,446	57,735	.4853394	3.5405495	13.6147078
	H	17,954	18,336	.4947344	2.2296437	5.5753175
Kentucky	S	80,077	38,727	.6740269	4.1624178	19.3547055
	H	30,373	21,456	.5860231	4.7644850	29.0813696
Louisiana	S	83,088	49,700	.6257212	1.7573380	3.1323713
	H	29,446	20,995	.5837671	2.5250115	7.3668008
Maine	S	26,211	8,807	.7485068	0.8096811	−0.4027144
	H	5,955	2,161	.7337001	0.9859042	3.3689857
Maryland	S	107,030	119,919	.4716037	1.7185467	2.1288223
	H	21,232	18,222	.5381452	1.8467339	2.7182323
Massachusetts	S	127,405	19,780	.8656090	0.7189994	0.5169948
	H	21,825	6,913	.7594519	0.9061084	1.3235289
Michigan	S	230,118	148,635	.6075671	1.6136593	2.2277965
	H	73,968	34,735	.6804599	1.1923953	1.3071320
Minnesota	S	51,370	45,364	.5310429	4.9967158	29.7465438
	H	26,763	28,210	.4868361	4.9053185	31.0552267
Mississippi	S	43,511	22,361	.6605446	1.4414026	2.5126735
	H	16,085	12,535	.5620148	2.4338574	6.0446013
Missouri	S	126,559	45,005	.7376789	1.8501350	3.3171122
	H	27,400	22,615	.5478380	2.0165619	6.2159266
Montana	S	21,049	15,652	.4349539	2.8133181	8.0989704
	H	6,183	3,112	.6651848	0.1302020	−0.9580776
Nebraska	S	32,822	15,364	.6811493	2.2854695	6.9409366
Nevada	S	16,104	31,297	.3397351	2.4534278	4.3676365
	H	4,208	4,098	.5065894	1.9814647	3.3576332
New Hampshire	S	25,285	7,947	.7608633	0.5390549	0.1762299
	H	1,343	618	.6847506	1.1859368	2.9099586
New Jersey	S	288,893	243,806	.5423191	1.1110387	0.4053261
	H	106,539	43,806	.7086302	0.6902714	0.2968090
New Mexico	S	29,719	45,502	.3950909	4.1341645	18.3434493
	H	11,083	6,276	.6384566	0.7682322	0.0918301

TABLE II. (*Continued*)

State	Chamber	Mean	Standard Deviation	ICV	Skewness	Kurtosis
New York	S	280,014	87,676	.7615487	1.8785133	4.8034630
	H	108,272	49,110	.6879584	0.7819559	1.7476650
North Carolina	S	99,009	51,116	.6595091	1.9167141	3.5592471
	H	34,610	20,663	.6261604	0.3760864	−1.0172762
North Dakota	S	12,877	8,016	.6163179	2.0505162	4.0352867
	H	5,898	3,620	.6196405	2.6064888	6.9992922
Ohio	S	266,788	79,625	.7701434	0.7763989	0.0224785
	H	54,077	32,566	.6241370	0.7459419	−0.4307439
Oklahoma	S	50,946	61,722	.4521801	3.6939135	3.6047136
	H	14,780	9,528	.6080271	2.6898505	9.3448576
Oregon	S	53,425	17,392	.7544100	0.4822606	−0.6204543
	H	27,716	7,774	.7809573	0.0653482	−0.7192202
Pennsylvania	S	226,380	119,542	.6544244	1.2429151	0.8493574
	H	51,210	18,251	.7372438	0.5084171	3.0602500
Rhode Island	S	19,299	18,013	.5172321	1.0935368	0.2608778
	H	8,331	5,011	.6244422	1.1642417	1.9587987
South Carolina	S	51,790	49,648	.5105543	2.1870522	4.1363029
	H	18,164	3,882	.8239129	0.0333626	−0.2751049
South Dakota	S	18,793	8,988	.6764667	3.0599798	9.9592973
	H	8,833	3,113	.7394452	0.5438431	−0.1616885
Tennessee	S	120,530	122,175	.4966112	2.9621367	9.5570304
	H	35,449	35,393	.5003961	4.2531467	24.6328687
Texas	S	308,531	241,503	.5609312	2.5115349	5.8760006
	H	55,262	33,363	.6235514	3.1492151	12.6480038
Utah	S	25,704	19,326	.5708154	1.0373689	−0.5113443
	H	9,122	6,792	.5731987	1.4001175	2.4790063
Vermont	S	12,033	3,892	.7555925	−0.6916369	0.2508094
	H	1,585	3,130	.3361228	6.5547544	58.7330107
Virginia	S	99,383	45,576	.6855906	2.2108364	5.7752989
	H	39,978	20,467	.6613963	2.3672073	7.4592624
Washington	S	57,636	26,563	.6845204	1.3975892	2.3238180
	H	28,362	10,002	.7392864	0.8924947	0.2523954
West Virginia	S	58,138	19,536	.7484917	2.5834058	6.4919247
	H	17,482	7,243	.7070628	0.4962934	0.2532985
Wisconsin	S	119,690	28,859	.8057295	1.1927362	1.4330474
	H	39,529	12,913	.7537712	1.7873667	3.1621984
Wyoming	S	11,142	7,520	.5970433	1.1960926	0.2863041
	H	5,439	2,204	.7115949	0.6471677	−1.0312947
United States	S	1,780,193	1,845,698	.4909672	1.8815122	3.3116625
	H	408,644	135,327	.7512243	1.4026598	2.6053311
Criterion values for % of maximum variation						
(%)						
5		100,000	5,000	.9523810	0.0000017	−2.0001151
10		100,000	10,000	.9090909	−0.0000001	−1.9999985
15		100,000	15,000	.8695652	0.0000000	−2.0000002
20		100,000	20,000	.8333333	0.0000000	−2.0000003
25		100,000	25,000	.8000000	−0.0000000	−2.0000000
30		100,000	30,000	.7692308	−0.0000000	−2.0000000
35		100,000	35,000	.7407407	−0.0000000	−2.0000000
40		100,000	40,000	.7142857	0.0000000	−2.0000000



FIG. 2. The apportionment of American Legislatures, as measured by variance in the population of representational units (as of March 26, 1962).

Federalists of 1787. We think that the empirical data support our attribution—on the basis of theory, a year before we saw any computer results—of the label "misapportioned" to the C quadrant. Two of these are states which have taken affirmative steps to assure that the senate will *not* be apportioned according to equality of population, but will instead be able to exercise a veto power over a lower house that is, relatively speaking, apportioned on such a basis; the New Jersey convention was specifically precluded from changing such an existent system—a concession which liberals made in order to change other parts of an archaic state constitution. In the B quadrant, on the other hand, the houses of Vermont and Connecticut most conspicuously reflect the silent gerrymander, retaining in the mid-Twentieth Century the patterns of apportionment that were established in the Eighteenth Century and the early Nineteenth Century, respectively. The lower houses of the states in this quadrant remain unapportioned. Our characterization of the quadrants, of course, is most clearly true of the four corners of the graph; they do not differentiate reliably among the dozen or so states that cluster in the middle around the intersection of the three medians.

The clustering of states along the median diagonal simply indicates a general tendency of many states to apportion both chambers of their legislature—at whatever level of variance—about the same. A general tendency also emerges, however, for the houses to be better apportioned than the senates: 21 states are to the left of the median diagonal, and 28 (not including Nebraska) are to its right. Thus there are a third again as many states in which the senate is less well apportioned than the house as there are states in which the opposite is true. The medians suggest a similar finding: the senate median ICV score is .59, while that for the house scores is .63; and since these axes are medians, they necessarily partition the legislatures symmetrically among the quadrants: sixteen and a half each in A and D, and nine each in B and C (see Table V). None of the states that appear in the D quadrant, with the exception of Rhode Island, is primarily urbanized and industrial; while several such states—New York, Massachusetts, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Michigan—do appear in Quadrant A.

Table III, which utilizes the categories of skewness and kurtosis on the basis of the g_1 and g_2 score ranges defined in Table I, provides summary information about the distributions of the representational curves. Considerable and extreme skewness are always positive; the solitary negative value lies within the normal range. Negative kurtosis is much more common than negative skewness, but also only within the normal range. Considerable and extreme kurtosis are always leptokurtic (positive); and with the exception of four lower chambers, considerable or extreme skewness always accompanies considerable or extreme kurtosis. The ten chambers with the highest skewness scores, in each of the two distributions (house and senate), are also the chambers with the ten highest kurtosis scores. The combination of extreme positive skewness with extreme leptokurtosis shows a piling up of many representational units with low population, with consequent severe underrepresentation of heavily populated districts. The marginal column and row totals of the table show that the senates tend to be more skewed than the lower houses, but that they show generally no more kurtosis than the houses do. We have indicated already that, in theory, skewness and kurtosis ought to be positively correlated; and Table III shows that, for our data, they are so associated in practice.

In Table IV we present a scale which ranks all

TABLE III. SKEWNESS AND KURTOSIS IN POPULAR REPRESENTATION IN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CHAMBERS

	SKEWNESS :			
KURTOSIS :	Extreme	Considerable	Normal	Totals
Normal		8 2	7 14	15 16
Considerable		24 19	 4	24 23
Extreme	11 10	1 1		12 11
Totals	11 10	33 22	7 18	Senates 51 50 Houses

TABLE IV. A SCALE OF THE APPORTIONMENT OF AMERICAN LEGISLATURES, WITH SUMMARY EVALUATION OF THE SKEWNESS, KURTOSIS, AND VARIABILITY IN THE CURVES FOR THEIR DISTRIBUTION ACCORDING TO THE POPULATION OF THEIR REPRESENTATIONAL UNITS

Rank	State	Senate:		House:		Joint Variability*	Apportionment Score
		Skewness	Kurtosis	Skewness	Kurtosis		
1	Mass.	Normal	Normal	Normal	Considerable	A	96.3
2	Ore.	Normal	Normal	Normal	Normal	A	86.5
3	Ohio	Normal	Normal	Normal	Normal	B	81.2
4	Neb.	Considerable	Considerable	NONE		A†	80.9
5	Maine	Normal	Normal	Normal	Considerable	A	80.3
6	N.H.	Normal	Normal	Considerable	Considerable	A	71.0
7	Pa.	Considerable	Normal	Normal	Considerable	A	70.8
8	N.Y.	Considerable	Considerable	Normal	Considerable	A	69.2
9	Ark.	Considerable	Considerable	Normal	Normal	A	66.1
10	W.Va.	Considerable	Considerable	Normal	Normal	A	65.2
11	Wash.	Considerable	Considerable	Normal	Normal	A	62.6
12	Wyo.	Considerable	Normal	Normal	Normal	A	62.3
13	N.J.	Considerable	Normal	Normal	Normal	C	58.9
14	Wisc.	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	A	58.5
15	N.C.	Considerable	Considerable	Normal	Normal	B/A	56.6
16	S.C.	Considerable	Considerable	Normal	Normal	C	55.6
17	Del.	Normal	Normal	Considerable	Considerable	D	50.6
18	Idaho	Considerable	Considerable	Normal	Normal	D	50.1
19	Haw.	Considerable	Normal	Considerable	Normal	C	48.9
20	Va.	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	A	47.6
21	Ill.	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	A	47.2
22	Mo.	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	B	46.2
23	Colo.	Considerable	Normal	Considerable	Considerable	D/B	45.5
24	Vt.	Normal	Normal	Extreme	Extreme	B	44.8
25	Mont.	Considerable	Considerable	Normal	Normal	C	44.7
26	S.D.	Extreme	Extreme	Normal	Normal	A	44.2
27	Mich.	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	A	43.7
28	Utah	Considerable	Normal	Considerable	Considerable	D	43.2
29	Miss.	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	B	42.1
30	R.I.	Considerable	Normal	Considerable	Considerable	D	42.0
31	N.D.	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	B	41.8
32	Alas.	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	Normal	C	41.5
33	La.	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	B	40.9
34	U.S.	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	C	39.5
35	Md.	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	D	29.8
36	Ariz.	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	C	27.2
37	Conn.	Considerable	Normal	Extreme	Extreme	B	27.1
38	Tex.	Considerable	Considerable	Extreme	Extreme	D	26.6
39	N.M.	Extreme	Extreme	Normal	Normal	C	23.2
40	Cal.	Extreme	Extreme	Normal	Normal	C	20.2
41	Nev.	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	D	16.6
42	Ky.	Extreme	Extreme	Extreme	Extreme	B	13.9
43	Alab.	Extreme	Extreme	Considerable	Considerable	D	13.8
44	Tenn.	Considerable	Extreme	Extreme	Extreme	D	11.8
45	Kans.	Extreme	Extreme	Considerable	Considerable	D	10.9
46	Fla.	Considerable	Considerable	Extreme	Extreme	D	10.2
47	Okla.	Extreme	Extreme	Considerable	Extreme	D	9.5

* The letters correspond to the quadrant designations in Figure 2.

† A maximal ICV score of +1.0 and a maximally positive *G* score of +0.3 were assigned to Nebraska's non-existent lower chamber.

TABLE IV. (*Continued*)

Rank	State	Senate:		House:		Joint Variability*	Apportionment Score
		Skewness	Kurtosis	Skewness	Kurtosis		
48	Iowa	Extreme	Extreme	Extreme	Extreme	D	7.8
49	Minn.	Extreme	Extreme	Extreme	Extreme	D	1.3
50	Ga.	Extreme	Extreme	Extreme	Extreme	D	−4.0
51	Ind.	Extreme	Extreme	Extreme	Extreme	D	−4.3

Summary Indices for the Apportionment Score Distribution:

Median = 44.2 ICV = .64

Mean = 42.5 $g_1 = -.02$

$\sigma = 24.2$ $g_2 = -.62$

of the legislatures in our sample according to "apportionment scores" which combine the ICV scores (that measure variance) with the *G* scores (that measure skewness and kurtosis). This scale is more comprehensive, therefore, than Figure 2, which measures variance alone, although as Table V shows, the quadrant classifications of Figure 2 are closely and positively associated with the tails of the distribution for the apportionment score ranking. In the middle ranks, however, the scale is quite independent (in a statistical sense) of the ICV categories. What this shows is that when both chambers of a legislature are similar in variance, then variance scores are a fairly good predictor for skewness and kurtosis, and hence for the composite apportionment scores; but when the two chambers of a legislature are quite dissimilar in variance, then many different combinations of variance-skewness-kurtosis can result in similar apportionment scores. We might say that the road to relatively good, or to relatively bad apportionment, is straight and narrow; while there are many ways in which a mediocre apportionment can be produced.

According to our scale, Massachusetts was the best-apportioned legislature in the country, and Indiana was the worst, at the time the Supreme Court decided *Baker* v. *Carr*. Georgia, however, ranks fiftieth; and Georgia has been conspicuous in recent reapportionment litigation before the Supreme Court.[35] There are only four states in which normal skewness is accompanied by considerable kurtosis, a condition which indicates a piling up of many average sized representational units near the mean and midpoint of the population range. We postulated that this was an essential condition for good apportionment; and it occurs empirically only in the lower chambers of Massachusetts, Maine, Pennsylvania, and New York—states which rank 1, 5, 7, and 8 in our scale. Not a single legislature apportions both of its chambers so well. Only seven states have normal *G* scores for their senates, and five of these rank among the first six in the scale. The other two are Delaware and Vermont, and Delaware ranks lower because of the high variance for both of its chambers, while Vermont ranks lower because of the extreme skewness and kurtosis, as well as the exceptionally high variance in the apportionment of its house. Nebraska ranks very high (fourth) because of our statistical—and political—assumption that

TABLE V. ASSOCIATION BETWEEN ICV QUADRANTS (FROM FIGURE 2) AND APPORTIONMENT RANKS (FROM TABLE IV)

ICV Quadrants:	Ranks: Top Third	Middle Third	Bottom Third	Total
A	12½	4	0	16½
B	1½	5½	2	9
C	2	4	3	9
D	1	3½	12	16½
Total	17	17	17	51

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[35] *Gray* v. *Sanders*, 372 U. S. 368 (March 18, 1963), declaring illegal Georgia's "county unit" system for statewide primary elections; and *Wesberry* v. *Sanders*, 32 L.W. 4142–4157 (February 17, 1964), invalidating Georgia's districting for the national House of Representatives.

the lower house of a unicameral legislature must be perfectly apportioned; there are a few states (actually less than a dozen) with senates better apportioned than Nebraska's, but none with a more equally apportioned house. Only five states have extreme *G* scores for both chambers of their legislatures; four of these states also are in the D variance category, and they occupy the bottom four ranks of the scale.

As Table IV reports, the set of apportionment scores shows considerable variance, but it evidently is quite normally distributed since it is not skewed, and it is only slightly platykurtic with a negative kurtosis value within the normal range. The mean and the median for the distribution of apportionment scores both fall between 42 and 45. Of the three states that are closest to the median of the distribution—Montana, South Dakota, and Michigan—two in one way or another are not a good choice as a "typical" pattern of apportionment; Montana's senate shows too much variance, and South Dakota's senate has too much skewness and kurtosis to be considered typical. However, Colorado (which ranks twenty-third and had the median senate) and Michigan both fall near the intersection of the median axes in Figure 2; and in spite of the fact that they are classified in different quadrants (D/B and A) of the figure, both have about average variance, which is accompanied by considerable skewness and considerable or normal kurtosis, in both houses of their legislatures. We think that both of those states (the one primarily rural and non-industrialized and the other primarily urban and industrialized) better typify the apportionment of American legislatures as of March 1962.

As Table II shows, and somewhat contrary to the usual understanding, the national House of Representatives, although *marginally* within the 35 percent range of variation, is not really very much better apportioned than is the United States Senate in terms of the criteria of skewness and kurtosis; and this is reflected in the rank of the national legislature on our scale.[36] The Congress is in rank 34, below two-thirds of the states.

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[36] The Supreme Court ruled, in *Wesberry* v. *Sanders*, *ibid.*, that Georgia's districting violated the principle of "one person, one vote" and therefore the popular election clause (Art. I, sec. 2) of the Constitution. Mr. Justice Harlan explicitly argued, in dissent, that if the conclusion of the Court's seven-man majority were correct, then the congressional districting in most of the other states also would be unconstitutional if appraised under the same standard that was applied to Georgia. The considerable skewness and kurtosis, for the distribution of representational units of the national House of Representatives, tend to support Justice Harlan's inference.

HOBBES'S CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION—I*

HANNA PITKIN
University of California, Berkeley

It is not customary to regard Thomas Hobbes as a theorist particularly concerned with representation. Hardly any of the traditional commentaries on his thought even acknowledge that he mentions the term; and the index to Molesworth's standard edition of Hobbes's English works contains no reference to it.[1] But the fact is that representation plays a central role in the *Leviathan;* and Hobbes's analysis of the concept is among the most serious, systematic and challenging in the history of political philosophy. It is an analysis both temptingly plausible and, as I hope to show, peculiarly wrong. And the ways in which it is wrong are intimately related to what is most characteristic and peculiar in the Hobbesian political argument.

If a theorist's analysis of a concept is both plausible and wrong, then it gives us a special opportunity. For in discovering why it is tempting and how it is wrong, we may ourselves be freed from the same temptation and thus protected against making the same error. Where, as with Hobbes, there is also a correlation between peculiarity of concept and peculiarity of doctrine (and I think this is much more commonly the case than is generally supposed), we have an additional opportunity. We can use the examination of the writer's concept as a help toward understanding, as a source of new insights about his doctrine. In Hobbes's case circumstances particularly invite such a study. For the concept of representation makes its appearance only in the *Leviathan,* the last of Hobbes's three major political works which are in other respects closely parallel.[2] Thus by comparing the argument of the *Leviathan* with that of the earlier works, we can learn what functions representation performs for Hobbes—the ways in which it grows out of his earlier ideas, and the ways in which it extends them.

But before this kind of comparative study can usefully be made, it is necessary to explicate and to criticize Hobbes's concept of what representation is and means. The burden of my criticism is that Hobbes's definition is incomplete, and therefore wrong, an inadequate and misleading account of the meaning of representation. To show this, I shall sometimes adduce counterexamples, instances of what we all recognize as "representation" or "representing" or a "representative" thing, instances of the ordinary, normal, unproblematic use of this family of words in English. Some of these instances are so ordinary and so common that Hobbes himself employs them; and where I can, I cite counterexamples from his own text. Because this fact may mislead the reader, let me be clear about my intentions at the outset. First, as to substance: it is *not* my intention to take Hobbes to task for being inconsistent (defining a word in one way and using it in another). *Nor* is it my intention to reinterpret his views as being, say, more democratic or less democratic than they are usually taken to be (he didn't "really mean" his definition, or he didn't "really mean" the uses inconsistent with it). I want merely to show (in the first part of this article) that, and how, his definition is peculiar; in order to be able (in the second part of this article) to let that peculiarity illuminate characteristic features of his political doctrine as a whole.

Second, as to method: the validity or force of my counterexamples *as* counterexamples in no case depends on the fact that Hobbes himself used them. Their force derives from the fact that they are normal English which any native speaker will recognize.[3]

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* This essay is largely based on two chapters from my doctoral dissertation. The dissertation was completed with the help of a fellowship granted by the Social Science Research Council, for which I am most grateful.

[1] *English Works,* edited by Sir William Molesworth (London: Longmans, Brown, Green and Longmans, 1839–1845), henceforth cited as *E.W.*

Karl Loewenstein goes so far as to call the principle of representation incompatible with the Hobbesian doctrine; *Volk und Parlament* (Munich: Dreimasken, 1922), p. 35. Among commentators on Hobbes, the importance of representation seems to have been noticed only by Ferdinand Tönnies in his *Thomas Hobbes* (Stuttgart: Fr. Frommanns, 1925), p. 238, and by Joseph Tussman in his unpublished doctoral dissertation, "The Political Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes" (University of California, Berkeley, 1947), pp. 89–119. The related concept of the "person" does get some attention in the French literature. See Raymond Polin, *Politique et Philosophie chez Thomas Hobbes* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1953), ch. x; René Gadave, *Thomas Hobbes* (Toulouse: Ch. Marques, 1907), pp. 93–101; B. Landry, *Hobbes* (Paris, 1930), ch. x.

[2] *The Elements of Law,* completed in 1640, was not published until 1650. *De Cive,* completed in 1642, appeared first in Latin and was not published in English until 1651, the same year that the *Leviathan* appeared.

I. THE DEFINITION

Hobbes defines representation in relation to the giving and having of authority. His definition therefore tends to be formalistic (one wants to say "legalistic," but representation is needed in the Hobbesian system even before the existence of positive law, in the "state of nature"). The definition is also strongly skewed in favor of the representative, making his position a highly privileged one. In brief, a representative is defined as a person who has been given authority to act, and this in turn means a deployment of rights and responsibilities. The representative has been given new rights; the man he represents has taken on new responsibilities, has become responsible for the representative's actions. Applied in the political argument, this notion comes to be a way of establishing the unlimited authority of the sovereign, and his subjects' unlimited obligation to obey.

Hobbes completes virtually his entire discussion and analysis of what representation means in a single chapter, Chapter Sixteen of the *Leviathan:* "Of Persons, Authors and Things Personated." The chapter begins with the notion of a person, distinguishes "natural" from "artificial" persons, and proceeds to define a representative as an artificial person. But we are not simply to equate "person" with "human being," for the chapter begins:

> A person, is he, whose words and actions are considered either as his own or as representing the words or actions of an other man, or of any other thing, to whome they are attributed, whether *truly or by fiction.*[4]

A person, then, is a "he" with words and actions, so that one can speak of his ("whose") words and actions. That is, a person is a thing we may observe speaking words or performing actions. But we do not always consider the words we observe spoken or the actions we observe performed as "his own"; sometimes we consider them as representing the words or actions of someone or something else.

Hobbes distinguishes two kinds of persons to correspond to these two possibilities: natural and artificial. A natural person is one whose words and actions are considered his own; a feigned or artificial person is one whose words and actions are considered those of someone else. At least some, if not all, artificial persons are representatives, so it is important to understand what Hobbes has to say about the artificial person. To begin with, the modern reader is liable to a confusion (to which some commentators have also succumbed), as to just what is "artificial" about an artificial person.[5] Modern legal terminology distinguishes between natural persons, that is, human beings, and fictitious persons like corporations. A corporation, although clearly not in reality a human being, may be treated like one in law; it may, for example, be sued in court, and it is responsible for the authorized actions of its officers. But this is not the way Hobbes draws the distinction. If the treasurer of a corporation, acting in his official capacity, makes out a check, we would regard him as a natural person, the corporation as an artificial one responsible for his action. But for Hobbes, the treasurer would be an artificial person, his actions "owned" by the corporation. In modern legal terminology the fictive element in the idea of a fictitious person is that a group of men associated by a legal agreement is (like) a human being. In Hobbes's terminology the fiction or artifice about an artificial person is that the actions he is performing are not (considered) his own but those of someone else.

This seems odd. What can it mean to say that sometimes a person's words and actions are not considered his own? When are someone's actions not his own? When might we spontaneously say such a thing?

One does talk that way sometimes about *words,* so perhaps that is the place to begin. A student who mouths phrases he has memorized, but the meaning of which he obviously does not understand, may be admonished to "put that in your own words." Thus sometimes a man's words are not his own; he has spoken them, but the work of composition was obviously done by Hegel, and not by this sophomore philosophy student. Or we may treat a speaker's ideas this way; a radio commentary may be preceded by the disclaimer: "the views expressed are the speaker's own, and do not necessarily reflect the views of our sponsor." Here the intent seems to be to underline the sponsor's refusal to take responsibility for what is said.

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[3] My approach thus leans heavily on the developments in modern philosophy variously referred to as "ordinary language philosophy," "Oxford philosophy," or "linguistic analysis." I am particularly indebted to Stanley L. Cavell, who introduced me to it; see especially his "Must We Mean What We Say?", *Inquiry,* Vol. 1 (1958), pp. 172–212. The reader unfamiliar with these ideas may find the most useful introduction to them to be the work of J. L. Austin, particularly "A Plea for Excuses" and "Other Minds," now collected in his *Philosophical Papers* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1961). Behind ordinary language philosophy there looms, of course, the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, particularly the *Philosophical Investigations* (New York, 1953). But I had not read Wittgenstein when the bulk of this essay was written, and its spirit is more Austinian than Wittgensteinian.

[4] *E.W.*, III, 147.

[5] Tönnies, *op. cit.*, pp. 238–9; Gadave, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

But is there a corresponding notion for actions? One thinks of various vaguely analogous situations: a person under hypnosis does what he is ordered to do by the hypnotist; a person "possessed" by the devil or by spirits does their bidding, a puppet goes through certain motions in response to the pull of the strings. But in none of these cases would one really say "his actions are not his own." One might say that his actions are not under his own control, or that he doesn't know what he is doing, or that he performs them not of his own volition. In the case of the puppet we might be inclined to deny that he is performing actions at all.

When are our actions not our own? When does one say of any object or concept, *X*, "His *X* is not his own," or "My *X* is not my own"? Even such a formulation is rare, but it does occur when the context supplies some sense of the possessive other than ownership, to contrast with it. Thus, "His house is not his own," might mean the house in which he lives belongs to someone else. "Since I took this job, my life is not my own"; I live the life all right, but I have no rights of ownership, no choice or control over what I do. Or, again, a child, having to share the family pet with the other children, may complain, "I wish I had a dog of my *own*." He has a dog available, has the use of a dog, but not the exclusive rights and prerogatives that ownership would bring. In the situation above, where the student's words were not his own, this criterion clearly is fulfilled. They were his words in the sense that he spoke them, but not his own in the sense that he did not invent the particular sentences he used and should not be credited with them.

One would suppose, then, that this is the sort of thing Hobbes has in mind with regard to actions. "My" things are not "my own" if I have possession of them but they are owned by someone else. My words are not my own if what comes out of my mouth is someone else's composition. Then, presumably, my actions are not my own if what I am seen to be doing is—what? owned by someone else? composed by someone else? Apparently Hobbes is thinking as if there were something which is to actions what ownership is to property, or authorship is to groups of words. And this is, indeed, the case.

The analogous idea for actions is *authority*, which Hobbes defines as the right to perform the action:

> That which in speaking of goods and possessions, is called an owner, and in latine dominus, in Greek Κυριος, speaking of actions, is called author. And as the right of possession, is called dominion; so the right of doing any action, is called AUTHORITY. So that by authority is always understood a right of doing any act; and done by authority, done by commission, or license from him whose right it is.[6]

And much later in the *Leviathan* Hobbes writes, "for every act done, is the act of him, without whose consent it is invalid."[7]

Hobbes calls the man who actually performs an action the "actor," and the one by whose authority he acts, who gave him the right to act, the "author." The idea seems to be this: when we see someone perform an action, just as when we see someone driving an automobile, we do not yet know who "owns" that action or that automobile. The man who owns the automobile is the one who has paid for it and in whose name it is registered. The man who owns the action is the author, the one who has authorized it, who had the right to do it, without whose consent it is invalid. The owner of an automobile may drive it himself, or he may turn it over to someone else to drive, or it may be driven by someone else without his knowledge or permission. Similarly, the man who has the right to perform an action may perform it himself, or he may authorize someone else to do so, or someone may perform the action without the right to do so, through fraud or pretense.

A person, then, is a performer of actions or speaker of words, like the driver of a car. But the question of ownership—of the action or the vehicle—remains open. Explicitly, Hobbes defines it in both cases in terms of having a right; the "right of ownership" over the car, the right to do the action. But if we consider the kind of situation in which it becomes *important* who owns a car, we see there is more to ownership than rights. An equally important aspect is responsibility: for instance, responsibility for damage caused by the car. And the responsibilities of ownership are relevant to actions as well. It is in this sense that one "owns up to" a misdeed. Hobbes is, as it turns out, very much interested in the responsibility borne by the owner of an action. As soon as he has asserted the parallel between authority and ownership, Hobbes makes a sudden jump from the rights to the responsibilities involved. The former passage closes:

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[6] *E.W.*, III, 148.

[7] *Ibid.*, 538.

> So that by authority, is always understood a right of doing any act; and *done by authority*, done by commission, or license from him whose right it is.[8]

The text then continues:

> From hence it followeth, that when the actor maketh a covenant by authority, he bindeth thereby the author, no less than if he had made it himself; and no lesse subjecteth him to all the consequences of the same.

Not only is it the author who is bound by any covenant made on his authority, but it is also the author who is responsible for any breaches of the law of nature he has authorized:

> When an actor doth any thing against the law of nature by command of the author, if he be obliged by former covenant to obey him, not he, but the author breaketh the law of nature; for though the action be against the law of nature; yet it is not his. . . .[9]

The action is not his because it is owned by the author.

And there is a significant passage at the end of the chapter:

> Of authors there be two sorts. The first simply so called; which I have before defined to be him, that owneth the action of another simply. The second is he, that owneth the action, or covenant of another conditionally; that is to say, he undertaketh to do it, if the other doth it not, at, or before a certain time. And these authors conditional, are generally called SURETIES. . . .[10]

Suppose one tries to interpret this passage using simply Hobbes' explicit definitions: ownership of actions is authority, which is the right to do the action. Then this passage would be about situations in which a man has the right to perform a certain action only if someone else does not do it (by a certain time). There *are* such situations, but this passage is clearly not about them, nor would we call such a man a surety. This passage clearly concerns conditional ownership in the sense of conditional *responsibility;* it concerns not the right to act but the obligation to act.

One may say, then, that Hobbes recognizes two aspects of authority, or what it means to own an action. He defines it as the right to do the action, but apparently regards it equally as responsibility for the action (as if one had done it oneself). This duality is reflected in two alternative ways of describing the authorization process. Sometimes Hobbes speaks as if a man who has the right to do an action, commissions someone else to do it for him. At other times, Hobbes describes a man making himself owner of, making himself responsible for, what someone else is going to do.[11] In both cases the rights and privileges accrue to the one who is authorized, the obligations and responsibilities to the one who authorizes. It follows that representation is such a relationship of rights and responsibilities, for a representative is an artificial person:

> . . . to personate, is to act, or represent himself or another; and he that acteth another, is said to bear his person, or act in his name; . . . and is called in divers occasions, diversly; as a representer, or representative, a lieutenant, a vicar, an attorney, a deputy, a procurator, an actor, and the like.[12]

That Hobbes's definition places all the rights at the representative's disposal and all the burdens on the represented, is partially obscured by a distinction he draws between limited and unlimited authorization. But careful study of the distinction shows that it leaves his fundamental position unchanged: the representative, as such, is free. Hobbes says that men may either give authority "without stint," or they may give it in limited amounts, restricting the representative "in what, and how far, he shall represent them."[13] Thus it is perfectly possible to talk about limits on or standards for what a representative may do, even within the Hobbesian system. But they are always limits of the *ultra vires* kind; the limits on what the representative *may* do are precisely the limits on what he *can* do *qua* representative. Outside the limits he simply does not represent. Within the limits he represents; and this *means* that he has a special right and no special obligations, that someone else bears the responsibility for his action. Thus it is possible in the Hobbesian system, *sometimes* to authorize without any limitations, creating a total representative, who in every sense and any situation may do as he pleases and bind you with his action.

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[8] *Ibid.*, 148.

[9] *Ibid.*, 149.

[10] *Ibid.*, 152.

[11] Hobbes's ambivalence on this point no doubt is related to his peculiar conception of rights, which in turn depends on the idea of the state of nature. (See Part II of this article.)

[12] *E.W.*, III, 148.

[13] *Ibid.*, 151.

II. SOME SPECIAL ARTIFICIAL PERSONS

But the pattern of bound author and free actor is only the most general one in Hobbes's analysis. A number of variations are possible on this theme, and in the variations the difficulties of the Hobbesian definition begin to emerge. The variations concern certain special kinds of artificial persons—for instance, the guardian, the fraud and the stage actor. Hobbes says of artificial persons that,

> . . . some have their words and actions owned by those whom they represent. And then the person is the actor; and he that owneth his words and actions, is the author: in which case the actor acteth by authority.[14]

Some artificial persons fit this basic model; what of the rest? Unfortunately, Hobbes never follows up on that "some" explicitly, so whatever else can be said must be inferred from his argument. Reviewing what we know about artificial persons so far, we have:

> A person, is he whose words and actions are considered either as his own, or as representing the words and actions of an other man, or of any other thing, to whom they are attributed, whether truly or by fiction.
>
> And when they are considered as representing the words and actions of another, then is he a feigned or artificial person.
>
> Of persons artificial, some have their words and actions owned by those whom they represent.

Taking these passages literally, there are only two possibilities for the remaining artificial persons, whose actions are neither their own nor owned by those whom they represent. Either their actions are owned and authorized by some third party other than the one they represent, or their actions are not authorized by anyone other than themselves. Both these categories of cases exist in the Hobbesian system, and both raise difficulties.

Take the first possibility, that the actions of some artificial persons are authorized not by the one they represent but by a third party. This is the case with the representatives of inanimate objects or irrational beings. Hobbes writes,

> There are few things, that are incapable of being represented by fiction. Inanimate things, as a church, an hospital, a bridge, may be personated by a rector, master or overseer. . . . Likewise children, fooles and mad-men that have no use of reason, may be personated by guardians, or curators. . . .[15]

But inanimate objects, children and madmen cannot be authors, and cannot authorize, because they "have no use of reason." Rationality is crucial here for Hobbes because one can only be obliged if he is capable of knowing his obligation and capable of having sufficient motive to perform the action it prescribes.[16] Both of these conditions presuppose rationality; in its absence one cannot be obligated, and hence cannot enter into valid agreements, like the authorization of a representative. Someone who cannot be held responsible for his own acts cannot assume responsibility for the acts of another. When inanimate objects, children or lunatics are represented, therefore, authority must come from somewhere else. Although inanimate objects cannot authorize their actors,

> . . . yet the actors may have authority to procure their maintenance, given them by those that are owners, or governors of those things. . . . Likewise children, fooles and mad-men . . . can be no authors . . . yet . . . he that hath right of governing them, may give authority to the guardian.[17]

Such situations apparently are examples of representation by fiction. ("There are few things, that are uncapable of being represented by fiction.") What fiction is it that Hobbes speaks of here? It cannot be merely the fiction discussed earlier, which is operative in every case where an artificial person acts: the fiction that his actions are not his own. But it may be related to the fiction referred to in the definition of a person. There Hobbes says the attribution of an action may occur "truly or by fiction." The case of the representation of inanimate objects suggests the following interpretation. When a person's actions are considered as representing those of another *truly*, it is because the latter has authorized them. And when a person's actions are considered those of another *by fiction*, it is because a third party, someone other than the one who is represented, has authorized them.

But why, in such a case, should we say that the artificial person represents the inanimate object, the child or the lunatic? Why should he not be considered simply the representative of the man who authorized him, of the "owner or governor" of the object, child or lunatic? We have here two situations. In the one case a man who happens to be the owner or director of a hospital, say, authorizes someone to represent him personally; the latter becomes representative of the director. In the other case the same man authorizes someone to represent the hospital; the latter becomes representative of the hospital. In both cases control over the action, the doing of the action, is in the hands of one or both of these men. In both cases responsibility for the action and obligations arising out of it rests on the author. (And in neither case is the author the hospital, since inanimate things cannot be authors.) What difference is there between the two cases justifying the differing ways we would describe who is represented? Nothing in Hobbes's explicit analysis of authorization can account for the difference, yet clearly there is one.

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[14] *Ibid.*, 148.

[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 149–50.

[16] Howard Warrender, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1957), p. 23.

[17] *E.W.*, III, 150.

How might we account for this difference? We might want to argue that children and hospitals *can* have rights and obligations after all. Then the representative of a hospital is someone who can incur obligations for it, spend its funds; and the representative of the hospital director is someone who can spend that man's personal funds. From such an argument Hobbes has cut himself off, by maintaining that the obligations arising out of an action always fall on the author, and that inanimate objects cannot be authors. But we might also want to say something else: that the two representatives are supposed, expected, obligated to do different things. The one should look after the interest or welfare of the hospital, the other after the interest or welfare of its director. And this suggestion does find an echo in Hobbes; for, as we just saw, the authority given to the representatives of inanimate objects or children is "authority *to procure their maintenance*."

Here, then, is an example from Hobbes's own text, which cannot be fully explained on the basis of his account of representation. Given Hobbes's assumptions, the only way to explain the difference between the representative of a hospital and the representative of the hospital's director, is that they are supposed to do different things, procure different maintenances. This should at least suggest that something is missing from Hobbes's definition: something related to what a representative is *supposed to do*, whose interest he is supposed to pursue. We shall return to this problem.

Turn now to the second possibility. In addition to those artificial persons authorized by someone other than the one they represent——*i.e.*, by a third party—there are artificial persons who are not authorized by anyone but themselves. This may at first seem paradoxical, since if they are themselves authors of their actions they must be natural persons by definition. But such a category nevertheless exists for Hobbes. They are persons who, in one way or another, *pretend* to be authorized by someone else, but in fact are not. This suggests an alternative interpretation of the assertion that we may attribute a person's action to someone else "truly or by fiction." It may be that when the actor is authorized we attribute his action to another truly; but when he is not, we attribute it by fiction.

The most simple and obvious example of an unauthorized artificial person of this kind is the fraud or swindler. A contract made by an authorized representative obliges the author as if he had signed it himself. But if someone fraudulently pretends to have authority, and so makes a contract with a third party, then of course the alleged author is not bound by it. "When the authority is feigned, it obligeth the actor only. . . ."[18]

But at this point we must consider a further troubling example Hobbes introduces—that of the stage actor, who is in certain respects like the swindler, but whose case really fits neither the standard author-actor pattern nor either of the variations. The stage actor is introduced when Hobbes uses the familiar theme of fiction or artifice to say something more about what a person is. Since a person performs actions, or does things, he is an actor; but an actor is also someone who appears on the stage in a play, and there the element of fiction or artifice is very evident.

Etymologically, Hobbes argues, "person" derives from the Latin *persona*, which,

> . . . signifies the disguise, or outward appearance of a man, counterfeited on the stage; and sometimes more particularly that part of it, which disguiseth the face, as a mask or vizard. . . .[19]

Like a mask on the stage, the person performing an action may not be "real"; that is, he may be only a "front" for the one who is the real "owner" of the action. In fact, the implication is that the person performing the action, like a mask on the stage, is *always* only a false front; but sometimes the face behind the mask is the same one that the mask depicts.

[18] *Ibid.*, 149.
[19] *Ibid.*, 147.

> So that a person, is the same that an actor is, both on the stage and in common conversation; and to personate, is to act, or represent *himself, or another* . . .[20]

Note that in this last statement Hobbes finds the same duality in yet a third word, "represent." First, a person is a human being in ordinary conversation, but, at least etymologically, a person is a mask. Second, an actor is one who performs actions but also an actor is a performer on the stage ("perform" itself also follows this dual usage, although Hobbes does not exploit it). But now finally, "to personate is to act or *represent* himself or another." The actor represents a character on the stage; the man who acts represents someone in ordinary life. *We* might say the latter is true only when a man acts in his capacity as representative of someone else. Hobbes is clearly suggesting that every act is an act of representation—if not of someone else, then of oneself.[21]

Hobbes chooses to illustrate the Latin use of *persona* by a quotation from Cicero, the text continuing,

> . . . and he that acteth another, is said to bear his person, or act in his name; in which sense Cicero useth it where he says, *Unus sustineo tres personas; mei, adversarii, et judicis:* I bear three persons; my own, my adversary's and the judge's. . . .[22]

This passage, although Hobbes (who seldom cites his sources) does not tell us so, is from Cicero's essay "On the Character of the Orator," in which he lets Antony describe his technique for preparing to argue a legal case. First, says Antony, he hears his client's story in private, and presents his opponent's case to him to draw out all the details and discover inconsistencies. "*Itaque cum ille discessit, tres personas unus sustineo summa animi aequitate, meam, adversarii, iudicis.*" That is, he plays three roles, or imagines himself in three roles, in order to see what arguments and questions would occur to each: himself, his adversary and the judge. He puts himself in their places, like the detective trying to outguess the criminal by asking himself, "now what would I do if I were he?"

The use of *persona* here clearly is a little wider than as a mask or vizard, or even the disguise or outward appearance of a man on the stage. Antony pretends to be his adversary and his judge, not on the stage, but to himself. It might be said that mentally he puts on their masks. And he may, indeed, assume a typical stance or facial expression of the man he is "playing," to aid himself psychologically in identifying, in imagining the other's thoughts and arguments. But now one may ask what the connection or relationship is between what Antony does in preparing a case, what an actor does on the stage, and what a representative does. Let us recall for a moment the context in which Cicero's Antony entered the discussion. Hobbes had said "person" derives from *persona,* and that therefore a person is an actor in both senses of the word, and "he that acteth another is said to bear his person, or act in his name; in which sense Cicero . . ." Does Antony act in the name of adversary and judge? Surely not; they do not even know of his little charade, and the charade will not have "official" consequences, as an action in the name of a judge might have. Does Antony bear the persons of adversary and Judge? Perhaps. This phrase is more difficult, since it is no longer in common usage. Certainly we can agree that he "acteth another," if only to himself, mentally, in the same metaphorical sense as (above) he puts on a mask.

Cicero's Antony, an actor on the stage, and a representative are all artificial persons to Hobbes, while they perform those specific actions. By definition, this means that their actions are considered not their own, but are those of someone or something else. But the only concept of ownership of actions Hobbes has given us refers to authority to perform the action—the right to do it, and responsibility for it. Surely this does not apply to a stage actor or to Antony "bearing three persons." No one has authorized their actions, neither the person(s) they represent, nor any third party.

Could one argue that they are self-authorized, that their authority is feigned, like that of a fraud or swindler? It is tempting to do so, because the element of artifice is so similar, and Hobbes himself may well have assumed such an argument. But it really will not do when examined closely; it simply is not true, that the stage actor and the legal agent both pretend to something which is false for the one and true for the other. There are, of course, situations in which a man pretends to be authorized when he is not; and we may *compare* such an activity to what goes on in a theater performance. A good actor, for instance, might be more successful at such deception than a poor one.

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[20] *Ibid.*; italics mine.

[21] The concept of the self as an assumed "role" that we "play," while evidently not entirely right, is most suggestive. *Cf.* Erving Goffman's extraordinary study, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (University of Edinburgh, 1958). But, of course, we do not ordinarily play or represent ourselves; as Goffman's title suggests, it is at most a matter of *pre*sentation; and even then the self is neither totally distinct from its masks, nor entirely exhausted in them.

[22] *E.W.*, III, 148. Although no citation is given in the *Leviathan,* Hobbes uses the same quotation in his "Letter to Bishop Bramhall" (*E.W.*, IV, 310); and there he attributes it to one of Cicero's letters to Atticus. I finally located the true whereabouts of the passage in II *de Oratore* 102.

But surely that situation is noticeably different from what *ordinarily* goes on on the stage, or when someone is acting a part. Ordinarily the actor in a play does not claim or even pretend to be the authorized representative of anyone. He does not pretend to act on authority of Hamlet, but to *be* Hamlet. His entire manner and appearance are directed to creating the illusion that he is someone else, someone whom he is playing, or, as we say, representing on the stage. Conversely, an authorized representative does not, under ordinary circumstances, pretend to *be* the person whom he represents. The agent of the king does not dress or behave like the king, or try to pass himself off as his royal majesty. Most assuredly the West-coast representative of a national corporation does not try to pass himself off as that corporation itself. Nor, of course, does a Congressman pretend to be a large number of citizens. Thus it seems again that Hobbes's definition of the ownership of actions, and of authority, may be too narrow, that his examples require more than he says explicitly.

What would be a more satisfactory account of Hobbes's own example of a theater performance? There *is*, surely, some sense in which the actions of a performer on the stage are to be considered "not his own." What this seems to mean is that there are certain kinds of restrictions on his actions, or expectations to which he conforms. His actions are not his own because they are not characteristic of him, do not express his own feelings or manners. He is deliberately conforming to the playwright's script and to the "role." One may say that his words are not his own, but Shakespeare's; more frequently one would say his words and actions are not his own, but Hamlet's. The role is an external standard for the actor, and this is true even if it is self-imposed (as is usually the case). It is true even though the actor himself helps shape the role; it would even be true if the actor himself had written the play.

The point for the present discussion is that the actor "represents" someone on the stage, and his actions are not his own but someone else's, in a different sense from any of those in Hobbes's account of authorization. The stage actor's situation is defined not by any prior giving of right or accepting of responsibility, nor by pretense to these, but by the *content* and *manner* of what he does and how he acts. This is perhaps seen even more clearly in the example of Antony's situation as portrayed by Cicero. Of course it is Antony who acts, and he is neither authorized nor pretends to be so. And he could put any words or thoughts he liked into the mouths of his adversary and judge while he played them; he is all alone and no one cares about his fantasies. But to achieve his purpose of preparing an effective legal argument, he must play these men well, play them as they are. He must think as they would think, fit his actions and words to the external but self-imposed standard of their character and reactions.

In the case of Antony, some further interesting evidence is available in Hobbes's own writings. For Hobbes comes back to the passage from Cicero in his later *Letter to Bishop Bramhall,* while defining "person" for a theological argument.[23] And he appends the following explanation to the citation:

> In the same sense we use the word [person] in English vulgarly, calling him that acteth by his own authority his own person, and him that acteth by the authority of another, the person of that other.

The American reader should be reminded here of the British usage, "He's not his own man," or the terming of a servant or vassal as, "———'s man."[24] But here again closer examination shows that the defining element in the situation is not, as Hobbes alleges, who has the right to act and who is responsible for the action, or at least not primarily that. The crucial element is, who has control over the action. He's not his own man—why? Because he is not free to do as he likes, or else because he has been well paid or otherwise brought into line so that he will do someone else's bidding.

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[23] *E.W.*, IV, 310.

[24] My argument here holds only if, in writing of the vulgar expression "he's not his own person," Hobbes in fact had in mind "he's not his own man." Otherwise there might conceivably have been a seventeenth century expression "he's not his own person," which *was* defined by acting on someone else's *authority*, as Hobbes suggests. I have not found any evidence of such a usage. No such use of "person" is listed in the *Oxford English Dictionary;* it does, however, list "he's not his own man." The earliest example of this expression dates from the fourteenth century, and it has been in use since then. Its meaning corresponds to the one I suggest, not that given by Hobbes. It seems to me extremely likely that Hobbes in fact had in mind "he's not his own man," and was again misled about it by his authorization definition.

A further aspect of the ownership of actions thus emerges from a study of some of Hobbes's examples; it is an aspect involving control over action, or limitation on it. Apparently sometimes representation is defined by the way an action is performed, or by standards or expectations to which it must conform, rather than by any agreement concerning the right to do it or responsibility for it. This additional aspect of representation was seen first in the account of the representation of inanimate objects, and now it reappears in the discussion of stage acting and of Antony preparing his legal argument.

It is worth noting that this aspect of ownership may be found also in almost all of the examples used in my earlier abstract discussion of what ownership is, as distinct from possession. The "views expressed are the speaker's own," so the sponsor should not be held responsible for them; but why not? Clearly because the speaker is the only one who has sufficient control over what he says. Or, again, the child that wants a dog of its own, and the man who complains that his life is no longer his own, are seeking the control, the freedom to do as one chooses with one's possessions, that go with ownership. The same element exists in the concept of authority itself, as well. For an author is not only someone with authority, who can authorize; he is also the one who writes or composes or originates something—who controls its development or outcome or final form.[25] And when a student is admonished to put into his own words something he has just parroted by rote, it is the act of authorship that was missing. The author of an action, like the author of a book is the one to whom credit or blame accrues—but why? Surely it is because he wrote and created the book, planned and controlled the action.

Nor is the Hobbesian notion of limited authorization really any help here. The stage actor and Antony do not have some sort of elaborately limited authority, nor do they pretend to have it. Authority, rights and responsibilities, are simply irrelevant to the way (sense) in which they represent. Similarly in the case of representing inanimate objects, children or lunatics; limited authorization is no help. One can easily imagine a man giving limited authority to someone to "procure the maintenance" of such an incompetent. But this does not explain why he is then the representative of the incompetent, instead of the (limited) representative of the person who authorized him.

These examples at least suggest the inadequacy of the Hobbesian definition, and point toward the nature of this inadequacy. Representing does not, in fact, mean merely acting with authority from another. There may be such relationships, but they are not what representation is normally like, and they are *not* what "representation" means. Though Hobbes defines it in this way, even his *use* of the word sometimes reveals that he "knows better"; he is, after all, a native English speaker.[26]

III. CRITIQUE

But merely concluding that Hobbes has given an inadequate or incorrect definition does not get us very far. It does not tell us *how* the definition is inadequate. And it does not tell us *why* the inadequate definition is so tempting; why should Hobbes have supposed that *that* is what representation means? No doubt, one major reason why it tempted Hobbes is that it fits so beautifully into his political argument, as we shall see. But it is tempting for us as well, and has tempted any number of theorists since Hobbes's time. For them, too, representing is acting with authority to bring binding consequences down on someone else.

Samuel Pufendorf followed the Hobbesian account most closely.[27] Among more recent writers, perhaps the outstanding adherent to the authorization view is Max Weber, who defines representation as,

> . . . [the] fact that the action of certain members of a group is ascribed to the rest; or that the rest are supposed to, and do in fact, regard the action as 'legitimate' for themselves and binding on them.[28]

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[25] "Author" derives, after all, from the Latin "*augere*," "to make something grow." The connection is noted by Harvey Pinney, "Government—By Whose Consent?" *Social Science*, Vol. 13 (October 1938), p. 297. It has recently been given full significance and development by Hannah Arendt, in "What is Authority?" in *Between Past and Future* (Cleveland: World Publishing, 1963).

[26] He knows, that is, how to use the word. But, like the rest of us, he may go wrong when he tries to *say* explicitly what it means.

[27] *Of the Law of Nature and Nations*, translated by Basil Kennett (London, 1729). But Pufendorf tries, for example, to avoid Hobbes's difficulties about representing incompetents; Bk. I, ch. I, sec. XII.

[28] "Unter Repräsentation wird primär der . . . erörterte Tatbestand verstanden: dass das Han-

Similarly, Karl Loewenstein considers the essence of representation to be,

> . . . that the representatives—whatever the manner of their investiture—are authorized in advance to act conjointly in behalf of their constituents and bind them by their collective decisions.[29]

And Avery Leiserson sees representation wherever certain persons in a group have the power,

> . . . to act with binding authority in the name of the entire membership of the association, and whose action insofar as it affects other individuals must be recognized by them as authoritative even if they find it legally, morally or economically coercive and distasteful.[30]

More or less similar definitions are adopted by Edward Sait, Sir Ernest Barker, Hans Wolff, Sir George Cornwall Lewis, John Plamenatz, Joseph Tussman and (as one among several senses) Eric Voegelin.[31]

The Hobbesian definition is plausible and tempting to so many astute writers and to us, because it is a true account of *part* of what representation means, a true account of its meaning in certain restricted contexts. There are occasions and contexts where the question whether or not a man is a representative does depend strictly on whether or not he has been authorized, where the extent of the principal's responsibility depends strictly on the explicit authorization he gave, and where the representative is free to act as he pleases. Some of these contexts are even important. The functioning of agency in business relations seems to be an example, although even here implicit obligations limit the agent's freedom in a large number of cases. In any event, though there are contexts where this definition seems right, it is nevertheless an incomplete definition, and therefore misleading even for those restricted contexts.

Need one say something at this point about the legitimacy of this kind of criticism? Is Hobbes perhaps entitled to use and define his words as he pleases, particularly if he warns us with an explicit definition? But it is quite obvious from the *Leviathan* that Hobbes was not trying to *re*define terms; he purported to be

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deln bestimmter Verbandszugehöriger (Vertreter) den übrigen zugerechnet wird oder von ihnen gegen sich als 'legitim' geschehen und für sie verbindlich gelten gelassen werden soll und tatsächlich wird." Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1956), I, 171. This work was written between 1911 and 1913. The translation of the passage is my own. There is an English translation available: *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, trans. A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (Glencoe, 1947). But the passages concerning representation are translated too loosely by Henderson and Parsons—at least, too loosely for my specialized interest. Where Weber implies only the ascription of actions, the translation often implies the ascription of normative consequences. (These terms are explained below; compare also *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, I, 25, 171–6, II, 438–40.)

[29] *Political Power and the Governmental Process* (University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 38. Loewenstein actually says "the legal essence," but the context makes quite clear that he means this as a general definition, that without authority to bind others there is no "real" representation.

[30] "Problems of Representation in the Government of Private Groups," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 11 (August 1949), p. 566.

[31] Edward McChesney Sait, *Political Institutions* (New York, 1938), p. 476: representation "occurs whenever one person is authorized to act in place of others."

Sir Ernest Barker, *Greek Political Theory*, p. 35, cited in John A. Fairlie, "The Nature of Political Representation," this REVIEW, Vol. 34 (April, June 1940), p. 459: "No body, even if directly elected, is really representative unless it has representative authority, or in other words, is entitled to deliberate and decide as the exponent of the general will within its sphere."

Hans J. Wolff, *Organschaft und Juristische Person*, vol. II, *Theorie der Vertretung* (Berlin: Carl Heymanns, 1934), pp. 17–18: the representative is "eine Person, die als 'Exponent' einer Gruppe in Erscheinung tritt, deren Verhalten kennzeichnend ist für den 'Geist' dieser Gruppe, und aus deren Verhalten der Gruppe wohl auch Verpflichtungen oder Berechtigungen erwachsen. Der Repräsentant vertritt die Gruppe mit der Wirkung, dass sein Verhalten dieser 'zugerechnet' wird."

Sir George Cornwall Lewis, *Remarks on the Use and Abuse of Some Political Terms* (Oxford: James Thornton, 1877), pp. 97–104.

John P. Plamenatz, *Consent, Freedom and Political Obligation* (London: Oxford, 1938), pp. 4–20.

Tussman, *op. cit.*, pp. 117–8. But *cf.* his more recent *Obligation and the Body Politic* (New York: Oxford, 1960), pp. 59–62, where a wider sense of representation seems to emerge.

Eric Voegelin, *The New Science of Politics* (University of Chicago Press, 1952), pp. 32–75.

giving an account of what they actually mean(t). Often enough his definitions are expressed in phrases like "is called" and "we call." But perhaps Hobbes only meant to define a part of the concept—the meaning of representing in the context of commercial agency, for example? If so, he gives no indication of the fact. It seems much more likely that the partialness of his definition is not intentional, but arises out of error.

This definition, then, can be criticized on three levels. First, as has already been suggested, it takes a part for the whole, and thus misses (cannot account for) some large areas of meaning that "representation" actually has in English. Second, as a result, it misleads us even about that area of meaning to which it does apply. By restricting itself to a single context, it treats that context in an unduly restricted way, an excessively formal way. And, third, because the definition links representation with authority, it leads Hobbes to make too much of the connection, to suppose that every instance of authority is an instance of representing. Let us examine the definition on each of these levels of criticism in turn.[32]

The Hobbesian definition is based on a fundamental assumption so obvious we hardly notice it, yet very restrictive indeed. He assumes that representation has to do with the activities of people, that it is a kind of arrangement among people concerning actions and their consequences. Now this surely is true of representation sometimes, but by no means all the time. What, for example, is someone armed with Hobbes's definition to say about representational art? In what sense is it "representational"? What is he to say of a representative sample? a representative case? a representative member of some collection of objects? In what sense are they "representative"? What is he to make of statements like, "this represents my best efforts," of "those tapestries represent half a life-time of painstaking labor"? What will he say about the portrait painter who represents his bourgeois client as a heroic warrior; what sort of "representing" is that? And how will he account for the way a flag represents the nation, the way a fish may represent Christ, the way major landmarks are represented on a map, or indeed, the way we "let x represent the number of apples John has"?

Hobbes assumes without question that representation concerns human activity; a representative is a person, and a person is one who acts. But representation can also be a state of affairs or condition, resulting from the characteristics of an object, or from the way it is regarded or treated. Inanimate things can represent. Representing, one might say, can be a "standing for" as well as an "acting for," a *darstellen* as well as a *vertreten.* As a matter of fact, the "standing for" senses of the word are much older; it is only during Hobbes's own century that representing becomes an acting-for-others in English. Before that it refers only to art, symbols and the theater, never to agency or political action.

What does Hobbes lose, by confining his definition to the context of action? Evidently, he cannot account for the "standing for" uses like those listed above. But more than that, he is led to a misconception of what representation is like even in the context of action. He emerges with a formal definition, in which whether a man represents depends on whether he has been authorized. And *if* he represents, this means he has certain rights, and someone else has certain obligations. We have already seen some examples that suggest, however, that representing as activity means more than this, that it involves certain obligations on the representative, certain limits on, or standards for his action. Had Hobbes's field of vision extended to "standing for" representation by inanimate objects, he might have seen some of the ways in which representing means conforming to an external standard: resembling an absent thing, embodying a principle, suggesting an idea, giving information about others like oneself, and so forth.

But he did not see these things, and so his account is inadequate even in the context of activity. Given only the formal notion of authorization, Hobbes can tell us nothing about the *activity* or representing as such, as a way or manner of acting. For him, any action taken with authority is representing; it is a formal question, never a matter of *what* is done or *how* it is done. Thus, starting from his definition, there is nothing a representative ought to do or refrain from doing, *qua* representative. There is no way of determining (or even discussing) whether he has represented well; there is no such thing as representing well or badly. Nor can there ever be representation except of "persons," or in the absence of authorization. One cannot "represent law and order," or

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[32] In the brief confines of this article it is only possible to indicate the areas of weakness or failure of the Hobbesian definition. The task of examining alternative definitions, and relating each of them to its context and all of them to each other, I undertake in a book on representation I hope to publish soon.

"represent the consumer interest," or "represent an enlightened foreign policy."

To gain some perspective on what has gone wrong here, we may adopt A. P. Griffiths' terminology and distinguish between ascribing one man's *action* to another, and ascribing the *normative consequences* of action.[33] By "normative consequences" Griffiths means those changes in rights, responsibilities, commitments, obligations and status that may result from an action.[34] The Hobbesian account begins with the ascription of action itself; this seems to be what he means by an action being a person's "own" or not his "own." But this notion is immediately interpreted in terms of authorization, which is to say that the ascription of actions is identified with three other ideas: the ascription of the normative consequences of action, the giving (and receiving) of the right to act (authority to act), and having authority in general, particularly having authority *over* someone else.

But in fact these four ideas are neither identical nor coextensive. It is true that the ascription of one man's action to another—the wanting to say *simultaneously* that it is A's action *and* that it is B's action—is what representation means in the context of actions. But this may or may not be connected with the ascription of normative consequences, the right to act, or authority. All of these can be occasions for the ascription of actions, but none of them need be; and there are quite other occasions for the ascription of actions as well.

Not every ascription of the normative consequences of A's action to B is an occasion for saying A represents B. On this point, Griffiths shares Hobbes's mistaken assumption. He suggests, for example, that we consider a union negotiator the representative of his union *because* his actions (agreeing to a contract, say) have normative consequences for the union.[35] But a judicial injunction may also have normative consequences for the union; yet we do not regard the judge who issues it as the union's representative. Why is the judge different from the negotiator? Both have authority to bind the union by their actions, but only the negotiator's *action* is ascribed to the union. The union may be bound by the judge's decision without being represented by him, without having "acted." But, for example, the union has not "consented" unless it has acted—either directly or through a representative—and consenting may have special, different normative consequences. What is crucial here is this: consenting is something which normally people must do for themselves; hence, if in special circumstances a person or group that did not literally act is supposed to have consented, we may invoke representation. But then the *action* is ascribed, along *with* its normative consequences.

Similarly, not every instance of A's giving B the right to act involves representation, nor need it involve the ascription of normative consequences. A police commissioner may issue licenses to peddlers, giving them the right to sell their wares in the community; but the peddlers do not become his representatives, nor need any normative consequences of their actions fall on him. Or I may give someone the right of access to my safe deposit box; this may entail making him my representative for this purpose, but it need not entail any normative consequences for me at all. Again, representation enters only where the action is ascribed to another; and here, too, this happens only when one man gives another the right to do something which ordinarily each must do for himself.

But there may also be quite different kinds of reasons or occasions for ascribing one man's actions to another. It may be neither a matter of ascribing consequences nor a matter of giving rights. We may, for instance, pretend that it is not *A* but *B* who is acting, for purposes of a theater performance; the ascription may be a way of expressing the fact that the actor is playing a role. Or we may find that a man is acting on orders from another, is merely a "front man" for him; to express this discovery we may speak of representation. Or representation may express the idea that one man is acting on behalf of another, furthering his interest. Or he may "represent"—that is, act for—some abstract idea. By comparison with such occasions, rights and normative consequences seem formal; for these occasions have to do with the substantive content of what the representative does, or how he does it. This substance is missing from the Hobbesian account.

Finally, even where the context specifies activity, and where this activity is to be viewed formalistically, in terms of rights and normative consequences—even there, it is a mistake to identify representation and authority. Hobbes is led quite naturally from his definition of a representative as someone who has been authorized, to the supposition that all authority is representative, and that every representative has authority over his principal.

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[33] A. Phillips Griffiths and Richard Wollheim, "How Can One Person Represent Another?" *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume* XXXIV (1960), 187–224.

[34] *Ibid.*, pp. 192–3.

[35] *Ibid.*

Again we can only briefly note that these suppositions are wrong. An agent, for example, may indeed have authority to act and thereby to bind his principal. But he does not usually have (is not said to have) authority *over* his principal; if anything, the principal may have authority over him. Thus it is with the employee who represents a corporation, the servant who represents his master. (Other representatives *do* have such authority over those for whom they act, notably political ones.) Conversely, there are any number of situations where one man has authority over others without representing (being said to represent) them. An army officer, for example, has authority over his men and can command them. But he is not thereby necessarily their representative. It is only if we want, for some reason, to ascribe his actions to those under his authority, that we begin to talk about representation.

Thus I would argue that Hobbes has correctly identified the ascription of actions (the "ownership" of actions) as definitive of *one* important sense of representation. But he has neglected other senses, and has wrongly identified the ascription of actions with the ascription of normative consequences, the giving of rights and authority. The result is a formalistic definition, that seems to leave no room for the substance of representing as activity, of what a representative is supposed to do. This should at least suggest that the different senses of representation may not be as distinct and independent as many writers, wanting to concentrate on political representation, have assumed. A blindness to the way that symbols and paintings represent may result in misconceptions about the way people represent other people. Perhaps the latter misconceptions may result in the former blindness. Or perhaps both should be seen as correlative related symptoms, expressions of an entire philosophical position.

Hobbes, at least, has surely failed to do justice to the complexity, and thereby to the meaning of representation. And the peculiarities of his formalistic definition correspond to peculiarities in his political argument, and, indeed, in his broad philosophical position. The relationship to his political argument is explored in the second part of this essay. Concerning the relationship to his entire philosophical position, I shall merely suggest this line of inquiry: in what sort of a world, among what sort of beings, would Hobbes's definition be adequate? The answer, I suppose, would be in a world of machines, whose behavior is programmed explicitly in advance. Such beings would have no need of concepts like motive and intention, trust and sympathy; instead of a language they might have a logical calculus. But such a world surely does bear interesting resemblance both to Hobbesian psychology and to his idea of a state of nature. The concept and the philosophy go together.

SOME AMBIGUITIES IN THE NOTION OF POWER*

WILLIAM H. RIKER
University of Rochester

The notion of power is often said to be central to the analysis of politics. But while that analysis is a very ancient activity, the conceptual clarification of the notion of power has been undertaken only in the past generation. The reason for this discrepancy I leave to the historians of political ideas. In this introduction I merely observe that the clarification has not proceeded as far as is needed, so that we are still not at all sure of what we are talking about when we use the term. Nevertheless there is light ahead, owing especially to some formal definitions that have been offered in recent years by Shapley and Shubik, March, Dahl, Cartwright, and Karlsson. By reason of the formality of these definitions the issues of meaning have been more sharply delineated than was previously possible. Hence we have reached the point, I believe, where we may confront definitions with each other and specify precisely how they differ. In so doing we may be able to resolve some of the ambiguities remaining in the concept of power. In that hope this essay is written.

But first a personal remark: most contemporary criticism of political theory is directed, unfortunately, at the so-called giants of the past. In such an enterprise, it is not personally embarrassing—indeed it is academically fashionable and intellectually trivial—to explain where Plato went wrong or what Rousseau meant. What political theory needs, however, is criticism of contemporary theory, for this is the theory that is important in guiding political research. But such criticism may be personally embarrassing, especially when, as in this instance, it is directed at the work of men whom I regard as at the very forefront of the social sciences. I want to make it clear, therefore, that (a) I regard the theories I discuss as a great advance, one which I have in the past struggled to make and failed and (b) I utter criticism not captiously but in the spirit of contributing to the dialectic of understanding.

I. FIVE FORMAL DEFINITIONS OF "POWER"

I start with a simple statement of the basic elements of each of the five definitions, ignoring most of the subtleties of each writer's interpretations, and usually using the symbols preferred by the authors. I have also offered verbal translations of the formal definitions, translations which exhibit, I suppose, all the characteristic pitfalls of translations generally.

Shapley, a mathematician who developed his notions originally to discuss the value of n-person games, was aided in applying it to social world by an economist, Shubik.[1] Their definition relates only to the power resulting from the right to vote in a system where voting, and only voting, determines outcomes:

$$P_i = \frac{m(i)}{n!},$$

where P is the power to determine outcomes in a voting body for a participant, i, in a set of participants: $\{1, 2, \ldots, n\}$ where $m(i)$ is the number of times i is in the pivotal position and where *pivotal position* is defined thus: when the rules define q votes as winning,

$$\frac{n+1}{2} \leq q \leq n \quad \text{or} \quad \frac{n}{2} + 1 \leq q \leq n,$$

the pivot position is the qth position in an ordered sequence of the votes. (Note that there are $n!$ ordered sequences or permutations of n things.)

Manifestly,

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} P_i = 1.$$

In words, the Shapley-Shubik definition may be stated thus: the power of a voter to determine an outcome in a voting body is the ratio of (a) the number of possible times the voter may be in a pivotal position in an ordered sequence, to (b) the number of ordered sequences possible, *i.e.*, $n!$. What this measures is thus the participant's chance to be the last added member of a minimal winning coalition, a position that is highly attractive presumably because the last added winner can control the form or distribution of the winnings.

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* I thank Professors Robert Dahl, William Flanagan, Carl Hempel, and Dennis Sullivan for criticisms helpful in improving the argument of this paper. An earlier version was delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York City, September 1963.

[1] L. S. Shapley and Martin Shubik, "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," this REVIEW, Vol. 48 (1954), pp. 787–92; L. S. Shapley, "A Value for N-Person Games," *Annals of Mathematics Study No. 28* (Princeton, 1953), pp. 307–17 and "Simple Games," *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 7 (1962), pp. 59–66.

March's definition grows out of his desire, as a political scientist, to measure comparative amounts of influence, which I take to be substantially equivalent to power in his usage. In his most important paper on the subject he defines the phrase "has at least as much influence as" as a relation, I, between two roles, R_1 and R_2, each acting upon a set of behaviors, $\{B_1, B_2, \ldots\}$.[2] The effect of R_1 and R_2 each choosing a behavior is an outcome, O_{ij}, which can be pictured as a matrix, thus:

$$\begin{array}{cc|c|c|}
 & & \multicolumn{2}{c}{R_2} \\
 & & B_1 & B_2 \\
\cline{3-4}
\multirow{2}{*}{R_1} & B_1 & O_{11} & O_{12} \\
\cline{3-4}
 & B_2 & O_{21} & O_{22} \\
\cline{3-4}
\end{array}$$

Defining Ω_{hk} as the set of outcomes for a choice by R_h of B_k (*e.g.*, a row or column in the foregoing matrix), and using "m" to refer to some measure on the set of possible outcomes (*i.e.*, the set $\{O_{ij}\}$):

$$R_1 \, I \, R_2 \equiv m(\Omega_{1k}) \leq m(\Omega_{2k}).$$

Verbally: To say "R_1 has at least as much influence as R_2" is equivalent to saying "the measure on the row of a choice of a row by Role 1 is equal to or less than the measure on the column of a choice of a column by Role 2, where the row and column chosen are identical behaviors." The essential notion is that the greater the power the greater is the ability to restrict outcomes. If one cannot by one's own action lessen the range (or value of) outcomes in a situation, then obviously one has no control over the future. If one can lessen, then one can control to that degree. Hence follows the notion that the ability to restrict outcomes is the essence of influence or power.

Dahl, also a political scientist, defines power in a way closer to the commonsense tradition than either of the previous two. He says at the beginning: "My intuitive idea of power . . . is something like this: A has power over B to the extent he can get B to do something B would not otherwise do."[3] This sentence is formalized by the use of two conditional probabilities:

$$p_1 = P(B, x \mid A, w)$$
$$p_2 = P(B, x \mid A, w)$$

where (A, w) means that person A does act w; where $(A, \overline{w})$ means that person A does not do act w; where (B, x) means that person B does act x; and where $P(u \mid v)$ is the symbol for conditional probability and means the probability that, given the occurrence of event v, the event u also occurs. Thus p_1 and p_2 are statements of conditional probability. The amount of power, M, is defined thus:

$$M\left(\frac{A}{B} : w, x\right) = p_1 - p_2.$$

Verbally: The amount of power A has over B with respect to order w (by A) and response x (by B) is (a) the probability that, when A does w, B does x, minus (b) the probability that, when A does not do w, B does x. Clearly, this is a straightforward formalization of Dahl's intuitive idea.

Cartwright, a social psychologist, has defined power in a way quite similar to Dahl's, without, however, the use of probabilities. He relies on the notion of a "psychological force" which is a sextuple of the following:[4]

> Agents: $\{A, B, C, \ldots\}$; acts of agents: $\{\alpha_A, \beta_A, \gamma_A \ldots\}$; loci: $\{a, b, c, \ldots\}$, which may be *directly joined* if they lie on a common boundary of regions; motive bases, $\{M_1, M_2, M_3, \ldots\}$ which are drives or predispositions; magnitudes, m, which are real numbers measuring acts; and a time indicator t_r.

Quoting Cartwright, p. 191, "If we wish to indicate that force, f, has act α of agent A as its activator, need for g as its motive base, locus

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[2] James G. March, "Measurement Concepts in the Theory of Influence," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 19 (1957), pp. 202–226; see also his "An Introduction to the Theory and Measurement of Influence," this REVIEW, Vol. 49 (1955), pp. 431–51.

[3] Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 2 (1957), pp. 201–15, at pp. 202–03. Note that Harsanyi has modified Dahl's definition (and also Shapley's) by adding opportunity costs. Since these modifications do not affect the basic theory, I have not discussed them here. John C. Harsanyi, "Measurement of Social Power, Opportunity Costs, and the Theory of Two-Person Bargaining Games," and "Measurement of Social Power in N-Person Reciprocal Power Situations," *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 7 (1962), pp. 67–80, 81–92.

[4] Dorwin Cartwright, "A Field Theoretical Conception of Power," pp. 183–220, in Dorwin Cartwright, ed., *Studies in Social Power* (Ann Arbor, 1959).

a as its location and ab as its direction, m as its strength, and t_k as its temporal position, we write: $f_1 = (\alpha_A, M_q, ab, m, t_k)$.” Defining the strength of an act, $|\alpha_0(ab)|$, Cartwright writes:

$$|\alpha_0(ab)| = |f_{ab}| - |f_{a\bar{b}}|$$

where

$$f_{ab} = (\alpha_0, M_x, ab, m_1, t_k)$$

and where

$$f_{a\bar{b}} = (\alpha_0, M_x, ab, m_2, t_k)$$

Verbally, (f_{ab}) is a force to comply and ($f_{a\bar{b}}$) is a force to resist. Power is defined in terms of the strength of an act:

$$\text{Pow } O/P\ (ab) = |\chi_0(ab)|^{\max},$$

where χ_0 is an element of the set $\{O, t_k\}$ of acts which O can perform at t_k.

In Cartwright's words: “The power of O over P with respect to a change from a to b at a specified time equals the maximum strength of any act which O can perform at that time, where strength is specified for the direction ab in P's life space.”

Finally, Karlsson, a sociologist, has defined power formally in terms of utilities.[5] Given a group of n members acting in time periods ($t_0, t_1, t_2, \ldots$). In each time period the participants perform acts which are identified thus: $a_1(t_j), a_2(t_j), \ldots a_n(t_j)$. The outcome, x, at the end of the time period is a function, g, of these acts:

$$x(t_j) = g(a_1(t_j), \ldots, a_n(t_j))$$

For each participant there is a utility function, u_i, on the outcome,

$$u_i(t_j) = u_i(x(t_j))$$

which determines his evaluation of each outcome, x. To define the power, p, of participant i over j, assume that other participants do not act so as to influence u_i and u_j and let j choose an act to maximize u_j. Also let i choose from among his possible acts to vary u_j from a maximum to minimum, $u_{ij\max}$ and $u_{ij\min}$. Power is then defined as:

$$p_{ij} = u_{ij\max} - u_{ij\min}.$$

This may be expressed verbally: given the situation in which i can vary behaviors and hence outcomes in such a way as to vary j's reward (which is j's utility for an outcome), the power of i over j is the absolute difference between (1) the maximum reward for j from i's determination of an outcome and (2) the minimum such reward. Thus, the greater the range over which i can determine j's reward, the greater is i's power over j.

II. DIFFERENCES AMONG THE FORMAL DEFINITIONS

Even when stated verbally, these definitions have very little in common. One could not, for example, directly infer any one of them from any other one. There is a vague family resemblance between Dahl's and Cartwright's and it is possible that, with some modifications in vocabulary, they could be equated.[6] As between this pair and the others, and as among the other three individually, there is no possible equation, although the spirit of Karlsson's definition is closer to Dahl and Cartwright than to March and Shapley-Shubik. With five definitions there are at least four distinct meanings, each of which appears quite reasonable by itself.

An easy response to the discovery of these four aspects of power is to hope that there will soon be discovered a yet more general formulation which combines these four aspects neatly into one. And yet this hardly seems possible for in some very important ways these definitions are in part mutually exclusive. For example, in Karlsson's definition, power involves an ability to control the rewards to someone else, while in March's it involves the ability to control the outcomes of events. These are quite different potentials and indeed it is quite easy to imagine circumstances in which they vary inversely with each other (e.g., in n-person situations where the very ability to punish occasions coalitions against the potential punisher).

With different and contradictory meanings, even when the form of the definition has already been raised to a high level of generality, it is probably vain to hope that on an even higher level the differences and contradictions might disappear. It seems rather that we are faced with a clear instance of ambiguity which, however desirable in poetry, has no place in science or philosophy. So our immediate problem is the clarification of ambiguity, which we approach by means of a comparison of some obvious differences among the definitions.

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[5] Georg Karlsson, “Some Aspects of Power in Small Groups,” in Joan H. Criswell, Herbert Solomon, and Patrick Suppes (eds.), *Mathematical Methods in Small Group Processes* (Stanford, 1962), pp. 193–202.

[6] If Cartwright's force to comply, f_{ab}, and force to resist, $f_{a\bar{b}}$, could be translated into conditional probabilities of compliance and resistance, then Cartwright's definition would be exactly the same as Dahl's formula, $p_1 - p_2$.

One major difference is the size of the group to which the relation refers. Here the two extremes are Cartwright's and Shapley and Shubik's definitions; Cartwright's is specifically dyadic although at the end of his essay he expresses the hope that an n-adic definition might be constructed out of his dyadic one. On the other hand, Shapley and Shubik begin with an n-person group of voters. Their definition of power leads to a method of calculating the relative chance of each person in the system to control the outcome. Since each person's chance depends on the distribution of chances to other people, the definition is clearly n-adic. Of course, the n-adic definition subsumes the dyadic case; but its application to the dyad is trivial. In between these extremes lie the other three definitions. All three assume an n-person group, either specifically as in Karlsson's definition or inferentially (e.g., from the examples used). But in Dahl's and Karlsson's definition, the measure applied to events is dyadic, that is, it is a numerical comparison between attributes of a pair of persons or actors. Both writers attempt to extend the application to the whole group by means of exhaustive comparisons of each possible pair of participants. But this procedure simply emphasizes the dyadic character of the definition. March's definition seems somewhat closer to Shapley and Shubik than to the other three. Although he specifically defines the relation, I, as a dyadic relation between roles, still the measure on outcomes is applied to all of them, including presumably those outcomes in the n-person system that are not subject to comparison when I is evaluated for two specific roles. Thus, though the comparison is dyadic, the tools of comparison are constructed with reference to the whole set of outcomes. Because of the nature of the tools, therefore, March's definition is essentially n-adic, even though it is cast in the form of a dyadic relation.

It is not surprising that there should be confusion about the size of the group wherein power is measured, or that there should be contradictions between dyadic and n-adic definitions of power. Running throughout theory in the social sciences is a recognition of qualitative differences among one-, two- and three-unit groups. In economics, the study of price determination has sharply distinguished among monopolistic, duopolistic, and oligopolistic situations of supply. Entirely different theories have been constructed to deal with each situation. In game theory, a qualitative difference in strategic problems has been found to occur between every game of size n and every game of size $n+1$, where $n=1$, 2, 3, 4. The sharpest qualitative breaks are between one-person and two-person games and between two-person and three-person games. Two-person theory requires a different kind of mathematics from one-person theory and three-person theory requires a different set of basic definitions from two-person theory. On the other hand, three-, four-, and five-person theory can use essentially the same definitions and mathematics, although each addition of a person introduces a new kind of strategic consideration. There seems little doubt that, quite generally, there is a significant qualitative difference between dyads and n-ads. Not surprisingly, then, definitions generated with the dyadic situation in mind differ sharply from definitions generated with the n-adic situation in mind.

A second major difference among the definitions is in the postulated object of power. (This difference may well turn out to be no more than a reflection of the difference between the dyad and the n-ad, but superficially at least it appears to be independent.) At one extreme again is Shapley and Shubik's definition wherein the object of power is influence over the outcome. For them, power is measured as the chance to occupy a uniquely valuable position in the decision-making process, a position from which one can make the final determination of the outcome. This kind of power is ego-oriented in that its object is to increase utility for ego. It is essentially indifferent to others, so long as ego wins. At the other extreme is Karlsson's definition in which the object of power is, intuitively, to inflict punishment, or, stated more closely to the formal definition, to restrict the utility of someone else. For Karlsson power is other-oriented in the sense that it is concerned only with influence over another and not with an outcome. The contrast can be stated thus: ego-oriented power (Shapley and Shubik) is the ability to increase ego's utility; other-oriented power (Karlsson) is the ability to decrease alter's utility. The other definitions under consideration range themselves in between these extremes: March's is quite close to the ego-oriented extreme, since he defines power in terms of constraints on outcomes, not people. Dahl and Cartwright's definitions are, however, close to the other-oriented extreme in the sense that they measure power as an ability to force others to do one's bidding. They are not quite so extreme in tone as Karlsson's with his emphasis on punishment, but they do have an element of personal dominance, which is the essence of the other-oriented position.

The theoretical significance of the distinction between ego-oriented and other-oriented theories is not, however, that one involves manipulating people and the other involves manipulating outcomes, but rather that they differ on whether or not power always exists. In ego-oriented theories, power always exists. It cannot be eradicated for it refers to outcomes and, so long as outcomes occur, it exists. If ego runs out of power, still someone else in the n-person system has the ability to influence an outcome. So power never disappears from the system. This is especially clear in the Shapley and Shubik definition, where the sum of all participants' power is always one. Suppose, in this system, the power of i is reduced to zero. Still there exist j, k, . . . who acquire i's erstwhile power over outcomes. So no power ever disappears under the Shapley-Shubik definition, although, as circumstances change, different egos may hold it. The same is to some degree true under March's definition. Roles may change in their ability to control outcomes, but some outcome is bound to occur, by definition. Some role or roles, then, can be expected to bring it about, although any particular role may be essentially powerless. Again power cannot disappear.

Under the three other-oriented definitions, however, it is quite possible that power disappears. In both the Dahl and Cartwright measures, it is possible that power be a positive number, zero, or a negative number. (Dahl specifically recognizes this range of possibilities and I infer the same range for Cartwright from the nature of the mathematical operation in his definition.) When power is a positive number, there is no problem: it clearly exists. Similarly, there is not much of a problem when power is a negative number, for a kind of ability to influence still exists. Negative power of A over B in Dahl's (and Cartwright's) terms is not, as might be initially expected, the power of B over A but rather the degree to which A's orders occasion a kind of spite reaction in B. If B decides not to do something that he otherwise intended to do just and only because A told him to do it, then A has negative power over B. Note, however, that negative power is still a positive ability to influence. So long as A is aware of B's probable reaction of spite, he can still manipulate B into doing what he wants him to do: A merely has to order B to do exactly the opposite of what A really wants B to do and B will comply with what A really wants. Hence negative power is a version of positive power and power has not disappeared. But if power is zero, then there is nothing in the relationship. In Cartwright's definition, where power is specifically dyadic, zero power means clearly that power does not exist. In Dahl's definition, however, zero power as between A and B does not preclude power between C and D. The same is true of Karlsson's definition, so we will consider these two together.

Karlsson's definition does not initially admit of power as a negative number. But he further defines relative power, r_{ij}, which is: $p_{ij}-p_{ji}$. This could, of course, be negative and would have the natural meaning, which Dahl's does not, of a reversal in the power relationship. But Karlsson's definition, like Dahl's, does admit zero power, although, if $p_{ij}=0$, it still may be that $p_{kj}>0$. Nevertheless, there is nothing in the Karlsson and Dahl definitions that precludes the possibility that, for all i and j, $p_{ij}=0$, or that, for all A and B, $M(A/B)=0$. And this is to say that power can be non-existent.

Perhaps the contrast between the other-oriented and the ego-oriented definitions can be made clearer with an example. Let there be three participants, a, b, c, in a system and let them have equal chances to influence the outcome and no chance to influence each other. In Shapley and Shubik's definition:

$$P_a = 1/3, \qquad P_b = 1/3, \qquad P_c = 1/3.$$

In March's definition:

$$R_aIR_b, \qquad R_aIR_c, \qquad R_bIR_c.$$

In Dahl's definition:

$$M\frac{(a)}{b} = 0, \qquad M\frac{(a)}{c} = 0, \qquad M\frac{(b)}{c} = 0,$$
$$M\frac{(b)}{a} = 0, \qquad M\frac{(c)}{a} = 0, \qquad M\frac{(c)}{b} = 0.$$

In Cartwright's definition:

$$\text{Pow } a/b=0, \qquad \text{Pow } a/c=0, \qquad \text{Pow } b/c=0,$$
$$\text{Pow } b/a=0, \qquad \text{Pow } c/a=0, \qquad \text{Pow } c/b=0.$$

In Karlsson's definition:

$$p_{ab}=0, \quad p_{ac}=0, \quad p_{bc}=0, \quad p_{ba}=0, \quad p_{ca}=0, \quad p_{cb}=0.$$

The one clearly ego-oriented definition (Shapley and Shubik's) defines power in this circumstance. In a less obvious way, so does March's for, while no numerical quantity is given, it is asserted that the influence of the three participants is equal. That it is equal does not preclude that it exist. In the last three definitions, however, power is clearly non-existent. The array of zeros proves the point. So I observe that ego-oriented power preserves power in the system, while other-oriented power does not.

III. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DYADIC AND N-ADIC POWER AND BETWEEN EGO-ORIENTED AND OTHER-ORIENTED POWER

The differences just pointed out in the kinds of definitions are differences in the kinds of explanations attempted by the several theories. When I speak of kinds of explanations, I have ushered in that *bête noire* of all philosophy of science, the notion of cause. And yet unpleasant as it is, we must deal with this beast for it is beauty's lover.

The thesis of this essay is that differences in the notion of cause stand back of these differences in the notion of power. Once we have straightened out some basic problems in causality, it will be simple enough to straighten out, to explain if not to reconcile, differences in the notion of power. At least two main types of notions of causality are used in social science discourse. One is a notion of marginality, the other is a notion of necessary and sufficient condition. These usually have quite distinct meanings and applications, but sometimes they run together enough to occasion some misunderstanding. It is just such a misunderstanding that is involved in the confusion about the meaning of power.

The popular notion of cause, what the word fundamentally denotes for most speakers of English, has been brilliantly explicated by Douglas Gasking, who points out the similarity between causation and recipes.[7] He observes that a basic human experience is the production of effects by manipulating nature. Any specific rule for manipulation is, he argues, a statement of cause. For example, one says "You can make iron glow by heating it," or, alternatively, "The cause of iron glowing is heat." Hence, causation generally is the notion of rules for manipulation, or recipes. Precisely, *A* is said to cause *B*, where *A* and *B* are repeatable kinds of events, if *B* can be made to occur by making *A* occur.

While the scientist wishes to use particular causes as the basis for inference, the popular notion of cause is much too confused a relation to admit much inference. There are at least two serious difficulties with it. For one thing, even the man in the street and certainly the scientist thinks of causal relations as obtaining between events that are inaccessible to human manipulation. Recipe-causality of course reflects one kind of test for the sentence "*A* causes *B*;" but one clearly does not wish to limit cause only to relations subject to this test. The more profound difficulty with recipe-causality, however, is that it takes as fixed all relevant variables except the manipulative one. Thus, to say "the monopolist's restriction of supply causes the price to rise" takes the state of demand as given, whereas in fact the level of the demand curve may itself vary independently (up or down), thus having a concomitant effect on price. If a non-manipulative variable in the antecedent condition does have a relation to the effect, then it must be involved in the cause even though recipe-causality does not admit it.

Logical confusion of this sort has rendered the popular notion of cause scientifically unusable. While most scientists have probably never successfully eliminated the popular notion from their lives or their work, still one main response to the realization of logical weakness has been a long-sustained attempt to banish the use of causality from science. The other response has been to redefine causality so that it has the same logical form as the equivalence relation and sometimes furthermore so that the two clauses have a similar temporal and spatial reference. Thus, to say "*A* causes *B*" is to say "*B* occurs if and only if *A* has occurred." From this statement the aforementioned problems of confusion in inference could never arise because the "if and only if" requirement directs attention to variables other than the manipulative one.

The usual form of the redefined notion of causality is the assertion that the cause of an event is a necessary and sufficient condition. The proof of necessity is a proof that *B* would not have occurred unless *A* occurred, and the proof of sufficiency is a proof that, if *A* occurs, then *B* occurs too.

Necessary and sufficient conditions are not recipes, rather they are full statements of all and only the antecedents required to bring about a consequent. The full complexity of the notion of necessary and sufficient condition, which often doesn't seem so difficult to prove in the laboratory, can be illustrated by a translation I have previously devised as a guide to proving sufficiency and necessity in social situations: "One event causes another if and only if the terminal situation of the causing event is identical in space-time location and in movers and actors with the initial situation of the caused event."[8]

The redefinition of causality has not, I hasten to add, eliminated the recipe kind of causality from science, especially not from social science. Most recent discussion of causality by social scientists has been fairly close to traditional usage. It has often been on a highly sophisticated level of discourse; but it has shared the recipe character with popular discourse. Thus Herbert Simon, whose work on this subject is cited with approval by March, argues in one essay that cause is the highest order variable in a set of equations, without enquiring into whether or not the set of equations contains all the relevant variables.[9] To take his simplest example: "poor growing weather→small wheat crops→increase in price of wheat," wherein the first phase is said to cause the second and the second the third. All this, of course, assumes that the demand for wheat, not included in the system of equations, is stable and that it does not "cause" the price. Instead, the cause is said to be a marginal effect on the state of supply, something on which a low price of wheat can be blamed.

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[7] Douglas Gasking, "Causation and Recipes," *Mind*, Vol. 64 (1955), pp. 479–87.

[8] William H. Riker, "Causes of Events," *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 55 (1958), pp. 281–91. This essay depends for its terminology on my "Events and Situations," *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 54 (1957) pp. 57–90.

The difference between the two kinds of causality is, like the difference among definitions of power, a difference in orientation toward outcomes. In recipe-like causality, the full explanation of the effect is not the problem. Rather the problem is to explain how the effect can be made to occur. If no manipulative technique is available, cause may be non-existent.[10] By contrast, in the necessary and sufficient condition kind of causality, the center of attention is on the effect rather than on manipulative techniques. Here the full explanation of the outcome is at stake. Hence, cause cannot be non-existent, although it can be unidentified.

Thus there is a direct parallelism (a) between ego-oriented power and necessary-and-sufficient-condition causality and (b) between other-oriented power and recipe causality. It is not surprising that this parallelism exists, for power and cause are closely related concepts. Power is potential cause. Or, power is the ability to exercise influence while cause is the actual exercise of it.

This parallelism is clearest in Karlsson's and Shapley and Shubik's definitions. Karlsson's power is clearly based on a recipe notion of causality. Not only is it concerned exclusively with ego's ability to restrict alter's utility, a wholly manipulative concern; not only is his power non-existent in the absence of manipulation or the will to manipulate; but also his definition of the measure of the motivation to use power is proportional to the amount of power possessed. It is postulated thus that the desire to manipulate increases with the ability to do so, an assumption about which we have no convincing empirical information one way or another. In short, Karlsson's power is a direct reflection of recipe causality. Conversely, Shapley and Shubik's is close to a direct reflection of necessary and sufficient condition causality.[11] Since the Shapley-Shubik definition of power, though stated in terms of individual opportunities to manipulate, involves the calculation of all possible opportunities to influence, the total picture presented is the distribution of the chance to manipulate among all participants. When the potential becomes actual we have a necessary and sufficient condition for outcomes. At no point in the analysis does power or cause cease to exist.

The parallelism in the other three definitions between kinds of power and kinds of cause is not so clear as in the two just mentioned, largely, I think, because of confusion engendered by the contrast between dyadic and n-adic situations. Probably the popular idea of power is similar to what Dahl calls his intuitive idea; perhaps it is even simpler, like Karlsson's intuitive idea, being merely the ability to inflict punishment on somebody. There is certainly a highly dyadic feature to punishing somebody or making somebody do something. Hence, in attempting to capture the popular and intuitive idea, there is a strong tendency to think of power as dyadic and to define it that way.

Once the notion of dyadic power is accepted there is also a strong tendency, I believe, to accept a recipe notion of cause. In the dyadic relation, especially when one actor is aggressive and the other passive, which is the usual situation in which men want to talk about power, it is very easy to see the recipe for action: "A uses his power over B." The recipe is at hand and may thus be used. Furthermore, even to those trained to look for necessary and sufficient conditions, the recipe itself looks like such a condition. Of course, it is not and cannot be, for another necessary condition is that B exist. Nevertheless, such background, non-marginal conditions are easy to overlook in the dyad. Hence follows the acceptance of recipe causality and other-oriented power.

The interesting, perhaps even astonishing thing about the March, and Dahl, and Cartwright definitions is the degree to which they have struggled away from the kind of power and causality suggestively imposed by the dyadic situation they purport to describe. March is the one who struggled most successfully. He retains the dyadic form of power, but he manages to import a large amount of ego-oriented power into it, so much so that previously I classified his theory as n-adic and almost ego-oriented. As noted, it is his emphasis on a measure over outcomes that turns his theory away from the dyad and the alter-oriented. And the emphasis on outcomes represents an approach to necessary-and-sufficient-condition causality, inasmuch as an explanation of outcomes tends toward total explanation rather than manipulative explanation. It seems to be that March started out with an other-oriented power and a recipe causality; but, as a scientist seeking complete explanations rather than manipulative techniques, he was driven toward the ego-oriented power and necessary-and-sufficient-condition causality. As a result there is a fundamental ambiguity in his definition, deeper perhaps than in any of the other writers under consideration—and for that reason more deserving of praise for scholarly integrity.

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[9] Herbert Simon, *Models of Man* (New York, 1957), chap, 1, 3.

[10] G. J. Warnock, " 'Every Event Has a Cause' " in Anthony Flew, ed., *Logic and Language*, Second Series (Oxford, 1953) p. 101 ff.

[11] But see the addendum of this paper for evidence of a manipulative element in their definition.

The same struggle March went through is also reflected in Dahl's and Cartwright's definitions, but in a different way. Both restrict the application of their measure: Dahl by requiring that it always be used in connection with a survey of the source, means, amount, and range of power; Cartwright by incorporating substantially these restrictions into his definition. I interpret these restrictions on an essentially manipulative theory of power that assumes an essentially manipulative theory of cause as an attempt at a total explanation and hence as an attempt at a necessary-and-sufficient-condition theory of cause. Of course, ambiguity results.

XI. CONCLUSION

Thus some fundamental ambiguities among definitions of power and inside particular definitions have been shown to reflect—and to root in—similar ambiguities about the nature of causation. Other writers, I hasten to add, have discussed the same ambiguities. Bachrach and Baratz, brilliantly criticizing Dahl's empirical work which uses a somewhat more directly manipulative definition than the theoretical definition discussed here, pointed out that a manipulative theory is far less than a complete explanation.[12] Similarly, Singer has recently observed the absence of reciprocity in power, as it has here been defined. This absence seems to me to be a function of the search for manipulative skill rather than a total explanation.[13] But I have in this essay shown that these ambiguities are not accidental features of a particular definition, but are rooted in the very conceptions of power and causality themselves.

The final question, once the full complication of the ambiguities is revealed, concerns the appropriate scientific attitude toward the conception of power itself. Ought we redefine it in a clear way or ought we banish it altogether? My initial emotion, I confess, is that we ought to banish it. But this suggestion will, I am sure, find little sympathy among my colleagues. Alternatively, I suggest minimally that each definition specify clearly the kind of theory of cause it reflects. Undoubtedly there are many kinds of situations in which one wants to investigate other-oriented power relations and recipe causality (*e.g.*, "how can the President control Congress?"); but these investigations should be clearly labelled as not likely to lead to total explanations. Beyond that I suggest that the customary definition of power be revised in the ego-oriented direction to reflect the necessary-and-sufficient-condition theory of causality. Only then will the notion of power reflect the totality of the situation it purports to describe. The Shapley-Shubik definition, which has this character, is, unfortunately, limited to committee-like situations and is not therefore general enough. What we need is a definition of power in the spirit of their definition, and applicable to a wider range of situations. But that is the subject of another paper.

ADDENDUM

There is a manipulative element in the Shapley-Shubik definition even though it is not immediately apparent. To show its existence I will construct a quite general definition of power with a necessary and sufficient condition notion of cause underlying it and then consider what is necessary to translate this more general definition into Shapley's and Shubik's.

Let there be a set of $\{1, 2, \cdots, n,\}$ participants and let $\{0_i\}$ be the set of outcomes, $i=1, 2, \cdots, m$ and let $\{A_{1i}, A_{2i}, \cdots, A_{ni}\}$ be the set of actions to bring about 0_i by a set of participants. Assume no A_{ji} alone is sufficient and some, but not necessarily all, A_{ji} are necessary for 0_i.

Let

$$v(A_{ji}) = 0, \text{ if } A_{ji} \text{ is not necessary}$$

$$v(A_{ji}) = 1, \text{ if } A_{ji} \text{ is necessary.}$$

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[12] Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," this REVIEW, Vol. 56 (1962), pp. 957–52.

[13] J. David Singer, "Inter-nation Influence," this REVIEW, Vol. 57 (1963), pp. 420–30.

Then, for $j \neq k$,

$$P_j > P_k \equiv \sum_{i=1}^{m} v(A_{ji}) > \sum_{i=1}^{m} v(A_{ki}),$$

where P_j and P_k are indices of the power of participants. Applying this definition to a simple majority voting body of $\{a, b, c\}$, where weights are $w(a)=50$, $w(b)=49$, and $w(c)=1$, then A_a is necessary (*i.e.*, is included in a minimal winning coalition) in six instances out of a possible six, A_b in four, and A_c in four. Thus, out of 14 necessary memberships, $P_a=3/7$, $P_b=2/7$, $P_c=2/7$, which is different from the Shapley-Shubik result.

To render the results identical let $u_j(O_i)$ be the utility of an outcome, O_i, for participant, j. Then, let

$$P_j = \sum_{i=1}^{m} u_j(O_i)v(A_{ji}); \text{ and let } \sum_{j=1}^{n} P_j = 1.$$

In the particular case of the Shapley-Shubik power index, let $u_j(O_i)=1$, if j is pivot, and let $u_j(O_i)=0$, if j is not pivot. In the example cited, it is now the case that $P_a=2/3$, $P_b=1/6$, $P_b=1/6$, which is the Shapley-Shubik result. I conjecture that it is generally true that the Shapley-Shubik definition can be derived from the definition here set forth by a utility function for pivoting. If so, then the Shapley-Shubik definition with its apparent emphasis on outcomes contains a manipulative element, although the thing manipulated is outcomes, not people. Nevertheless, to the extent manipulation is involved, a recipe-like notion of cause has contaminated the fundamental notion of explanation, which is that of a necessary and sufficient condition, underlying their definition.

POWER AND VIOLENCE*

E. V. Walter
Brandeis University

The ancient Greeks rarely fail us when we turn to them in a receptive but cautious spirit for conceptual clarity, and their treatment of the abstraction "power" and terms related to it is relevant and suggestive. In Greek, a root contained in several words associated with political power has two meanings. The verb *archein* means both "to rule" and "to start"; the noun *arché* means both "sovereignty" and "beginning." J. L. Myres, in his analysis of Greek political ideas, suggests:

> It is now clear that in compounds the prefix *arkhé* (as in our words "architect" and "archbishop") describes not merely the first or chief man of a company or organization, but the initiatory function of him who "starts" the others to work, and originates the design which they are to complete. And this appeal to Greek practical life confirms the view that what is essential in the notion of *arkhé* is just this initiatory "push" or "drive" with which the gifted man imposes his will-and-pleasure on the rest.[1]

If we follow Myres, we may infer that in the place where Herodotus reports the wealthy noble, Otanes, to have said he had no wish "*archein kai archesthai*"; as well as where Aristotle writes that the good citizen must have the knowledge and the ability "*archesthai kai archein*" the words mean "to start and be started" as well as "to rule and be ruled."[2] When Aristotle defines terms in *The Metaphysics*, one of the six meanings of "beginning," following the Ross translation, is the group or individual "at whose will that which is moved is moved and that which changes changes, e.g. the magistracies in cities, and oligarchies and monarchies and tyrannies, are called *archai* . . ."[3]

"To have power" covers a broader range of activity than "to govern" or "to rule," but the concepts have two factors in common; namely, initiative and causation. Defining *dynamis*, Aristotle says, "the beginning of a change or movement is called a power . . ."[4] In social interactions, we may say that if the source of an action performed by an individual is to be found in a prior act of another individual, then the latter has power over the former with respect to that act. By "source" we also mean "cause" in the sense that it must be the sufficient condition for the action; if the prior act did not occur, then the subsequent action would not take place. When action is "caused" in this way, then we can speak of one individual or group "controlling" the action of another. As I shall explain, however, there is more to power than "control," for power processes frequently deal with actions that are out of control. If an individual or group we shall name "*P*" intends to cause a respondent designated "*R*" to perform an action "*X*", and *R* does not perform *X*, then if *P* proceeds to change *R* in some way—for example, to penalize or to "reform" *R*—because of the failure to perform *X*, this procedure is a form of power, since with respect to *X*, *P* is the source of changes in *R*.[5]

Aristotle states, moreover, that the tendency to resist change is also a kind of power,[6] and the observation that resistance, or the ability to withstand attempts at control, is a form of counterpower, is a central idea in the present investigation.

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[1] John L. Myres, *The Political Ideas of the Greeks* (New York, Abingdon Press, 1927), p. 158.

[2] Herodotus, *Histories* III 83; Aristotle, *Politics* 1277b 15.

[3] Aristotle, *The Metaphysics* V 1013a, trans. W. D. Ross, 2d ed. (London, Oxford University Press, 1948).

[4] *Metaph.* 1013a, 1046a, trans. Richard Hope (Ann Arbor: Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1960), pp. 104, 182. The Hope translation prefers "power" to the word "potency," which is found in older translations.

[5] As indicated below, I have extended the conception of power proposed by Felix E. Oppenheim in *Dimensions of Freedom: An Analysis* (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1961). His scheme is more useful than those proposed by Lasswell and other contemporary analysts of power. As David Braybrooke has stated in a recent review, Oppenheim has probably "come closer than any previous writer to achieving maximum clarity about freedom and such related concepts as power and control." I agree with Braybrooke that "the next order of business" in the analysis of power and freedom is the critique of this scheme, "for as of this moment that subject starts with Oppenheim's account." *Philosophical Review*, Vol. 72 (1963), p. 525.

[6] *Metaph.* 1019a, trans. Hope, p. 105.

One must bear in mind the cases that would be excluded from the conception of power; for example, instances in which an individual acts on his own, without the act being initiated by some other specific person or group. To avoid confusion, power should be distinguished from other social transactions similar to it, especially the process that is usually called "social control" in the more narrow sense. (I am excluding altogether the very general sense in which social control means regulated behavior of any kind.) In the course of socialization, the inclinations and dispositions of individuals are shaped in ways that cause them to want to do the things that are expected of them—that is, to act in an institutionalized manner. This social conditioning yields acts which stem from the individual's own initiative. In cases of deviant behavior, excluding illegal acts, the right to levy social sanctions such as criticism or ridicule is usually exercised by an indeterminate number of persons within a given range of social relationship. What differentiates this kind of social control from power is that first, conventional behavior comes from the individual's own initiative, and second, deviant behavior is not punished by specified persons charged with the task of enforcing the socially prescribed conduct. In contrast, a case of conformist behavior caused by the demand for a conventional act by a specific person, is indeed an instance of power. So also is a case of legal punishment carried out by a specific staff.

This is not to deny that social control and socialization are related to power as auxiliary forces. Individuals are conditioned to obedience in most societies, with lesser or greater degrees of rigor, so that in ordinary circumstances when acts of power do come their way, men are disposed to obey them. If these acts come under the aegis of legitimate authority, obedience is usually voluntary and resistance minimal. As MacIver puts it, "Men obey because they are social beings—or, if you prefer it, because they are socialized beings."[7]

The concept of power is often confined to acts of control, or to "the production of intended effects," as Bertrand Russell defines it.[8] These notions are too limited. When controls are exercised and penalties imposed by individuals who did not think of doing so in the first place, or by those who did not foresee the consequences of their actions, they are unintended acts of power. Moreover, Felix Oppenheim has shown that "control" is a domain too narrow to be identified with power, and he extends the latter to mean the ability to influence, to restrain, or to punish. To have power, in this sense, means "to be able to subject others to one's control or to limit their freedom."[9] Oppenheim's taxonomy of power relations is based on the microanalysis of particular transactions, but it may still be used to identify events and processes after we move from the interpersonal to the macrosocial level of observation, although it has certain limitations on that level.

Control of an individual's act, Oppenheim demonstrates, is exercised in two ways: through determining his choice or through managing his body or environment in such a way that he has no choice. The former way is called "influence," and its several methods include "persuasion," which means convincing him in some manner that it is to his advantage to perform (or withhold) the act in question, and "deterrence," which means making him withhold (or perform) the act out of apprehension for the consequences if he were to refuse.[10] All cases of control—with the consent of the one who is controlled as well as against his will—imply a causal relation, meaning that the act of the controller is the sufficient condition for the response of the individual controlled. "Whenever one actor exercises control over another, he causes him to behave in a certain way."[11]

In addition to "exercising control," Oppenheim introduces the category of "having control," a form of potential action which includes "having influence" and "preventing." The former means that a controller stands in such a relation to an individual that if the latter *were* to intend performing a given act, then the controller *would* dissuade, deter, or otherwise influence him not to perform it. "Preventing" means not actually causing an individual to withhold a specific act, but closing the alternative in advance, making it impossible—whether he decided to act or not—for him to perform the act. Oppenheim explains:

> Prevention is usually not mentioned among the various forms of control and power; yet, making it impossible for others to act in a certain way constitutes the most effective device of gaining control over their actual behavior. Would-be controllers usually want to establish control over their respondents in such a way that the latter make no attempt at evading it.[12]

Making something impossible, he observes, frequently means constructing some physical or psychological obstacle that constitutes a sufficient condition for a state of affairs to be not realized.

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[7] R. M. MacIver, *The Web of Government* (New York, 1947), p. 77.

[8] Bertrand Russell, *Power: A New Social Analysis* (London, Unwin Books, 1962), p. 25.

[9] *Dimensions of Freedom,* p. 100.

[10] *Ibid.*, ch. 2.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 40.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 52.

If a person is ordered to perform a specific act and refuses, his behavior is *not controlled* with respect to that act. Yet, if the commander of the act punishes the person for not performing it, he still has power over the person, according to Oppenheim's scheme, with respect to that act. One has power over another with respect to a particular act if he can control (cause) the act or make it punishable to perform or to withhold it.[13] Penalizing is the major form of imposing punishment, and penalties—involving pain, privation, or some other kind of unpleasantness—are experiences which are disliked and avoided because they are considered harmful, or for some other obvious reason. I would go beyond Oppenheim's scheme to include along with penalties, procedures of "reform," "treatment," and "rehabilitation." These, too, may be imposed by persons in power as responses to acts they are unable to control. In some cases, these practices are disguised forms of penalty. In others, they may help an individual rather than harm him—add something valuable to his life rather than take something away. Yet, regardless of whether the experience given is baneful or beneficial, it constitutes a form of power if it changes the individual whose conduct was out of control.

A power relation, moreover, is a dynamic interaction in which at least some control may be exercised by all parties. It is clear, of course, that each does not control the others to the same degree, nor do they control the same thing. Oppenheim's static taxonomy, valuable as it is for some purposes of descriptive nomenclature, cannot deal adequately with features such as reciprocity and tension.[14] Indeed we should not expect its conceptual frame, limited to reporting power relations as individual acts of control or punishment, to capture the dynamic aspects of interaction. Thus, the report: "Y has power over X with respect to x, but X has power over Y with respect to y" could not inform us how behavior x is related to behavior y, nor could it tell us anything about the nature of the *relation* between person X and person Y. Power *relations* are built of repetitive, durable patterns of action, but microsociological taxonomic schemes, when stretched beyond their useful limits, tend to dissolve relation into individual acts. One needs to introduce a set of dynamic concepts—such as the idea of *stress*, developed in physics as well as in medical pathology—to understand durable interactions, such as the relation between force and resistance.[15] To have a conception broad enough to cover all types, elementary and complex, I would define a power *system* as a pattern of actions, initiated by specific persons, which controls a range of behavior in a specific group and deals with instances of behavior, within a given range, out of their control. This generic definition is formal and does not specify methods or the way in which power is experienced.

In elementary systems of power with a solitary head, the leader, chief, or king generally performs a configuration of functions that involves both controlling and punishing: initiating collective action, legitimating, coordinating particular acts, integrating the group, adjudicating disputes, and dealing with disruptive behavior. Some characteristics of control and integration in an elementary system of power are revealed in William F. Whyte's classic study of the Cornerville gang:

> The leader is the focal point for the organization of his group. In his absence, the members of the gang are divided into a number of small groups. There is no common activity or general conversation. When the leader appears, the situation changes strikingly. The small units form into one large group. The conversation becomes general, and unified action frequently follows. The leader becomes the central point in the discussion. A follower starts to say something, pauses when he notices that the leader is not listening, and begins again when he has the leader's attention. When the leader leaves the group, unity gives way to the divisions that existed before his appearance.[16]

The leader provides coordination and initiative, but reciprocal obligations and the exchange of services, Whyte shows also, bind the group, and built into the leader's role is the expectation that he will be generous.

George Homans has noted in Tacitus's description of the German tribes how the relation between the king and his companions resembles the relation between the informal leader and the small group.[17] If we turn to Tacitus, we find also that the king's power is limited, and "the generals do more by example than by authority." In assembly, the king or chief is heard "more because he has influence to persuade than because he has power to command." The leaders with the largest following are those whose exploits promise the largest advantages.[18] Similarly, in many African traditional systems, it is the practice for large followings to adhere to popular chiefs who rule well and for poor rulers to lose their people. Even among the Southern Bantu, where loyalty and patience have been cardinal virtues, Eric Walker indicates that if a chief "ate up his men" by confiscating their property and otherwise meting excessive punishments, he might wake up to find his people gone over to a more moderate rival.[19]

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[13] *Ibid.*, chs. 4, 5.

[14] *Ibid.*, chs. 1–6.

[15] *Cf.* Hans Selye, *The Physiology and Pathology of Exposure to Stress* (Montreal, Acta, 1950), pp. 2–13; or Selye's popularization, *The Stress of Life* (New York, 1956).

[16] William Foote Whyte, *Street Corner Society*, 2d ed. (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 258.

[17] George C. Homans, *Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms* (New York, 1961), p. 386.

Whereas the traditional chief typically holds power in relatively peaceful conditions, the king is a figure more often found in conditions of repetitive, organized warfare. Weber suggests, "The king is everywhere primarily a war lord, and kingship evolves from charismatic heroism."[20] The Israelites, one will recall, according to the King James version, wanted a king to "judge us, and go out before us, and fight our battles." The king typically combines in his person several functions: military, judicial, religious, and civil executive. Since they have little division of function and not much constitutional machinery, primitive monarchies resemble one another, despite cultural differences, in a striking way.[21]

Kingship of the simple kind requires ritual control over the royal ancestors and other spirits—making possible the control of nature by magic; military might—involving a staff of armed dependents; judicial skill; and the techniques of civil administration. Some ruling houses tended to develop this configuration of abilities as a specialty which they would bring to any people they could rule by force or by invitation. During the heroic age of Greece, there is evidence, that some Achaean princely families moved about, thrust out of one area, winning a throne in another, fleeing vengeance from one people to establish a dynasty in the midst of another. Exercising power through a typical, elementary configuration of control and punishment techniques, and by the force of their personalities, kings managed to hold together in a single political unit several diverse kinship groups.[22] Many primitive people have believed that the power configuration is the exclusive property of a royal family, and that a single sacred source of control and punishment is the only alternative to internal fighting and other kinds of disorder. A. W. Southall in his remarkable study of some traditional political systems in Western Uganda, describes how power—especially rainmaking and judicial skill—is a quality exclusively possessed by the lineage of Alur chiefs. Members of the chiefly family would be invited, bought, or even stolen by neighboring people who yearned for welfare and order, but knew of no other method to establish a political head.[23]

Power may be experienced as inspiring, wholesome, tolerable, or oppressive, depending on the circumstances. It may release creative energy, heightening vitality,[24] it may destroy motivation, generating a pall of depression, or it may stimulate conflict and rebellion. It may induce a sense of freedom or a sense of tyranny, but deeper than those alternatives, Ortega has shown, sometimes the state may be shaped after the community's vital preferences and life within it felt as exhilarating freedom, whereas at other times the whole weight of regulative institutions is oppressive and life is converted into "spiritless adaptation of each individual existence to the iron mold of the state."[25] From an historical point of view, the way in which power is experienced is a critical matter, for it determines the motivations of people to keep or to change the system in which they live.

When people do something according to their own will, we ordinarily say they are acting voluntarily. When they act against their will, desire, inclination, or intention, we say they are being forced to do something. This is the sense in which the word "force" will be used here—a general term to include any agency that compels someone to do something that he does not want to do. The term "coercion" will be limited to mean any social form of compulsion—usually some kind of institutionalized force. The term "violence" will be restricted to the sense of *destructive harm;* hence, a destructive kind of force. As a general term, it would include not only physical assaults that cause damage to the person, but also magic, sorcery, and the many techniques of inflicting harm by mental or emotional means. It includes psychic and spiritual harm as well as physical damage, and one may turn to anthropological literature for accounts of magical and spiritual terrorism practiced by shamans, magicians, and priests.[26] Historically, however, physical violence is more ponderable, extensive, and is the type that is organized on the widest scale.

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[18] Tacitus, *The Complete Works* (New York, Modern Library, 1942), pp. 712, 714.

[19] Eric A. Walker, *A History of Southern Africa*, 3d ed. (London, Longmans, Green, 1957), p. 112; *cf. Cambridge History of the British Empire*, VIII, p. 41 ff.

[20] *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, p. 251.

[21] A. Andrewes, *Probouleusis* (London, Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 6, 9.

[22] *Cambridge Ancient History*, II, 1st ed., ch. xvii; N. G. L. Hammond, *A History of Greece to 322 B.C.* (London, Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 67, 140.

[23] Aidan W. Southall, *Alur Society: A Study in Processes and Types of Domination* (Cambridge, W. Heffer, 1953).

[24] Dorothy Emmet, "The Concept of Power," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Vol. 54 (1954), p. 13.

[25] José Ortega y Gasset, *Concord and Liberty*, trans. Helene Weyl (New York, 1946), pp. 34, 35.

Forms of "influence" such as "persuasion" are, then, not instances of force, for by them the controller changes intentions, causing people to choose to perform acts initiated by him. Deterrence, prevention, restraint, and punishment, when they work against the will of the respondent are, of course, instances of force. If people are forced in ways that are destructive and injurious, they are being treated with violence. Although the term may also be applied to property, I shall restrict its meaning to events that cause undesirable changes in the condition of the person, including processes that threaten his life or substantially diminish his physical or psychic wellbeing and safety.

Violence is generally understood as unmeasured or exaggerated harm to individuals, either not socially prescribed at all or else beyond the limits established for its use.[27] Thus, it is often socially defined to include processes that may originate as authorized, measured force, but which go beyond the prescribed conditions and limits. For example, in systems such as ours, a police officer may be authorized to exercise physical restraint in making an arrest, but he will be said to act in a violent manner if, without acceptable reasons, he attacks and injures a fugitive. In some cases, however, police brutality may be officially condemned as violence, yet socially expected and used unofficially as means of control.

When a violent process is socially prescribed and defined as a *legitimate* means of control or punishment, according to the practices familiar to us, the destructive harm is measured and the limits made clear. Social definition as an authorized method often extracts it from the category of violence—at least from the standpoint of the society—and places it in the same domain with other socially approved coercive techniques. In this study, however, any kind of destructive harm to the person will be taken as violence—but specified as legitimate or illegitimate in its social definition.

Aristotle does not distinguish between force and violence, but uses the term *bia,* which, like the German word *Gewalt,* may mean both. In his works, *bia* is used in a very general way, standing for the physical concept referring to inanimate nature as well as for "compulsion" in human behavior. As he defines it in the fifth book of *The Metaphysics, bia* is a kind of necessity which hinders and impedes the course of impulse and purpose.[28] The notion of force "as an agent of compulsory motion," Max Jammer shows, is the core of Aristotle's system of mechanics.[29] To force something means to make a thing move against its own "natural internal tendency," and the same conception appears in his ethical theory as well as in his theory of physics. In human conduct, *bia* refers to cases where the cause of action lies in things outside the actor, and when the actor contributes nothing.[30] Jammer explains that in physics, the notion of force evolved through the Peripatetic and Scholastic stage, where it was encumbered by animistic formulations. In this stage, the notion of force was rooted in the everyday experience of push and pull, but it is easy to see how close it was as well to the sociological notions of conflict and power.[31] Paul Tillich, too, has indicated that the notions of power and force when expressed in words by physicists are anthropomorphic metaphors. "Power is a sociological category and from there it is transferred to nature . . ." he observes.[32] Indeed, when the concept of force in physics is liberated from confusion with the sociological notion, it tends to disappear, and although modern mechanics still tolerates it as a "methodological intermediate," Jammer argues, "the theory of fields would have to banish it even from this humble position."[33]

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[26] *Cf.* Paul Radin, *The World of Primitive Man* (New York, 1960), chs. 6, 8.

[27] David Cooperman takes a different approach in *Power, Force, and Violence* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1954). Working out the problem in a conceptual framework that follows Talcott Parsons, he deals with effects on the normative structure and defines violence as destructive harm not to persons, as I have defined it, but to boundaries of action.

[28] *Metaph.* 1015a, b.

[29] Max Jammer, *Concepts of Force: A Study in the Foundations of Dynamics* (New York, 1962), p. 37.

[30] *Nichomachean Ethics* 1110b.

[31] Jammer, *op. cit.*, p. viii.

[32] Paul Tillich, *Love, Power, and Justice* (New York: Galaxy Books, 1961), p. 7.

[33] Jammer, *op. cit.*, p. 264.

Another Greek term associated with political power, *kratos,* often appears in the same context with *arché,* which was discussed above. It signifies "strength" or "might," and just as *arché* is found in terms such as "monarchy" and "oligarchy," *kratos* appears in the suffix of such terms as "aristocracy," "democracy," and "plutocracy"—which mean systems in which the best-born, the people, and wealth, respectively, are the strongest element. In other contexts, however, where *arché* suggests initiative and the voluntary side of obedience, *kratos* indicates force and the involuntary side.[34]

The poetic tradition, differing from Aristotle in this respect, offers a provocative distinction between force and violence. As mythological personifications, Kratos (Might) and Bia (Violence) are individuated spirits, but they are both forms of force, and they appear together on the same team, servants of divine power. In Hesiod's genealogy of the gods, Kratos and Bia are the "wonderful children" of Pallas—whose name perhaps means the "brandisher" or "shaker" thereby representing threat—and Styx, who represents horror. Kratos and Bia dwell only in the house of Zeus and go where he directs them.[35] In *Prometheus Bound,* they are the first to appear on stage, dragging Prometheus to his rock. In this play, Aeschylus conveys that Zeus is ruling as a tyrant who has seized power, having overthrown the old order of gods and having displaced the previous king, Kronos. Whenever rule is new it is harsh, we are told. A tyrant's orders are his own private business, and the new steersman on Olympus controls by rules which have no law in them.[36] Kratos (Might) is the first to speak in the play; he discusses the fate of Prometheus and later rebukes him for rebellion. Bia (Violence) is silent throughout the play.[37] The words of Kratos are consistently tough and bitter, and he is told that he is always ruthless and without pity.[38] Even though both are instruments of force in the service of tyrannical power, the difference between the roles of Might and Violence is instructive. Might uses words and directs itself to reasoning processes. Violence remains mute. It suggests that force in the sense of Might is similar in some way to leadership, since it employs persuasion. But persuasion for what? If leadership induces voluntary action, how can Might exhort involuntary action? If the content of Kratos' speeches is examined, an answer emerges: the persuasive mission of Might is to manage the impression of irresistibility and to diminish resistance. No one can escape obedience and service; only Zeus is free. Resistance is foolish and dangerous. The message of Kratos is that one should learn endurance and resignation in the face of superior strength.[39] Violence, the other instrument of tyrannical power, acts, but has nothing to say.

Although men universally agree that violence and other kinds of force are perennially associated with the exercise of power, there is anything but agreement over the question of the proper—in both a technical and a moral sense—relation between such methods and the power system. Among the several ideas of political power in the vast literature on the subject, two prominent conceptions appear, superficially at least, to contradict each other. One, considering violence as the failure of power, would exclude it from the definition; the other, considering violence as the specific property of political associations, makes it central to the definition of political power. When the concepts, "power" and "political" are disentangled and examined separately, the points of view may be discerned with greater clarity.

One position considers "authority" as the authentic form of power, based on consent, voluntary obedience, and persuasion, and considers violence as a symptom attending the breakdown of authority. The nuclear ideas in this venerable notion may be found far back in the Western tradition—in Homer's and Hesiod's beliefs about the antagonism between violence and right, in the Socratic opposition to Thrasymachus, and in Plato's conviction that persuasion is morally superior to force, to mention only a few sources. The notion is held by many writers in the modern period—by Rousseau in *The Social Contract,* for instance—and expressed in the recent literature of social science by writers such as Charles Merriam and R. M. MacIver. Merriam protests that many observers "make the same fundamental error in analysis of the power situation in society, of overstating the role of violence." He argues:

> In most communities the use of force is relatively uncommon in proportion to the number of regulations, and the success of the organization is not

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[34] In Sophocles, *Oedipus at Colonus* 373, Ismene tells exiled Oedipus that at Thebes, each of his sons is attempting to grasp both *arché* and *kratos* of the throne.

[35] Hesiod, *Theogony* 385.

[36] Aeschylus, *Prometheus Bound* 34, 402, 150.

[37] The fact that the official rules limited speech to only two persons on stage, it should go without saying, is hardly a complete or sufficient explanation for Bia's silence.

[38] Aesch. *Pr.* 42.

[39] *Ibid.,* 50, 10.

measured by the amount of violence in specific cases, but by the extent to which violence is avoided and other substitutes discovered. The monopoly of force, which is so often declared to be the chief characteristic of the political association, is not meant for daily use, but as a last resort when all other measures of persuasion and conciliation have failed.[40]

Similarly, MacIver declares:

> Without authority force is destructive violence, spasmodic, undirected, futile. Authority is responsive to the underlying social structure. The force of government is but an instrument of authority, vindicating the demands of an order that force alone never creates.[41]

Though writers who hold this point of view recognize that violence may be used as an instrument of force by men in authority, they think of it as a last resort and tend to diminish its significance in the organization of controls. They are inclined to deny not only its moral value but also its effectiveness as an instrument.

The contrary idea was expressed recently by C. Wright Mills, who states succinctly, "All politics is a struggle for power; the ultimate kind of power is violence."[42] Although Mills and others who view power in this fashion may deplore the bitter reality they perceive, a number of writers holding similar points of view have drawn more positive conclusions. The tradition that includes many of the Sophists, Machiavelli, and Hobbes is a familiar one, and writers within it may not only describe the instrumental worth of violence but also defend its moral value, arguing that it contributes to the termination of discord, the maintenance of order, or the safety of the ruler. The "Mirror of Princes" genre, which is to be found in many civilizations, frequently combines advice in the form of rules for cultivating personal virtue with a manual of refined violent techniques.[43] In the literature of India, the combination is seen in the classic *Kautilya Arthasastra,* probably written at the end of the fourth century B.C. shortly after the death of Alexander, composed, according to the tradition, by the Brahman who engineered the downfall of the low-caste Nanda dynasty, placed the great Maurya Chandragupta on the throne, and served as his chief minister. In this book, an introductory section on the personal conduct of the saintly king is followed by an elaborate handbook of systematic deception, violence, and internal espionage.[44] Max Weber observed, "In contrast with this document Machiavelli's *Principe* is harmless."[45] It is useful to select this kind of writing in the Indian tradition to illustrate the point of view under discussion because the contrary Indian strain with its idealism and nonviolence is more familiar.

In India's Code of Manu, which tradition places at the dawn of civilization,[46] violence is described as an instrument of punishment, which in turn is declared to be the most important technique of power. The chapter on kingship goes so far as to state that "Punishment is (in reality) the king . . ."[47] Fear of punishment maintains social order and holds all beings, including the gods, to their duties. Above all, social order depends on the integrity of the caste system, and, indeed, "The king has been created (to be) the protector of the castes (var*n*a) and orders, who, all according to their rank, discharge their several duties."[48] The picture Manu paints of what the world would be like if the ranking system were violated reminds one of the speech Shakespeare gives to Ulysses in Act 1, Scene iii of *Troilus and Cressida:*

> O, when degree is shaked,
> Which is the ladder to all high designs,
> The enterprise is sick!
>
> . . .
>
> Take but degree away, untune that string,
> And hark what discord follows!
>
> . . .
>
> Then everything includes itself in power,
> Power into will, will into appetite;
> And appetite, an universal wolf,
> So doubly seconded with will and power,
> Must make perforce an universal prey,
> And last eat up himself.

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[40] *Political Power* (Glencoe, Ill., 1950), p. 21.

[41] *The Web of Government*, p. 16.

[42] C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York, 1956), p. 171.

[43] I am grateful for several references furnished by Larry Gross in his unpublished paper, "Political Institutions of Organized Violence in Several Ancient and Modern States."

[44] *Kautilya Arthasastra*, trans. R. Shamasastry, 7th ed. (Mysore, Mysore Printing and Publishing House, 1961).

[45] *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, trans. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York, 1946), p. 124.

[46] For a brief summary of the controversy over the date of Manu, see D. Mackenzie Brown, *The White Umbrella: Indian Political Thought from Manu to Gandhi* (Berkeley, Univ. of California Press, 1953), p. 27.

[47] *The Laws of Manu*, trans. G. Bühler, *The Sacred Books of the East*, vol. XXV (London, Oxford University Press, 1886), p. 219.

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 221.

Punishment, according to Manu, keeps the social hierarchy intact:

> The whole world is kept in order by punishment; for a guiltless man is hard to find; through fear of punishment the whole world yields the enjoyments (which it owes). . . .
>
> All castes (varna) would be corrupted (by intermixture), all barriers would be broken through, and all men would rage (against each other) in consequence of mistakes with respect to punishment.
>
> But where Punishment with a black hue and red eyes stalks about, destroying sinners, there the subjects are not disturbed, provided that he who inflicts it discerns well.[49]

Hence the most important function of the king is to measure and administer correct penalties in the form of violence and deprivations.[50]

Recognizing that violence inspires fear, Manu recommends that the king punish severely those offenders who have committed violent acts. A king must not "let go perpetrators of violence, who cause terror to all creatures," and a king who desires glory

> shall not, even for a moment, neglect (to punish) the man who commits violence.
>
> He who commits violence must be considered as the worst offender, (more wicked) than a defamer, than a thief, and than he who injures (another) with a staff.

Official violence, however, is indispensable, and in the scale of punishments, the degree of violence administered is proportional to the gravity of the offence. Since the purpose of punishment is to maintain the social system with its castes intact, the most violent punishments—penalties *in terrorem*—are to be meted for actions which most seriously threaten the system. For example:

> Men who commit adultery with the wives of others, the king shall cause to be marked by punishments which cause terror, and afterwards banish.
>
> For by (adultery) is caused a mixture of the castes (varna) among men; thence (follows) sin, which cuts up even the roots and causes the destruction of everything.[51]

It is clear, then, that according to the ancient text of Manu, the effective and proper use of violence as an instrument of punishment is essential to the exercise of power.

The contrast between the two ideas of violence in the system of power may be further illuminated by turning to the social thought of another political culture; namely, the literature of China during the latter half of the third century B.C., in which orthodox Confucianism is pitted against the so-called "Legalist" revision of that doctrine. Describing the confrontation, which takes place during the Ch'in empire and continues in the revolutionary period which follows, H. G. Creel observes, "Seldom have two political principles been so clearly opposed and so plainly tested. . . ."[52] The Confucian principle maintains that government must be judged by the degree to which it satisfies the people, considers the state as a cooperative venture, and declares that the proper technique of rule is education and persuasion. The opposite doctrine maintains that it is foolish for the ruler to seek the good will of the people, and that their "wisdom" is useless, for "they are like babies." The Legalists hold that the only way to govern is through force and fear, and in the book named after one of their leading theorists, the *Han Fei Tzu:*

> They set forth, with ruthless clarity and astringent logic, a system of totalitarian depotism. Han Fei Tzŭ recognizes the supremacy of nothing but force, and aims at making the ruler rich and powerful. The people are to be used completely as instruments of the ruler's designs, living or dying as suits his purpose. . . . The ruler need only keep [his ministers] and all of his subjects in such a state of fear that they will dare to do no wrong.[53]

Moreover, they offer a highly refined, repressive system of *shu*, or "methods," and insist that to rule properly, the sovereign must "monopolize the handles which control life and death."[54] After the *Han Fei Tzu*, Creel remarks, "the policies of Machiavelli's *Prince* seem timid and vacillating."

The administration of proper punishment is as crucial a matter to Han Fei-tzu as it is to

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[49] *Ibid.*, p. 219–20.

[50] *Ibid.*, p. 218–19.

[51] *Ibid.*, p. 314–15.

[52] H. G. Creel, *Confucius and the Chinese Way* (New York, 1960), p. 222. The contrast between Legalism and Confucianism is also described by the historian, Fung Yu-lan, *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy* (New York, 1960), p. 164–65.

[53] Creel, *op. cit.*, p. 215–16. Fung Yu-lan considers Han Fei-tzu as the "culminating representative" and "the last and greatest theorizer of the Legalist school. . ." *Op. cit.*, p. 157.

[54] Creel, *op. cit.*, p. 239.

Manu.[55] However, the purpose of the king, according to Manu is to maintain the established order; he is not interested in absolute control. The ideal ruler of Han Fei-tzu, on the other hand, is content, the historian Fung Yu-lan indicates, with nothing less than celestial omnipotence. The "methods" guarantee strict enforcement, *"and nothing that he encounters resists him."*[56]

The extreme attitudes concerning the proper place of violence in the power system—one minimizing, the other maximizing its importance—may be understood, as usual, as opposite poles of a continuum, with several alternative positions between them. Among the ancient Greeks, for example, Solon of Athens apparently believes that good order is based on the concord of classes and that the state is a cooperative venture, but, disagreeing with Hesiod, he does not think that violence and right are irreconcilable opposites. Instead, he thinks they are coordinate elements in the power system, working together in the cause of good order, and that violent force is sometimes necessary, because it separates warring factions and prevents them from destroying one another and the state.[57]

The extreme positions are based on presuppositions which may be expressed as two different social models. The viewpoint that minimizes violence reasons from a model of cooperation,[58] and seeing violence as an indication that cooperative activity has broken down, infers that violence signifies the breakdown of power as well. The other viewpoint begins with a model of social conflict and reasons that in many cases if conflict were absent, then power would be unnecessary. Violence from this perspective may be seen as a decisive form of power responding to conflict.

This point of view is classically expressed by Max Weber, who stipulates: "A social relationship will be referred to as 'conflict' in so far as action within it is oriented intentionally to carrying out the actor's own will *against the resistance* of the other party or parties."[59] Weber then defines power as "the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will *despite resistance*, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests."[60] Thus, it is clear that according to Weber, two kinds of power are possible: one kind in conditions where conflict and resistance are absent; the other, a conflict in which one party successfully overcomes resistance. Since Weber is careful to distinguish power from other forms of social control in which cooperation is more crucial, his approach at least suggests that in the exercise of power, resistance and conflict in one degree or another are highly probable, and perhaps even expected. This idea of power, therefore, tends to imply a process of *overpowering*. Reinhard Bendix has perceptively observed "that Weber's definition of power is very similar to Clausewitz's definition of war."[61]

The contrary points of view reflected in the concept of power are similarly manifested in concepts of political association including, of course, the definition of the state, one view emphasizing cooperation, authority, and peaceful methods of control; the other, conflict, coercion, and violence. Among the social scientists who hold the latter viewpoint, the anthropologist, A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, reasons that coercive processes lie at the heart of political organization, and he states in his Preface to *African Political Systems:*

> In studying political organization, we have to deal with the maintenance or establishment of social order, within a territorial framework, by the organized exercise of coercive authority through the use, or the possibility of use, of physical force. In well-organized states, the police and the army are the instruments by which coercion is exercised. Within the state, the social order, whatever it may be, is maintained by the punishment of those who offend against the laws and by the armed suppression of revolt. Externally the state stands ready to use armed force against other states, either to maintain the existing order or to create a new one. . . .
>
> The political organization of a society is that aspect of the total organization which is concerned with the control and regulation of the use of physical force.[62]

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[55] Fung Yu-lan, *op. cit.*, pp. 160, 164.

[56] *Ibid.*, p. 158, italics added.

[57] T. A. Sinclair, *A History of Greek Political Thought* (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961), p. 24.

[58] The dependence of power on cooperation is cogently argued in E. E. Harris, "Political Power," *Ethics*, Vol. 68 (1957), pp. 1–10.

[59] Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, trans. A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York, 1947), p. 132; italics added.

[60] *Ibid.*, p. 152, italics added.

[61] Reinhard Bendix, *Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait* (New York, 1962), p. 290.

[62] *African Political Systems*, ed. M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. xiv, xxiii.

The conception is frequently challenged by those who believe that other activities are much more essential to political associations than the use of force and violence. Thus, David Easton, a political scientist who views the political structure as a distributive system, authoritatively allocating values for the entire society, protests that Radcliffe-Brown "over-emphasizes the role of coercive sanctions, especially force." He argues:

> In selecting the organized use of force as the gross distinguishing quality of political systems, neither Radcliffe-Brown nor those who share his point of view can be considered adventurous pioneers. Rather they have been following a course laid down by Thomas Hobbes, well marked out by later utilitarianism, reinforced by Max Weber, and validated by many generations of professional students of politics. It is an approach that research in American political science has all but abandoned, although it still has enough vitality to raise its head from time to time.[63]

Easton agrees that at one time or another all kinds of different organized groups "have used both violent and non-violent means of persuasion with varying degrees of legitimacy attached to this use," but whereas Weber claims that when they do employ violence, the use of this method gives such groups a "political" character, Easton comes to the opposite conclusion that "governmental institutions can no longer be differentiated from others merely by virtue of the sanctions that they are able to impose."[64]

Max Weber is often held responsible for the line of thought that identifies political action with violent techniques, and although he is hardly the originator of the idea, as Easton points out, his work nevertheless provides a classic modern statement of it. In the encyclopedic *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft,* he ascribes to the state certain formal characteristics; namely compulsory membership, territorial jurisdiction, continuous organization, and coercive enforcement, but he clearly singles out the use of violence as a *specific* characteristic giving an organization political identity. In the text of a celebrated address given in Munich in the revolutionary year, 1918, he makes his ideas on this subject clear.

In that address, he observes that since there is no task that some political association has not taken up, and since there are no special ends that are exclusively political, the state and its historical antecedents can be defined in sociological terms:

> only by a specific means peculiar to it as to every political association: that of physical violence. "Every state is founded on force (*Gewalt*)," declared Trotsky duly at Brest-Litovsk. That is in point of fact correct. If there existed only social structures for which violence were unknown as a means, then would the concept, "state" be abolished, and then would emerge what is defined as "anarchy" in this special sense of the word. Violence is naturally not the normal or only means of the state—that goes without saying—but indeed a means specific to it. Today the relation between the state and violence is especially intimate. In the past, all kinds of different associations—beginning with the sib—have known physical violence as an altogether normal means. On the contrary, today we have to say that a state is that human community which, within a given territory—"territory" is one of its characteristics—claims for itself (successfully) the legitimate monopoly of physical violence. Specifically, at present the right of physical violence is assigned to all other associations or individuals only to the extent permitted by the state; it is supposed to be the exclusive source of the "right" to use violence.[65]

Instead of the more felicitous version in the volume edited by Gerth and Mills, I use my own translation here because it renders more precisely the terms under discussion. In this passage, Weber uses the word, "*Gewaltsamkeit*"—which means "violence"—eight times, modifying the noun four times with the word meaning "physical." Only at one point in the passage, and in a quote from Trotsky, does he use the term, "*Gewalt,*" which may be translated either as "violence" or as "force." "*Gewaltsamkeit*" is less equivocal. The Gerth translation diminishes the impact of the passage by translating "*Gewaltsamkeit*" five times as "force" and three times as "violence."[66]

In the section from *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* on political and hierocratic associations, which Weber takes up immediately after the section in which he defines power ("*Macht*"), these associations, from their aspect as structures of domination, are treated as different species of the same genus; namely, groups with a head, staff, and members, organized according to a coercive principle. In this section, Henderson and Parsons translate "*Gewaltsamkeit*" each time as "force," obscuring Weber's meaning, especially since they render "*Zwang*"—meaning "coercion"—as "force" at the same time, losing the distinction which Weber apparently wishes to make. At the beginning of the section, he identifies both hierocratic and political associations with the threat or practice of *coercion*—the former employing a psychic kind, the latter, physical—naming *violence* as the specific form of coercion used by political groups exclusively. He makes it clear that other methods besides physical coercion are widely used by political groups, including the state, insisting, nevertheless, that the threat or use of violence is a special characteristic that identifies associations as "political." Of course, translating terms such as "*Macht*," "*Kraft*," "*Zwang*," "*Gewalt*," and "*Gewaltsamkeit*" is a subtle problem of style with ample latitude for interpretation. But if a stranger to historical reality were to read the Henderson and Parsons translation, he might never guess that states were acquainted with violence. One could not receive that impression from reading Weber's own words.[67]

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[63] David Easton, "Political Anthropology," *Biennial Review of Anthropology 1959,* ed. Bernard J. Siegel (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 213, 218–19.

[64] David Easton, *The Political System* (New York, 1953), p. 153, n. 2.

[65] Max Weber, "Politik als Beruf," *Gesammelte Politische Schriften,* 2. Aufl. (Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr, 1958), S. 494.

[66] *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology,* p. 78.

Few writers will commit themselves to an exclusive choice between authority and violence as the essential principle of political action, for it appears more sound to work out formulas that keep them both in some preferential ratio. Likewise, few would, in the manner of Heinrich von Treitschke and Franz Oppenheimer, insist on force as the primary principle in formulas of the state; it is more usual to balance the principles of coercion and consent. Thus, MacIver writes:

> force holds nothing together. Force is a substitute for unity. . . .
>
> Coercive power is a criterion of the state, but not its essence. . . . When force is much in evidence it is a pathological symptom. . . .
>
> It is true that there is no state where there is no overruling force. This is the *differentia* between the state and all other associations. There is no state where other associations arrogate to themselves the exercise of compulsion. There is no state where there is anarchy. But the exercise of force does not make a state. . . .[68]

One should not infer from this truism that "society" always precedes, logically and historically, the state, or that social trust and coöperation precede without exception the mutual acceptance of coercion. Georg Simmel shows that purely antagonistic, coercive relations have often been transformed into social tissue, that conflict can evolve into cooperation, and that coercive power can create a social tie which did not previously exist.[69]

The stale controversy over whether violence is a defective or an ultimate form of power, and, similarly, whether it is factitious or "essential" to the political system cannot be ignored because it invades the ordinary usage as well as the technical usage of crucial terms. Nevertheless, it is not useful to pursue the point of deciding whether coercion or consent is the "essence" of the state. The relative amounts of coercion and consent in any political structure are problematic and a matter for empirical judgment in each case.

The most useful concept of power would not exclude from its domain either persuasion or coercion, nor would it consider either authority or violence to be more essential or ultimate. Similarly, a useful concept of the state would not be restricted either to moderate or to violent states, for history is full of both. Nor is it reasonable to confine ideas of the political system to organized negotiation, bargaining, exchange, competition, and other peaceful processes, omitting violent methods. Both extremes should be included, and conceptions framed in a manner that will lead the investigator to uncover the empirical conditions determining the presence or absence of violence. Merely to declare that political organizations may resort to violence because this kind of action is one of their characteristics is a circular line of reasoning without much consequence. More fruitful would it be to trace the processes, mark the structures of violent action, discern the conditions in which it takes place, and examine the various methods in use. Exploring in this way how and why organizations use violence may be crucial to a better understanding of the political system and its various forms.

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[67] Compare *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, pp. 154–56 with Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 4. Aufl. (Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr, 1956), I. Hbd. K. i. § 17, S. 29–30.

[68] R. M. MacIver, *The Modern State* (London, Oxford University Press, 1926), pp. 222, 223, 225, 230.

[69] *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*, trans. Kurt H. Wolff (Glencoe, Ill., 1950), p. 192; "Conflict," trans. Kurt H. Wolff, in Georg Simmel's *Conflict* and *The Web of Group-Affiliations* (Glencoe, Ill., 1955), p. 26.

CONSENSUS AND IDEOLOGY IN AMERICAN POLITICS*

HERBERT McCLOSKY
University of California, Berkeley

The belief that consensus is a prerequisite of democracy has, since deTocqueville, so often been taken for granted that it is refreshing to find the notion now being challenged. Prothro and Grigg,[1] for example, have questioned whether agreement on "fundamentals" actually exists among the electorate, and have furnished data which indicate that it may not. Dahl,[2] reviewing his study of community decision-makers, has inferred that political stability does not depend upon widespread belief in the superiority of democratic norms and procedures, but only upon their *acceptance*. From the findings turned up by Stouffer,[3] and by Prothro and Grigg, he further conjectures that agreement on democratic norms is greater among the politically active and aware—the "political stratum" as he calls them—than among the voters in general. V. O. Key,[4] going a step further, suggests that the viability of a democracy may depend less upon popular opinion than upon the activities and values of an "aristocratic" strain whose members are set off from the mass by their political influence, their attention to public affairs, and their active role as society's policy makers. "If so, any assessment of the vitality of a democratic system should rest on an examination of the outlook, the sense of purpose, and the beliefs of this sector of society."

Writers who hold consensus to be necessary to a free society have commonly failed to define it precisely or to spcify what it must include. Even Tocqueville[5] does not go deeply enough into the matter to satisfy these needs. He tells us that a society can exist and, *a fortiori*, prosper only when "the minds of all the citizens [are] rallied and held together by certain predominant ideas; . . . when a great number of men consider a great number of things from the same aspect, when they hold the same opinions upon many subjects, and when the same occurrences suggest the same thoughts and impressions to their minds"—and he follows this pronouncement with a list of general principles he believes Americans hold in common. Elsewhere, he speaks of the "customs" of the American nation (its "habits, opinions, usages, and beliefs") as "the peculiar cause which renders that people able to support a democratic government." But nowhere does he set forth explicitly the nature of the agreement upon which a democratic society presumably depends.

Later commentators have not clarified matters much. Some, like A. Lawrence Lowell,[6] have avoided Tocqueville's emphasis upon shared ideas, customs, and opinions in favor of the less demanding view that popular government requires agreement mainly "in regard to the legitimate character of the ruling authority and its right to decide the questions that arise." Consensus, in this view, becomes merely a synonym for legitimacy. Others speak of consensus as a sense of solidarity or social cohesion arising from a common ethos or heritage, which unites men into a community.[7] Political scientists have most frequently employed the term to designate a state of agreement about the "fundamental values" or "rules of the game" considered essential for constitutional government. Rarely, however, have writers on consensus attempted to state what the fundamentals must include, how extensive the agreement must be, and *who* must agree. Is agreement required among all men or only among certain of them? Among the entire electorate or only those who actively participate in public affairs? Is the same type of consensus essential for all democracies at all times, or is a firmer and more sweeping consensus needed for periods of crisis than for periods of calm, for newer, developing democracies than for older stable ones?

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[1] James W. Prothro and C. W. Grigg, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 22 (Spring, 1960), pp. 276–94.

[2] Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven, 1961), ch. 28.

[3] Samuel A. Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties* (New York, 1955).

[4] V. O. Key, "Public Opinion and the Decay of of Democracy," *Virginia Q. Rev.*, Vol. 37 (Autumn, 1961), pp. 481–94. See also David B. Truman, "The American System in Crisis," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 74 (Dec., 1959), pp. 481–97. John Plamenatz, "Cultural Prerequisites to a Successfully Functioning Democracy: a Symposiium," this REVIEW, Vol. 50 (March, 1956), p. 123.

[5] Alexis deTocqueville, *Democracy in America* (ed. Phillips Bradley, New York, 1945), II, p. 8; I, pp. 392, 322. The difficulty of specifying the values which underly democracy, and on which consensus is presumed to be required, is illustrated in the exchange between Ernest S. Griffith, John Plamenatz, and J. Roland Pennock, cited above, pp. 101–37. The problem of certifying the "fundamentals" of democratic consensus is directly discussed by Pennock, pp. 132–3. See also Peter Bachrach, "Elite Consensus and Democracy," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 24 (August, 1962), pp. 449–52.

[6] A. L. Lowell, *Public Opinion and Popular Government* (New York, 1926), p. 9.

While certain of these questions are beyond the scope of this paper (no one, in any event, has done the systematic historical and comparative research needed to answer them satisfactorily), something might be learned about the relation of ideological consensus to democracy by investigating the subject in at least one major democracy, the United States. In the present paper I wish to explore further some of the questions raised by the writers I have cited and to present research findings on several hypotheses relating to those questions.

I. HYPOTHESES AND DEFINITIONS

We expected the data to furnish support for the following hypotheses, among others:

That the American electorate is often divided on "fundamental" democratic values and procedural "rules of the game" and that its understanding of politics and of political ideas is in any event too rudimentary at present to speak of ideological "consensus" among its members.

That, as Prothro and Grigg report for their samples, the electorate exhibits greater support for general, abstract statements of democratic belief than for their specific applications.

That the constituent ideas of American democratic ideology are principally held by the more "articulate" segments of the population, including the political influentials; and that people in these ranks will exhibit a more meaningful and far reaching consensus on democratic and constitutional values than will the general population.

That consensus is far from perfect even among the articulate classes, and will be evidenced on political questions more than on economic ones, on procedural rights more than on public policies, and on freedom more than equality.

That whatever increases the level of political articulateness—education, S.E.S., urban residence, intellectuality, political activity, etc.—strengthens consensus and support for American political ideology and institutions.

Whether a word like ideology can properly be employed in the American context depends, in part, on which of its many connotations one chooses to emphasize. Agreement on the meaning of the term is far from universal, but a tendency can be discerned among contemporary writers to regard ideologies as *systems* of belief that are elaborate, integrated, and coherent, that justify the exercise of power, explain and judge historical events, identify political right and wrong, set forth the interconnections (causal and moral) between politics and other spheres of activity, and furnish guides for action.[8] While liberal democracy does not fulfill perfectly the terms of this definition, it comes close enough, in my opinion, to be considered an ideology.[9] The elements of liberal democratic thought are not nearly so vague as they are sometimes made out to be, and their coalescence into a single body of belief is by no means fortuitous. American democratic "ideology" possesses an elaborately defined theory, a body of interrelated assumptions, axioms, and principles, and a set of ideals that serve as guides for action. Its tenets, postulates, sentiments, and values inspired the great revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and have been repeatedly and explicitly set forth in fundamental documents, such as the Constitution, the Declaration, and the Federalist Papers. They have been restated with remarkable unanimity in the messages of Presidents, in political speeches, in the pronouncements of judges and constitional commentators, and in the writings of political theorists, historians, and publicists. They are so familiar that we are likely to see them not as a coherent union of ideas and principles embodying a well-defined political tendency, but as a miscellany of slogans and noble sentiments to be trotted out on ceremonial occasions.

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[7] *Cf.*, for example, Louis Wirth, *Community Life and Social Policy* (Chicago, 1956), pp. 201–3, 381–2. For a critique of "consensus theory" and the several definitions of consensus see Irving L. Horowitz, "Consensus, Conflict, and Cooperation: a Sociological Inventory," *Social Forces*, Vol. 41 (Dec., 1962), pp. 177–188.

[8] *Cf.* Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology* (Glencoe, 1960), pp. 369–75; Edward Shils, "Ideology and Civility: on the Politics of the Intellectual," *Sewanee Review*, Vol. 66 (Summer, 1958), pp. 450–1; Louis Wirth, *op. cit.*, pp. 202–3.

[9] A persuasive case for considering liberal democracy as an ideology is made by Bernard Williams, "Democracy and Ideology," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 32 (October–December, 1961), pp. 374–84. The nature of ideology in America and some of the other questions addressed in the present paper are discussed by Robert G. McCloskey, "The American Ideology," in Marian D. Irish (ed.), *Continuing Crisis in American Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1963), pp. 10–25.

Although scholars or Supreme Court justices might argue over fine points of interpretation, they would uniformly recognize as elements of American democratic ideology such concepts as consent, accountability, limited or constitutional government, representation, majority rule, minority rights, the principle of political opposition, freedom of thought, speech, press, and assembly, equality of opportunity, religious toleration, equality before the law, the rights of juridical defense, and individual self-determination over a broad range of personal affairs. How widely such elements of American liberal democracy are approved, by whom and with what measure of understanding, is another question—indeed, it is the central question to be addressed in this paper. But that they form an integrated body of ideas which has become part of the American inheritance seems scarcely open to debate.[10]

The term consensus will be employed in this paper to designate a state of agreement concerning the aformentioned values. It has principally to do with shared beliefs and not with feelings of solidarity, the willingness to live together, to obey the laws, or to accept the existing government as legitimate. Nor does it refer to an abstract or universal state of mind, but to a measurable state of concurrence around values that can be specified. Consensus exists in degree and can be expressed in quantitative form. No one, of course, can say how close one must come to unanimity before consensus is achieved, for the cutting point, as with any continuous variable, is arbitrary. Still, the term in ordinary usage has been reserved for fairly substantial measures of correspondence, and we shall take as a minimal requirement for consensus a level of agreement reaching 75 per cent. This figure, while also arbitrary, recommends itself by being realistically modest (falling as it does midway between a bare majority and unanimity), and by having been designated in this country and elsewhere as the extraordinary majority required for certain constitutional purposes.

Since I shall in subsequent pages frequently (and interchangeably) employ such terms as the "articulate minority," the "political class," the "political elite," the "political influentials," and the "political stratum," I should also clarify what they are intended to signify. I mean them to refer to those people who occupy themselves with public affairs to an unusual degree, such as government officials, elected office holders, active party members, publicists, officers of voluntary associations, and opinion leaders. The terms do not apply to any definable social class in the usual sense, nor to a particular status group or profession. Although the people they designate can be distinguished from other citizens by their activity and concerns, they are in no sense a community, they do not act as a body, and they do not necessarily possess identical or even harmonious interests. "Articulates" or "influentials" can be found scattered throughout the society, at all income levels, in all classes, occupations, ethnic groups, and communities, although some segments of the population will doubtless yield a higher proportion of them than others. I scarcely need to add that the line between the "articulates" and the rest of the population cannot always be sharply drawn, for the qualities that distinguish them vary in form and degree and no single criterion of classification will satisfy every contingency.

The data for the present inquiry have been taken from a national study of political actives and supporters carried out in 1957–58. I have in a previous paper described the procedures of that study in some detail,[11] and will not trouble to repeat that description here. Perhaps it will suffice for present purposes merely to note the following: national surveys were carried out on two separate samples, the first a sample of over 3,000 political "actives" or "leaders" drawn from the delegates and alternates who had attended the Democratic and Republican conventions of 1956; the second a representative national sample of approximately 1,500 adults in the general population drawn by the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup Poll). Gallup interviewers also delivered and introduced the questionnaire to all respondents, discussed its contents with them, and furnished both oral and written instructions for its self-administration and completion. (For sample characteristics, see Appendix B.)

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[10] See Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and American Democracy* (New York, 1944), ch. 1. For a comprehensive review of the American value system and evidence concerning its stability over time, see Clyde Kluckhohn, "Have There Been Discernible Shifts in American Values during the Past Generation?" in E. E. Morison (ed.), *The American Style: Essays in Value and Performance* (New York, 1958), pp. 145–217. Kluckhohn concludes (p. 152) that despite some changes, the American value system has been "remarkably stable" since the 18th century and remains "highly influential in the life of the United States."

[11] Herbert McClosky, Paul J. Hoffmann, and Rosemary O'Hara, "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers," this REVIEW, Vol. 44 (June, 1960), pp. 406–27.

The party actives may be considered an especially pure sample of the "political stratum," for every person in the sample has marked himself off from the average citizen by his greater political involvement. Although the general population sample may be regarded as a sample of "inarticulates," to be compared with the sample of leaders, there are within it, of course, many persons who by virtue of education, profession, organizational activities, etc. can be classified as "articulates." We shall for certain purposes consider them in this light in order to provide further tests for our hypotheses.

Both samples received the same questionnaire—a lengthy instrument containing questions on personal backgroud, political experience, values, attitudes, opinions, political and economic orientation, party outlooks, and personality characteristics. Many of the questions were direct inquiries in the standard form, but most were single sentence "items" with which the respondent was compelled to express his agreement or disagreement. While each of these items can stand alone and be regarded in its own right as an indicator of a person's opinions or attitudes, each of them is simultaneously an integral element of one of the 47 "scales" that was expressly fashioned to afford a more refined and reliable assessment of the attitude and personality predispositions of every respondent. Each of the scales (averaging approximately nine items) has been independently validated either by empirical validation procedures employing appropriate criterion groups, or by a modified Guttman reproducibility procedure (supplemented, in some instances, by a "face validity" procedure utilizing item ratings by experts).

Data on the *scale* scores are presented in Table IV and are to be distinguished from the "percentage agree" scores for *individual items* presented in the remaining tables.

II. FINDINGS

"Rules of the game" and democratic values. Although the so-called "rules of the game" are often separated from other democratic values, the distinction is to some extent arbitrary. One might, for example, reasonably regard as "rules of the game" many of the norms governing free speech, press, social and political equality political toleration, and the enforcement of justice. For convenience, nevertheless, we shall treat separately those responses that stand out from the general body of democratic attitudes by their particular emphasis upon fair play, respect for legal procedures, and consideration for the rights of others. A sample of items expressing these values is presented in Table I.

The responses to these items show plainly that while a majority of the electorate support the "rules of the game," approval of such values is significantly greater and more uniform among the influentials. The latter have achieved consensus (as we have defined it) on eight of the twelve items and near consensus on three of the remaining four items. The electorate, by contrast, does not meet the criterion for consensus on a single item.

Although the *scales* (as distinguished from individual *items*) cannot appropriately be used to measure *consensus*, comparison of the scores on those scales which most nearly embody the "rules of the game" furnishes additional evidence that the political class responds to such norms more favorably than does the electorate. The proportion scoring high[12] on a scale of "faith in direct action" (a scale measuring the inclination to take the law into one's own hands) is 26.1 per cent for the active political minority and 42.5 per cent for the general population. On a scale assessing the willingness to flout the rules of political integrity, the proportions scoring high are 12.2 per cent and 30.6 per cent respectively. On "totalitarianism," a scale measuring the readiness to subordinate the rights of others to the pursuit of some collective political purpose, only 9.7 per cent of the political actives score high compared with 33.8 per cent of the general population.

These and other results which could be cited support the claim advanced by earlier investi-

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[12] "High" refers to a score made by the upper third of the popular distribution on the scale in question. For example, in the case of the "political indulgence" scale approximately one-third (actually 30.6%) received scores of five or above. Hence, anyone making a score of five or above on this scale is considered to have scored high on "political indulgence." "Low" refers to scores made by the lower third of the distribution.

TABLE I. POLITICAL INFLUENTIALS VS. THE ELECTORATE: RESPONSE TO ITEMS EXPRESSING "RULES OF THE GAME"*

Items	Political Influentials (N=3020)	General Electorate (N=1484)
	% Agree	
There are times when it almost seems better for the people to take the law into their own hands rather than wait for the machinery of government to act.	13.3	26.9
The majority has the right to abolish minorities if it wants to.	6.8	28.4
We might as well make up our minds that in order to make the world better a lot of innocent people will have to suffer.	27.2	41.6
If congressional committees stuck strictly to the rules and gave every witness his rights, they would never succeed in exposing the many dangerous subversives they have turned up.	24.7	47.4
I don't mind a politician's methods if he manages to get the right things done.	25.6	42.4
Almost any unfairness or brutality may have to be justified when some great purpose is being carried out.	13.3	32.8
Politicians have to cut a few corners if they are going to get anywhere.	29.4	43.2
People ought to be allowed to vote even if they can't do so intelligently.	65.6	47.6
To bring about great changes for the benefit of mankind often requires cruelty and even ruthlessness.	19.4	31.3
Very few politicians have clean records, so why get excited about the mudslinging that sometimes goes on?	14.8	38.1
It is all right to get around the law if you don't actually break it.	21.2	30.2
The true American way of life is disappearing so fast that we may have to use force to save it.	12.8	34.6

* Since respondents were forced to make a choice on each item, the number of omitted or "don't know" responses was, on the average, fewer than one percent, and thus has little influence on the direction or magnitude of the results reported in this and subsequent tables.

gators like Prothro and Grigg, and Hyman and Sheatsley,[13] that a large proportion of the electorate has failed to grasp certain of the underlying ideas and principles on which the American political system rests. Endorsement of these ideas is not unanimous among the political elite either, but is in every instance greater than that exhibited by the masses.

The picture changes somewhat when we turn from "rules of the game" to items which in a broad, general way express belief in freedom of speech and opinion. As can be seen from Table II, support for these values is remarkably high for both samples. Both groups, in fact, respond so overwhelmingly to abstract statements about freedom that one is tempted to conclude that for these values, at least, a far-reaching consensus has been achieved.[14] These results become even more striking when we consider that the items in the table are not mere clichés but statements which in some instances closely paraphrase the arguments developed in Mill's essay, *On Liberty*. We cannot, therefore, dismiss them as mere responses to familiar, abstract sentiments which commit the respondent to nothing in particular.

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[13] Prothro and Grigg, *loc. cit.;* Herbert Hyman and Paul B. Sheatsley, "The Current Status of American Public Opinion," in Daniel Katz *et al.* (eds.), *Public Opinion and Propaganda* (New York, 1954), pp. 33–48.

[14] *Cf.* Robert Lane's report on his "Eastport" sample, in *Political Ideology* (New York, 1962), pp. 461–2

Still, as can readily be discerned from the items in Table III, previous investigators have been partially correct, at least, in observing that the principles of freedom and democracy are less widely and enthusiastically favored when they are confronted in their specific, or applied, forms.[15] As Dahl remarks, it is a "common tendency of mankind . . . to qualify universals in application while leaving them intact in rhetoric."[16] This observation, of course, also holds for the political articulates, but to a lesser degree. Not only do they exhibit stronger support for democratic values than does the electorate, but they are also more consistent in applying the general principle to the specific instance.[17] The average citizen has greater difficulty appreciating the importance of certain procedural or juridical rights, especially when he believes the country's internal security is at stake.

Findings which underscore and amplify these conclusions are yielded by a comparison of the scale scores. The data presented in Table IV confirm that the influentials not only register higher scores on all the pro-democratic scales (faith in freedom, faith in democracy, procedural rights, tolerance), but are more likely to reject antidemocratic sentiments as well. Although they are themselves an elite of a sort, they display greater faith in the capacity of the mass of men to govern themselves, they believe more firmly in political equality, and they more often disdain the "extreme" beliefs embodied in the Right Wing, Left Wing, totalitarian, elitist, and authoritarian scales. Their repudiation of anti-democratic attitudes

TABLE II. POLITICAL INFLUENTIALS VS. THE ELECTORATE: RESPONSES TO ITEMS EXPRESSING SUPPORT FOR GENERAL STATEMENTS OF FREE SPEECH AND OPINION

Items	Political Influentials (N = 3020) % Agree	General Electorate (N = 1484) % Agree
People who hate our way of life should still have a chance to talk and be heard.	86.9	81.8
No matter what a person's political beliefs are, he is entitled to the same legal rights and protections as anyone else.	96.4	94.3
I believe in free speech for all no matter what their views might be.	89.4	88.9
Nobody has a right to tell another person what he should and should not read.	81.4	80.7
You can't really be sure whether an opinion is true or not unless people are free to argue against it.	94.9	90.8
Unless there is freedom for many points of view to be presented, there is little chance that the truth can ever be known.	90.6	85.2
I would not trust any person or group to decide what opinions can be freely expressed and what must be silenced.	79.1	64.6
Freedom of conscience should mean freedom to be an atheist as well as freedom to worship in the church of one's choice.	87.8	77.0

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[15] See Hyman and Sheatsley, *op. cit.*, pp. 40–2; Prothro and Grigg, *op. cit.*

[16] Robert A. Dahl. *loc. cit.* For data on the failure of some people to perceive the relevance of democratic principles for concrete situations see G. D. Wiebe, "The Army-McCarthy Hearings and the Public Conscience," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 22 (Winter 1958–59), pp. 490–502.

[17] See also Stouffer, *op. cit.*, ch. 2.

TABLE III. POLITICAL INFLUENTIALS VS. THE ELECTORATE: RESPONSE TO ITEMS EXPRESSING SUPPORT FOR SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS OF FREE SPEECH AND PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

Items	Political Influentials (N=3020)	General Electorate (N=1484)
	% Agree	
Freedom does not give anyone the right to teach foreign ideas in our schools.	45.5	56.7
A man oughtn't to be allowed to speak if he doesn't know what he's talking about.	17.3	36.7
A book that contains wrong political views cannot be a good book and does not deserive to be published.	17.9	50.3
When the country is in great danger we may have to force people to testify against themselves even if it violates their rights.	28.5	36.3
No matter what crime a person is accused of, he should never be convicted unless he has been given the right to face and question his accusers.	90.1	88.1
If a person is convicted of a crime by illegal evidence, he should be set free and the evidence thrown out of court.	79.6	66.1
If someone is suspected of treason or other serious crimes, he shouldn't be entitled to be let out on bail.	33.3	68.9
Any person who hides behind the laws when he is questioned about his activities doesn't deserve much consideration.	55.9	75.7
In dealing with dangerous enemies like the Communists, we can't afford to depend on the courts, the laws and their slow and unreliable methods.	7.4	25.5

is by no means unanimous either, but their responses are more uniformly democratic than are those expressed by the electorate.

Equalitarian values. If Americans concur most strongly about liberty in the abstract, they disagree most strongly about equality. Examples of equalitarian values are presented in Table V. Both the political stratum and the public divide sharply on these values, a finding which holds for political, as well as for social and economic equality. Both are torn not only on the empirical question of whether men are *in fact* equal but also on the normative issue of whether they should be *regarded* as equal. Neither comes close to achieving consensus on such questions as the ability of the people to rule themselves, to know their best interests in the long run, to understand the issues, or to pick their own leaders wisely. Support for these equalitarian features of "popular" democracy, however, is greater among the elite than among the masses.

The reverse is true for the values of economic equality. Among the political stratum, indeed, the weight of opinion is against equality—a result strongly though not exclusively influenced by the pronounced economic conservatism of the Republican leaders in the sample. Support for economic equality is only slightly greater among the electorate. The pattern, furthermore, is extremely spotty, with some policies strongly favored and others as strongly rejected. Thus approval is widespread for public policies (such as social security) that are designed to overcome gross inequalities, but is equally strong for certain features of economic life that promote inequality, such as private enterprise, economic competition, and unlimited pursuit of profit.[18] On social and ethnic equality, both samples are deeply split.

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[18] These inferences are drawn not only from the few items presented in Table V, but from data previously reported by H. McClosky, P. J. Hoffmann, and R. O'Hara, *op. cit.*, p. 413; and from the responses to dozens of items in the present study that express attitudes and opinions toward the private enterprise system, taxes, private

In short, both the public and its leaders are uncertain and ambivalent about equality. The reason, I suspect, lies partly in the fact that the egalitarian aspects of democratic theory have been less adequately thought through than other aspects, and partly in the complications connected with the concept itself. One such complication arises from the historical association of democracy with capitalism, a commingling of egalitarian and inegalitarian elements that has never been (and perhaps never can be) perfectly reconciled. Another complication lies in the diffuse and variegated nature of the concept, a result of its application to at least four separate domains: political (*e.g.*, universal suffrage), legal (*e.g.*, equality before the law), economic (*e.g.*, equal distribution of property or opportunity), and moral (*e.g.*, every man's right to be treated as an end and not as a means). Accompanying these are the confusions which result from the common failure to distinguish equality as a *fact* from equality as a *norm.* ("All men are created equal," for example, is taken by some as an empirical statement, by others as a normative one.) Still other complications arise from the differential rewards and opportunities inevitable in any complex society, from the differences in the initial endowment individuals bring into the world, and from the symbolism and fears that so often attend the division of men into ethnic compartments. All these confound the effort to develop a satisfactory theory of democratic equality, and further serve to frustrate the realization of consensus around egalitarian values.

Faith in the political system. Another perspective on the state of ideology and consensus in America may be obtained by observing how people respond to the political system. How do Americans feel about the political and social institutions by which they are ruled? Do they perceive the system as one they can reach and influence? Are they satisfied that it will govern justly and for the common good?

TABLE IV. POLITICAL INFLUENTIALS VS. THE ELECTORATE: PERCENTAGES SCORING HIGH AND LOW ON DEMOCRATIC AND ANTI-DEMOCRATIC ATTITUDE SCALES*

Scale	Political Influentials (N = 3020)	General Electorate (N = 1484)	Scale	Political Influentials (N = 3020)	General Electorate (N = 1484)
	(%s down)			(%s down)	
Faith in Democracy			Elitism		
% High*	40.1	18.5	% High	22.8	38.7
% Low	14.4	29.7	% Low	41.0	22.4
Procedural Rights			Totalitarianism		
% High	58.1	24.1	% High	9.7	33.8
% Low	12.3	31.3	% Low	60.1	28.4
Tolerance			Right Wing		
% High	61.3	43.1	% High	17.5	33.1
% Low	16.4	33.2	% Low	45.3	28.9
Faith in Freedom			Left Wing		
% High	63.0	48.4	% High	6.7	27.8
% Low	17.1	28.4	% Low	68.7	39.3
Ethnocentrism			California F-Scale		
% High	27.5	36.5	% High	14.7	33.5
% Low	46.9	36.3	% Low	48.0	23.5

* For explanation of % High and Low see footnote 12. The middle group has been omitted from this table. Differences between the influentials and the electorate on all the scales in this table are, by Kolmogorov-Smirnov and chi-square tests, statistically significant at or beyond the .01 percent level of significance.

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property, profits, socialism, etc. On the whole, little enthusiasm is registered among either the elite or the masses for a drastic revision of the economy or a major redistribution of the wealth.

TABLE V. POLITICAL INFLUENTIALS VS. THE ELECTORATE: RESPONSES TO ITEMS EXPRESSING BELIEF IN EQUALITY

Items	Political Influentials (N=3020) % Agree	General Electorate (N=1484) % Agree
Political Equality		
The main trouble with democracy is that most people don't really know what's best for them.	40.8	58.0
Few people really know what is in their own best interest in the long run.	42.6	61.1
"Issues" and "arguments" are beyond the understanding of most voters.	37.5	62.3
Most people don't have enough sense to pick their own leaders wisely.	28.0	47.8
It will always be necessary to have a few strong, able people actually running everything.	42.5	56.2
Social and Ethnic Equality		
We have to teach children that all men are created equal but almost everyone knows that some are better than others.	54.7	58.3
Just as is true of fine race horses, some breeds of people are just naturally better than others.	46.0	46.3
Regardless of what some people say, there are certain races in the world that just wont mix with Americans.	37.2	50.4
When it comes to the things that count most, all races are certainly not equal.	45.3	49.0
The trouble with letting certain minority groups into a nice neighborhood is that they gradually give it their own atmosphere.	49.8	57.7
Economic Equality		
Labor does not get its fair share of what it produces.	20.8	44.8
Every person should have a good house, even if the government has to build it for him.	14.9	28.2
I think the government should give a person work if he can't find another job.	23.5	47.3
The government ought to make sure that everyone has a good standard of living.	34.4	55.9
There will always be poverty, so people might as well get used to the idea.	40.4	59.4

Sample items relating to these questions are contained in Tables VI and VII. An assessment of the responses, however, is confounded by an ambivalence in our tradition. Few will question that Americans are patriotic and loyal, that they accept the political system as legitimate, and that they are inclined to shy away from radical or extreme movements which aim to alter or to overthrow the constitutional foundations of the system. Yet Americans are also presumed to have a longstanding suspicion of government—a state of mind which some his-

TABLE VI. POLITICAL INFLUENTIALS VS. THE ELECTORATE: RESPONSES TO ITEMS EXPRESSING CYNICISM TOWARD GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Items	Political Influentials (N=3020)	General Electorate (N=1484)
	% Agree	
Most politicians are looking out for themselves above all else.	36.3	54.3
Both major parties in this country are controlled by the wealthy and are run for their benefit.	7.9	32.1
Many politicians are bought off by some private interest.	43.0	65.3
I avoid dealing with public officials as much as I can	7.8	39.3
Most politicians can be trusted to do what they think is best for the country.	77.1	58.9
I usually have confidence that the government will do what is right.	81.6	89.6
The people who really "run" the country do not even get known to the voters.	40.2	60.5
The laws of this country are supposed to benefit all of us equally, but the fact is that they're almost all "rich-man's laws."	8.4	33.3
No matter what the people think, a few people will always run things anyway.	30.0	53.8
Most politicians don't seem to me to really mean what they say.	24.7	55.1
There is practically no connection between what a politician says and what he will do once he gets elected.	21.4	54.0
A poor man doesn't have the chance he deserves in the law courts.	20.3	42.9
Most political parties care only about winning elections and nothing more.	28.3	46.2
All politics is controlled by political bosses.	15.6	45.9

torians trace back to the depredations of George III and to the habits of self-reliance forced upon our ancestors by frontier life.[19]

It is impossible in the present context to determine the extent to which the scores contained in these tables signify genuine frustration and political disillusionment and the extent to which they represent familiar and largely ritualistic responses. It is plain, however, that Americans are, verbally at least, both confused and divided in their reactions to the political system. Many feel themselves hopelessly ineffectual politically. Approximately half perceive government and politicians as remote, inaccessible, and largely unresponsive to the electorate's needs or opinions.[20] About

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[19] Evidence is accumulating that the distrust of politics, often thought to be peculiar to the United States, is also found in many other countries. In fact, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba report in their cross-cultural study of citizenship that political interest is higher in the United States than it is in the four other countries they studied (United Kingdom, West Germany, Italy, and Mexico); and that Americans, if anything, are less negative toward politics than are the citizens of the other countries. See *The Civic Culture* (1963), chs. III–IV.

[20] See also the Michigan data on voters' sense of "political efficacy" in Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston, 1954), pp. 187–94.

TABLE VII. POLITICAL INFLUENTIALS VS. THE ELECTORATE: RESPONSES TO ITEMS EXPRESSING A SENSE OF POLITICAL FUTILITY

Items	Political Influentials (N=3020)	General Electorate (N=1484)
	% Agree	
It's no use worrying my head about public affairs; I cant do anything about them anyhow.	2.3	20.5
The people who really "run" the country do not even get known to the voters.	40.2	60.5
I feel that my political leaders hardly care what people like myself think or want.	10.9	39.0
Nothing I ever do seems to have any effect upon what happens in politics.	8.4	61.5
Political parties are so big that the average member hasn't got much to say about what goes on.	37.8	67.5
There doesn't seem to be much connection between what I want and what my representative does.	24.0	43.7
It seems to me that whoever you vote for, things go on pretty much the same.	21.1	51.3

the same proportion regard politics as squalid and seamy, as an activity in which the participants habitually practice deception, expediency, and self-aggrandizement. Yet by a curious inconsistency which so frequently frustrates the investigator searching the data for regularities, 89.6 per cent express confidence that the government will do what is right. However strongly they mistrust the men and the procedures through which public policies are fashioned, most voters seem not to be greatly dissatisfied with the outcome. They may be cynical about the operation of the political system, but they do not question its legitimacy.[21]

Although the influentials do not unanimously endorse American political practices either, they are substantially less suspicious and cynical than is the electorate. Indeed, they have achieved consensus or come close to achieving it on most of the items in the two tables. These results are further borne out by the *scale* scores: only 10.1 per cent of the articulates score "high" on the political cynicism scale, as contrasted with 31.3 per cent of the general population; on political suspiciousness the scores are 9.0 per cent high versus 26.7 per cent; on pessimism they are 12.6 per cent versus 26.7 per cent; and on sense of political futility the influentials score (understandably enough) only 3.1 per cent high compared with 30.2 per cent high for the electorate. The active minority also exhibits a stronger sense of social responsibility than the people do (their respective percentage high scores are 40.7 per cent versus 25.8 per cent) and, as previously noted, they are less tolerant of infractions against ethical political procedures.

Should we not, however, have expected these results as a matter of course, considering that the influentials were selected for study precisely because of their political experience and involvement? Possibly, except that similar (though less pronounced) differences emerge when we distinguish articulates from inarticulates by criteria other than actual political activity. Voters, for example, who have been to college, attained high status occupations or professions, or developed strong intellectual interests are, by a significant margin, also likely to possess more affirmative attitudes toward government, politics, and politicians.[22]

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[21] For other data on ambivalent attitudes toward government, see Hyman and Sheatsley, *op. cit.*

[22] Similar findings are reported by Robert E. Agger, Marshall N. Goldstein and Stanley A. Pearl, "Political Cynicism: Measurement and Meaning," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 23 (1961), pp. 477–506.

They display a greater sense of social and political responsibility, are more optimistic, and are less indulgent of shoddy political methods. The political actives who are highly educated exhibit these attitudes even more strongly. Familiarity, it seems, far from breeding contempt, greatly increases respect, hope and support for the nation's political institutions and practices. Inferential support for this generalization is available from the findings turned up by Almond and Verba in all five countries they investigated in their comparative study of citizenship.[23]

Coherence and consistency of attitudes. So far we have explored the question of ideology and consensus mainly from the point of view of agreement on particular values. This, however, is a minimum criterion. Before one can say that a class or group or nation has achieved consensus around an ideology, one should be satisfied that they understand its values in a coherent and correct way. It is a poor consensus in which generalities and slogans are merely echoed with little appreciation of their significance. It seemed appropriate, therefore, to compare the influentials and voters concerning their information and understanding, the relation of their opinions to their party preferences, and the consistency of their views on public affairs.

To begin with, the influentials are more likely than the electorate to have opinions on public questions. For example, 28 per cent of the public are unable (though a few may only be *unwilling*) to classify themselves as liberal, middle of the road, or conservative; while only 1.1 per cent of the articulates fail to make this classification. Forty-eight per cent of the voters, compared to 15 per cent of the actives, do not know in which direction they would turn if the parties were reorganized to reflect ideological differences more clearly. Forty-five per cent of the electorate but only 10.2 per cent of the influentials cannot name any issue that divides the parties. By ratios of approximately three or four to one the electorate is less likely to know which level of government they are mainly interested in, whether they prefer their party to control Congress or the presidency, whether they believe in party discipline and of what type, whether control of the parties should rest at the national or local levels, and so on.

As these and other of our findings suggest, active political involvement heightens one's sense of intellectual order and commitment. This inference is further supported by the data on partisanship. One example may suffice to illustrate the point: when the articulates and the electorate are ranged on a scale assessing their orientation toward 14 current liberal-conservative issues, the political actives tend to bunch up at the extreme ends of the distribution (the Democratic actives at the "liberal" end, the Republican actives at the "conservative" end), while the rank and file supporters of both parties fall more frequently into the middle or conflicted category. The political influentials, in short, display issue orientations that are more partisan and more consistent with their party preferences.

Essentially the same effect is achieved among the general population by increases in education, economic status, or other factors that raise the level of articulateness. College-educated Democrats and Republicans, for example, disagree more sharply on issues than grade school Democrats and Republicans do. Partisan differences are greater between the informed than between the uninformed, between the upper-class supporters of the two parties than between the lower-class supporters, between the "intellectuals" in both parties than between those who rank low on "intellectuality."

Increases in political knowledge or involvement, hence, cause men not so much to waver as to choose sides and to identify more unswervingly with one political tendency or its opposite. Inarticulateness and distance from the sources of political decision increase intellectual uncertainty and evoke political responses that are random rather than systematic. We are thus led by the findings to a pair of conclusions that may at first appear contradictory but that in reality are not: the political class is more united than the electorate on fundamental political values but divides more sharply by party affiliation on the issues which separate the two parties.[24] Both facts—the greater consensus in the one instance and the sharper cleavage in the other—testify to its superior ideological sophistication.

Not only are the articulates more partisan, but they are also more consistent in their views. Their responses to a wide range of political stimuli are to a greater extent intellectually patterned and informed. They are, for example, better able to name reference groups that correspond with their party affiliation and doctrinal orientation: approximately twice as many active Democrats as ordinary Democratic voters name liberal, Democratically oriented organizations as groups they would seek advice from (*e.g.*, trade unions, Farmers Union, etc.); and by equally large or larger ratios they *reject* as sources of advice such conservative or Republican oriented organizations as the NAM, the Farm Bureau, and the Chamber of Commerce. With some variations, similar findings emerge when Republican leaders are compared with Republican voters. If we also take into account the liberal or conservative issue-orientation of the respondents, the differential ability of party leaders and followers to recognize reference groups becomes even more pronounced. Clearly, the political stratum has a better idea than the public has of who its ideological friends and enemies are. The capacity to recognize sympathetic or hostile reference groups is not highly developed among the public at large.

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[23] Almond and Verba, *op cit.*, ch. IV. One can, of course, imagine circumstances, such as political disorganization or revolutionary crises, in which the generalization would not hold—in which, indeed, the political elite might lead the struggle *against* the existing governing institutions. I am speaking, in the present context, of politics under "normal" conditions in established democracies.

[24] See also V. O. Key, *Public Opinion and Democracy* (New York, 1961), pp. 51–2.

Compared with the influentials, ordinary voters also show up poorly in their ability to classify themselves politically. For example, among Democratic actives who score as "liberals" in their views on issues, 82.2 per cent correctly describe themselves as "liberals," while 16.7 per cent call themselves "middle of the roaders" and only 1.1 per cent misclassify themselves as "conservatives." Among Democratic *voters* who actually hold liberal views, only 37.0 per cent are able to label themselves correctly. The disparity is less striking between Republican leaders and followers but bears out no less conclusively that most voters lack the sophistication to recognize and label accurately the tendency of their own political views. Even their choice of party is frequently discrepant with their actual ideological views: as we reported in a previous paper,[25] not only do Democratic and Republican voters hold fairly similar opinions on issues, but the latter's opinions are closer to the opinions of Democratic leaders than to those of their own leaders.

Data we have gathered on patterns of support for individual political leaders yield similar conclusions: the articulates are far better able than the electorate to select leaders whose political philosophy they share. Often, in fact, voters simultaneously approve of two or more leaders who represent widely different outlooks—for example, Joseph McCarthy and Dwight D. Eisenhower. In a similar vein, a surprisingly large number of voters simultaneously score high on a Right Wing scale and a liberal issues scale, or hold other "discrepant" outlooks. Such inconsistencies are not unknown among the political actives either, but they are much less frequent. Not only does the public have less information than the political class but it does not succeed as well in sorting out and relating the information it does possess.[26]

Most of the relationships reported in the foregoing have been tested with education, occupation, and sometimes with other demographic variables controlled, but the introduction of these factors does not change the direction of the findings, although it sometimes affects the magnitude of the scores.

Comparisons of scores for the two samples have also been made with "acquiescent" response-set controlled. Acquiescence affects the results, but does not eliminate the differences reported or alter the direction or significance of the findings. (See Appendix A.)

III. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

Several observations can be offered by way of summarizing and commenting upon the data just reported:

1. American politics is widely thought to be innocent of ideology, but this opinion more appropriately describes the electorate than the active political minority. If American ideology is defined as that cluster of axioms, values and beliefs which have given form and substance to American democracy and the Constitution, the political influentials manifest by comparison with ordinary voters a more developed sense of ideology and a firmer grasp of its essentials. This is evidenced in their stronger approval of democratic ideas, their greater tolerance and regard for proper procedures and citizen rights, their superior understanding and acceptance of the "rules of the game," and their more affirmative attitudes toward the political system in general. The electorate displays a substantial measure of unity chiefly in its support of freedom in the abstract; on most other features of democratic belief and practice it is sharply divided.

The political views of the influentials are relatively ordered and coherent. As liberals and conservatives, Democrats and Republicans, they take stands on issues, choose reference groups, and express preferences for leaders that are far more consistent than the attitudes and preferences exhibited by the electorate. The latter's opinions do not entirely lack order but are insufficiently integrated to meet the requirements of an ideology.[27] In contrast to the political elite, which tends to be united on basic values but divided on issues by party affiliation (both of which testify to a measure of ideological sophistication), the voters divide on many basic political values and adopt stands on issues with little reference to their party affiliation.

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[25] McClosky, Hoffmann, and O'Hara, *op. cit.*

[26] For other findings on the state of ideological development among the electorate, see Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York, 1960), chs. 8–10.

The evidence suggests that it is the articulate classes rather than the public who serve as the major repositories of the public conscience and as the carriers of the Creed. Responsibility for keeping the system going, hence, falls most heavily upon them.[28]

2. Why should consensus and support for democratic ideology be stronger among the political stratum than among the electorate? The answer plainly has to do with the differences in their political activity, involvement and articulateness.

Some observers complain that Americans have little interest in political ideas because they are exclusively concerned with their own personal affairs. Evidence is becoming available, however, that political apathy and ignorance are also widespread among the populations of other countries and may well be endemic in all societies larger than a city-state. It is difficult to imagine any circumstance, short of war or revolutionary crisis, in which the mass of men will evince more interest in the community's affairs than in their own concerns. This is not because they are selfish, thoughtless, or morally deficient, but because the stimuli they receive from public affairs are relatively remote and intangible. One can scarcely expect ordinary men to respond to them as intensely as they respond to the more palpable stimuli in their own everyday lives, which impinge upon them directly and in ways they can understand and do something about. The aphorism which holds man to be a political animal may be supportable on normative grounds but is scarcely defensible as a description of reality. Political apathy seems for most men the more "natural" state. Although political matters are in a sense "everyone's concern", it is just as unreasonable to hope that all men will sustain a lively interest in politics as it would be to expect everyone to become addicted to chamber music, electronics, poetry, or baseball. Since many voters lack education, opportunity, or even tangible and compelling reasons for busying themselves with political ideas, they respond to political stimuli (if they respond at all) without much reflection or consistency. Their life-styles, furthermore, tend to perpetuate this state of affairs, for they are likely to associate with people like themselves whose political opinions are no more informed or consistent than their own. As inarticulates, they are also inclined to avoid the very activities by which they might overcome their indifference and develop a more coherent point of view.

Many voters, in addition, feel remote from the centers of political decision and experience an acute sense of political futility. They know the political world only as a bewildering labyrinth of procedures and unceasing turmoil in which it is difficult to distinguish the just from the wicked, the deserving from the undeserving. The political questions about which they are asked to have opinions are complex and thorny; every solution is imperfect and exacts its price; measures that benefit some groups invariably aggrieve others. The principles which govern the political process seem vague, recondite and impossible to relate to actual events. All this obviously deters voters from developing ideologically, from acquiring insights into the subtleties of the democratic process, and from achieving consensus even on fundamental values.

Although the influentials face some of the same obstacles, they are better able to overcome them. As a group they are distinguished from the mass of the electorate by their above-average education and economic status, their greater political interest and awareness, and their more immediate access to the command posts of community decision. Many of them participate not only in politics but in other public activities as well. This affords them, among other benefits, a more sophisticated understanding of how the society is run and a more intimate association with other men and women who are alert to political ideas and values. Political concepts and abstractions, alien to the vocabulary of many voters, are for the elite familiar items of everyday discourse.

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[27] For a similar conclusion on this point, see V. O. Key, *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York, 1961), pp. 41, 49. The second chapter of this volume contains an excellent discussion of opinion consensus among the electorate, and touches on a number of the points dealt with in this paper. Evidence on the infrequency of "ideological" thinking among the voters is presented in Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, *op. cit.*, p. 249. By the criteria used the authors were able to classify only 3.5% of the voters as "ideologues" and 12% as "near-ideologues."

[28] V. O. Key, "Public Opinion and the Decay of Democracy," *loc cit.*

Consider also that the political stratum is, by almost every social criterion we have examined, more homogeneous than the electorate. This promotes communication among them and increases their chances of converging around a common body of attitudes.[29] As Newcomb[30] has remarked, "The actual consequences of communication, as well as the intended ones, are consensus—increasing." Among many segments of the general population, however, communication on matters of political belief either occurs not at all or is so random and cacophonous as to have little utility for the reinforcement of political values. If Louis Wirth is correct in observing that "the limits of consensus are marked by the range of effective communication,"[31] it becomes easier to understand why the active minority achieves consensus more often than the voters do.

Compared with the electorate, whose ordinary members are submerged in an ideological babble of poorly informed and discordant opinions, the members of the political minority inhabit a world in which political ideas are vastly more salient, intellectual consistency is more frequently demanded, attitudes are related to principles, actions are connected to beliefs, "correct" opinions are rewarded and "incorrect" opinions are punished. In addition, as participants in political roles, the actives are compelled (contrary to stereotype) to adopt opinions, to take stands on issues, and to evaluate ideas and events. As *articulates* they are unavoidably exposed to the liberal democratic values which form the main current of our political heritage. The net effect of these influences is to heighten their sensitivity to political ideas and to unite them more firmly behind the values of the American tradition. They may, as a result, be better equipped for the role they are called upon to play in a democracy than the citizens are for *their* role.

The findings furnish little comfort for those who wish to believe that a passion for freedom, tolerance, justice and other democratic values springs spontaneously from the lower depths of the society, and that the plain, homespun, uninitiated yeoman, worker and farmer are the natural hosts of democratic ideology. The mystique of the simple, unworldly, "natural" democrat has been with us since at least the rise of Christianity, and has been assiduously cultivated by Rousseau, Tolstoy, Marx, and numerous lesser writers and social reformers. Usually, the simpler the man, the lower his station in life, and the greater his objective need for equality, the more we have endowed him with a capacity for understanding democracy. We are thus inclined to give the nod to the farmer over the city man, the unlearned over the educated, the poor man over the man of wealth, the "people" over their leaders, the unsophisticated over the sophisticated. Yet everyone of these intuitive expectations turns out, upon investigation, to be questionable or false. Democratic beliefs and habits are obviously not "natural" but must be learned; and they are learned more slowly by men and women whose lives are circumscribed by apathy, ignorance, provincialism and social or physical distance from the centers of intellectual activity. In the absence of knowledge and experience—as we can readily observe from the fidgety course of growth in the newly emerging nations—the presuppositions and complex obligations of democracy, the rights it grants and the self-restraints it imposes, cannot be quickly comprehended. Even in a highly developed democratic nation like the United States, millions of people continue to possess only the most rudimentary understanding of democratic ideology.

3. While the active political minority affirms the underlying values of democracy more enthusiastically than the people do, consensus among them is far from perfect, and we might well inquire why this is so.

Despite the many forces impelling influentials toward agreement on basic ideological values, counteracting forces are also at work to divide them. Not all influentials are able to comprehend democratic ideas, to apply them to concrete contexts, or to thread their way through the complexities of modern political life. Nor is communication perfect among them either, despite their greater homogeneity. Many things divide them, not least of which are differences in education, conflicting economic and group interests, party competition, factional cleavages and personal political ambitions.

In demonstrating that the influentials are better prepared then the masses to receive and reflect upon political ideas, we run the risk of overstating the case and of exaggerating their capacity for ideological reasoning. Some members of the political class obviously have no more intellectual concern with politics than the masses do; they are in it for "the game," for personal reasons, or for almost any reason except ideology.

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[29] For additional data on the homogeneity of social characteristics and values among American elite groups, see James N. Rosenau, "Consensus-Building in the American National Community: Hypotheses and Supporting Data," *Journal of Politics,* Vol. 24 (November, 1962), pp. 639–661.

[30] Theodore M. Newcomb, "The Study of Consensus," in R. K. Merton *et al.* (eds.), *Sociology Today* (New York, 1959), pp. 277–92.

[31] *Op. cit.*, p. 201.

Then, too, while most democratic ideas are in their most general form simple enough for almost all members of the elite to understand, they become considerably more puzzling when one sets out to explicate them, to relate them to each other, or to apply them to concrete cases. Only a few of the complications need to be cited to illustrate the point: several of the ideas, such as equality, are either inherently vague or mean different things in different contexts. Some democratic (or constitutional) values turn out in certain situations to be incompatible with other democratic values (*e.g.*, the majority's right to make and enforce the laws at times clashes with individual rights, such as the right to stand on one's religious conscience). As this suggests, democratic ideas and rules of the game are ordinarily encountered not in pure form or in isolation but in substantive contexts that are bound to influence the ways in which we react to them.[32] Many businessmen who consider the regulation of business as an unconstitutional invasion of freedom look upon the regulation of trade unions as a justifiable curb upon lawlessness; trade unionists, needless to say, lean to the opposite view.

Consider, too, what a heavy burden we place upon a man's normal impulses by asking him to submit unconditionally to democratic values and procedures. Compliance with democratic rules of the game often demands an extraordinary measure of forbearance and self-discipline, a willingness to place constraints upon the use of our collective power and to suffer opinions, actions, and groups we regard as repugnant. The need for such self-restraint is for many people intrinsically difficult to comprehend and still more difficult to honor. Small wonder, then, that consensus around democratic values is imperfect, even among the political influentials who are well situated to appreciate their importance.

4. We turn now to the most crucial question suggested by the research findings, namely, what significance must be assigned to the fact that democratic ideology and consensus are poorly developed among the electorate and only imperfectly realized among the political influentials?

Our first and most obvious conclusion is that, contrary to the familiar claim, a democratic society can survive despite widespread popular misunderstanding and disagreement about basic democratic and constitutional values. The American political system survives and even flourishes under precisely these conditions, and so, we have reason to think, do other viable democracies. What makes this possible is a more conjectural question, though several observations can be offered by way of answering it.

Democratic viability is, to begin with, saved by the fact that those who are most confused about democratic ideas are also likely to be politically apathetic and without significant influence. Their role in the nation's decision process is so small that their "misguided" opinions or non-opinions have little practical consequence for stability. If they contribute little to the vitality of the system, neither are they likely to do much harm. Lipset[33] has pointed out that "apathy undermines consensus," but to this one may add the corollary observation that apathy also furnishes its own partial corrective by keeping the doubters from acting upon their differences. In the United States, at least, their disagreements are *passive* rather than *active*, more the result of political ignorance and indifference than of intellectual conviction or conscious identification with an "alien" political tendency. Most seem not even to be aware of their deviations from the established values. This suggests that there may, after all, be some utility in achieving agreement on large, abstract political sentiments, for it may satisfy men that they share common values when in fact they do not. Not only can this keep conflicts from erupting, but it also permits men who disagree to continue to communicate and thus perhaps to convert their pseudo-consensus on democratic values into a genuine consensus.

I do not mean to suggest, of course, that a nation runs no risks when a large number of its citizens fail to grasp the essential principles on which its constitution is founded. Among Americans, however, the principal danger is not that they will reject democratic ideals in favor of some hostile ideology, but that they will fail to understand the very institutions they believe themselves to be defending and may end up undermining rather than safeguarding them. Our research on "McCarthyism," for example, strongly suggests that popular support for the Senator represented less a conscious rejection of American democratic ideals than a misguided effort to defend them. We found few McCarthy supporters who genuinely shared the attitudes and values associated with his name.[34]

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[32] For a discussion of this point, see Peter Bachrach, "Elite Consensus and Deomocracy," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 24 (August, 1962), pp. 439–52.

[33] Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man*, (New York, 1960), p. 27. Chapter I of this volume provides a stimulating and valuable discussion of the relation of conflict and consensus to the operation of democracy.

Whether consensus among the influentials is either a necessary or sufficient condition for democratic stability is not really known. Since the influentials act, make public decisions, are more organized, and take political ideas more seriously, agreement among them on constitutional values is widely thought to be essential for viability. At present, however, we do not have enough information (or at least we do not have it in appropriately organized form) to state with satisfactory precision what the actual relation is between elite consensus and democratic stability. Some democratic governments, *e.g.*, Weimar Germany, crumbled when faced with ideological conflicts among their political classes; others, *e.g.*, post-war Italy and France, have until now manged to weather pronounced ideological cleavages. The opinion has long prevailed that consensus is needed to achieve stability, but the converse may be the more correct formulation, *i.e.*, that so long as conditions remain stable, consensus is not required; it becomes essential only when social conditions are disorganized. Consensus may strengthen democratic viability, but its absence in an otherwise stable society need not be fatal or even particularly damaging.

It should also be kept in mind that the existence of intellectual disagreements—even among the influentials—does not necessarily mean that they will be expressed or acted upon. In the United States (and doubtless elsewhere as well), numerous influences are at work to prevent ideological cleavages from assuming an important role in the nation's political life. This is certainly the tendency of such political institutions as federalism, checks and balances, separation of powers, bicameralism, the congressional committee system, the judiciary's practice of accomodating one discrepant law to another, and a system of elections more often fought around local issues and personalities than around urgent national questions. Our two-party system also functions to disguise or soften the genuine disagreements that distinguish active Democrats from active Republicans. The American social system contributes to the same end, for it is a model of the pluralistic society, a profuse collection of diverse groups, interests and organizations spread over a vast and variegated territory. Consensus in such a society becomes difficult to achieve, but by the same token its absence can also more easily be survived. The complexities of a highly pluralistic social and political order tend to diminish the impact of intellectual differences, to compel compromise, and to discourage the holders of divergent views from crystalizing into intransigent doctrinal camps. Thus it seems, paradoxically enough, that the need for consensus on democratic rules of the game increases as the conflict among competing political tendencies becomes sharper, and declines as their differences become more diffused. Italy, by this reasoning, has greater need of consensus than the United States, but has less chance of achieving it. A democratic nation may wisely prefer the American model to the Italian, though what is ideally desired, as Lipset observes,[35] is a balance between cleavage and consensus—the one to give reality and force to the principle of opposition, the other to furnish the secure framework within which that principle might be made continuously effective. Countervailing power within a structure of shared political values would, by this logic, be the optimal condition for the maintenance of a democratic society.

5. But even giving this much weight to consensus may exaggerate the role which intellectual factors play in the attainment of democratic stability. The temptation to assign a controlling influence to the place of ideas in the operation of democracy is very great. Partly this results from our tendency to confuse the textbook model of democracy with the reality and to assume the high order of rationality in the system that the model presupposes (*e.g.*, an alert citizenry aware of its rights and duties, cognizant of the basic rules, exercising consent, enjoying perfect information and choosing governers after carefully weighing their qualifications, deliberating over the issues, etc.). It is not my purpose to ridicule this model but to underscore the observation that it can easily mislead us into placing more weight than the facts warrant upon cognitive elements—upon ideas, values, rational choice, consensus,

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[34] Herbert McClosky, "McCarthyism: The Myth and the Reality," unpublished paper delivered at the American Psychological Association, New York, September, 1957. See also Wiebe, *loc. cit.*

[35] Lipset, *op. cit.*, pp. 21–2.

etc.—as the cementing forces of a democratic society. An *ad hominem* consideration may also be relevant here: as intellectuals and students of politics, we are disposed both by training and sensibility to take political ideas seriously and to assign central importance to them in the operation of the state. We are therefore prone to forget that most people take them less seriously than we do, that they pay little attention to issues, rarely worry about the consistency of their opinions, and spend little or no time thinking about the values, presuppositions, and implications which distinguish one political orientation from another. If the viability of a democracy were to depend upon the satisfaction of these intellectual activities, the prognosis would be very grim indeed.

Research from many different lines of inquiry confirms unequivocally that the role heretofore assigned to ideas and to intellectual processes in general has been greatly exaggerated and cannot adequately explain many political phenomena which, on *a priori* grounds, we have expected them to explain. Witness, for example, the research on the non-rational factors which govern the voting decision, on the effects—or rather the non-effects—of ideology on the loyalty and fighting effectiveness of German and American soldiers, on the differences between the views of party leaders and followers, on the influence of personality on political belief, and on group determinants of perception.[36] We now have evidence that patriotism and the strength of one's attachment to a political community need not depend upon one's approval of its intellectual, cultural, or political values. Indeed, our present research clearly confirms that the men and women who express "patriotism" in extreme or chauvinistic form usually have the least knowledge and understanding of American democratic ideals, institutions, and practices.

Abundant anecdotal data from the observation of dictatorial and other nations further corroborates the conclusion that men may become attached to a party, a community, or a nation by forces that have nothing to do with ideology or consensus. Many of these forces are so commonplace that we often neglect them, for they include family, friends, home, employment, property, religion, ethnic attachments, a common language, and familiar surroundings and customs. These may lack the uplifting power of some political doctrines, but their ability to bind men to a society and its government may nevertheless be great. This observation, of course, is less likely to hold for the intelligentsia than for the inarticulates, but even the political behavior of intellectuals is never governed exclusively by appeals to the mind.

The effect of ideas on democratic viability may also be diminished by the obvious reluctance of most men to press their intellectual differences to the margin and to debate questions that may tear the community apart. So long as no urgent reason arises for bringing such differences to the surface, most men will be satisfied to have them remain dormant. Although there are men and women who are exceptions to this generalization, and who cannot bear to leave basic questions unresolved, they are likely to be few, for both the principles and practices of an "open society" strongly reinforce tolerance for variety, contingency and ambiguity in matters of belief and conscience. As our data on freedom of opinion suggest, few Americans expect everyone to value the same things or to hold identical views on public questions. The tendency to ignore, tolerate, or play down differences helps to create an illusion of consensus which for many purposes can be as serviceable as the reality.[37]

6. To conclude, as we have in effect, that

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[36] *Cf.*, for example, Campbell, *et al.*, *op. cit.;* Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago, 1954), especially ch. 14; Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the German Wehrmacht in World War II," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* Vol. 12 (1948), pp. 280–315; Herbert McClosky, "Conservatism and Personality," this REVIEW, Vol. 52 (March, 1958), pp. 27–45; T. W. Adorno *et al. The Authoritarian Personality,* (New York, 1950), ch. XVII; Richard Crutchfield, "Conformity and Character," *American Psychologist,* Vol. 10 (1955), pp. 191–198.

[37] Robert G. McCloskey, *loc. cit.*, suggests that the American political tradition is marked by "ambivalence" toward certain of our fundamental values and that this may discourage the achievement of "consensus" in the usual sense. He believes, however, that Americans have learned to live with, and even to ignore, inconsistencies in the value system, in keeping with our "pragmatic spirit." Whether this ability is uniquely American or whether it is characteristic of all "open," democratic societies is a question well worth investigating. It could, conceivably, be a natural outgrowth of democratic ideology itself, no element of which can be conceived and enforced absolutely without infringing other elements. On this last point, see Sidney Hook, *The Paradoxes of Freedom* (Berkeley, 1962), pp. 14–62.

ideological awareness and consensus are overvalued as determinants of democratic viability is not to imply that they are of no importance. While disagreements among Americans on fundamental values have tended to be passive and, owing to apathy and the relative placidity of our politics, easily tolerated; while they do not follow party lines and are rarely insinuated into the party struggle; and while no extremist movement has yet grown large enough to challenge effectively the governing principles of the American Constitution, this happy state of affairs is not permanently guaranteed. Fundamental differences could *become* activated by political and economic crises; party differences could *develop* around fundamental constitutional questions, as they have in France and other democracies; and powerful extremist movements are too familiar a phenomenon of modern political life to take for granted their eternal absence from the American scene.

Obviously a democratic nation also pays a price for an electorate that is weakly developed ideologically. Lacking the intellectual equipment to assess complex political events accurately, the unsophisticated may give support to causes that are contrary to their own or to the national interest. In the name of freedom, democracy, and the Constitution, they may favor a McCarthy, join the John Birch Society, or agitate for the impeachment of a Supreme Court Justice who has worked unstintingly to uphold their constitutional liberties. They may also have difficulty discriminating political integrity from demagoguery, maturity and balanced judgment from fanaticism, honest causes from counterfeits. Our findings on the attitudes shown by ordinary Americans toward "extreme" political beliefs (Left Wing beliefs, Right Wing beliefs, totalitarianism, isolationism, etc.) verify that the possibilities just cited are not merely hypothetical. Those who have the least understanding of American politics subscribe least enthusiastically to its principles, and are most frequently "misled" into attacking constitutional values while acting (as they see it) to defend them.

There is, however, reason to believe that ideological sophistication and the general acceptance of liberal democratic values are increasing rather than declining in the United States. Extreme ideological politics of the type associated with Marxism, facsism and other doctrinaire networks of opinion may be waning, as many sociologists believe,[38] but the same observation does not hold for the influence of democratic ideas. On the contrary, democratic ideology in the United States, linked as it is with the articulate classes, gives promise of growing as the articulate class grows. Many developments in recent American life point to an increase in "articulateness": the extraordinary spread of education, rapid social mobility, urbanization, the proliferation of mass media that disseminate public information, the expansion of the middle class, the decline in the size and number of isolated rural groups, the reduction in the proportion of people with submarginal living standards, the incorporation of foreign and minority groups into the culture and their increasing entrance into the professions, and so on. While these developments may on the one side have the effect of reducing the tensions and conflicts on which extreme ideologies feed, they are likely on the other side to beget a more articulate population and a more numerous class of political influentials, committed to liberal democracy and aware of the rights and obligations which attend that commitment.

APPENDIX A. THE EFFECT OF ACQUIESCENCE OR "RESPONSE-SET"

Because responses to scale items are subject to a response-set known as acquiescence, *i.e.*, a tendency to agree (or disagree) with items regardless of what the items say, all procedures in the present study have routinely been run with acquiescence controlled. For this purpose we employed a specially constructed acquiescence scale, consisting of 19 pairs of contradictory or near-contradictory items. Each respondent received an acquiescence score of 0 to 38, depending upon the number of "agree" and "disagree" responses he registered on the scale. For convenience we have divided our sample into those who scored high, middle, or low on acquiescence, and have compared the influentials and electorate within each acquiescence level.

As the accompanying table shows, variations in acquiescence have a powerful effect on the scale scores (and implicitly the item scores) of both the political elite and the public. It is equally plain, nevertheless, that the differences between the two samples on democratic and related ideological values remain large and statistically significant even when acquiescence is held constant; they cannot, therefore, be explained as mere artifacts of response-set. Then, too, although one cannot discern it from these tables, acquiescence functions in the case of some items to reduce rather than to enlarge the "actual" differences between the influentials and the electorate.

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[38] *Cf.* Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology* (Glencoe, 1960), pp. 369–375; S. M. Lipset, *op. cit.*, pp. 403–17; Edward Shils, *loc. cit.*

The question might also be raised whether we are doing the inquiry a disservice by conceiving acquiescence *entirely* as a response-set which artificially inflates or deflates the scores registered by respondents on certain items or scales. Our research has yielded a vast amount of data on acquiescence which suggests that the tendency to agree or disagree with items indiscriminately reflects personality and cognitive capacities that are strongly associated with the ability to sort out, understand, relate, and internalize norms. Conceivably, therefore, the electorate demonstrates a weaker grasp of democratic and constitutional principles not only because its members are more prone than the influentials to response-set (which means that they say yes to items that happen *in this case* to express undemocratic and "unconstitutional" sentiments), but also because they characteristically lack the habits, skills, or capacities for thinking about these matters in a coherent and sophisticated way. It appears, in short, that the correlation between acquiescence and the expression of certain poorly valued sentiments results not entirely from the influence of the former upon the latter, but also from the influence upon *both* of a common, underlying, mental state.*

APPENDIX B. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PAB GENERAL POPULATION SAMPLE

Because the self-administration and return of questionnaires left with respondents by interviewers represents a somewhat unorthodox sampling procedure, the accompanying table presents a description of the PAB general population sample utilized in this paper. For purposes of comparison, the table also includes

TABLE VIII. INFLUENTIALS VS. THE ELECTORATE: PERCENTAGES SCORING HIGH—LOW ON SELECTED SCALES WITH ACQUIESCENT RESPONSE-SET CONTROLLED

	%'s Down					
	Low Acq.		Mid Acq.		High Acq.	
	Infl. N=1369	Elect. 453	Infl. 1159	Elect. 520	Infl. 492	Elect. 471
Faith in Procedural Rights						
High	70	35	56	28	32	10
Low	6	21	13	27	28	45
Faith in Democracy						
High	50	29	36	21	22	6
Low	8	19	16	28	28	42
Tolerance						
High	66	57	62	48	45	27
Low	13	21	15	29	29	48
Faith in Freedom						
High	64	45	63	50	59	50
Low	17	32	15	27	20	26
Totalitarianism						
High	2	11	9	26	35	63
Low	80	52	54	30	21	5
F-Authoritarianism						
High	4	9	14	24	46	67
Low	70	48	38	22	10	2
Political Cynicism						
High	2	9	10	24	31	60
Low	74	51	47	25	20	6
Elitism						
High	12	21	27	35	45	60
Low	53	37	36	23	20	8

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* The full presentation and explication of our findings on acquiescence cannot be accomodated within the limitations of the present paper, and I have put the matter aside for presentation in a separate paper.

TABLE IX. CHARACTERISTICS OF MCCLOSKY NATIONAL GENERAL POPULATION SAMPLE AND SELECTED OTHER SAMPLES

	AIPO Samples[a] (January, 1958)	Michigan SRC Sample[b] (1956 Presidential Election)	McClosky-PAB General Population Sample (January, 1958)	Others
	(N = 3024)	(N = 1762)	(N = 1484)	
	%	%	%	%
Sex				(1960 Census)
Men	48	44.7	51	48.4
Women	52	55.3	49	51.6
Age (1)				
21–29	16.5		17.3	
30–49	45.5		44.5	
50+	37.0		37.9	
Undesignated	1.0		.3	
Age (2)				
Under 35		30.2	28	
35–44		25.6	23.6	
45–54		19.1	20.6	
55+		25.0	27.7	
Race				
White		91.3	93.1	
Negro		8.3	6.5	
Rural-Urban				(1960 Census)
Urban (over 2500)		68	72.2	71.5
Rural (farm-non farm under 2500)		32	27.8	28.5
Region				PAB (Adjusted)
East	28	25.7	27.7	24.8[c]
Midwest	32	34.4	35.7	35.7
South	25	26.7	19.7	22.8
West	15	13.3	16.9	16.9

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[a] The figures for the AIPO sample are averages computed from two national surveys conducted by the Gallup Poll in January, 1958. The information on the characteristics of these samples was supplied by the AIPO in a letter to the author.

[b] In most cases, the figures from the Michigan SRC sample are computed from the information supplied in the codebook for Deck 6 of Study 417, September 1956. Urban rural figures are computed from a table in *The American Voter*, p. 454. Criteria for urban-rural are set out on p. 406.

[c] Michigan SRC included Md. and W. Va. in the South, while we had classified these states as Eastern. This column shows the PAB figures with Md. and W. Va. classified as Southern. SRC regional figures combine data from 1952 and 1956 (See *The American Voter*, p. 158.)

[d] Data on party preference for the AIPO and the national congressional elections of 1958 are taken from a Gallup news release, May 24, 1959.

[e] Two-party vote only. PAB sample contained 821 Democrats, 623 Republicans, and 40 Independents, Other, and DK's.

TABLE IX (*Continued*)

	AIPO Samples[a] (January, 1958)	Michigan SRC Sample[b] (1956 Presidential Election)	McClosky-PAB General Population Sample (January, 1958)	Others
	(N=3024)	(N=1762)	(N=1484)	
Education				
College	15.5	18.7	27.2	
High School	51.5	50.6	51.2	
Grade School	33.0	30.7	21.6	
Religion				
Catholic		21.1	21.9	
Jew		3.2	2.5	
Prot, Other, & NA		75.7	75.6	
Income				
Under 3000		24.3	20.4	
3000–5000		28.8	34.0	
5000–7500		25.6	26.6	
7500–10,000		10.8	9.4	
10,000+		7.6	5.7	
Refuse, NA, Dk		3.6	3.8	
				(Actual Congressional Vote, November, 1958[d]
Party Preference				
Democrat	56[d]	57.1	56.9[c]	56.6
Republican	44	42.9	43.1	43.4

the characteristics of two AIPO (Gallup) samples, interviewed in January-February, 1958; the September–November sample employed by the Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, in its study of the 1956 presidential election; and, where comparable, census and voting data.

As the figures make plain the PAB sample closely resembles in its social characteristics both the AIPO and Michigan SRC samples. Although some of the differences among the samples doubtless arise from the differences in response rate, other differences may be due to the differences in the time of polling as well as differences in the coding criteria employed.

In only one characteristic does the PAB sample deviate substantially from the other samples, namely, in the overrepresentation of the college-educated strata and the corresponding underrepresentation of the grade school educated. This, of course, was to be expected, in light of the length and complexity of the PAB questionnaire and the difficulty associated with its self-administration. It should, however, be kept in mind that oversampling the upper educated has tended to flatten rather than to accentuate the differences between the influentials and the electorate reported in this paper. Since the highly educated tend to embrace democratic values and the "rules of the game" more frequently than the less educated do, the item and scale scores we have reported for the general population of voters are doubtless slightly inflated. In other words, the differences in ideological outlook between the political stratum and the electorate are probably even a bit larger than we have reported. Hence, correcting for the educational bias in the sample would strengthen rather than weaken the conclusions of this paper.

THE CONCEPT OF NEUTRALISM*

FRANCIS LOW-BEER
Vancouver, B. C.

Since the Chinese invasion of India a good deal of effort has been devoted to a reappraisal of the policy of neutralism which has long been considered to constitute a cornerstone of India's foreign policy. As that policy and reappraisal is by no means confined to India, it might be of more than local interest to examine the concept of neutralism itself on which that policy is grounded. Indeed, the reappraisal has not been sufficiently intense or agonizing because the examination has been too long delayed and "neutralism" has been allowed to slumber undisturbed, tacitly assumed to be an unassailable term in the vocabulary of the foreign office. We shall deal with the related concept of non-alignment at a later stage in the discussion. In order to put both these concepts in proper perspective it will be necessary to say a few words on the logic of foreign policy formulation.

As neutralism is the policy of remaining neutral in certain circumstances, we can turn our attention to the word "neutral." We can begin our task of clarification by observing that the meaning of the sentence "State *A* is neutral" is incomplete unless other facts are given or assumed. For if "neutral" were a simple attribute or quality like "european" or "tropical" no further terms would be required to be supplied to determine the meaning of the sentence in which it occurred. Because other terms are necessary we recognize it as a relation.[1] These terms must be specified before the sentence in which the relation occurs can be understood. What are these other terms in the case of "neutral"?

First of all we must specify to what *A* is neutral. "Neutral", in this political sense which we are isolating for examination, always means neutral toward a conflict. So specifying this conflict is providing one additional term. But this is not enough. For our purposes we will require the word "conflict" to function so that it in turn constitutes a relationship between only two states (or two groups of states, or a state split into two by civil war like South Vietnam). For if a conflict is not reducible to one between only two entities, the concept of conflict becomes unworkable. We can thus reformulate "State *A* is neutral" as "State *A* is neutral toward conflict *X* between states *B* and *C*." "Neutral" therefore emerges as a four-term relation between three states and one conflict, all of which need to be specified before the meaning of a sentence asserting neutrality can be determined.[2] To realize that the meaning of such a sentence is a function of the meaning of a specified conflict is salutary because it focuses our attention on the need to understand that conflict before we can understand a policy of neutralism in a specific case.

A few other preliminary matters need clarification. When we assert that *A* is neutral, are we referring to *A*'s own self-assessment of its status or that of other states, in particular that of *B* or *C*?

For instance, let us assume that the Swiss regard themselves as neutral in the East-West conflict; yet there can be doubt that the Soviet Union so regards them. Who is to be the judge whether that certain relationship exists or not? How objective a thing is it? What is to be the criterion as to whether a state is really neutral? We shall return to attempt an answer to these questions later.

Again, granted that a state is now neutral with respect to a given conflict, we ought to be clear as to the degree of intensity of the conflict to which that state now intends to remain neutral in the future. So, to return to our example, Switzerland neutral toward Russia now, may realize that it could not afford to be so if Russia attacked Austria. Russia's realization of this future behavior of Switzerland toward it in certain possible circumstances would affect its present judgment of Switzerland's present neutrality.

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* First read in somewhat different form at the India International Centre, New Delhi, on April 15, 1963.

[1] Whether we say "neutral" *is* a relation rather than *stands for* or *refers to* a relation, depends on how seriously we take our nominalism.

[2] It is sometimes wistfully assumed that we can guarantee another's neutrality toward us by being neutral toward it. This would follow logically, if "neutral" were a symmetrical relation (like "join"). But it is logically worse off even than "love" (which is notoriously non-symmetrical) for we see by the above analysis that "neutral" being a relation with more than two terms must be asymmetrical and therefore reciprocity is logically precluded. By the same token it must also be intransitive.

We have already hinted at the central position that a state's estimate of the *relevance* of a conflict has in determining whether it will take a neutral position toward it. A conflict between *B* and *C* can be relevant to *A* in two ways. It can be about[3] matters that concern *A*. That is, the subject matter or content of the dispute may figure in the schedule of state interests of *A*. In that case *A* will have an interest in the direction the resolution of the conflict will take. Or second, the practical consequence of there being a conflict at all may affect *A*. That is, the content of the dispute may be immaterial to *A* but the form it takes highly material. If that form is explosive, its repercussions will be felt by *A* and it will be rational for *A* to seek to contain or eliminate the conflict to avoid the threat of harm. Now, this distinction between the two sorts of relevance which a conflict can have for a given state lies at the heart of the most fashionable argument for neutralism in the East-West conflict.[4] For it is argued that what is relevant to the uncommitted Afro-Asian nation in that conflict is not its subject matter but the very existence and practical implications of that conflict itself. Such a state would contend that it was indifferent to the issues or the way they were resolved as long as they were resolved in a manner which did not endanger it. Its interest lay in the form and not in the content of the conflict. Indeed the neutral would go further and say that to take sides in the conflict would seriously hamper it in its task of doing away with the danger which the conflict presented to those not engaged in it.

Leaving aside for a moment the examination of that task, we should now ask ourselves whether this distinction between form and content, which is crucial to this argument, can in fact be drawn. It can clearly be drawn where the conflict is between relatively small states. For instance, the conflict between the Yemen and Saudi Arabia is of small import to many states because the reasons for the dispute and its probable consequences both lie beyond the pale of their interests. Many countries are, however, greatly concerned about the Arab-Israel conflict, in spite of complete indifference to the national interests of the Arabs and Jews, solely because they realize the possibility that acceleration of the conflict presents a genuine danger to them. Here again the distinction can be drawn. But when one turns to a conflict between the major powers this bifurcation of considerations becomes unworkable. It is futile to attempt to separate out into two heaps the considerations that led Britain to declare war on Germany in 1939. It is similarly unrealistic in the present East-West conflict to disregard the political and economic consequences which a war, and victory by one side, would bring and to concentrate solely on the military aspects. The power of the protagonists in the struggle is sufficient to fuse our two sets of considerations into one ultimate criterion of relevancy.

Taking all the facts into consideration (and these facts include its desire to maintain a certain way of life and so on) a state must decide whether a given major external conflict exceeds a certain critical degree of relevance. Let us borrow the concept of threshold from psychology and quantum mechanics and assert that, *prima facie,* it will be rational for a state to seek to affect the outcome of a conflict which is transliminal in relevance, and irrational not to.[5] Most conflicts are subliminal for a given third state and the third state thus remains implicitly neutral towards them. For instance, the conflict between the United States and Canada over the development of the Columbia River is subliminal for India. But as the world shrinks and interrelationships increase, the level of critical relevance drops, revealing more conflicts jutting out to be dealt with.

We have been led round to a position where we can now attempt a contextual definition of "neutral". *State A is neutral toward conflict X between States B and C if and only if A does not seek to affect the outcome of X.*[6] The first thing that strikes us about this definition is that it is negative. By saying this, nothing more sinister or metaphysical is intended than that a definition of "neutral" cannot be given without invoking the concept of the negative and still embody the considerations we have been discussing. But certain consequences do follow. Rules or policies are only valuable if they act as guides to behaviour; if they point to certain conduct rather than other conduct. Some rules couched in the negative are admirably clear guides to behavior because they enjoin the doing of some specific act. Indeed, "Thou shalt not steal" is in a limited sphere of life a more effective guide than the positive but vague "Do unto others as you would have others do unto you". But the Old Testament injunction does not give us the faintest hint of what we *ought* to do, whereas the Golden Rule does. If all we hear about our new neighbor is that he does not steal we will be gratified, but surely not sufficiently enlightened so that we can predict his future conduct. A policy of neutralism tells us next to nothing about what a state's real aims in foreign policy are. As it does not have the compensating advantage of being specific, its net cash value is pretty petty as a guide to action. Just as nothing not trivial can be derived from the Commandment nothing significant can be derived from a policy of neutralism. Both eliminate some possible course of action but neither can serve as a springboard for future action. But it is the function of such a fundamental principle to do just this: to point the way, to give an impetus to national conduct and to generate decisions down the line. Thus we see from our definition that neutralism is not logically fit to serve as a first principle of foreign policy.

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[3] The logical difficulties surrounding "about" and "relevant" need not detain us here.

[4] This argument is examined in greater detail below.

[5] We could equally well have borrowed the concept of remoteness from the law of tort and paraphrased the rule thus: a conflict is *remote* for *A* if it is reasonably foreseeable that its consequences will not substantially affect it. It would therefore be rational for a state to seek to affect the outcome of a proximate (non-remote) conflict and irrational not to.

[6] *Neutralism* then becomes the policy of not seeking to affect the outcome of unspecified present and future conflicts between unspecified states. "Neutralism in the air" indeed.

Why then do we have an intuitive feeling that there is something positive about the policy of neutralism? Because we confuse it either with the motives that give rise to a belief in it or with the reasons advanced to justify it. As the correctness of a decision is independent of the motives which causally determine it, and as it is a bit odd to speak of a *state's* motives in any event, we can dispense with considering them except as tentative clues to the intentions of its leaders. If we had known Hitler's motives in 1938 we might have predicted his intention to invade Austria. But if we had known of his intention to invade Austria then we would have known all we needed to know in order to act, and further consideration of his motives would have been superfluous except to the biographer and psychologist.

Let us then abandon *motives* and consider in some detail the various *reasons* that could be advanced for being neutral or not toward a specific conflict. We have already concluded that, everything else being equal, it is rational to seek to affect the outcome of a conflict that is transliminal and irrational to remain neutral toward it. In reaching this conclusion, we have of course tacitly assumed enlightened self-interest as a more ultimate goal for a state. If we further assume that unwarranted interference in the affairs of another does not advance that higher goal and may endanger it, it follows that it is rational to be neutral to a subliminal conflict and irrational not to be. These are the dominant considerations that govern and ought to govern the adoption of policies of neutrality. But all else is not always equal and states sometimes have reason to interfere in matters that would not otherwise be relevant, or to desist from action where they would otherwise act. These seeming aberrations[7] of the general rule can be grouped as follows:

First: *A*'s inability to act otherwise than neutral. *A* has neutrality expressly imposed upon it by superior powers and thereby loses freedom of action. Laos and Austria are examples.

Second: *A*'s interest in not displeasing *B* or *C*. Nepal is neutral in the conflict between India and China not because it has no interest in the outcome of the conflict but because it cannot afford to offend its powerful neighbors. Similarly for Finland, neutrality becomes a condition *sine qua non* of survival.

Third: *A*'s interest in pleasing *B* or *C*. *A* may consider it wise to ingratiate itself with *B* or *C* in order to extract some advantage out of either. If *A* is sorely in need of aid and *B* or *C* is inclined to render it to states with helpful foreign policies, then it may be rational for *A* not to take a neutral position in a subliminal conflict.

Fourth: *A*'s interest in harming *B* or *C*. *A* may have unfriendly or hostile relations with *B* or *C* and it may be a fundamental aim of its foreign policy to weaken its adversary in any way it can. In that case it will be rational to seize the opportunity presented by *B*'s conflict with another to further this aim even though the conflict does not otherwise concern *A*. The West has often accused the Soviet Union of exploiting difficulties the West has had with its former colonies for this reason.

Fifth: *A*'s interest in disassociating itself with the policies of *B* or *C*. *A* may feel that for internal political reasons it cannot support *B* in a conflict with another even though it might otherwise be in *A*'s interest to do so. To take this course is irrational for *A* although it may be extremely rational for the governing party of *A*.[8] Weak governments are particularly susceptible to this consideration. The rational process of relating means to ends in foreign policy is sacrificed to relating them in party politics.

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[7] These "aberrations" can of course be considered as five cases of special relevance.

[8] It can be argued that Canada's neutrality in the Cuba-United States conflict owes a good deal to such an interest in disassociating itself from American policies. The Cuban crisis also provides a nice example of transition of the Cuba-United States conflict from subliminal to transliminal relevance for many of the South American states.

It is partly out of an implicit recognition of the dangers which this incompatibility between the rational conduct for the state and for the party holds, that the major political parties of stable democracies have generally submitted themselves to a bipartisan foreign policy.

Now this consideration of the political effect of a certain foreign policy owes its potency to that of nationalism. The argument that we hear put forward is that the honor, dignity, sovereignty and independence of *A* demand that it should determine its own foreign policy and that it should remain unfettered in the future. If *B* or *C* happens to be more powerful, an alliance with one of them will imply inferiority or servitude. And if *B* or *C* happens to be a former imperialist power then such an alliance, however desirable it might otherwise be for *A*, could spell political suicide for the party advocating it. Sometimes the argument is more subtle. The alliance is bearable but it is the decisions within the alliance that must remain within the control of *A* alone. The effect of this argument is often to deny reality to the alliance. NATO offers a wealth of examples.

It should be observed that this stance of nationalism is assumed not only to impress the citizens of *A* but other countries and their nationals who share this ideal as well. In this connection we can also note the danger of confusing criteria of manufacture with criteria of packaging.[9] All policies must be sold, but merchandising gimmicks that lead to a quick sell sometimes backfire.

These, then, are the five reasons for adopting or rejecting policies of neutralism other than mere relevancy. Whether they are good reasons or not depends on the value we assign the specific interests referred to and the degree that such policies can serve to advance those interests. A second group of three reasons is enlisted in support of policies of neutralism which are purported to serve an interest we cannot reasonably question—that of peace. Let us turn to examine these.

First: *A* remains neutral with respect to *X* between *B* and *C* so that it can serve as an arbitrator between them, or a meeting ground. History has cast Switzerland in this latter role and that country has doubtless made repeated contributions to peace by being regarded as neutral by the conflicting parties. But Switzerland has been able to perform this function because of its tradition and its uniqueness. More than one or two such havens might impair the usefulness of the existing ones. Moreover, even the usefulness of Switzerland has declined since the creation of the United Nations which is supposed to serve the function of arbitrator. With the availability of the United Nations, Switzerland, Sweden and dozens of other nations (usually of insignificant physical power for this increases the likelihood of being selected by both parties) there is no dearth of prospective arbitrators and it would be foolish for any state to regard itself as indispensable. Furthermore, it does not follow that non-neutrality necessarily precludes one from the function of intermediary as Poland has shown in acting as a meeting place between Communist China and the United States. But if what is required is an impartial judge, it would be rash for one of the adversaries to choose a state for whom the conflict in question was transliminal. Yet if it is subliminal, the chosen state would be neutral in any event according to our general principle and no question of remaining or becoming neutral would arise. It follows that to sacrifice a clear advantage which non-neutrality might offer in order to remain eligible for arbitration duties is irrational.

Second: *A* remains neutral with respect to *X* in order to avoid *itself* coming into conflict with *B* or *C*. Certainly it would be increasing the risk of war between oneself and another gratuitously to interfere in the affairs of that other. That is why it is rational to remain neutral toward subliminal conflicts. But that is tantamount to saying that such a subliminal conflict poses no real danger to *A*. For if it did, it would not be subliminal and interference would consequently not be gratuitous. The only dangers we can hide from are those that do not really threaten us. Unilateral goodwill and pious neutrality have little shielding power, as Belgium realized in 1914, a host of countries in 1939, the United States in 1941, and India more recently.[10] It would be prudent for

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[9] I am indebted to Professor Gabriel Almond for this point.

[10] It could be argued that Switzerland's position can be justified by induction. Surely few states have had such a consistently successful foreign policy. The argument would be that its present neutralist policy is justified by past success. But it is the burden of this paper that even in the strong case of Switzerland such an approach is full of pitfalls, not because of a distrust in induction but because of respect for it. With induction everything hangs on a careful scrutiny of past and present facts, and a comparison between them. It is only if both can be placed in the same narrow class (the narrower and more crowded it is the better) that the same consequences can be predicted for both. And it is just this sort of scrupulous examination of the particular situation

Cambodia and Burma to assess whether in the long run they can afford to remain neutral to the conflict within South Vietnam. What decision they reach will or ought to depend on their judgment of the intention of the parties, the cause of the conflict, the consequences to them of a change in policy, and ultimately the weight they attach to their findings which will determine whether the conflict is subliminal or not.

Third: A remains neutral with respect to X in order to preserve peace between B and C. This is the argument for the preservation and promotion of coexistence which we touched on before. We concluded that we can distinguish between concern for the issues in dispute and concern for the practical consequences of that dispute when it is one between minor powers. But we cannot meaningfully do so in the East-West conflict for several reasons. In the first place, the whole world is its checkerboard and one of the issues is precisely that one side accuses the other of seeking to make every neutral its pawn. How then can the neutral consider himself indifferent to this issue? In the second place, victory by one side would thrust the remainder of the issues willy nilly on to A. In the third place, the neutral must examine the issues themselves, that is the body of beliefs and intentions of both parties, in order to predict their future behavior and therefore his own. So the neutral is hopelessly concerned with the substance as well as with the form of the conflict. As the matter is not subliminal it becomes rational to seek certain solutions to the conflict rather than others, which implies abandoning neutrality.

Let us delve further into the assumptions behind this argument for neutralism which we so often hear put forward. The neutral's belief in the possibility of coexistence between East and West will turn on his view of what the conflict consists of, the intentions of the parties as he sees them, and the meaning he gives to the ambiguous term "coexistence." If he believes that the ultimate aim of B is to impose its sociopolitical system throughout the world and that B would do so if resistance were not offered it, he will reach one conclusion. If on the other hand he believes that B is now satisfied with the present division of the world on the condition that the present balance of power between B and C is maintained and he further desires to maintain that present division of the world, then he finds himself in the anomalous position of not only condoning that balance of power and the armed might on which it rests, but applauding it. For this balance of power which on this assumption is a necessary means to the preservation of the neutral's domestic system (and therefore is a benefit to him) is being maintained by others without his help.

Is there not something incompatible with the ideal of self-determination of A in this passivity?

But there is a deeper assumption which underlies his reasoning. The neutral assumes a tripartite division of the world. There are states or groups of states B and C with systems Y and Z and then there is that third class, defined as *not B or C*, of which A is a member. Its avowed aim is to maintain that third class and its membership in it. And it is further assumed by A that the essence of the conflict between B and C is to whittle away that third class. Its interest therefore lies in putting an end to this lethal process to safeguard its own

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confronting the state that is here being urged. Might not such an examination reveal for Switzerland a disquieting disparity between facts then and now? The conflict that now threatens is one between Western Europe (of which it is a member) and Eastern Europe, not primarily between groups of states within Western Europe. It is one between capitalist states (of which it is one) and communist states, not primarily between capitalist states. On the other hand, Switzerland in spite of being a democracy, was successful in maintaining its neutrality in the last two wars sometimes labelled as being between democracies and totalitarian regimes. These considerations indicate the difficulties in causal determination that make induction from past experience with neutralism (or any other policy) so hazardous. But hazardous or not, a state must arrive at a select number of such intermediate principles of foreign policy by taking into account all the facts, values and risks. What is here argued is that it follows from our definition that neutralism cannot serve as such an umbrella principle from which specific decisions of remaining neutral toward specific conflicts can be deduced. The *reverse is true: a specific policy of neutrality* toward a specific conflict can only be justified by being itself deduced from quite different policies and statements of fact. An illuminating example of such an intermediate principle at work is the Monroe Doctrine which is a curious amalgam of a negative policy of neutralism toward conflicts outside the hemisphere and a positive policy of resisting outside interference in continental affairs. It is noteworthy that the second element has proved more durable than the first. Neutralism toward such conflicts was indeed practised to a degree until the time they became transliminal for the United States when it became rational to seek to affect their outcome.

position. Now if *A* conceives of coexistence as consisting of nothing more than the absence of war between *B* and *C* regardless of which side is gaining or losing ground, then *ex hypothesi* its safety cannot be guaranteed by coexistence, for its own independence and system may vanish without war ever erupting between *B* and *C*. If, on the other hand, *A* conceives of coexistence as not merely the absence of war but the preservation of the *status quo,* then if *A* observes one side slipping in the struggle it would be rational to spring forward to bolster it to redress the balance. Some would consider this a *reductio ad absurdum* of the argument that neutrals can secure peaceful coexistence between East and West.

It goes without saying, when the chips are down, that the Soviet Union and the United States have not in fact been much influenced by the entreaties of the neutrals in the past. The announcement of the resumption of nuclear testing by the Soviet Union during the Belgrade conference of neutrals and almost every aspect of the Cuba crisis are conspicuous examples of this indifference.

So far we have been tackling the neutrals on their own ground of a tripartite division of the world. But of course *B* and *C* would never agree to this classification. Each would characterize the conflict differently but each would end up with a two-fold division into the communist and non-communist world. Oddly enough the division in both cases turns on demarcating the Eastern States and their system first as *S*—then the rest of the world as *not S*. This curious parallelism of classification is remarkable in itself. And it has great significance for the neutral, for along with it goes a parallel attribution of distinct values (either good or bad) to *S* whereas no such distinct values are attributed to *not S*. To the East, communism is good and worthy of propagation and other systems are more or less bad as they deviate from it, whereas the West in its candid moments has no illusions about the deplorable quality of the systems of many of its member states. The argument of the West is very simple and runs as follows: the non-communist world is certainly not all good but the communist world is clearly bad. It is bad in the final analysis because it seeks to impose its system on the other half which does not want it. It has been shown that this imposition can only be prevented by resistance. Organized resistance is better than unorganized resistance.[11]

It is to be remarked that nothing in this argument of the West hinges on the type of sociopolitical system that obtains or ought to obtain in the non-communist world except that it be non-communist. Therefore if the chief concern of the neutral is the preservation and development of the system he presently has, there is nothing incompatible to his aim in the West's argument. On the other hand because of this very parallelism of classification, if one tried to frame the corresponding argument of the East it would be impossible to do so without implying an aim to change radically the form of society of the non-communist countries in the communist direction. If *A* therefore wishes to travel in that direction it would be rational for it to give up its neutrality and follow the Eastern path. But if *A* wishes to retain its own system, then as the conflict is now seen to be transliminal, it will be rational to abandon its neutrality.[12]

Somewhat surprisingly then, we have found no reason to believe that neutralism will advance peaceful coexistence among the major powers. It follows that it is irrational to give up a clear advantage which non-neutralism may offer for one or more of these three reasons.

We must return to dispose of one problem we left dangling. What is the test by which we determine whether a state really is neutral or not? Now that we have seen that the question can be translated into one of *seeking* to achieve a certain result, it will be illuminating to consider how we decide whether an individual does or does not seek to achieve a certain object. Surely the answer is that we observe his total behavior. We do pay attention to what he tells us about his intentions but we do not necessarily take what he says at face value. Similarly for nations. And the empirical test of the correctness of our judgment is successful prediction of future behavior; a painful test indeed sometimes.

Let us sum up what we have accomplished so far. We recognized "neutral" as a four-term relation and not a quality. We emphasized it could only be understood in terms of a specific conflict and that the clarity of language about neutrality is a function of the clarity of language about a conflict. We saw the cardinal position which the relevance of that conflict played in determining the rationality of a neutral position and we put forward the concept of threshold level of relevance as an heuristic aid. We then moved to a contextual definition of "neutral" in terms of "seeking" which turned out to be formulated in the negative. We saw that the positive connotations of the concept could be explained by the motives and reasons for holding it. We then examined five of these reasons and found them sound, given the soundness of the ends for which a policy of neutralism served as the means. We then examined a further three reasons advanced for neutralism as a means of achieving peace and we came to negative conclusions with respect to these. Finally, we said a few words about the relation of behavior to intentions in general, and those of seeking certain solutions to specific conflicts in particular. We also plead guilty to littering the roadside with random distinctions which must remain uncollected.

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[11] Some would add: "and while resisting the imposition, improve the non-communist world as much and as fast as possible".

[12] The crumbling of this two-fold division into three with the growing split between China and the Soviet Union will only affect this analysis if it can no longer be assumed as a fact that it is a fundamental aim of the Soviet Union to disturb the *status quo*. If this assumption is rejected then this aspect of the problem will have to be reexamined.

Let us now take a quick sidelong glance at the related concept of non-alignment. It is related to neutralism as follows. If a state decides it is rational to seek to affect the outcome of a conflict and thus to take a non-neutral position toward it, it may further decide it can best do this by aligning itself with another state in some manner. This proceeds from what can be called the principle of cooperation, taught us by logic and experience, which governs individuals and states alike. It simply asserts that, every thing else being equal, it is more effective to work in concert toward common goals than individually. Again we may notice that the shrinking world with its growing interrelationships by making an increasing number of goals common, renders their attainment possible only by cooperation for the very same reason that we observed an increasing number of conflicts emerging from their subliminal state. Thus "aligned" in a broad sense refers to any sort of cooperative agreement between states. But as "non-alignment" is commonly used to refer solely to agreements concerning military cooperation, we shall use the phrase in this narrow way. *A* may be receiving considerable economic aid from *B* and therefore be aligned in this broad sense and yet not have any agreement with *B* concerning military aid. Is it not somewhat paradoxical that *B* should be willing to give, and *A* to accept, aid on various important but dispensable matters but when *A*'s very survival is at stake the propriety of giving and receiving indispensable military aid should be questioned? It would be profitable for donor and donee to keep in proper perspective the descending order of *A*'s real national interests and apportion aid to them accordingly. And if such aid is proper at the time of aggression, is it not proper and prudent prior to it?

But we are anticipating. We have seen that the decision to abandon one's neutrality with respect to a conflict is logically prior to deciding to align oneself with one of the adversaries. Alignment entails non-neutrality but non-neutrality does not entail any sort of alignment. In order to define alignment as a species of non-neutrality so that these entailment relations will hold, we will define it in terms of the state seeking aid. We can then say, *A is militarily aligned with B in respect to conflict X with C if and only if A has an agreement with B to render it military aid with respect to that conflict.* We see that "non-alignment" wears its negative quality on its sleeve and not covertly like "neutral". Then again, it is patently a relation and not a seeming quality as we found "neutral" to be. Furthermore, we can define "military aid" as precisely as we want, so that we are left with a concept that, all told, is less confusing and more specific than "neutral". Being more specific, a policy of non-alignment is a better pointer to action than a policy of neutralism. But at its best it serves the same usefulness as "Thou shalt not steal". It can tell us what not to do but as a guide to general policy it is totally impotent.

All the distinctions made with respect to "neutral" can be made with respect to "non-alignment" *mutatis mutandi*. And the reasons we listed that were advanced to justify the adoption of a policy of neutrality can also be advanced to justify a policy of non-alignment. The difference is one of degree. For instance, *A* may decide that conflict *X* is transliminal and that it ought to seek to affect its outcome. But it does not wish to antagonize *B* on whom it is dependent for aid. It reasons that *B* will not be sufficiently disturbed by *A*'s abandonment of neutrality to halt its aid but that *B* would do so if *A* entered into a military pact with *C*. *A* therefore abandons its neutrality but shrewdly stops short of entering into the military pact with *C*.

Finally, we must ask the same question we did with respect to "neutral". What is the criterion by which we determine whether *A* is aligned with *B* or not? That question in turn can be reduced to how do we empirically test our belief in the existence of a particular agreement. Now the formulation of an agreement between *A* and *B* to give aid can be expanded thus: if *X* occurs, then *B* gives *Q* to *A*. The import of this formulation is that if we are on the facts justified in predicting in advance that, on the invasion of *A* by *C*, *A* will receive aid from *B*, we can say that *A* is in fact already militarily aligned with *B* even though there are no documents to that effect in existence prior to the invasion. If, on the other hand, even *A* cannot make such a prediction then there is little point in saying *A* is aligned with, say, *D* even though there is a sheaf of sealed papers to attest to the agreement. It is sobering and intriguing to realize that friendship between states can be similarly analyzed in terms of the predictability of what one allegedly friendly state ought to do for the other in specified future circumstances to justify that status. It is not here argued that such implicit relationships should be made explicit and public. Effective foreign policies are seldom transparent to those outside; but they must be recognizable for what they are to those within.

We can conclude our enquiry by a valuation of the policies of neutralism and non-alignment. Policies like other entities have value, if they have any at all, either as ends in themselves or as means to other ends. Few would seriously maintain that the policies in question here have value as ends in themselves. Not because they are negative, for "Thou shalt not steal" could be considered as an end good in itself, but because most would posit some vague ideal of enlightened self-interest as the ultimate good for a state to which these policies would then be subservient. If this ideal really *is* rejected then it would not be illogical to place these policies on that pedestal, merely odd. If neutralism or non-alignment is to have any value at all, then, it must be because they serve as effective means to higher policy objectives. We have examined five such situations in which neutralism or non-alignment might have value. But in each case what was salvaged was not a general policy of neutralism or non-alignment but specific decisions which implied neutrality in a specific context. As these policies must justify themselves as means, or not at all, and as such justification depends on ever changing facts, we would be surprised to find a state clinging to them regardless.

In the final analysis, the value of a policy is determined by its usefulness in solving specific problems. Let us examine a few hypothetical ones to see what help neutralism and non-alignment can be in their solutions. *B* builds a military base in Ceylon. What are India or Burma to do? Or *A* is against all atomic testing? *C* breaks a test-ban treaty and commences testing. Should *A* join *B* in condemning *C*? or does neutralism imply striking an arithmetic average of criticism over a period of time favourable to neither? Indeed, to what extent must *A* suspend objective inquiry altogether into the merits of any dispute between *B* and *C* in deference to its policy of neutralism? Surely the raising of these last questions is sufficient to dispose of them. These policies can serve only as mischievous slogans that obscure the real national interest of the state concerned which must remain the touchstone by which the answers to these everyday problems are tested.

How, then, are these practical decisions to be rationally made? By determining the relationship that possible answers to the problem bear logically and causally to the aims of the state; for rational behaviour is precisely that which successfully relates means to ends. Foreign policy is, of course, one means of serving the national interest. It is based on a series of aims ranked in descending order of generality with causal and logical relations mapped out between them. A long ladder of means leads up to each of these aims, each rung serving as an end to the one below. As the factual situation changes, some rungs are supplanted by others, and ladders themselves may be replaced. In the event of an agonizing reappraisal past cherished aims give way to new ones and the whole web of logical and causal interrelationships must be rewoven. There is a constant refashioning of means to ends, an occasional reshuffling in the priority of these ends and an even rarer substitution of one end by another.

The method of formulating foreign policy that starts out by assuming a comprehensive policy of neutralism or non-alignment and seeks to arrive at satisfactory concrete foreign policy decisions is theoretically bad. Neutralism and non-alignment cannot be points of departure but may turn out to be points of arrival on the long road of policy formation. Admittedly, we sometimes find ourselves in an agreeable picnic spot even if we have lost our bearings, but that is no reason to congratulate ourselves on the loss of our compass.

What is here argued is that the concepts of neutralism and non-alignment have surreptitiously crept to a much higher station in this hierarchy of policy aims than their logical status entitles them to. To build one's foreign policy structure round the cornerstone of these policies is then a mistake. It follows that any scheme for an alliance of non-aligned countries is entirely misconceived. For even if one could determine that these prospective members were non-aligned in the same way, to the same degree, and toward the same powers, they would still be non-aligned for quite different reasons. Each would be non-aligned only as long as it served his own national interest and these are in fact quite different in important respects. At any moment alignment might become rational for one state because of Israel, for another because of Cuba, for a third because of Kashmir, for a fourth because of China and so on. One cannot base a stable union on the common fortuitous circumstance that each state happens *not* to be doing a certain thing at a certain time. One can only base a union or alliance on a community of positive interests, be they economic, political, ethnic, or geographic. The scheme is misconceived because there is in reality no common denominator.

It does not follow from this analysis that once state *A* has rationally decided to abandon its neutrality on a specific issue, it should become homogeneously "for" or "against" the states involved on all other issues. On the contrary, it follows from our conclusion that "neutrality" is not a relation merely between states but between states and a specific conflict, that *A*'s attitude toward other conflicts and issues should remain open. Each fresh issue is then left to be dealt with on its merits, some of which will depend on its relation to other issues. If, indeed, such interests truly coincide it would be foolish to rule out cooperation between the most hardened adversaries, as the nuclear test-ban treaty negotiations demonstrate. Out of such an approach comes flexibility and realism.

It may be objected that the canons of rational behavior here advocated for states are too severe. But conducting a nation's affairs is a practical matter akin to being breadwinner of a family. Neither is an exercise in sainthood. Both are fiercely competitive. We disregard the rules for success in pursuing practical affairs (those of logic and experience) at our practical peril, whatever the spiritual rewards may be. Yet morality is as relevant to the statesman as it is to the breadwinner. For neither is it a positive consideration in shaping policy. For both it is a limiting framework outside which his actions should not lead. But neutralism and non-alignment cannot form part of that framework because they are neither accepted as ends in themselves nor derive moral validity from higher moral principles. To be sure, states as well as individuals may also hold positive ideals that give ultimate purpose to their daily conduct. But as long as the political structure of the world remains anchored to a foundation of sovereign nation-states for whom the preservation of that sovereignty is paramount, we have no right to expect a higher moral ideal from them than this. And in the pursuit of that ideal these policies of neutralism and non-alignment may find occasional lowly service.

COMMUNICATIONS

VAN ALSTYNE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION: AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW

To the Editor:

Van Alstyne's "quest for a coherent position" regarding the constitutional separation of church and state, in the December 1963 issue of this Review, suffers from certain elementary defects. It begins by citing the wide disagreement ". . . as to the applied meaning of the opaque language of the religion clause," and proposes as its first (though least significant) objective to ". . . make clear which parts of the storm are entitled to be taken seriously and which are merely bluster." But its three more significant purposes all presuppose the correctness of the Supreme Court's actual understanding of church-state separation. Thus, contrary to first impression, Van Alstyne is not engaged in a quest for something as yet unknown but in the clarification of something already discovered and generally followed by the Court. In an area where disagreement admittedly abounds, however, he should first demonstrate why the Court's actual position (the immediate cause of the disagreement) *deserves* to be followed. And to do this he would have to explore the alternative positions with impartiality and care: no other method will serve his first objective—that of distinguishing the serious from the non-serious criticisms of the Court.

It is therefore surprising, and shocking to some, to be immediately confronted by a fiat deciding in favor of the Court's position on the basis of nothing more than the Court's own authority. Since 1947, we are told, the Court has pronounced so consistently and emphatically on the various unacceptable views of the establishment clause that ". . . there is no practical benefit in re-evaluating them once again," and, again, that arguments in favor of such views ". . . are no longer presentable in the Court" (p. 867). Away, then, disagreement, and begone bluster—the Court has spoken. But who, other than those already committed to the Court's position in this matter or narrow legal practitioners bent only on winning cases, will be persuaded by Van Alstyne's asseverations? Have we not heard of a Dred Scott decision that stood for at least thirteen years—all wrong? Are we not told that in *Plessy* v. *Ferguson* Justice Brown and the majority were wrong, and Justice Harlan right, for fifty-eight years? Do we not generally acknowledge decades of mistaken decisions excessively favorable to property rights? Are there not liberals among us still objecting to the Court's constant upholding of the Smith Act ever since 1951? Why, then, does a Supreme Court position on separation of church and state going back to 1947 suddenly become hallowed and unassailable? Naturally, nothing is more apt to preserve this position than the widespread notion that it is already permanent.

At two crucial points within the body of his essay Van Alstyne's argumentation shows a similar weakness. He holds that one political objective of the religion clause, as rightly interpreted by the Court, is "to respect the integrity of non-believers by disabling government from lending its authority in behalf of religion" (p. 868). In arriving at this view he insists that the establishment clause prohibits non-preferential assistance of every kind to all religion, and he tries to extend the free exercise clause so that it too works in the direction of protecting both religion and irreligion. Without entering upon the difficulties inherent in the word "establishment" (which Van Alstyne never seriously considers), it is enough to reject the implausible view that the framers of the First Amendment took the word "religion" to mean all religious *and* irreligious beliefs. The free exercise of atheism and agnosticism is not protected by the free exercise clause because only a ludicrous violation of general usage, today and even more so in 1789, would call these "religions" and forbid their establishment as well as protect their exercise.

Van Alstyne supports his view not by argument but by citation from the Court itself—*i.e.*, by authority. He tells us that the Court has identified Secular Humanism as a religion, and that Julian Huxley describes his own "evolutionary humanism" as a religion (p. 873). But is "religion" a term every individual can define for himself? Is every "philosophy of life" a religion, however emphatically it renounces the very idea of a divine principle? Is every group banding together for the furtherance of moral purposes (such as the Ethical Culture Society) a religion? Surely any definition that would logically result in the Boy Scouts being called a religion is open to more doubt and skepticism than Van Alstyne expresses.

The quotations he supplies from *Torcaso*, *Zorach*, *Everson* and *McGowan* (p. 868) all affirm, as their central point, the idea that the religious clauses of the First Amendment forbid *forcing* religious belief or disbelief on anybody. But are there not ways of publicly or officially expressing and approving religion in a non-preferential way that do not amount to "establishment" and do not interfere with the free exercise of religion? At President Kennedy's inauguration, representatives of the three major religions of the country participated in the ceremony. God is invoked in our pledge of allegiance, motto and anthem. Are these clearly unconstitutional "establishments?"

The language of the Constitution by itself would not suggest that the protection of non-religion and irreligion from governmental coercion derives from the religious clauses of the First Amendment. Simply put, preventing an establishment of religion does not guarantee freedom from governmental coercion to atheism, and the free exercise of religion does not include the free exercise of atheism. Even the only other phrase in the Constitution mentioning religion—the prohibition of a religious test for public office in Article VI—may have been intended more for the protection it would afford the diversity of religious believers than for the protection it would also afford atheists. Atheists may therefore undoubtedly hold public office, but it would seem from the language of the Constitution that the only general protection for their living lives free from governmental coercion must be derived from the later non-religious parts of the First Amendment—from those guaranteeing freedom of speech, press and assembly. Here is the likely source of safeguards for the expression of atheism and the assembling of atheists, to mention the extreme case only. But these safeguards, while broad, are not as broad as those afforded religious believers by the First Amendment taken as a whole. By all interpretations, the religious clauses forbid government from favoring the beliefs of a specific religion, but it is far from certain that no public encouragement can constitutionally be given to religion as such—or to all religions if it can be done without hurting any. If such encouragement is indeed permissible under the religious clauses of the First Amendment, it would not be forbidden by the clauses protecting atheists, agnostics or other non-believers in their speech, press and assembly. The religious clauses intend, above all, to protect religious belief, while the other clauses protect not belief but public expression and action. Government might therefore constitutionally encourage religion (and discourage irreligion) without in any way infringing on the rights of atheists so long as atheists are not prevented from speaking and assembling in their own right or compelled to speak against their will.

This is the line of interpretation toward which a plain rather than a contrived interpretation of the Constitution would incline us. The Constitution is not clearly neutral between religion and irreligion; on the contrary, if anything it shows itself more favorably disposed to religion than to irreligion. Nevertheless, unless it can be shown that there is a vital public need for the public encouragement of religion, the whole question may have only theoretical importance. To show that there is such a need, we must begin by picturing the state of affairs in church-state relations toward which the present Court is pointed by the logic of "complete separation" or "strict neutrality." Although Van Alstyne does not accept Justice Douglas's determination in *Engel* to consider even the slightest public assistance to religion unconstitutional, he would clearly take further steps in this direction—for example, in connection with "religious slogans enacted by Congress into law" and prayers in the public schools (pp. 868, 869, 881). Yet the issue posed by Justice Douglas remains the crucial one: is not each and every public encouragement of religion unconstitutional, including the invocations of God by public officials, mottos on coins, and a whole variety of greater or lesser transgressions of absolute separation? The logic of the Court was originally established in *Everson*'s hallmark passage calling for such separation, and though that passage was written by Black, Douglas alone has pushed for its full consequences. Either the logic of *Everson* will work itself out in decision after decision, steadily denuding the public of every vestige of religion, or some new principle will be found to justify calling a halt to this process. But the choice between these alternatives involves a problem of policy as well as constitutionality, and it cannot be decided wisely without inquiring whether a free society is served by the public encouragement of religion.

Judging from the political point of view—the view we all share as citizens—religion is a part of free society and may either contribute to or detract from its well-working. According to Tocqueville,

> it (religion) is much more needed in democratic republics than in any others. How is it possible that society should escape destruction if the moral tie is not strengthened in proportion as the political tie is relaxed? And what can be done with a people who are their own masters if they are not submissive to the Deity?

And Bryce echoes him:

> The more democratic republics become, the more the masses grow conscious of their own power, the more do they need to live, not only by patriotism, but by reverence and self-control, and the more essential to their well-being are those sources whence reverence and self-control flow.

This point, and its implications, can be appreciated by liberals and conservatives alike. Both can see the immense importance to our society of the idea that the rights of men are not mere human inventions or conveniences and that the only legitimate aim of government is to secure these rights. This, after all, is what Jefferson attempted to teach in the Declaration of Independence—the same Jefferson who later authored the much-abused "wall of separation" phrase. But, in addition, a society stressing individual rights and individual self-care is in need of a balancing stress on duties and human brotherhood, and this element is best supplied not by the teaching of the Declaration but by our Biblical religious tradition. In order to consecrate the aims of our republic and renew our dedication to them, it is fitting that the ideas of God, created men, rights and duties receive public expression, approval and encouragement. In this way religion, within the requirements of the First Amendment, can constitutionally serve to foster those attitudes and beliefs necessary and proper to the structure of government established in the Constitution itself. Thus, the official motto "In God We Trust" is neither more nor less constitutional than the public use of flags, pledges and anthems as such.

A more mundane argument is also relevant and cogent. Members of the executive and legislative branches, paying no attention to the Court's words on this subject, continue to invoke religious symbols on solemn and public occasions, in circumstances that do not make a "case or controversy." A long list of actions and usages that cannot logically be reconciled with a rigid doctrine of complete separation are thereby immune to judicial review. Is it sensible for the Court to commit itself to a formula so inflexible that it implies a futile condemnation of coordinate constitutional authorities, acting in their own spheres, when the formula is mocked in everyday practices that the Court cannot control?

A line of reasoning acknowledged by Van Alstyne would, if perfected, offer a sound constitutional basis for the encouragement of religion. He admits that the use of religion (*e.g.*, prayers) may have secular effects the state has a right to promote (p. 877). He mentions that school prayers were partly defended by the states employing them on the ground of promoting morality rather than religion *per se* (p. 875). But he quotes Justice Brennan to the effect that ". . . government may not employ religious means to serve secular interests, however legitimate they may be, at least without the clearest demonstration that nonreligious means will not suffice (p. 878). No more is needed to construct a weighty case in favor of the public encouragement of religion, provided that "the clearest demonstration" does not require a kind of proof beyond the capacity of human experience and wisdom ever to offer. Certainly this consideration—one of the most important in the history of political philosophy—should have been explored in Van Alstyne's essay.

One final point. Van Alstyne specifically denies that *any* prayer, and, by implication, any verbal invocation of the deity—can really be nonpreferential and nonsectarian (p. 871). But, first, it is both closer to our tradition and intrinsically wiser to allow for possible constitutional uses of religion than to declare all such uses unconstitutional in principle. In the second place, however, it is far from certain that agreement cannot be obtained from those believers in God still comprising the vast majority and for whom alone the free exercise clause was originally intended; in fact, they are in very widespread agreement on many public uses of religion right now. If this condition is met, the non-believer's freedom of speech constitutionally protects him against being forced to express himself as if he were a believer. He should therefore be permitted to abstain or withdraw from such utterance, but it should not be necessary for the state to keep every *social* as well legal pressure from being exerted upon him should he choose to abstain. The law cannot rightly compel him to conform to belief and expression, but it need not and should not cease to favor religion because of him. The precise wording of the First Amendment permits this; the national need enjoins it.

I have dwelled on certain elements of Van Alstyne's essay to show its intrinsic weakness constitutionally and prudentially. Its tacit assumption that the public will equably bear further steps toward removing public support from religion is also open to challenge. The distinct possibility of widespread discord being precipitated, with consequent danger to the Court's status in our constitutional scheme of things, should prompt lovers of their country and the Court to seek an alternative. We need a clear constitutional principle permitting something short of absolute separation of church and state without sacrificing religious liberty. Van Alstyne tried to inject into his discussion of the whole issue an awareness of its various aspects and subtleties. Unfortunately, by permitting the Court to determine his premises for him he was driven, willy nilly, in the direction staked out by Justice Douglas and thus toward a worse "simplistic dogmatism" than the one he sought to avoid. Only a less worshipful attitude toward the Court's premises can serve as the basis of the real quest still to be undertaken.

DAVID LOWENTHAL

Wheaton College

A BRIEF REPLY

TO THE EDITOR:

Without disparagement, Professor Lowenthal's criticisms are reducible to the following four propositions:

(1) An article which in part clarifies the Supreme Court's position respecting the separation of church and state serves little purpose, because most of the Court's critics already have a clear understanding of what they are criticizing; it is the Court's "actual position" which is "the immediate cause of the disagreement."

(2) It is indefensible to express even qualified approval of the Court's construction of the First Amendment, without some demonstration in the article itself that that construction is "correct" other than because the Court says so.

(3) Alternative constructions urged by others should have been examined within the article, to determine why they are any less desirable or correct; in the absence of such a comparison, there is no reason why the course marked out by the Court "deserves to be followed."[1]

(4) A more desirable construction of the First Amendment would be based on the propositions that non-preferential governmental aid to theistic religions is constitutional, and that non-theists are adequately protected without reference to the religion clauses.

The first three of these, succinctly stated, carry their own refutation, I believe, on their face and in the circumstances in which I was writing. I shall confine myself here to the fourth.

In opting for a construction of the First Amendment different from that evolved by the Court, he argues toward the conclusion that non-preferential aid to (theistic) religion as such should be allowed as a matter of constitutional law. The conclusion is supported by what is offered as a "plain . . . interpretation of the Constitution," and a "policy" which recognizes a "vital public need for the public [*i.e.*, governmental] encouragement of religion." A few of the difficulties in this position are these:

(1) There is no plain meaning on the face of the Establishment Clause, and the weight of the evidence respecting the understanding of its principal sponsors, James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, supports the view that it was meant to separate all religious matters from governmental processes as far as practicable.

(2) Professor Lowenthal has failed to demonstrate any need for state support of religion, and there is significant evidence that governmental support of religion is not needed and that it might well be detrimental to religion itself. The churches in fact are thriving.

(3) The virtual impossibility of providing governmental aid of a genuinely non-preferential character, even among theisms, renders the suggested standard worthless to serve the very need which called it into being.

(4) Such little aid as might become available would necessarily reintroduce into the civil process the very kind of religious strife which the Court has wisely attempted to discourage, and would further isolate the non-conformist from a position of equality under the law.

These objections could be developed at some length; the exigencies of space limit me to the last two.

Significant state support on a non-preferential basis among theisms? It is remarkable that while Professor Lowenthal insists that governmental support for religion on a non-preferential basis is greatly needed, he does not provide us with a single example of aid which would be permissible by that test. Rather, it is described only as "non-preferential assistance," "something short of absolute separation of church and state," and something agreeable to "believers in God still comprising the vast majority." It is doubtful whether any significant illustration can be given which would genuinely comply even with his rock-bottom constitutional test for neutrality, *i.e.*, non-preferential among all theisms (although not neutral with respect to non-theists).

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[1] Whether he means this in the sense that no one ought to comply with the decisions of the Court unless he is personally satisfied as to their correctness (as Governors Wallace and Barnet seem to believe), or whether he means that the Court should be urged to alter its position (as in *Brown v. Board of Education*), or that the Constitution should be amended (as after *Dred Scott*), I cannot presume to say.

Certainly state financial aid to religious schools would not qualify, for it would not be of equal benefit to all theistic religions. Not all sects rely upon such institutions to win or keep adherents to their faith, and those who do not would be significantly disadvantaged in being obliged to pay taxes for the support of their competitors who do. The preferential character of such aid is nicely attested by the fact that proposals to extend aid to religious schools have been opposed by a number of religious denominations—principally those which eschew parochial education as a necessary or proper part of their religion. It is helpful to note, in this connection, that one of the early religious bills opposed by Madison in Virginia was a tax bill for the support of all religions, Christian, "Mohammedan, Hindu or what have you."[2]

Similarly, no governmentally supported *prayer* would be permissible, because even among acknowledged theisms, there is wide disagreement respecting the assumptions contained within a given prayer. The Regents of New York were mistaken, for instance, in supposing that even the following prayer was equally acceptable to all faiths:

> Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our country.[3]

A number of faiths take exception to the very first word, "almighty," their position being that God is not almighty and that to insist otherwise is to commit blasphemy by holding Him responsible for the sins, crimes, diseases, and corruption so readily apparent in nature and mankind. The next word, "God," is also preferential, for not all theisms are monotheisms; the singling out of one god as *the* God is not in keeping with Hinduism, for instance, and that was a faith acknowledged even at the time the First Amendment was drafted. To acknowledge "dependence" upon God is not consistent with the position held by some deists in the eighteenth century, and some theists today, who regard God merely as a primordial first cause: God set the universe in motion much like a clock, but is not responsive to prayer. Similarly, to invoke God's blessing for one's country is distasteful to a number of conscientious theists who regard God as less nationalistic and more cosmic than some. Even were some prayer devisable to reflect a core religion, a number of faiths are opposed to the speaking of prayers in public or in unison. Indeed, as one surveys the range of theistic religions in the United States, from the most credulous forms of primitive anthropomorphism still popular in rustic parts, to the most scholastic theologies in other parts, he cannot fairly deduce any form of specific assistance equally deferential to them all. Finally, I would submit that religion itself cannot reasonably be restricted in its constitutional and free exercise sense to theisms alone. One need not rely upon references to James, Dewey, Huxley, Taoism, humanism, or ethical culture for support, for as thoughtful a theologian as Paul Tillich has seen fit to concur:

> Every human being has an ultimate concern, although not everybody calls it God. Not even the Buddhists call it God but everyone knows it is a religion. And so I would say that they . . . have their expressions of what the meaning of their life is and they are committed to it. They are often even willing to sacrifice most of their life or their whole life to it if necessary, and for this reason I would call them religions or, with a more technical word, quasi-religions.[4]

Discord avoided and non-theists adequately protected? As a matter of policy and law, a test of non-preferential aid among theisms will not permit the kind of state aid which Professor Lowenthal evidently feels is needed, and this fact by itself argues convincingly against the acceptance of that test. On the other hand, to hold that such state aid is theoretically available is to encourage the very kind of religious rivalries and internecine conflicts among theisms which should be avoided and can be better avoided through the standard adopted by the Supreme Court. That standard attempts to free the civil process from religious discord, while fully protecting each religion's right to compete for success in the marketplace of ideas and faiths.

Let me last respond to Professor Lowenthal's insistence that those who are not theists receive all the protection they deserve from other parts of the Constitution, and that they ought not to be regarded as having any legitimate interest in the free exercise or establishment clauses of the

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[2] Brant, *James Madison, The Nationalist* (New York, 1948), pp. 344–45.

[3] Reproduced in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 422 (1962).

[4] Tillich, "The Sum and Substance," *University of Southern California Alumni Review*, Vol. 44 (1963), 11, 13.

First Amendment. The response is contained in the following case.

In 1948, Congress amended the Selective Service Act to limit draft exemptions for conscientious objectors to those basing their objection on a belief in "a Supreme Being." The exemption is still available today, whether or not the theistic objection might be regarded in some cases as naive, undeveloped, or completely lacking in reflective judgment. The courts are not entitled to decide the rationality of the theistic objection, only its sincerity.[5] This is as it should be, for to hold otherwise would be to reduce constitutional protection of the free exercise of religion to that which the state itself decided was rational. On the other hand, a religious objection to military service not bottomed on a belief in a Supreme Being does not qualify under the Selective Service Act. Under Professor Lowenthal's view, it *ought* not to qualify, since the free exercise clause is exclusively a haven for theists.

Now we come to a specific case, testing whether the conscientious objector in question is adequately protected by other parts of the Constitution. The defendant in this case is the son of an exceptionally religious Roman Catholic family, an honor student in high school with an excellent academic record and with no record of any previous legal difficulties. When summoned for the draft, he considers the question of military service carefully, and finally concludes that conscientiously he cannot serve:

> My decision arises from what I believe to be considerations of validity from the standpoint of the welfare of humanity and the preservation of the democratic values which we in the United States are struggling to maintain. I have concluded that war, from the practical standpoint, is futile and self-defeating, and that from the more important moral standpoint, it is unethical.

He is examined by a Hearing Officer of the Justice Department and investigated by the FBI. With the benefit of the FBI report, the Officer concludes that the defendant, is "a truthful, decent young citizen who conscientiously objects to joining in any manner any activity which would bear on military affairs."

Under the statute, however, it is not enough that his objection be conscientious. It must, as well, rest on a belief in a Supreme Being. Unfortunately for him, it does not:

> [He was anxious to explain that] skepticism or disbelief in the existence of God does not necessarily mean lack of faith in anything whatsoever. . . . Such personages as Plato, Aristotle and Spinoza evolved comprehensive ethical systems of intellectual and moral integrity without belief in God, except in the remotest sense.
>
> . . . .
>
> Finally, rejecting dependence upon his Creator for a guide to morality, [he] asserted "more respect for . . . belief in and devotion to goodness and virtue for their own sakes, and a religious faith in a purely ethical creed.

When he is prosecuted for refusing to submit to military induction, he relies upon the First Amendment's religion clause and the Fifth Amendment's implied equal protection clause by way of defense. In keeping with Professor Lowenthal's preference for theism, however, the district court should (and does) brush these objections aside:

> (a) The free exercise clause of the First Amendment is not violated because it protects only the exercise of those whose religion is based upon a belief in a Supreme Being. Such a belief is not involved in this case, as the defendant readily admits.
>
> (b) The equal protection clause is not violated because it is reasonable for Congress to distinguish between those whose objection is theistic in character and those whose objection is not theistic, in deciding who shall be exempt from military service.
>
> (c) The establishment clause is not violated, because the exemption provided for theists is non-sectarian. In any case, defendant has no standing to contest this issue.

So this young man should be sentenced to prison, while others basing their objection to military service on some belief in a Supreme Being enjoy civilian status. Professor Lowenthal's standard operates neatly: it is all right to exempt the theists, for religion should receive "public encouragement," unrestricted by the establishment clause which might otherwise rule it out; it is all right to jail this man, however, for his is not the kind of religion which the free exercise clause meant to protect equally with all others. Somewhere, however, we may suspect that the First Amendment really has been mocked here; most certainly, this is an instance where the other parts of the Constitution scarcely afford equal respect for the integrity of non-theists.

A Constitution as insensitive as this would hardly be worth expounding. Happily, the Supreme Court has not expounded it in this fashion. And when this very case was appealed to the Circuit Court, which understood religion to reflect a breadth of philosophy including that which was bravely held by this young man, the conviction was reversed. The holding was that a classification for draft exemption purposes, based solely on an objection according to the dictates of a Supreme Being, is arbitrary; religion in the First Amendment is not limited to theisms, and a classification based on theism consequently denies the equal protection of the laws.[6]

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[5] See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).

The issue as of 1964 has thus developed to this extent. The free exercise of religious convictions is broadly protected from governmental restraint whether or not the religion in question is based on the mysteries or miracles of divinity. And, under the establishment clause, the success or failure of religious institutions is made to depend essentially on their own vigorous competition for communicants, unaided, as unencumbered by the government. I am hopeful that few will see in this arrangement any "sacrificing [of] religious liberty," any "worshipful attitude" toward the Supreme Court, or any occasion for the caliber of the protest advanced by Professor Lowenthal.

William W. Van Alstyne
Duke University Law School

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[6] United States v. Seeger, 326 F. 2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964). Earlier quotations in the text are taken from the case report which warrants a complete reading. For an admirable discussion of "religion" in a slightly different context, see Fellowship of Humanity v. Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d 394 (1957).

BROWNLOW ON THE LEGISLATIVE REORGANIZATION ACT

To the Editor:

In his letter to Richard Neustadt, which appears in the December, 1963, issue of the Review, the late Louis Brownlow refers at page 864 to what he considers to be "the adverse effects on the institution of the Presidency as the result of the La Follette-Monroney legislative reorganization which occasioned the proliferation of subcommittees and committee staffs—an effect which has set us a considerable way back on the road to the Congressional Government about which Woodrow Wilson was writing nearly eighty years ago. By this device," says Brownlow, "and the breakdown in party discipline, the 'Executive power' is being subsumed to a degree that seems to me to be much more difficult to handle than any encroachment on the part of the bureaucracy."

Brownlow does not establish a cause-and-effect relationship in making his criticism and drawing his conclusions, but his selection of the Legislative Reorganization Act as an alleged cause of adverse effects upon the Presidency must not go unchallenged or be permitted to stand without analysis.

Brownlow assumes that—

(1) too many committees, subcommittees and their staffs affect the president adversely;

(2) party discipline in the legislative process, particularly as it affected the relationship between the president and congress, once existed to such a degree (apparently at some time prior to 1946) that we can speak of "the breakdown in party discipline";

(3) the number of committees, subcommittees and their staffs is difficult to handle—he doesn't say difficult for whom, but presumably for the president to deal with in getting his legislative program passed; and

(4) adverse effects only happened because of the La Follette-Monroney legislative reorganization.

These assumptions are untenable.

With regard to (1)—the mere number of committees and their staffs cannot be a reason for the executive power being "subsumed," *i.e.*, contained and encompassed. One or two committee chairmen can facilitate or obstruct legislation recommended by a president. It can be just as difficult for a president to convince one chairman strongly opposed to a particular bill (even when there is little or no staff involved, *e.g.*, the House Rules Committee) as it is to deal with several chairmen in the House and Senate who are not strongly opposed to particular legislation. Instead of an increased number of committees affecting the presidency adversely, actually such a situation gives a president more alternatives for getting particular bills passed.

The number of congressional committee staff employees, greater now than in 1946, is actually quite small when compared with their counterparts in the Executive Branch. The Department of Defense, for example, had 1,205,231 civilian and 2,675,018 military employees with a total payroll of $17.6 billion in 1963. In contrast, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees had a combined professional staff of 17 and a clerical staff of 21 in 1963, with expenditures of $165,335.94 for employed personnel in 1963.

Even if the Legislative Reorganization Act had not been passed in 1946, there would have been an increase in the number of committees and their staffs. This increase would have been caused, in part, by the advent of the United States as a world power with a responsibility for keeping peace under cold war conditions. The atomic bomb was used in 1945, and in 1946 the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy was established, paralleling the creation of the Atomic Energy Commission. The Marshall Plan, foreign aid, military assistance, the Korean War, the development of long-range missiles and the coming of the space age—all these events created more work for both the executive and legislative branches. But the number of employees in the legislative branch, naturally needing more expertise among staff members required to deal with such legislation, is far less than the number of employees in the "bureaucracy" about which Brownlow writes.

I think it can be said that, if the Legislative Reorganization Act had not passed in 1946, we would still have had an increase in the number of committees and in congressional staffs, but instead of subcommittees organized under major committees with well-defined jurisdictions, there would have been more separate committees, probably more overlapping, and less probability of the committee structure cohering, as it now does, around large subject-matter fields. For example, instead of the large area of responsibility now organized under the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, there might have been separate committees and separate chairmen for each of the areas now covered by subcommittees. This would have made it more difficult, not less, for any president dealing with foreign policies requiring legislation and appropriation by the Congress. Similarly, had the Army and Navy had separate committees, as they did before 1946, undoubtedly there would have developed a separate committee for the Air Force, and then it would have been more difficult for a president to deal with the three committees than with the one Armed Services Committee—having one overall jurisdiction. The Armed Services Committee avoided the interservice rivalry pattern which developed (and proved to be so difficult to handle) in the Department of Defense.

With regard to assumption (2)—while it is true that a pattern of party discipline is not discernible in the relationship between the president and Congress, this is nothing new. I could not agree that there was a "breakdown," from some former system of party discipline which was quite efficient in terms of legislative process, to some system which made it more difficult for the president. It is always difficult for a president, but this element of party discipline must not be overemphasized in ascribing reasons for events which occur in executive-legislative relations. The personalities of the president and the majority leaders of the House and Senate are factors; when Eisenhower was president, even with a majority of Democrats in the House and Senate, effective relations prevailed between the Republican president and the Democratic Speaker Rayburn and Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson. History affords examples of more obstruction when the president and a majority of both houses of Congress have been of the same party.

Assumptions three and four have already been answered above.

Finally, the notion that the Executive power is being subsumed to a degree (much more difficult to handle than any encroachment on the part of the bureaucracy) by anything that happens in Congress will be news to many members of Congress who have increasingly complained that legislative powers are being delegated to the executive. Some of them deplore the reorganization powers granted the president. Executive agencies are reorganized and Congress does not have an opportunity to participate in the plans while they are being made, and cannot amend the plans even in small ways which might be an improvement. Congress appropriates money for military manpower and weapons which the president does not or will not spend. In fact, there is a growing belief in Congress that the executive is becoming too powerful and that the legislative power is being gradually diminished in the process.

George B. Galloway
Legislative Reference Service,
Library of Congress

To the Editor:

I would do Louis Brownlow no favor by interpreting or reinterpreting his passing remarks in his letter to Dick Neustadt about Congress and the La Follette-Monroney Act. As a political reporter and the son-in-law of a Congressman, he became no mean expert on Congress and its variable virtues while George Galloway and I were still in grammar school. At times, in his later years, as he freely admitted with a grin, he was a *laudator temporis acti*. Yet he did have, quite aside from that, an increasing concern with some of the newer congressional habits of which I may mention three:

(1) The habit of limiting authorizing legislation to a single year, so that year after year the bureaucrats and their bosses must spend untold hours rechewing the same cud before

the legislative committees and the appropriate Appropriations subcommittees.

(2) The habit of permitting (or is it encouraging?) congressional professional staff to propose a continuing series of subjects for investigation and hearings even when the Representatives or Senators have completed the inquiries that concern them.

(3) The habit of ever-increasing Committee (not congressional) veto-power over individual administrative actions such as real property transactions, and weapons procurement.

Brownie believed that the first habit was unwise and unwarranted; it forces the representatives of the President to waste their energies because two committees are rivals for public attention. He believed that the second habit was a lurid example of allowing an expert to be on top, rather than on tap—where he belonged—a question that fascinated and infuriated him.

As for the third habit, he was convinced that it was both an unconstitutional interference with the President's responsibility for taking care that the laws be faithfully executed; and equally an abdication, in the Wilsonian sense, of congressional responsibility to an essentially irresponsible body.

No doubt Brownie would have agreed that these habits were not created by the Legislative Reorganization of 1946; he might have said that they were encouraged by it. At any rate, if I may depend on my own memory, he didn't like them, and neither do I.

One more point. Congressional complaints about the delegation of "legislative powers" to the executive in the successive reorganization acts, passed by successive Congresses, hardly deserve citation, especially by so learned a supporter of our national legislature as George Galloway, in justification of an extension of congressional authority.

Congressional power to reorganize, like congressional power to enact tariff legislation, was laid on the shelf when Congress came to realize, painfully, that congressional power was not synonymous with congressional competence.

HAROLD STEIN

Princeton University

A POST-POLEMIC

TO THE EDITOR:

I would like to clarify and comment on an issue concerning the notion of the "pre-scientific" world and understanding in the polemic exchanged between Professors John H. Schaar and Sheldon S. Wolin in their "Review Essay" on *Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics* (ed. Herbert J. Storing) and Professor Leo Strauss which appeared in the March 1963 issue of this REVIEW. It is too important to miss notice.

Schaar and Wolin raised the question as to why Strauss's "pre-scientific" world and understanding could not be called a "pre-logical" or "pre-philosophical" world or understanding, and whether a "post-scientific" understanding is possible. In my opinion, it could be called a "pre-logical" or "pre-philosophical" world or understanding. As a matter of fact, Strauss himself used the term "prephilosophic" referring to the "natural world," *i.e.*, "the way in which they [political things] present themselves in political life, in action" (*Natural Right and History* [NRH], 1953, pp. 79, 81), and criticized Max Weber for not having been concerned with "an analysis of social reality as it is experienced in social life or known to 'common sense'" (NRH, p. 78). It is also referred to as "the world in which we live" or "the world of common sense" as contrasted to "the world of science" (see also: *What Is Political Philosophy? And Other Essays* [WPP], 1959, p. 23, *et passim* and "An Epilogue," in *Essays*, p. 331, *et passim*). The question raised here by the reviewers is not entirely of their own fault: it is a legitimate question. Strauss is partially responsible for this confusion. He writes that, "To grasp the natural world as a world that is *radically* prescientific or prephilosophic, one has to go back behind the first emergence of science or philosophy. It is not necessary for this purpose to engage in extensive and necessarily hypothetical anthropological studies" (NRH, pp. 79–80, italics mine). Moreover, in his reply to his critics, he rejects "in passing" the suggestion that "the notion according to which the 'world' is 'a whole' is of biblical rather than of Greek origin" (this REVIEW, March, 1963, p. 154). According to these statements, two things are clear: first, the "prescientific world" is of Greek origin; second, it *tends*, if one does not fully understand the meaning of the term "radically," to suggest that this "pre-scientific world" is a pre-historical world, *i.e.*, the world prior to the development of philosophy and science. I would not question the truth of the first, but I would like to clarify the notion of the "pre-scientific world."

In the light of what Strauss attempts to describe about the "natural world," the term "pre-reflexive world" seems to convey its meaning more adequately than the term "pre-scientific world": thus, it is "pre-conceptual," "pre-logical" and "pre-philosophical" in the sense that conceptualization, logic and philosophy are all reflexive activities. This "world" is not foreign to phenomenology and existentialism, particularly in post-Husserlian phenomenology. The term *Lebenswelt* (Life-world, the world of every-day life or the world of immediate, lived experience) was used and expounded originally by Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, in his last and posthumously published work: *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und transzendentale Phänomenologie* (2d ed., 1962). See also an English article by Husserl's student Ludwig Landgrebe, "The World as a Phenomenological Problem," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 1 (September, 1940, pp. 38–58). The *Lebenswelt* is one of the foremost areas of phenomenologists' and existentialists' concern today. The French existential phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty uses the phrase *l'être au monde* which has its origin in Heidegger's *in-der-Welt-Sein* in his epoch-making *Sein und Zeit*. In this country, in addition to the late Professor Alfred Schutz who devoted much of his life to working at phenomenology of the social sciences, Professor John Wild of Yale University is the most enthusiastic proponent of the *Lebenswelt* and has applied it to social and political philosophy (*e.g.*, in his latest book, *Existence and the World of Freedom*, 1963). In this connection, we can also mention William James's "radical empiricism," and the British philosopher John Macmurray has independently worked out a philosophy regarding "immediate experience" (see *Interpreting the Universe*, 1933). The *Lebenswelt* is the primordial world of every-day life in the sense that it is "pregiven to both the man in the world of working and to the theorizing thinker" (Schutz, *The Problem of Social Reality*, 1962, p. 247). It is more rich, ambiguous, immediate and emotional than the reflexive world. Strauss's distinction between "scientific" and "common-sense" understanding is similar to the one that Schutz makes between the phenomenological *epoché* and the *epoché* of the natural attitude (or Husserl's *natürlicher Weltbegriff*). Thus, the *Lebenswelt* is not the prehistorical world but the world of every-day life "Here and Now," even if the study of "primitive mentality" helps to understand it.

Strauss lists Husserl and Heidegger among "the four greatest philosophers of the last forty years"—the other two are Bergson and Whitehead (WPP, p. 17). However, as far as I know, he has nowhere related his "natural world" or "pre-scientific world" to Husserl's *Lebenswelt* or Heidegger's *in-der-Welt-Sein*. To the extent that the task of philosophy is to describe and understand the *Lebenswelt*, Strauss's "phenomenological" interpretation of classical political philosophy is a notable enterprise and suggests an important direction.

HWA YOL JUNG

Moravian College

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Nature and Limits of Political Science. By Maurice Cowling. (Cambridge University Press, New York, 1963. vi, 214. $4.75.)

Social Science and Political Theory. By W. G. Runciman. (Cambridge University Press, New York, 1963. Pp. 197. $3.95.)

These two "scope and method" essays are by fellows of Jesus College and Trinity College, Cambridge, respectively. Both evidence high intelligence and wide scholarship. But they are as distinct in flavor as plum and apricot. Both are valuable reading for the political scientist interested in the philosophical-methodological problems of his trade; more so for the political scientist who is not—perhaps because he already Knows the Answers.

The dominating quality of Cowling is an eccentric, radical scepticism. He is sceptical *vis-à-vis* all conventional and(or) widely held positions; conversely, his own position, insistently stated and often repeated, is eccentric and radical in terms of widely accepted positions. His stance and arguments evoke from memory many precedents and similarities: Burke, Benda, Sait, Butterfield and Oakeshott, among others. But the position taken is precisely equivalent to none of these; and owes a debt to the fact that the schools of logical positivism and linguistic analysis have existed and exerted influence.

Cowling's key word is *explanation,* which is posed against both *persuasion* and *practice.* Explanation deals with "what is the case" (162), but not in terms that, in contemporary social science, one expects to find associated with this phrase. For Cowling is not interested in any "prediction" and "control" to follow "explanation," and indeed argues strenuously that these are illegitimate, impossible goals for social science. What, then, is explanation and what is its use? It is science—"A science is a body of explanation and nothing more. . . ." (171). It is also philosophy—"Philosophy is thought without arrest or limitation, explanation with as few assumptions as possible. . . . " (124). And what is the use of explanation? Only a philistine would ask, for ". . . in philosophy it is not the arrival but the journey itself which matters" (146); philosophy dignifies and justifies the enterprise of civilization. "The task of political philosophy," explicitly, "is to make as transparent as possible the assumptions implicit in any way of speaking about politics: but that is all it can do and the affectation should be avoided of pretending that it can do more." (147)

The sin that Cowling finds intolerable is to move from explanation to persuasion, using the "cover" of the former to justify or dignify the latter: here his indictment is lengthy and inclusive, moving through a spectrum from Science to Christianity and being especially scathing towards the "liberal orthodoxy" of contemporary political science. Here is a powerful sermon against sermonizing, especially directed toward the children of the Enlightenment who make of their Science a new Religion. ("'Values' are what people parade who have neither settled habits nor religion to tell them how to act.") Not that Cowling lacks a respect for the arts of persuasion or the world of practice. On the contrary, the world of practice is a Real World and persuasion is necessary to make it move. But this Real World is rather like Burke's. In its complexity and subtlety it can be but imperfectly known; those who know how to move it have a knowledge different from an academic's, a philosopher's; and there is an arbitrariness about the beliefs that form and move it, an arbitrariness that is a part of the nature of things and needs no apology.

This essay will strike most of us as perverse and precious. Cowling's Science for Science's Sake, equated more or less with Philosophy for Philosophy's Sake (offensive in itself to many), is not likely to attract a School. Certainly as a point of view and stance it is not without serious difficulties, theoretical and practical. But it may well be that in the critical aspects of the essay there is an astringency, an acidity, which may do us all—and I do mean *all*—good.

Regarding Runciman, it may be appropriate to begin with a warning to the reader: the reviewer found this essay so congenial on the whole to his own outlook that his appraisal of it may be unduly high. That acknowledged, this is an excellent essay in both content and style—penetrating, sensible, fair, graceful and lucid. Many of the basic issues of the enterprise of social science, so often dealt with ponderously and dogmatically, are reviewed briefly and deftly. Nor is the small book simply a discussion of scope and method. There is also summary and critique of a considerable range of theory and research findings in recent social science; chapters on "Elites and Oligarchies" and "Voters and Parties," especially, are addressed to the status and problems of the theory of democracy.

Centrally, Runciman argues that the two enterprises of political science and political philosophy are equally legitimate and necessary, that neither is reducible to the other, that each is dependent upon the other for its health—indeed, for its very existence. "The social scientist is a part of the history from which his knowledge is constructed; every tomorrow, that knowledge may have to be revised or abandoned altogether. Likewise, the criteria of analysis and appraisal which any philosopher brings to the problems which he studies are themselves a part of the subject-matter which he is studying. Both philosophy and social science are thus in a sense parasitic activities; but it is their own as well as each other's washing that they are required to go on taking in." (174)

Actually, in the customary terminology of the book it is not political science but "political sociology" that is paired with political philosophy. The point is that, to Runciman, the two are the same. The essay, in fact, begins with a discussion of "The Nature of Social Science" in which it is argued that, if sociology means a *general* theory of society, then it is a waste of effort (issuing only in philosophies of history or elaborate classificatory schemes), and if it is broken into areas of specific behavior, then it is one in content and method with other disciplines—in this case, political science. In short, he proposes not to hand over political science to the sociologists, but to merge political scientists and the interests in this country designated as "political sociology."

While recognizing that "every tomorrow" we may have to revise both facts and opinions, Runciman takes pains to distinguish his position from Weldon's "ice cream model"—that all one can say about values is that he likes them or doesn't: "There are strong arguments to the effect that there is a shared body of political philosophical beliefs which may be treated as analogous to the starting-point for beliefs in the canons of natural science."(168) The position developed is related, overtly, to that argued by Hart in *The Concept of Law*, holding it is entirely respectable to argue that there is a "minimum content of natural law"; but holding also that there are conflicts irreconcilable by any single ethical norm.

In sum and roughly, Cowling presents explanation and practice as two parallel lines that are almost wholly unrelated and can in principle never meet; whereas Runciman presents political science and political philosophy as two lines defined each in terms of the other and, while never meeting, perhaps approaching each other asymptotically.

DWIGHT WALDO
University of California, Berkeley

Nomos VI: Justice. BY CARL J. FRIEDRICH AND JOHN W. CHAPMAN (eds.). (New York: Atherton Press, 1963. Pp. x, 325. $6.00.)

This sixth volume from The American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy contains fifteen essays, five written by political scientists, two by lawyers, one by an economist, and seven by philosophy teachers. David Granfield discusses a difference between Thomas Aquinas and William of Ockham; Robert C. Tucker argues that Marx was not moved by a concern for distributive justice; Hugo A. Bedau examines the ways in which justice was understood by the Utilitarians; and Richard C. Cox contributes a kind of prolegomenon to an understanding of Locke on justice, which is ignored by Raymond Polin in his essay on Locke. The remaining essays are not interpretations of other works.

Carl J. Friedrich concludes that an act is just when "it is based on a balanced evaluation of the persons it affects, comparing (and classifying) them on the ground of values prevalent in the political community concerned" (43). This means that justice is the conventional, conforming to the conventions or "values" of the place, and Friedrich merely acknowledges but does not pursue the question of whether it is possible to ascend from conventional justice to justice truly understood. The importance, indeed, the necessity of this question is argued by Iredell Jenkins in what is perhaps the most thoughtful essay in the book, and is acknowledged implicity by Richard McKeon in the essay that follows Friedrich's. McKeon refers in passing to the problem of the "tyranny of prevailing opinion" (51), which implies an understanding of justice independent of that justice defined by "prevailing opinion." To adopt the words of Arnold Brecht in the next essay, it implies "some measure, standard, yardstick, or norm" (62) beyond that supplied by local conventions. The attempt to discover this measure is, or was, the task of political philosophy. According to Brecht, however, this quest cannot succeed: "I hold that on purely scientific grounds we cannot even establish the validity of the most fundamental of our modern humanitarian principles, namely, that in certain basic aspects the life and the liberty of all human beings . . . should be treated with equal respect" (66). This view is familiar to all political scientists today and is probably accepted by most. Yet, its acceptance would seem to undermine political science itself; and despite Brecht's reassurances to the contrary, it would surely undermine any attempt to write meaningfully about justice. For, if justice rests on mere opinion, or on mere "preferences for a certain style of living" (66), an appeal against the opinion of the majority can itself be grounded on nothing but opinion, and books about justice would be " 'obsolete verbal rubbish' "—to adopt the words Tucker quotes (312) Marx as using against his socialist opponents.

John Rawls's essay appears at first to be an attempt by modern philosophy to refute, or to avoid the conclusions of, the argument of modern political science made by Brecht. His thesis is that knowledge of justice is possible, and more precisely, that "the concept of justice provides conclusive arguments" (99) favoring a constitution based on liberty of each person and of each conscience. Using the techniques of linguistic analysis, Rawls believes he discovers justice, but the justice he discovers has nothing to do with the politics of this world. He begins with an abstraction about human nature and ends with an abstraction about the character of the needs that bring men into civil society. Justice has nothing to do with "specific distributions of desired things"—that is, it has nothing to do with "who gets what"—any attempt to discover such a justice is "mistaken in principle" (102); on the contrary, justice consists merely in a constitution granting liberty to all, because no one—at least, no one of Rawls's hypothetical persons—can complain of such a constitution. The proof of this is that no one will agree to the establishment of a constitution permitting slavery because no one can be sure that, in the ensuing lottery, he will not ("whatever chance device is used" [107]) be assigned to the slave class. Once civil society is established, justice consists in permitting everyone to achieve his own ends, "whatever they are [but] within certain limits" (118). Whatever end is sought, the freedom to seek it may be limited by the need for "the security of public order" (118). Justice turns out to be the preservation of this hypothetical state inhabited by these hypothetical beings.

Nomos VI is not concerned with the application of the principles of justice to contemporary problems; it is a book of theory. To publish it implies (there is no preface or introductory chapter) that the old theory, the old teachings are inadequate or are inadequately understood. But the old teachings at least had political relevance.

Walter Berns

Cornell University

Of Time, Work and Leisure. By Sebastian De Grazia. (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1962. Pp. 559. $6.50)

One test of an important book in the political, social and behavioral sciences is whether it holds a new and more accurate mirror to contemporary society. De Grazia's volume is such a mirror. No matter how disagreeable the process of re-perception, American and more generally industrial civilizations will eventually concede the substantial accuracy of the new image. It will be impossible for any serious discussion of leisure to ignore the data, the definitions, and the challenges put forward in De Grazia's examination of the subject.

The definitional problem is how to describe the calendar of human activites. Quite wisely, the choice of descriptive definitions is influenced by preferred definitions of goal. Hence, De Grazia postulates various goals of human association, or adopts for purposes of inquiry, value objectives which have played a role in man's history. The result is a treatise that plays back and forth between what are commonly called normative and descriptive issues; and among descriptive issues, considers the flow of historic sequences, of scientific analysis, and contingent futures. Less well-developed, though strongly implicated, are questions that call for the invention, evaluation and selection of policies designed to close the gap between things as they are and things as they might be.

If we assume with De Grazia that one end of the state is to allow and encourage as many men as possible to cultivate their minds, and that the cultivation of man's distinctive propensities calls for leisure (freedom from necessity), the body politic ought to foster the conditions of leisure, hence of enlightenment. It is argued that though the fruits of leisure cannot be guaranteed, they are likely to be freedom, truth, and beauty.

It cannot be said that De Grazia has been wholly successful in defining what he means, or in identifying the factors that condition leisure. It is assumed that freedom from necessity is a state of mind, that it includes a sense of emancipation from external necessity. But what of the inner necessities generated by obsessional and compulsive imperatives? How are they to be distinguished from the "demonaic" impulses whose results are sometimes celebrated as creative contributions? The discussion does not quite succeed in disentangling classical conceptions of leisure from the collective prescriptions imposed as the code of a landholding class or of a teaching profession. De Grazia is more successful in identifying the component of objectivity (or serenity) than in clarifying the element of spontaneity (a term, by the way, which he does not use, even though many of its connotations are appropriate to his purpose).

Whatever reservations may be suggested, the author has achieved impressive results by applying the intellectual instruments which he has sharpened for the task. The most compelling result distinguishes leisure from both "work" and "time free from work." If off-the-job time is filled up with activities which are matters of "obligation", they are not of the realm of leisure, but of necessity. De Grazia makes a remarkable critique of conventional ideas of free time, holding that the figures usually cited to show how technology has increased per capita leisure are untenable. He arrives at this result by adding to the "on-the-job" total the hours spent going to and from work, the time spent in "do it yourself" chores at home, and in recreational activities which are contaminated by such objectives as preparing the individual to do his job better. Politics and religion carry enough overtones of serious purpose to fall outside the realm of leisure.

De Grazia is not dismayed to discover that he is advocating an ideal that has largely vanished from the contemporary world. For he believes that one aim of the inquiring mind, especially of the political thinker and observer, is to jolt the complacencies around him, if they diverge from his conception of the good life.

Political scientists who cannot or will not go all the way with De Grazia will nevertheless find themselves provoked and intrigued by the measurement problems to which the author draws attention. De Grazia's approach is configurative; and my recommendation is that we accustom ourselves to contextualism and join in searching for ways of exhibiting the significance of *any* interaction for the shaping and sharing of *all* values. Industrial sociologists and psychologists have moved in this direction by looking beyond the technical operations performed on the "job" to discover the interplay of affection, respect, power and other values in the plant. Some political scientists are sufficiently emancipated to examine an act of ballot casting or lobbying in a comprehensive frame of reference. As a contextualist De Grazia is not entirely systematic; but his critical forays provide many brilliant indications of the realm of necessity in man's condition. The conventional institutions of government, law and politics will be perceived with heightened luminosity when the leads given in *Of Time, Work, and Leisure* become part of the non-leisure time researches of political scientists. As for leisure in De Grazia's sense, it will probably remain an elusive horse of many colors and no jockey.

HAROLD D. LASSWELL

Yale University

Metropolitics: A Study of Political Culture. BY SCOTT GREER. With the advice and assistance of Norton E. Long. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1963. Pp. xii, 207.)

The concentration of population in cities has been accompanied by dispersion from the center toward the extremities. Long before the automobile large proportions of the total land area of cities were losing population as the cities and their immediate environs were growing at impressive rates. Park and associates note a clear and set concentric pattern of "suburban" migration in Chicago. In St. Louis between 1910 and 1930, the old city along the river lost 50,000 inhabitants.

In the past, as now, the process of dispersion usually was socially selective. Upper class escaped working classes; Protestant escaped Catholic and Jew, who in turn escaped from the Negro. People were searching for greater comfort, higher status and more neighborly neighborhoods long before social scientists discovered the "quest for community." Even the scale and complexity of urban living has always been very large, relatively speaking perhaps larger in the past than today because of the less efficient technology for production, distribution and social control.

So, what's new and different about the modern metropolis? Of all the possible answers to that question, most certainly one of the most important is that of governmental and political forms. Generally since the 1930's the corporate limits have not followed the population; city institutions remain hemmed within static boundaries. As a result there is a multiplication of governments and a dispersion of power to a degree unknown to the earlier metropolis which was large enough to contain its exploding population (St. Louis) or kept up with its population by annexation (Chicago, New York). When annexation ceases, areas outside the central city develop independently, create their own governments, their own histories, identities, jealousies and capacities to resist change.

Because of the proportion of America now metropolitan, and because of the dispersion of government and governing power therein, "metropolitan life", says Norton Long in *The Polity*, "has become the basic pattern of our existence . . . [and the] problem of local self-government, if not democracy itself, has become the problem of metropolitan government." What are the consequences of governmental proliferation in a large, economically interdependent unit? How are the problems faced and dealt with, and with what effect? What informal instruments of co-ordination and problem-solving emerge? What elements of the community take over, if any, when legal authority is short and fragmented? Is democracy possible; if so, under what conditions?

In a book called *Metropolitics* one expects to find questions of the foregoing type at the very core of the inquiry. One also expects it from the author's earlier work and from his association with Norton Long, and from the author's intention to integrate the data of reform "in a broad, systematic theoretical framework." It is also to be expected from the fact that the book takes three metropolitan charter movements as its problem situation. Unfortunately, Professor Greer's inquiry has almost nothing at all to do with the foregoing. As a book on comparative metropolitics this book is neither comparative nor metropolitics. It is almost exclusively a study of a sample of residents and a sample of the content of some news media in the one metropolis of St. Louis. (There are occasional, secondary, sideglances at Dade and Cuyahoga counties.) To Professor Greer metro-politics is simply an opportunity to study how people react to a campaign.

Chapter One, the introduction, deals with some of the facts about and the significance of a common political culture. Those aspects of the common culture that have bearing upon metropolitan reform Greer calls the "morality plays." These are *purification rites* (anti-corruption), *capitalist realism* (efficiency) and *the fertility ritual* (growth). This is certainly a bona fide, if quite conventional and non-exhaustive, classification of civic norms. But the purpose of the classification, especially the peculiar translations of well-known and accepted doctrines, is not at all clear. Once identified, and once emphasized as influential in the formulation of charter proposals, the entire scheme is nearly abandoned. What one expects to see developed into the promised theoretical framework is, after Chapter One, never developed and only occasionally invoked.

The book is at its best in the mere workaday descriptions of the process of putting the three charter movements together and formulating the charters themselves. Through translation into difficult and often irrelevant analogies (drawn from ecology, topography, engineering, games, the military, etc.), abstractions and moralities, Greer attempts to infuse into these chapters a sense of significance they do not need and a sense of theory they do not deserve. But he does provide a few facts about three reform movements that later studies will profit from. For example, it seems clear that the "Big Mules" are necessary for any reform movement, but that they generally are not found in exposed leadership positions, which devolve upon middle-level political entrepreneurs. His descriptions reveal some of the types of leaders with a special stake in the *status quo*. And they provide some interesting insights into the general political significance of party organization (often in its absence) as compared to the press and other news media, and to the organized and *ad hoc* local groups. In Chapters Two and Three, therefore, one is impressed by the formal and informal complexities of policy-making in and for the metropolis; and one begins to see the beginning of a truly comparative empirical study.

The remaining chapters of the book treat the foregoing not as ground work but as ground clearing. No more can be found of leadership, governments, groups, parties, issues, or policy formulation. Rather, the emphasis shifts to the mass and to the "study of political culture." The questions are, for example, Who was listening? What did they hear? Who talked to whom? What strata did they belong in? These were asked of a small sample (a "panel" of 81 in the city and 165 in the county) "loaded" for those who were presumed to be more involved, alert and likely to vote in the referendum. The findings relating to the level of awareness of these people are most interesting. For example, only about 10 per cent of even this loaded sample received any of the message of the campaign; a higher proportion could identify a campaign leader but not his position. But then the remainder of the book is based on the "general conversational ferment" among neighbors, friends, etc., as seen through this sample. And, in order to assess the metropolitics of his sample—*their* conversational ferment—he had to neglect the overwhelming proportion of his already small sample. This, in turn, unduly exaggerated many of his percentages. (For example, between 75 and 90 per cent of the city sample and 60 and 70 per cent of the county sample [pp. 128–130] remembered nothing about the origins of arguments pro and con; of those who *could* remember "74 per cent in the city and 70 per cent in the county . . . mentioned the media" as the source of favorable arguments.)

If carefully studied to allow for the small sample and the percentages based on subsamples, there are other interesting, if negative, findings. But all that is clearly proven in the book is that sample survey is an extraordinarily limited technique for political analysis. Used along with many other techniques and approaches, survey has power. Used alone, or as the most important tool, it tends to lead away from politics into the social psychology of the grass roots. In this study the latter was even then only possible through a shaky assumption of a "conversational ferment." As a consequence, the following items are conspicuously and woefully absent, despite the opportunities afforded by the three campaigns: (1) Comparison among the three cities and movements in terms of consistent units of analysis and firm data. There were no aggregative data on elections, the referenda or the communities; and there were no summary tables and analyses of leaders, factions, parties, etc.—not even the reputational data for which survey research has so often been employed by sociologists. (2) Comparison with, profit from, building upon or any other recognition of Banfield on Chicago, Munger and others on Syracuse, Salisbury and others on St. Louis, Dahl in general, and many others. These are not studies of merger, but they are studies of or have direct bearing upon the study of metropolitics. (3) Theory, or theorizing. No chapter ends with more than a short summary, and the final nine-page chapter ("What Happened?") is a summary and a bit of moralizing.

THEODORE J. LOWI

Cornell University

The British Political Elite. BY W. L. GUTTSMAN. (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1963. Pp. 398. 50 shillings.)

Recruits to Labour: The British Labour Party, 1914–1931. BY CATHERINE ANN CLINE. (Syracuse: University Press, 1963. Pp. 198. $5.00.)

In an aristocracy, de Tocqueville wrote, historians attribute events to the will of individuals; in a democracy, to the working of great general causes. Given the aristocratic bias of politics in England, it is hardly surprising that political biography has long been the great *forte* of British students of politics. The merit of the two books reviewed here is that they represent attempts at generalizing about the political process by accumulating data from a rich and plentiful source. As such, they are of interest to students of political recruitment generally, as well as important for specialists in British politics.

Guttsman's book is a large work. He analyses the changing social composition of members of the Cabinet since 1832, and the social origins of contemporary leaders in a variety of quasi-governmental institutions such as the BBC and Royal Commissions. Data are presented in 55 tables and 9 diagrams; the subheadings for classification are well chosen and carefully explained. But the book is more than tables. Because of wide reading in the massive literature, the author is constantly able to illuminate his statistics with revealing quotations from biographies and autobiographies; this helps to establish psychologically important distinctions within groups sharing similar objective characteristics.

The chief strength of the book is its broad historical sweep. The author introduces the study by showing how Cabinet office prior to 1832 was integrally related to the status hierarchy of a society from which the political system was not functionally differentiated. The traditional bases of legitimation are also described. In the central chapters (4–7) the decline of the aristocracy and the rise of politicians drawn from the professional middle-class are carefully traced. The difficulties of middle-class businessmen and manual workers seeking Cabinet office are also discussed. The chief historical change has been minor in terms of social origins, but major in terms of achievement characteristics, for today the Cabinet minister is expected to display specific political skills, rather than simply to have diffuse social status.

In analyzing the contemporary political system, the author comes unstuck. The data are useful to have available, particularly the estimates of the size of the political elite; Guttsman puts the number at 11,053 (p. 328). But whereas the historical section deals primarily with social origins, the contemporary section deals primarily with power relationships. In terms of social origins, there is, as Guttsman claims, a self-perpetuating stratum of society in British politics. But this is not necessarily a 'ruling class'. The author is unaware of the literature on measuring elite power which has flourished in America in the aftermath of C. Wright Mills and Floyd Hunter. Furthermore, he fails to make any allowance for inter-elite and intra-elite differences, and for institutionalized role conflicts.

Miss Cline, an American historian, has written a monograph about 70 aristocratic and professional middle-class recruits to the Labour Party at a crucial period in its development. The book is short, well documented and sensible. The author shows that many recruits were primarily reacting against the pro-war policy of the Liberal government, and did not abandon Liberal ideas while within the Labour Party. Particularly notable is the proportion who later abandoned the Labour Party. These newcomers, however, did not dilute the party's Socialism, because already established leaders such as Ramsay MacDonald, J. H. Thomas and Philip Snowden were hardly Socialists. In policy terms, their influence was chiefly felt in foreign affairs, where the Labour Party had previously had no considered program. The chief conclusion is that the recruits were a heterogeneous lot, and their varied outlooks often corresponded to the varied outlooks already established within the party. Unfortunately, there is no discussion of the extent to which the presence of so many gentlemen in a rising workers' party was important in reassuring Labour's opponents that the party did not challenge fundamental principles of the culture.

RICHARD ROSE

University of Manchester

The Dawn of a New Age: Reflections on Science and Human Affairs. BY EUGENE RABINOWITCH. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963. Pp. v, 332. $6.95.)

In this valuable collection of essays, the distinguished editor of the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* has assembled a number of his writings on the impact of science upon public affairs and the new and unique role that scientists are able to play in helping humanity to master the forces they are unleashing. Unlike the sensitive artist, Dr. Rabinowitch seems to be saying, the responsible scientist cannot claim that the harsh realities of his surroundings are those of a world he never made. Because the scientific revolution of our times is so directly the work of scientists, the problems it raises demand that they become vigilant critics of dangerously unrealistic social policies and constructive participants in the effort to turn a precarious stability into an enduring peace.

Dr. Rabinowitch himself has played a unique role as a kind of political journalist extraordinary within the scientific community. He might almost be described as a highly articulate biophysicist and biochemist who combines the passionate idealism of Norman Cousins with the analytical pragmatism of Walter Lippmann. (Which of the two gets the upper hand seems to depend upon just how desperate Dr. Rabinowitch thinks the situation is.) It was Dr. Rabinowitch who in 1945 drafted most of the Franck Report, now remembered most of all for expressing the doubts of scientists on the wisdom of using the atomic bomb, but then notable as the first perceptive forecast of the social implications of atomic energy. And it was he who more recently organized the Pugwash Conferences bringing together scientists from East and West to discuss ways of diminishing the menace of nuclear war. And in the two decades since World War II he has also been a teacher and researcher, the author a three-volume work on photosynthesis, and the crusading editor of the *Bulletin*.

Twenty years have not shaken Dr. Rabinowitch's conviction that atomic energy and the scientific revolution are the crest and wave of a great sea change in human history. The time is past, he contends, when domestic conflict arising out of scarcity and ignorance had to lead to exploitation and oppression and when, in international relations, "power politics" could decree that each nation pursue its own selfish interests by any and all means, including war. Science makes it possible to eliminate the sources of domestic conflict and science makes it necessary to overcome the anarchy of international conflict. Science, in short, has opened the way to a new universal community at the same time as it has rendered the once necessary evils of civilized society obsolete and intolerable.

Dr. Rabinowitch is quite aware, however, that the world in which we must now live is at best in transition from its "traditional" ways to codes of behavior that take adequate account of advances in science. Poverty persists, and so does indifference to human suffering, in the midst of the "atomic age," the "computer revolution," the "conquest of space" and other such wondrous novelties. Intolerance and tyranny such as were exhibited in the United States in the punishment of Dr. Oppenheimer and in the rather more extensive purges of scientists in the Soviet Union, do not escape his notice. He takes hope, however, from the signs that the "haves" are finally beginning to help the "have nots" out of motives other than unenlightened self-interest, from the increased willingness of politicians to heed the counsels of scientists, and most of all from the growing recognition (as shown in the conflicts over Korea, Suez and Cuba) that hostilities involving nuclear powers may easily escalate into a war of world annihilation.

Inevitably, perhaps, Dr. Rabinowitch's lapses occur in his analyses of the less ultimate questions that political scientists find so much more complex and difficult than the choice between total war and total peace, abundance and poverty, harmony and anarchy. Did Castro turn to the Soviets only, or even primarily, because the United States refused him economic assistance? Was the Suez invasion aborted only, or even primarily, because the Russians threatened the British and French with nuclear retaliation? Did the Russians install their missiles in Cuba and then withdraw them because of America's first-strike superiority? Can we really expect the problem of German reunification, and presumably the status of Berlin as well, to be settled by "internal developments" *after* a more general freeze of existing boundaries is arranged? The trouble with Dr. Rabinowitch's analysis of these and other such questions is not so much that his affirmative answers are wrong as that the questions themselves are too narrowly formulated to yield any convincing results.

On a broader level, one would have hoped that all these years of political analysis would have taught Dr. Rabinowitch the inadequacy of the theory of international politics with which he began and in which he persists. To say, as he does, that international relations are all a matter of "mass times velocity" (when mass means the number of people in an area, their natural resources and productive power, and velocity no less than their leadership, motives, incentives, etc.) is worse than having no theory at all, in that the desire for an overall framework is satisfied by what is in reality only a license for the free exercise of intuition. One responsibility that ought to be taken quite seriously by anyone who counsels scientists on world affairs is surely to avoid reenforcing the naive belief, still entertained by some of them, that politicians could solve all of their problems if they would only make use of the scientific method. Dr. Rabinowitch knows better, as is obvious from the humane, practical, and balanced judgment which so often graces these essays.

Sanford A. Lakoff

Harvard University

Foreign Policy Decision Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics. Edited by Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin. (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. Pp. vii, 274. $5.00.)

The International System: Theoretical Essays. Edited by Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961. Pp. 237. $5.00.)

I shall shock nobody if I begin a review of these works by noting our continued dogged pursuit of "theory" in international relations and our very limited success. Further, I am merely saying the obvious when I observe about these books—as about most others—that we are far from having a professional consensus. The Knorr-Verba collection does not aim at creating one while the Snyder-Bruck-Sapin work would like to make a contribution toward that elusive end. We ought not to embrace "new theory" merely because it is new, nor accept "traditional theory" simply because it has been with us a long time. The utility of the new consists in the improvement in our understanding, no more and no less.

"Governments", commented Theodore C. Sorensen in his own book on decision-making, citing Woodrow Wilson, "are what politicians make them . . . Government is not a body of blind forces [but] a body of men . . . not a machine but a living thing. It falls, not under the theory of the universe but under the theory of organic life. It is accountable to Darwin, not to Newton." The citation is an accurate synopsis of how Sorensen views the decision-making process: a chain of events defying the schemata of our models. Fortunately, Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, represent the opposite position. Their volume republishes unchanged the original mimeographed essay on decision-making, Herbert McClosky's penetrating critique of the effort, the Snyder-Paige case study of the decision to initiate the Korean intervention, and an article by Richard A. Brody seeking to link decision-making "theory" with Field Theory and General Systems Theory. The volume, thus, brings together several related pieces which were hitherto scattered. The editors acknowledge that many conceptual and empirical advances have taken place since the original publication (in 1954) of their scheme and they offer the piece simply as an "approach" which has aroused great interest and which can be combined with a number of other approaches. In this they are quite right. But the case study of the Korean decision, in my judgment, illustrates the limits of the approach. It served the authors as a situation against which to match their checklist of factors: competence, communication and motivation. But they did not use it to refine the list, to sort the relevant from the imagined, or to tell us something about the decision to intervene in Korea which we did not know from other sources. The case study confirms McClosky's basic comment that as an "approach" decision-making studies, as so far developed, lack "theory." The editors readily admit this and make no immodest theoretical claims. It would be well if other commentators were to refrain from treating as "theory" something which ought to be considered an important and conscientious *methodological* stance, very useful in working in a variety of theoretical camps. If, as the editors suggest, much water has by now flowed over the dam, it is high time that important methodological innovations be recognized in their own right without also making more ambitious claims for them.

Brody attempts, however, to advance a theoretical justification for the decision-making approach. His piece suffers from the apparently interchangeable use of the terms theory, conceptual scheme, model, paradigm, etc. But he suggests that General Systems Theory (tied to game theory) is the most satisfactory theoretical stance for international relations research, *provided* it can be broadened to comprehend the interaction between structured relationships at the national and international levels. Current theorizing, he claims, stresses only the higher level. He properly advances the notion of "feedback" to link the two levels and suggests decision-making as the proper *method* for the operational study of its presence or absence. Yet he also describes decision-making as a *theory*. While a method must be judged by its utility in advancing understanding "theories (of any sort) do not have to be justified on the basis of their practicality" (p. 270). If that is so why then justify decision-making "theory" as an important step in advancing world peace? (p. 272). Should not "theory" also pass the test of satisfactorily accounting for recurrent factual patterns.

Nevertheless, I agree wholeheartedly that some species of systems theory do provide the most comprehensive and interesting means for dealing with international relations. Further, the collection of essays in the Knorr-Verba volume (the hard-cover version of the special issue of *World Politics* of October 1961) represents the very best and the most sophisticated I have seen of this *genre*. Since no effort is made by the editors to force a group of perceptive and talented scholars into a single thematic framework, individual comments must be offered here. Morton Kaplan's essay is an important elaboration and refinement of his own earlier approach to system theory, one which spells out the limits implicit in this type of theorizing. Arthur Burns, with commendable courage, criticizes and all but discards his own earlier attempts to develop a rigorous theory of international relations based on pure power. Thomas Schelling offers a series of rules for experimental games and bargaining which drive him farther away from "pure" game theory. Richard Quandt argues that it is not possible, by means of gaming, to "proceed from metamodel to reality", thus confining games to the practical utility of enlarging possible outcomes and strategies.

These essays all deal with refinements and reformulations of well established paths in systems theory. George Modelski and Fred Riggs offer papers which present ambitious new systemic models of international relations based on structural-functional sociology. National policies and the international inputs they typify are central to the effort. In Modelski's case this involves two ideal types, Agraria and Industria, which are designed to contrast the pattern of international politics in the preindustrial era with the present and future in which functional specificity and universalism are widely established at the national level. Riggs is interested in very much the same thing, even though he uses three ideal types; his addition consists of a "prismatic" system, transitional between the "fused" (i.e. Agraria) and the "refracted" (i.e. Industria), but of concern to a systemic theory of international relations in which many of the actors are of the "prismatic" variety. While the language is difficult, and the rewards with respect to understanding not always commensurate with the terminological effort, both papers are laudable conceptual advances in the direction of dealing with concrete systems—still in an analytic framework—instead of resting the case at the exalted level of General Systems Theory.

The final group of papers is also concerned with the concretization of systems theory but it takes the additional step of positing historical (rather than analytic) systems and discussing the techniques appropriate for dealing with them. David Singer contributes an excellent essay on the vexing issue of identifying the level of analysis at which one operates and the logical-methodological constraints this necessitates. Sidney Verba discusses the equally vexing matter of rationality and non-rationality in the conduct of the actors one studies and suggests ways of building a decision-making model which accommodates a measure of actor irrationality. Charles McClelland writes about the nature of acute international crises, arguing that the "acuteness" of a given crisis is a function of the adequacy of the governmental and inter-governmental communications network. The actual level of tension is held to be less important than the techniques of communication in predicting the likelihood of general war. Finally, Stanley Hoffmann, in a scintillating piece dissecting international law in terms of the systems offered by historical sociology, demonstrates the explanatory and predictive power of concrete-historical systems theory while advancing some overdue novel ideas in the area of international law.

I suspect that the utility of the decision-making approach, conceived as the orderly way of studying and observing the conduct of actors so painstakingly set forth by Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, will truly come into its own when applied by scholars working in the vineyard of this more modest variety of systems theory.

Ernst B. Haas
University of California (Berkeley)

BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

Futuribles: Studies in Conjecture. EDITED BY BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL. (Geneva: Droz Geneva, 1963. Pp. xi, 322.)

The word "futuribles," Baron de Jouvenel informs us, "associates the two notions of future and possibility": a "futurible" is an event or state of affairs that is possible off in the future. And we owe this book, like so many other things that a few years ago were possible but improbable off in the future, to a Ford Foundation grant—this time, to a "small international company of social scientists" who were invited, each with respect to his speciality, to speculate about developments they deemed "probable" during the decade ending in 1970. Their "Futuribles" project, it seems, has produced to date 55 papers, of which 8 are reprinted in this initial volume of a two-volume-per-year series.

Surmising about the future, writes Baron de Jovenel in an Introduction, has in the past been a "very private, indeed occult, activity of the individual mind: spontaneous [like Spengler? one asks oneself], untrained [like Toynbee and Voegelin?] uncriticized [like Marx? like Burke?]." We should, he concludes, move forward into " 'trading' in surmises"—with a view both to improving the surmises we ourselves produce, and developing a methodology that will, hopefully, lead to still better surmises by our progeny.

There are, we see at once, two stools here, and plenty of room in between them for even a de Jouvenel to fall into: the possible off in the future is of course not the same thing as the probable off in the future; and the essays prove, upon examination, to be mainly ventures in identifying not the possible (that is, the various alternatives the future demonstrably holds in store) but the probable (that is, the alternative or alternatives the future is most likely to serve up to us). More: the authors assume the future to be by no means a "given"; it depends rather upon "our" "choices," so that the futuribles game we are invited to play easily becomes, at one extreme, a matter of forecasting the choices that are likely to be made and, at the other extreme, a matter of forgetting all about choices and merely extrapolating from present "trends." Or, as with Baron de Jouvenel's own remarkable essay, "On the Evolution of Forms of Government," a matter of really falling between the two stools, that is, forgetting about *both* the future and the choosing, and merely analyzing the present and the immediate past. The reader is less than certain, as he lays the volume down, whether or not his leg is being pulled.

The surmises, *qui est pire,* have given a wide berth to what might fairly be called the $64.00 Futurible, namely, that of the future relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Hardly without exception, the forecasts in the book would be invalidated if the Cold War were to move sharply in the direction of "victory" for either principal; the forecasters, for the rest, show in their various ways that they know that; but they see nothing for it but to assume gratuitously, here at least, that the future will merely perpetuate the *status quo* as of now. And the unavoidable result is that the future they hold out to us is flatly predicated on an uncriticized tacit major premise.

Two of the essays would seem to deserve special mention here:

First, an essay entitled "Whither Black Africa?", which is the book this writer at least has been needing in order to begin to make sense of the news dispatches from Africa. There it all is—the geography, the demography, the politics, the economics, the "problems," including the problem of Africa's relations with the outside world—laid out with a pedagogical skill that, I confidently assert, has rarely been equalled in such a treatise. I recommend it whole-heartedly to any APSR reader for whom, as for me, Africa has been hitherto a cacophony of strange and unrelated sounds. René Servoise imposes order on the cacophony, and makes it intelligible.

Second, an essay by Jacques Ellul on "Western Man in 1970." Here the "method" is unabashedly that of extrapolating into the 1960s the observed "trends" during the 1950s, so that the question becomes: What will Western Man be like in 1970 if he continues, on ever larger scale, to become during the next decade that which he seems to have been becoming during the past decade? In Ellul's hands, I must add, however, the "futurible" becomes a venture not into the future and possible but rather into the future and horrible—whose possibility the mind cannot accept without risking its sanity.—WILLMOORE KENDALL, *University of Dallas.*

The First New Nation. BY SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET. (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1963, Pp. xv, 366. $5.95.)

The American Democratic Tradition: A History.

BY ARTHUR A. EKIRCH, JR. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963. Pp. xiii, 338. $5.95 cloth; $2.50 paper.)

In *The First New Nation,* Lipset continues an interest which he has expressed in previous works in the conditions of a stable democracy. He has joined with this interest a concern for what other new nations might learn from our experience, and the experience of other democracies. His inquiry is thus both comparative and historical.

In the first and most coherent part of the book Lipset explores our passage from the traditional legitimacy basis of authority under British rule, to the legalized system of authority which developed under the Constitution. Washington (like Nkrumah), had *charisma,* and his leadership, together with his voluntary relinquishment of power, facilitated the transfer of legitimacy to the new system. Likening the Federalist party to the patron parties in Africa today which are composed of "local notables" rather than the common people, Lipset finds that the Jefferson Democratic-Republicans, in their search for a broad, popular base of power, contributed to the concept of a national citizenship and a national identity. Both parties, however, reflected the tendency of parties in power in other new nations to curtail the rights of the opposition. Gradually the government of our new nation acquired legitimacy by being "effective" in the economic sphere, where its direction and activities played a crucial role. Throughout the discussion of the emergence of the United States as a nation Lipset draws many useful comparisons with emerging nations today and sharpens his discussion with perceptive observations.

Parts two and three deal with a miscellany of topics: the American character, religion, trade unionism, a comparison of selected social values (education, wage differentials, electoral systems) in England, France, Germany, Sweden, Australia and Canada. Throughout much of this discussion Lipset articulates a kind of sociological determinism which may best be presented in his own words: "Thus the value system of a society influences the character of its institutions and these shape the character of its citizens as they grow up. The character of a society's members in turn reacts upon the character of its institutions." (p. 276). And further "the main purpose of this book is to suggest the utility of relating value orientations to structural correlates of behavior . . . " (p. 277). And on the last page, ". . . a major purpose of this book has been to demonstrate the independent explanatory power of value analysis, seen as the codification of historical experiences" (p. 348). His thesis is a qualified one, but in this work the primacy of a value orientation is emphasized.

Where values are portrayed as, in effect, antecedent causal factors, the selection of which values (among many competing values), take primacy becomes of great importance. Lipset asserts the primacy of what he calls the "equalitarian-achievement" value basis. The latter (equated with competitiveness, achievement of status, success) comes presumably from the Puritan ethic; the former is found in the political ethic of the Revolution. The choice of these particular values, as opposed to others, is presumably validated by the data which the author offers. Here I find the analysis unsatisfactory. In part my dissatisfaction proceeds from the lack of any clearly defined stated standard which makes effectively evidential the case he is arguing. What kinds of data would prove the prior existence of an equalitarian value system in a society? The observations of foreign travelers? A comparison with non-equalitarian societies of public educational systems? Of wage and income differentials? I think that in the limited areas of religion, and race, for instance, the American experience has evidenced not so much the success of the equalitarian ethic as the practical failure of inequalitarianism to sustain a consensus. "*In my judgment,*" Lipset observes, "*it was the prolonged post-Civil War Republican reign that was the major deviant case in the general American political pattern of liberal domination.*" [Italics in original, p. 329.] When the discussion of the broad "equalitarian-achievement" ethic is restricted to a few selected topics as it is here; when it is confined only to whites; and when it finds the Southern social system as well as the post Civil War Republican period of political hegemony to be deviant, then is what remains of the American experience sufficient to bear the burden of the argument? I did not find it so.

Where Lipset has sought new ways to understand and interpret the American experience Ekirch has chosen a more conventional course; to provide a brief survey of "both the idea and the practice of democracy for the entire sweep of American history." The book is intended, Ekirch asserts, "to meet the need for a history of American democracy considered in terms of social theory and ideas as well as of political practice and reality" (p. viii). He thus endeavors to interweave a history of democratic ideas with a history of democratic institutions. This brief history, however, does tend toward the extensive use of unqualified statements, where qualification would not only have avoided occasional errors in fact, but clarified interpretations. For example, in referring to state constitutional changes in the 1830's Ekirch states: "Alabama's democratic constitution was now matched by that of Mississippi, which also established universal manhood suffrage," (p. 80) when these constitutions in fact provided for "white" manhood suffrage. And later, in discussing the New Deal, he asserts, "The liberalism and democracy of the New Deal accordingly minimized individual freedom in favor of a greater social security and economic equality of the whole people" (pp. 253–254). In the redistribution of individual freedoms was the loss greater than the gain, and was economic equality the goal? In discussing the election of 1940, he suggests that Roosevelt's third term was "a possible threat to the American democratic tradition," (pp. 269–270), and further: "Anxious, however, to win election and gain the peace vote, Roosevelt and Wendell Willkie strove to outdo each other in misleading and demagogic promises to keep the nation out of war" (p. 270).

As a survey of "social theory and ideas" the book is exceedingly skimpy. For example, Thorstein Veblen and Lester Frank Ward are omitted, while William Graham Sumner rates only a few paragraphs. While the more familiar political theorists are mentioned in passing, discussion and commentary are brief. Yet as a short descriptive history of the institutional changes that have accompanied, and evidenced, the growth of American democracy it may prove a serviceable volume.—Alan P. Grimes, *Michigan State University.*

Class Structure in the Social Consciousness. By Stanislaw Ossowski. (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963. Pp. 202. $5.00.)

Much of social science literature is important less for what it says about the subject, whatever that may be, than for what it reveals about the author and his time and place. Professor Ossowski's book succeeds in being important in both these respects. His analysis of the contrasting Western and Marxian attitudes toward class is perceptive, and it could stimulate a good deal of systematic research on comparative class systems. His book is also revealing of the new vitality that characterizes certain intellectual circles in the communist bloc. Although it deals with a subject that Marxists in the past have tended to approach dogmatically, the book is without cliches, without slogans, without stereotypes, and without the Stalin-era platitudes that made much of the alleged classlessness of life in the Soviet Union and People's Democracies. In this sense the book is the social science counterpart of Fyodor Abramov's *The New Life* and Alexander Solzhenitsyn's *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovitch.*

Professor Ossowski, who holds the Chair of Sociology at Warsaw University and served as vice-president of the International Sociological Association 1959–62, maintains as his central thesis that neither the Aristotelian nor Marxian concepts of class structure enables us to fully understand the nature of modern social life. The Aristotelian theory, tri-chotomous in its commitment to the three-class structure of rich, middle, and poor, assumes that "it is not the middle class but the extreme classes that are in some sense marginal." Traditional Marxian theory, on the other hand, regards the middle class as marginal and therefore as likely to join one of the other two classes in the event of a crisis. In effect, the Aristotelian view has been taken over by the Western countries and especially the United States; Americans, notes Professor Ossowski who is obviously *au courant* with American sociology, think in terms of upper, middle, and lower largely in terms of income and status differences. Traditional Marxists speak of the capitalists, the petty bourgeoisie, and the proletariat, largely in terms of their relationships to the means of production.

But in reality, Professor Ossowski, argues, the term class no longer means what it did in the 19th century—and if I understand him correctly, he believes that the *traditional* Marxist view is less relevant to our understanding than the approach to class of W. Lloyd Warner and his colleagues. I emphasize *traditional* because Professor Ossowski does not totally reject the Marxian version of class structure; what he seeks is a blending of that version with modern concepts of social stratification. Marxists, he notes, are mistakenly inclined to regard these concepts as "a sort of mystification aimed at masking the essential class conflicts . . . (but) there is one reason why this American conception should not strike a Marxist as absurd. For this extreme, optimistic and democratic view of society, combining classlessness with the maintenance of great differences in the share in the national income, which is contained in a certain version of the American creed, is by no means alien to the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies in relation to their own societies." In other words, because the class reality in both East and West is becoming a shared reality, the contrasting and formerly sharply conflicting class theories should prepare to accommodate each other.

The author may or may not be right about this; certainly some American sociologists see more class rigidity in *both* worlds than Professor Ossowski is willing to admit. Perhaps the more interesting question is whether his book, together with other books, signifies that the cold war of the intellectuals is reaching the stage of thaw. Doubtless *Class Structure in the Social Consciousness* could not have been published in Poland during the Stalin years (it appeared there in 1957), and it would have been altogether impossible to conclude, as Professor Ossowski does, that "the scholar should not overlook, amongst the tasks awaiting him, the duty of watching out for the social consequences of habits of thought left to us by the past. I am thinking here not only of the relics of capitalist culture but . . . of the grim myth with which those who were reconciled to the existing state of affairs salved their consciences: the myth of historical necessity as revealed to those who wield power." Stalin is dead, but we, too, in the open society have our "grim myths" and to that extent Professor Ossowski is not just looking backward or writing for the benefit only of his Polish and East European colleagues.—ARNOLD A. ROGOW, *Stanford University.*

Community Power and Political Theory. BY NELSON W. POLSBY. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1963. Pp. x, 144. $5.00.)

By this book, an able political scientist and a dissertation of distinction fall victims to academic overexposure. It is Nelson Polsby's unlucky fate to be reporting on the theoretical underpinnings of the celebrated New Haven study after Robert Dahl had presented the cream of its substantive findings and after Polsby himself had summarized the essentials of its approach in four excellent journal articles. Thus, to the "community of scholars" whom he intended to be his audience, the book is not exactly news. Other readers, even scholars not working in the urban field, will find the analysis cryptic and complicated, for the author presupposes extensive familiarity with a specialized literature.

The task of the book is essentially to overturn the theory and conclusions of the stratification school of sociology especially as this analysis is applied to community power structures. This Polsby does with considerable sophistication, restraint and balance. A careful definition of terms, a respect for the scientific method, and an explicit model are his working tools. Systematically, he examines the literature from the Lynds' Middletown through Hunter's Regional City to less well known studies of Roland Pillegrin and Charles Coates (Bigtown) and Robert O. Schulze (Cibola) and documents their logical inconsistencies and empirical deficiencies. He tests the five principal assumptions of the elite theory of community governance (the essential proposition being that a monolithic elite of upper class origins rules) by New Haven data and finds them wanting and he presents again the case for "the pluralist alternative."

Although Polsby executes his assignments skillfully, he adds little to what he has said before. His best chapters are his last two when he explains how empirical analyses of social stratification are confounded by the concept of power and how a comprehensive theory of community power might be constructed. But even here, one wishes he had probed further. As sensible and attractive as the pluralistic alternative is to political scientists, it still requires further conceptualization to make it operative.

In particular, the notions of exploitation of power resources, of slack, and of power exchanges remain qualitative and susceptible to the metaphoric treatment Polsby rightly criticizes in other works. In the same way, evaluations of political success or failure are tantalizingly indefinite. With so much uncertainty built into the pluralistic model, its predictive capacity remains low, and the relationships among variables inexact. So, the characterization of power *structures* in such terms as hierarchial or pluralistic, remains categorical and simple, paralleling the typology the more sophisticated sociologists have developed.

In his last page, the author alludes to one avenue that offers promise, the correlation of typologies of community power with social, economic and cultural typologies. This route does have potential because it provides the opportunity for comparative analysis so urgently required to develop a comprehensive theory and prospects for meaningful quantification. More important, it signals all political scientists in the field that destruction of a defective approach is only the first step in serious model building. Now the task is to develop a theory that is genuinely operative for a sizeable number of American communities.

One would hope then that *Community Power and Political Theory* marks the end of the methodological dialogue between devotees of reputational and decision-oriented studies. Clearly we are wiser because the debate has taken place, and our professional lives have been stimulated by the controversy. But future progress now turns on research demonstration, not debate, and on application of the preferred hypothesis, not argument. By this and other work, Polsby has proven himself to stand close to the top of students of the field. Hopefully he will take up the challenges he has implicitly laid down.—ROBERT C. WOOD, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology.*

Passion and Social Constraint. BY ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG, in association with Ralph Ross. (New York: Stein and Day, 1963. Pp. xvi, 368. $6.95.)

The general theme of this book is a familiar one today: conflict between individuality and "passion," on the one hand, and a society and culture seemingly moving relentlessly in the direction of greater standardization, on the other. In dealing with the problem, Van Den Haag attempts nothing less than an enquiry into all the psychological, social, and political dimensions of the modern world.

He begins with the development of infants, examines the Freudian thesis of personality growth, and devotes considerable attention to the present status of the Oedipus complex in scholarly thought. Although sympathetic to many Freudian propositions, he recognizes some validity in anthropological and sociological criticisms of the Oedipus complex analysis. His discussion of the relation between sex drives and cultural-social repression gives weight to both social and psychological facets; and he is dubious about all attempts to define a "normal" person. He is particularly critical of those notions which contend that there are "sick" societies.

Having thus explored what he deems to be major aspects of personality development, he turns in Part II to Society. There he examines, sometimes with an appealing humor, such standard topics as the nature of the group, conflict, co-operation, and rivalry. The political scientist will be particularly interested in his chapter (X) on "Leadership, Authority, and Power." Within the space of a relatively few pages, he suggests the ways in which authority can generate power and the equally decisive tendencies for possessors of power to seek legitimacy. Other sections treat of class and caste and the relation of democracy to elites. A relatively large space is devoted to problems illustrated by the Supreme Court's desegregation decision. Distinguishing between the prohibition of compulsory segregation and the principle of compulsory congregation, he suggests that the Court in effect curtailed "freedom of dissociation."

There follows a third part of the book devoted to "popular culture," in which Van Den Haag re-examines many familiar themes—the lonely crowd, the relation of high to folk and popular culture, and the corruption which allegedly sets in with industrialization and the exaltation of mass culture and purchasing power. Although he deals with many of the issues of alienation, he mercifully refrains from employing that overworked term.

In Part IV, there is a good discussion of the objectives and limitations of science. Here, as elsewhere, the author approaches his subject critically and does not hesitate to say where he stands. In general, science is held to be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for social understanding and control. "Only science can make *testable* predictions," he points out, "and thus prove scientific theories. But, if it is correct to say that only what is true can be proved to be so, it does not follow that only what is proved, or provable, can be true. Demonstration and truth are not the same." (p. 351). While he concedes that science cannot establish the "truth" of first-order values, he holds that there is a "truth" in morality and aesthetics: ethical and aesthetic judgments are not merely matters of taste.

The aphoristic nature of many of Van Den Haag's statements does not permit adequate qualification and hence one unfortunately often gains the impression of a dogma handed down from on high. Moreover, some of his propositions are merely half-truths or highly questionable at best. He seems to weight the scales very heavily against popular culture, for example, and in favor of so-called high culture. Some, including this reviewer, will not be satisfied with his definition of democracy and with the implications he reads into it ("since democracy is a form of government, it involves leaders and led by definition"). Although some of his comments on the plurality of elites in the United States are well-taken, he goes too far in dismissing the late C. Wright Mills' contention that there is in some sense a "power elite." And he appears to hold, contrary to the evidence, that there has been a substantial shift of income distribution in favor of lower categories during the past generation. In general, he is far too complacent about the way in which economic power is allocated.

One might also point out that such statements as "political science was refounded in the Renaissance" (p. 340) are, however widely they may be accepted, very dubious. Van Den Haag has a penchant for the flat assertion; and although this often makes for interesting reading, accuracy is sometimes sacrificed in the process.

On the whole, while the book says nothing that is basically new (and how many books do?), many will find it a useful and certainly a gracefully written essay that helps us see some of the problems of social analysis a bit more clearly and without the unduly complex jargon which so often accompanies such treatments.—MULFORD Q. SIBLEY, *University of Minnesota.*

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3. Tokyo University of Education
4. University of Chicago
5. Brown University
6. Harvard University
7. Stanford University
8. University of Oregon
9. University of Missouri
10. University of Maryland
11. Michigan State University
12. Massachusetts Institute of Technology
13. University of Michigan
14. University of Cambridge, England
15. University of Kentucky
16. Rutgers University
17. University of Wisconsin
18. University of Illinois
19. University of California Medical School, San Francisco
20. University of California, Riverside
21. Brooklyn College
22. University of Colorado
23. Ohio State University
25. University of California, Berkeley
26. Princeton University
27. Louisiana State University
28. Naval Medical Research Institute, Bethesda, Maryland
29. University of Missouri, Kansas City
30. United States Military Academy
31. New York University
32. Kansas State University
33. Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa
35. Cornell University
36. University of Southern California
37. Case Institute of Technology
38. Tulane University
39. Colorado State University
40. University of Nebraska
41. State University of New York at Buffalo
42. Boston University
43. Northwestern University
44. Scottish College of Commerce, Glasgow
45. University of North Dakota

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

City Politics. By EDWARD C. BANFIELD AND JAMES Q. WILSON. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press and the M.I.T. Press, 1963. Pp. 362. $6.95.)

Almost eight years have elapsed since Norton Long accused political scientists of losing sight of the important issues in local government and politics[1] and since Lawrence Herson's review of textbooks on municipal government[2] provided a bill of particulars and specifications independently buttressing the indictment. Since then, a substantial body of research less vulnerable to the changes has appeared. Nevertheless, not much of it has made its way substantively into the textbooks, even though many of the more recent ones have acknowledged the new perspectives and data; most contemporary textbook treatments of municipal politics have not been notably different from their predecessors. This new book, however, by Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, both of Harvard, *is* a departure from the traditional treatise, *really* makes use of the latest materials, and actually *does* take a large and long-awaited step toward revitalizing an exciting and important but inexcusably weak area of political science. It unquestionably stands as a significant contribution to the field.

The reason for its achievement is relatively simply stated: its underlying premise is that the governing of cities in America is a political process, and that politics permeates every aspect of municipal governmental decision-making and activity. Whereas traditional textbooks almost uniformly confined their discussions of politics to descriptions of parties and elections (and even then emphasized legal forms and procedures rather than the struggle between different interests over public policies), Banfield and Wilson see city government as an arena in which differences among various elements of the community are brought to a head and resolved. For Banfield and Wilson, a major function of government is "managing conflict in matters of public importance," and politics is everywhere in the system; they are thus led into analysis of cleavages and attachments in the populations of cities, the tensions between tendencies toward fragmentation and modes of centralizing influence, the range of political forms and styles, and the roles and strategies of classes of participants in the political process. City government is portrayed in relation to the whole urban setting, not, as is so often the case, in isolation from it, and the portrait is for me dramatic and convincing.

Wisely, the authors strive for selectivity rather than for an unattainable comprehensiveness; they concentrate on what they regard as strategic factors rather than reaching for total inclusiveness. For this reason, however, there are some disappointing omissions. For example, the list of questions on which they hope to shed light is extensive (p. 18), but it does not include any inquiries about the process of appointment to public office. The city manager gets rather full treatment in a separate chapter devoted to the council-manager form, but the elected mayor gets little systematic examination. Politics is defined in part as a game (p. 22)—that is, as "play carried on under rules"—but the rules of play and the strategic manipulation of the rules are presented in somewhat sketchy and scattered form. The roles of courts and judges in city politics are virtually ignored. In the light of what the authors *have* accomplished, it is perhaps carping to complain that they should have done more; all the same, I cannot help regretting that important facets of municipal government are not explicitly examined.

To admire and applaud this book, as I certainly do, is not necessarily to agree with its main thesis, with which in fact I quarrel. Throughout, it "emphasizes the fundamental cleavage between the public-regarding, Anglo-Saxon Protestant, middle-class ethos and the private-regarding, lower-class, immigrant ethos" (p. 329). To be public-regarding is "to favor proposals for metropolitan reorganization, regional planning, fluoridation of water supplies, city manager government, and the like" (p. 236). In taking this position, the authors discard the tough-minded, realistic framework of analysis they employ for the most part and substitute a peculiar, rather misleading, excessively simple dichotomy. Is metropolitan reorganization an altruistic plan or, as Morton Grodzins[3] has argued, a strategy for overwhelming the voting strength of Negro concentrations in core cities by swamping them with white votes in suburbs from which the Negroes are systematically excluded? Is city manager government simply a commitment to efficiency and honesty, or a design to prevent the office of the chief executive from falling into the hands of an elected tribune of the people? Is fluoridation of water intended to raise the level of public health, or merely to reduce the dental bills of those who can afford dental care, even at some risk to the health of those endangered by the use of this chemical? If, as the authors themselves observe (p. 165), nonpartisan elections tend to strengthen and reinforce the dominance of a particular class, is nonpartisanship actually a technique of protecting the privileges of those in power but unable to command majority support? If, as alleged (p. 36), upper-income groups favor a high level of public expenditures, is it because they are generous and considerate or because they know that desperate and unhappy people may resort to desperate measures, and the rich would rather mollify them than hazard the total loss of their own advantages? In other words, are those measures designated "public-regarding" by Banfield and Wilson *really* manifestations of selfless fellow feeling or are they the self-serving policies of a particular group in society that is trying to hold on to what it has?

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[1] "Aristotle and The Study of Local Government," *Social Forces*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Autumn, 1957), pp. 287–310.

[2] "The Lost World of Municipal Government," THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol. 51, No. 2 (June, 1957), pp. 330–45.

[3] *The Metropolitan Area as a Racial Problem* (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958).

The latter interpretation is no less plausible, and not obviously less accurate, than the former. In most cases, governmental and political changes benefit some people and disadvantage others, and no one can blame people for defending their interests. But the analysis of politics is clouded and confused if it is cast in terms of "good guys" versus "bad guys" because it discourages full investigation of the impact of alternative programs and patterns of organization on the relative positions of all the participants in the governmental process. For my part, I should like students of city politics to consider the possibility that even the best-intentioned proposals do not distribute benefits equally on all, and not to assume *a priori* that what is good for the middle classes is good for everyone. I think the outlook of this book does not promote such discussion, and it will fall to the teachers who adopt the book to provide the appropriate balance.

Fortunately, since Banfield and Wilson state their preferences clearly, and qualify their arguments with the comment that no one really knows whether the benefits claimed for "good government" reforms actually accompany such reforms (pp. 340–41), it is not difficult to establish what I regard as a desirable objectivity. Moreover, since their observations and data capture effectively most of the flavor of urban politics, the book tends to supply its own corrective. Thus, even those who disagree with its central argument will use it and assign it with great profit. And this, after all, is the real measure of its worth.—HERBERT KAUFMAN, *Yale University.*

When Governors Convene: The Governors' Conference and National Politics. BY GLENN E. BROOKS. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1961 Pp. x, 186. $4.50.)

In the growing literature on the actual operation of the intricate American system of cooperative federalism, little systematic attention has been paid to the changing roles of the state governors or to the contributions of their Governors' Conference. This book attempts, in an introductory and summary fashion, to fill that gap. It traces the development in this century of the Governors' Conference from an institution consisting of an annual meeting exclusively and ineffectually concerned with intrastate affairs to one wherein a large, professional staff serves a permanent organization whose annual meetings are only one manifestation of its lively concern for national and even international, as well as, intrastate affairs. It also describes the extent to which the annual meetings have become partisan political exercises, especially when one or more governors is a prominent and/or skillful presidential aspirant.

A serious weakness in this book is its unsatisfactory treatment of the fundamental issue of political influence. How influential is the Governors' Conference in national policy-making? How influential are individual governors? Questions of this kind are raised from time to time but are not adequately dealt with. The author declares, for example, that "In Congress, the governors have attempted to influence national policy primarily through formal proceedings—the use of resolutions and testimony before congressional committees. In the executive branch, the influence has been more subtle and personal, but it has nevertheless created a steady pressure on the national government." (p. 88) These two sentences—and especially the word "nevertheless"—cast doubt upon the author's entire conception of how political influence is exercised. It is extremely doubtful that the governors' influence in Congress—whatever it may be—is exercised "primarily through formal proceedings." A much more likely hypothesis is that it is exercised primarily through *informal* contacts between governors and members of Congress. Formal resolutions and testimony before committees have much less impact on Congress than phone calls or visits from governors or other prominent political leaders from one's own state. Similar observations apply to attempts to influence the President or executive branch.

Measuring influence is admittedly a difficult and ultimately impossible task. But this study relies for its assessments merely on the opinions of journalists, the often diverging opinions of governors, a random assortment of views expressed by staff personnel of the Governors' Conference and the Council of State Governments, and the author's own hunches. Nowhere is there any evidence that he interviewed or otherwise sought the opinions of those who were allegedly being influenced by the governors. The result is that a careful reader has no way of knowing whether the unquestionably enlarged range of gubernatorial activities on national questions in the last generation has really had much impact on national policy. The "1313" enthusiasts would doubtless have us believe so, but one wonders. And doubt is only increased by such sentences as the following: "Individual governors have maintained close liaison with Washington in the development of effective state civil defense programs." (p. 71) Anyone who is even vaguely familiar with the condition of civil defense programs in this country must have his suspicions aroused by such a claim.

Mr. Brooks has written a decent introduction to the wide-ranging activities and impressive staffing available to modern American governors. It remains to be shown how important a role the governors and their Conference play in the actual formulation of national policy affecting the states.—WILLIAM P. GERBERDING, *University of California* (*Los Angeles*).

Legislative Partisanship: The Deviant Case of California. BY WILLIAM BUCHANAN. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963. Pp. 167. $3.50.)

Study of the state legislative process no longer is a new venture. Numerous instructive studies of individual legislatures have been published in the last decade. Among the very best—ranking with *Legislative Politics in Illinois* by Steiner and Gove—is Professor William Buchanan's systematic study of the California legislature.

This study, which centers on the lower house, covers three more or less distinctive eras: the emergence of legislative partisanship in the 1930's, the consolidation of nonpartisanship in the 1940's and early 1950's, and the stirrings of party in the late 1950's following Governor Brown's election. In general, the author seeks to show how the legislature went about its job at times in which the legislative parties performed the usual functions of parties (selecting leaders, organizing committees, scheduling legislation, and making policy decisions) and at times in which party spirit and objectives were scarcely distinguishable and "party" functions were up for grabs. Data from interviews with some 100 lawmakers, roll-call analysis of controversial votes in the 1957 and 1959 sessions, legislative publications, and newspaper accounts provide the principal support for the author's generalizations. Certain of the conceptual tools which first appeared in *The Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior* (by Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson) are used, here and there with modifications, to great advantage.

Over much of its history since the governorship of Hiram Johnson, the California legislature has had an immoderate attachment to nonpartisanship. When nonpartisanship has reigned the legislature has been characterized by: (1) the development of factions internal to the legislature, with no clear lines extending into the electorate and with virtually no programmatic commitments; (2) the choice of legislative leaders by a bifactional coalition, spliced together by the candidate for the speakership most adroit in swapping committee chairmanships or other favors for votes; (3) the steady intrusion of the minority party in the selection of the speaker, further eroding the link between the house leadership and the majority party contingent; (4) the preëminent position of certain lobbies (e.g., oil, alcohol, horse racing, tobacco) some of which, notably the liquor lobby in the 1940's, carried on functions outside the legislature ordinarily assumed by parties; (5) the inability of the legislative leadership to exercise "systematic power," which would permit it to deal effectively with novel or unexpected developments; (6) the critical part played by committees—centers of power tied haphazardly to the majority party, sometimes even chaired by minority party members who had been successful in divining and joining the winning speakership coalition; (7) the formation of literally hundreds of transient alliances to pass legislation, brought together by lobby groups for exceptionally privatized purposes; (8) the struggle to develop linkages with the rest of the political system; and (9) the persistence of an ambiguous, unpredictable process, one difficult to fathom by even the most attentive sectors of the California public.

The massive nonpartisanship of the 1940's and early 1950's has not been easy to overcome, though party counts for significantly more today than it did then. Neither in the level of party voting nor in the extent of inter-party conflict is the California legislature comparable to the legislatures of most other urban, industrial states. Professor Buchanan's roll-call analysis shows that, over the years, party unity has been highest on issues of party "maintenance" (legislation involving election law, party organization, responsibility for administration, and so on) which often have had but minimal impact upon the public at large. Programmatic issues which separate the two parties on the national level have come more and more to distinguish the legislative parties since Governor Brown's election, though the parties' cohesion remains low and many legislators continue to perceive the parties as unimportant in the legislative process. In 1962, certain Assembly committee chairmanships were still held by members of the minority party.

This study suggests that the weakness of legislative parties was not critical to the legislature's performance. The legislature was not immobilized. By and large, it was able to operate reasonably well without parties, though it was unable to develop coherent programs. Functions ordinarily performed by legislative parties were carried out by the speaker or by the assembly as a whole. An important question, however, is whether the public can discharge its functions satisfactorily under these conditions. In the author's judgment, factional domination of the legislature made it extraordinarily difficult for the public to understand the process and to appraise the record of its representatives. Isolated abuses of power led to public criticism of the institution as a whole. Whether this dilemma will be eased—the legislative process made more comprehensible, predictable, and responsible—by the current revival of parties remains to be investigated. Subsequent inquiries might profitably take Professor Buchanan's study as a model.—WILLIAM J. KEEFE, *Chatham College.*

Political Activities of the Public Service: A Continuing Problem. BY PAMELA S. FORD. (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of Governmental Studies, 1963. Pp. 142. $2.50.)

In this work Miss Ford points to the need for a re-examination of federal and state regulations restricting political activities of public servants, except those dealing with employee organizations. Although there is lack of a conclusive statement to this effect, she implies that current inadequacies are due to a lack of a scientifically derived definition of what is "proper" political activity. She appropriately notes that there are ideological and practical obstacles which contaminate the search for the best program, noting that the chief problem is that such control "touches and at the same time falls between a number of stools, including individual constitutional rights, the public interest, ethics, efficient administration, and common sense."

In her analysis of the Hatch Act, the author emphasizes problems encountered in interpreting and applying the Act. Analysis of state and local regulations is approached by explaining the California system and briefly comparing it with practices in other states. The California system gets the blue ribbon because of the "viability of the merit system, composition of the state personnel board, and its mode of operation." This merely represents the author's evaluation of the procedural virtues of the system. These virtues have led to programmatic success with emphasis on political freedom for public servants. Her discussion indicates that these major improvements were effected during the administration of former Governor Earl Warren, who pledged to modernize the system during his campaign. One could conclude that public concern, which helped make the problem a heated campaign issue, has, in turn, helped the program succeed.

Next the author investigates the British program, not because she believes we should duplicate it but because it might offer "clues to the solution of a common problem." Yet she concludes that the British system has succeeded because it maximizes employees' political rights. In effect she accepts the British system for the same reason she favors the California program. Summarizing her concrete statements and implications, one could conclude that: first of all, we need to recognize and discuss the problem; secondly, an exhaustive analysis of the dilemma would probably point to liberalizing political rights as a solution and, thirdly, the soundness of this solution is shown by the success of the English and California programs.

While this work lacks thorough analysis at times, this weakness is overshadowed by some very distinct strong points. One can hardly argue with its issue-posing purpose. The author goes to great lengths to articulate the questions which need answering. The work is extremely well documented, containing abundant references in footnotes and bibliographical citations. There is also a superb digest of current federal regulations and their corresponding application to California agencies which utilize federal funds. This is an invaluable source of data for instructors, study groups, and students of personnel administration who need this information quickly.—WILLIAM L. MORROW, *DePauw University.*

Congressmen and Their Constituencies. BY LEWIS A. FROMAN, JR. (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co. 1963. Pp. xv, 127. $2.35, paper; $4.75, cloth.)

With the aid of the *Congressional Quarterly* and the *Congressional District Data Book* one can test a number of hypotheses about the constituency relations of the House of Representatives. Voting turnout in 1958 and 1960, the relative liberalism of Senate and House in 1961, the positions of individual Congressmen on the CQ indices in 1961, and variations of a district's position on reciprocal trade (1948–1958), may be related to characteristics of the districts. Among these characteristics are the partisan leanings of the district, continuity or variation in incumbency, per cent non-white, per cent urban, owner occupancy of dwelling units, and population density.

Froman presents most of these cross-tabulations, relates them to published statistical studies of the subject, and connects the findings with a series of generalizations. If this were done successfully, it would contribute to our understanding of Congress, albeit at some remove from the actual transactions of the House and from the thoughts and motives of Congressmen. Unfortunately, the attempt is not quite successful, because the times series considered for most of the tests are very short, and because statistical controls are not used effectively.

The lack of long time series leads to interpretations in terms of general explanatory factors, where more specific ones might be necessary. For example, Froman gives one explanation of why the Senate is more "liberal" than the House in terms of the bias of districting along urban-rural lines. If, a decade or two earlier, the Senate had not in fact been more liberal, then more temporary explanatory factors would have been necessary. Again, in relating party voting to closeness of election, he proposes an ingenious explanation for differential party effects in terms of intra-party variation among incumbents' votes. Such an explanation would not be appropriate if the relation had not existed, say, under Eisenhower. An important task of the researcher is to establish the conditions under which his generalizations hold.

A major gap in the methods Froman uses is insufficient use of quantitative and multivariate techniques. Aggregate data lend themselves well to correlation and regression techniques, yet Froman repeatedly converts quantitative variables into trichotomies (e.g., per cent non-white) or dichotomies (per cent Democratic). This not only throws away information, but also makes it harder for the reader to judge whether the regression slope is above or below unity (e.g., between per cent non-white and turnout).

The simplest multivariate technique that is lacking is the control of one variable while the relation between two others is examined. Per cent non-white should have been controlled while urbanization was related to turnout (p. 27); urbanization, when turnout was related to region (p. 34); district characteristics, when Senate and House were compared on liberalism (pp. 80ff.); and ruralism, when district competitiveness was related to partisan support (p. 120). In the absence of such controls, the interpretations are weak.

Chapters 7 and 8 are among the best in the book; both appeared previously in journals. Other materials in the book might have been made into good articles as well. Possibly Chapter 5, an analysis of turnout and the results of the 1962 elections, would have appeared sooner as an article; a parallel analysis by Angus Campbell was published in the October 8, 1962, *New Republic*, but is not referred to in this book. The loose structure of the book also suggests that it need not have all been published at once. Had the author submitted a series of articles instead, the better editing and selection would have benefited the reader.—DUNCAN MACRAE, JR., *University of Chicago*.

Piety and Politics: American Protestantism in the World Arena. BY ALAN F. GEYER. (Richmond, Va.: John Knox Press, 1963. Pp. 173. Paperback, $2.75.)

The author of this little book has set for himself three formidable tasks. The first is to "identify patterns of religious influence upon American action between 1898 and 1960, focussing on Protestantism." The second (around which the book is organized) is to devise a useful typology into which to sort these patterns of influence. The third is to present it all in a way which is meaningful both to churchman and social scientist, building "some conceptual bridges between religion and politics for both churchmen and scholars." He is uniquely suited for the latter task, for he is both a professor of Political Science (at Mary Baldwin College), and an ordained Methodist minister.

Conflict and loyalty comprise the organizing principles of Geyer's typology of the functions of Protestantism in America's foreign policy. He isolates six types. Religion can function as (1) a transcendent *source of loyalty*, competing with nationalism and other secular religions; (2) a *sanction for political loyalty* (read "loyalty to the nation-state"), exemplified in one side of the dualistic Puritan attitude toward the state; (3) a *sanction for political conflict*, as in zealous clerical support of the first World War; (4) a *source of political conflict*, generating conflict between the religious and political communities; (5) a *sanctuary from political conflict*, represented by pacifism (rejection of violence), isolationism (rejection of foreign policy) and privatization (rejection of politics); and (6) a *reconciler of political conflict*, especially evident in some of the work of the World Council of Churches. A chapter is devoted to each type.

In order to understand religious influence, one must, of course, range far beyond the deeds and statements of ecclesiastics. Accordingly, Geyer treats such topics as religion and the American character, the impact of Protestant missions on revolutionary ferment in emerging nations, and Puritan strains in the style and deeds of statesmen. In so doing, he confronts the dilemma of the social scientist: whether to focus on the significant (no matter how speculative) or the measurable (no matter how trivial). Geyer opts for the former, and inevitably evokes many questions, even from trans-empiricists. Was it the Puritan ethos which made Woodrow Wilson rigid in the face of the Lodge reservations, or was it his illness? When Secretary of State Dulles, in his first press conference, called for "competence, discipline and positive loyalty," should the credit line read John Calvin or Joe McCarthy? The problem is particularly acute if, as Geyer holds, "the emotional style of the Puritan ethos remains more vital than the ethical substance of it," and if "millions of Americans are religious in their profession of faith and secular in their operational values." (The latter concepts, by the way, are not really integrated into the typology.)

The typology itself is an intriguing one, especially when compared with H. Richard Niebuhr's *Christ and Culture.* Any typology invites carping criticism, of course, and it is unfortunate that Geyer does not go to pains to sharpen the distinctions among the various types, or to show how they interact. How, for instance, shall we classify a group of ministers who go to Washington to lobby for unilateral disarmament? On the one hand, they are contesting for a policy (Type 4); but they may also be expressing a transcendent loyalty (1), escapism (5), or reconciliation (6), or a combination of these. Types 1, 4 and 6 are inevitably related to one another, as are Types 2, 3, and 4. In fact, Type 4 is more of a vehicle through which any of the other types might express themselves, and might better be made a basic premise of the entire typology than a separate type. In any case, inter-relationships are left for the reader to work out for himself.

If the typology (or its explication) is not perfect, and if some of the material distracts from, rather than clarifying, the typology, the book is nonetheless worth the while of any person seriously interested in the political sociology of religion. The first chapter, and the last two, are particularly well done. One finds throughout a wealth of information and interpretation, based on contact with an extraordinary range of sources, and cast in graceful rhetoric. All in all, it is of value to the scholar, and of great value to the professional churchman.—GORDON L. SHULL, *The College of Wooster.*

The Atomic Age, Scientists in National and World Affairs. EDITED BY MORTON GRODZINS AND EUGENE RABINOWITCH. (New York and London: Basic Books, Inc., 1963. Pp. xviii, 616. $10.00.)

Scientists and National Policy Making. Edited by ROBERT GILPIN AND CHRISTOPHER WRIGHT. (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1964. Pp. viii, 307. $7.50.)

America's New Policy Makers: The Scientists' Rise to Power. BY DONALD W. COX. (Philadelphia and New York: Chilton Books, 1964. Pp. xiv, 298. $6.95.)

During the 1930s social scientists entered policy-making, becoming prominent, with some irony, in a report on the cost of medical care requested by President Hoover. In the 1940s and 1950s the physical scientists and the engineers were prominent for their work in atomic, aeronautics, and space developments, all of which had both military and civil uses. The 1960s and 1970s should see the biological scientists as the most influential experts because discoveries in molecular biology may have public consequences as startling as those of nuclear energy, aeronautics, and space. Scientists, both natural and social, are well established in American government, certainly in the Executive branch. Now, some think, they have become the most influential force in national policy.

Natural scientists began to act politically before political scientists began to describe the drastic change in government brought by the new influence of scientists.

The *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* was first published in December, 1945, only six months after the first explosion at Alamogordo. "One purpose," say Eugene Rabinowitch and Morton Grodzins in their introduction to *The Atomic Age,* "was to make fellow scientists aware of the new relationships between their own world of science and the world of national and international politics." The other purpose was to "help the public understand" what nuclear energy in war would mean. "It was anticipated that the atom bomb would be only the first of many dangerous presents from Pandora's box of modern science."

Mr. Rabinowitch, a bio-chemist at the University of Illinois, is founder and editor of the *Bulletin.* The late Professor Grodzins was a political scientist at the University of Chicago and a director and editor of the *Bulletin.* They collected in *The Atomic Age* the foremost articles and documents from the *Bulletin* to recount the years of triumph and anguish.

The book opens with Albert Einstein's letter to President Roosevelt, August 2, 1939, drafted by Leo Szilard and delivered by Alexander Sachs, a business economist, because only Einstein's name was considered strong enough to get presidential attention and no scientist felt that he could get an appointment with the President. That is how it began. "Some recent work . . . leads me to expect that the element uranium may be turned into a new and important source of energy in the immediate future."

From this beginning the book recalls the argument over whether to use the bomb on a city, then the failure to get international control after it was used and the argument by some that world government had to be the answer. Next the articles stress the danger to the world and the possible protection in arms control or shelters. Espionage, loyalty, and security are included as elements of the era of peril. Finally the book closes with some articles of hope for international cooperation.

"The documents and articles collected in this volume represent scientists dealing directly with political issues." Here were the natural scientists tackling the new age. They acted as advisors, politicians, experts, and propagandists and did so very well, no matter how discouraged they sound at times in memory. Except for Morton Grodzins, no political scientist is represented among the distinguished list of authors.

Not that the natural scientists, as collected here, did a poorer job by themselves; for they show up well in their grasp of public issues. The scientists who wrote these articles were neither hand-wringers nor cynics. That baneful type who does extensive social research in *Time* and *Reader's Digest* then produces rounded plans for instant world government does not appear in these pages. The editors, the writers, and the nation can be proud of scientists, as they are represented in this book.

One interesting fact shows through all the pages. These scientists are, with one or two exceptions, working scientists. They are not men who were once scientists but who have become political executives in the administration of scientific activities. Any discussion would be helped by some clearing up of this distinction. Often now we call a man a scientist when he long ago left research and entered politics. These working scientists not only were concerned with policy; they were free to write about it. Writing about public policy, they made it respectable for all men of science to talk about morality and politics as well as about their technical findings.

A few political scientists have been trying to define the change in government brought by accelerating change in science and technology. It is not easy to define. Most of the talk so far has been theory based on experience and observation. Some hard research is underway in a few places, but the results are not yet clear.

By far the best comment yet published is *Scientists and National Policy Making*, a collection of papers by scholars who were brought together by the Columbia University Council for Atomic Age Studies. The authors are Robert Gilpin, Don K. Price, Robert C. Wood, Harvey Brooks, Wallace S. Sayre, Robert N. Kreidler, Warner R. Schilling, Albert Wohlstetter, Bernard Brodie, and Christopher Wright. There is not a weak or a dull paper in the book.

Considering ten uniformly good essays a reviewer cannot mention each author's points. Some of the main conclusions follow. They are made either by the authors, or the reviewer derives them from a reading of the essays.

The new intermingling of government, industry, and universities, due to the contract relations of research and development, creates a new form of government in the United States. A new theory will have to explain the limits of the state, if they can be found. Contractors are agents of the state.

Conventional notions of bureaucracy become more irrelevant than ever in the American system. Our bureaucracy is one of dispersed centers of power and negotiation of compromises. It is so fluid that one can never assume that the most influential members are in a government agency, in a business firm that works for government, or in a university that does research for government.

Contracts also diminish the hostility of private business to federal spending, and State officials and members of Congress become competitors for federal money instead of opponents of spending.

Within the new kind of bureaucracy the politically influential scientist-politicians (estimates of their number range from 200 to 1,000) become the initiators of issues and the central powers over decision.

Such broad statements would be ridiculous if we were dealing with a small part of government. We are not. Research and development alone now take more money than the whole federal budget took before Pearl Harbor. Other striking statistics can be exhibited to make the point that science is a very big part of the public enterprise.

Indeed political philosophers of the future may have to agree with one of the authors in this book, Robert C. Wood, that the responsibility of the modern state has gone beyond the legal provision of order and justice to the survival of a system in technological change. "What a political system cannot ignore . . . is the quality of the scientific enterprise. . . ."

One danger for the future is derived from these essays. The present advisers, and presumably all members of the politically influential group, tend to be self-perpetuating. Men recommend or appoint successors whom they know and trust. Men reappear in other parts of the system. This has meant that the physical scientists, the engineers, and the scientist-administrators from physical sciences and engineering still hold the most influence. In a time when the biological sciences are making the discoveries that will make the great public issues of the future, lag in the culture of science and technology can mean that we will be as surprised by a technology of controlled biology as we were surprised by the technology of nuclear fission twenty years ago.

The Atomic Age brings back the noble effort of natural scientists to assume civic responsibility, and a good job they did. *Scientists and National Policy Making* presents the best discussion so far by thoughtful men about the new American system created by the arrival of science and technology in its present importance.

It is difficult to write an insignificant book about the new place of scientists in government, but Donald W. Cox has done it. Reading his *America's New Policy Makers* is like seeing the Rocky Mountains from a jet plane. He skips in short chapters over most of the main topics that have ever been raised by others in more serious discourse. His treatment is breathless, sometimes in imitation Timestyle, and one gets the feeling that he used everything that he had in a very large file of clippings but not much else. His content has almost no relation to the title. Dr. Cox is described as "a noted free-lance lecturer" who has written a half dozen books on space science and who handled the first travelling space science exhibit in schools and colleges. This book is one of the six. For one who has read nothing else about the subject, this book might be an introduction. But don't stop with it.—JAMES L. MCCAMY, *University of Wisconsin.*

Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American Temperance Movement. BY JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1963. Pp. 188. $5.00.)

It is a truism that every political conflict contains elements of symbol and instrument. In this terse book the author attempts to extend the truism and to establish the symbolic meaning, or status implications, of political action as a category susceptible to separate analysis. He has argued that prohibition and temperance have not operated simply as symbolic *and* instrumental, but as "symbolic *rather than* instrumental goals in American politics." [Emphasis added.] The case of prohibition illustrates his general thesis that movements of moral reform are not "easily understood by sociological models of economic class conflict. The division of the political spectrum into an economic right and left, middle class and working class, conservative and liberal, has little relevance for high issues of race relations, civil liberties, or moral standards."

Substantially, he contends that the old, Protestant Americans, giving up on assimilative (evangelical) reform, launched the campaign for coercive reform (legislation) in order to assert their dominance over the newcomers—the Catholic and Jewish immigrants—to whom alcohol was not abhorrent. In the same way, he contends that the Progressive movement represented an attempt on the part of groups in society which felt themselves slipping to assert their dominance over the corporate businessman, the machine politician, and the newly rich. The political victories won by reformers were again largely symbolic. To bring matters down to date, Professor Gusfield tells us that "the current school desegregation struggle is symbolic rather than instrumental." One might agree that "to miss the symbolic goal of the token is to miss the crucial quality of it," and still believe that it is a mistake to think that token integration can or will satisfy the demand for equality.

There are other difficulties. Only subjective knowledge ordinarily inaccessible to the researcher could establish whether "the agitation and struggle of the temperance adherents [really] has been directed toward the establishment of their norms as marks of social and political superiority," or whether they simply wanted to curb the evils of drink.

Even so, it remains reasonably clear that at some time in American life a stigma was attached to drinking. Looking back, we may now see that the apex of the temperance movement coincided with a status crisis for American Protestants. Looking back, we may see the achievement of national prohibition was the beginning of the end for the capacity of fundamentalist Protestants to set the style of American life—to decide what's in and what's out and enforce it.

The book is not persuasive on the critical argument that a shift in prohibitionists' goals from attempted conversion to outlawing liquor signified that the movement had become concerned with status rather than the achievement of prohibition. In the first place, it is doubtful that such a shift in tactics took place. From first to last temperance propagandists argued that abstinence was good for you—socially, morally, physically, economically; at least after 1838 prohibitionist legislation was a consistent plank in the program. In the second place, there is little in the book to demonstrate that the real issue for the participants was one of status.

The author's thesis might reasonably be restated to assert that, in addition to some other factors, status panic focused on prohibition about the time of World War I evoked an unusual amount of political activity from the old American types who felt themselves threatened. They used propaganda techniques, modern political organization, and the food saving measures made necessary by war as devices to put over a national prohibition law. In so doing, they reached a high point of legal control over the habits of the American people, and at the same time their decline began.

This would be about as far as one can go with the present instruments of social science in paying homage to the insight that status politics occurs when "its tangible, instrumental consequences are subordinated to its significance for the conferral of prestige." Professor Gusfield treats a very broad topic on a narrow canvas; his thesis has implications for analysis of the popular movements of the day—from civil rights to the far right. He calls attention to the symbolic significance of governmental action and politics. He does not assist us very much in separating the instrument from the symbol.—PAUL TILLETT, *Rutgers, The State University.*

A Data Processing System for State and Local Governments. BY EDWARD F. R. HEARLE AND RAYMOND J. MASON. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963. Pp. 147. $4.95.)

This is not a how-to-do-it book but a proposal and argument for the establishment of a centralized data bank for state and local governments. Hearle and Mason argue that much of the information now collected by various state and local agencies duplicates that already in the files of another agency. As computers have the capability of storing and retrieving millions of bits of information, they argue that it would be much more economical to centralize information files. Each agency would contribute its data file together with whatever restrictions it wished to place on its use. Whenever it needed information of any sort, it would request it from the Unified Information System; such requests could be filled, the authors estimate, within 3 minutes when necessary. Only when the Information System lacked the data requested, would an agency be forced to collect it from original sources. Thus each agency would have the benefit of most of the information in the files of other agencies. Much duplication of effort would be eliminated. The costs of the system according to the authors would be less than than 2% of the total expenditures for a small state like New Hampshire and only .23% for a large state like California.

In many ways, the book reads like a chapter of a Jules Verne novel. Should such centralized information systems be established, they would make many governmental activites more efficient; they would also promise enormous benefits to social and political researchers even if much data were restricted. On the other hand, the proposal also reminds one of George Orwell's *1984*. Although the authors argue that no information not already in government hands would be collected through this system, much information that the police, for instance, do not now have available would be made accessible to them. Even if restrictions were initially placed on the data, few political safeguards could be erected to insure the continuance of such restrictions, for operation of the system would probably be outside the normal scope of public observation. The proposal, therefore, raises a value question in addition to the technical questions to which the book is principally addressed; namely, is it more desirable to fragment information at some dollar costs or centralize it at the potential cost of arming governmental officials with more information than we like? Despite the increase in efficiency, and the attractiveness of the research possibilities promised by a Unified Information System, this reader prefers the relative safety and comfort of some governmental confusion.—HERBERT JACOB, *The University of Wisconsin.*

Apportionment and Representative Institutions: The Michigan Experience. BY KARL A. LAMB, WILLIAM J. PIERCE, AND JOHN P. WHITE. (Washington: The Institute for Social Science Research, 1963, Pp. xvii, 408. $6.50, cloth; $2.50, paper.)

The state of Michigan has all the ingredients necessary for a classic example of the reapportionment problem: a single metropolitan county with more than a third of the state's population, a history of nearly half a century without a reapportionment based fully on population, the adoption of a "federal" plan in 1952 to break the deadlock, and more than a decade of deadlock between a Democratic governor and Republican legislature, which was widely attributed to malapportionment and the urban-rural bipolarization of the two parties. This was the background for a constitutional convention that met in October, 1961, with its attention focused on the thorny, highly partisan issue of reapportionment and that eventually drafted an apportionment formula which became the key issue in a bitter and narrowly successful struggle for approval of the new constitution at the polls. The constitutional convention and its plan for apportionment are the subject of this case study. It is a thorough, highly competent job by three professors who were strategically located to study the convention at the University of Michigan.

In the opening chapters, Professor Pierce offers a concise review of litigation concerning apportionment in state and federal courts prior to *Baker* v. *Carr* and the court decisions and unresolved problems subsequent to that case. It is useful summary for students, but it offers little that will not be familiar to those who have been reading recent issues of the law reviews. Pierce calls attention to a feature of the Florida case that has been neglected—the argument that each county needs a representative in at least one house in those legislatures where the individual member bears most of the responsibility for the enactment of local legislation.

Professor Lamb offers an engrossing study of the convention. It is evident from his account that intense partisanship is highly dysfunctional for a constitutional convention and that George Romney's candidacy for governor added a particular obstacle because of his prominent role in the convention. The Democrats campaigned for positions as delegates largely on the apportionment issue and approached the convention with deep suspicion of the Republican majority's stand on the issue. The Republicans, despite divisions on the apportionment question that reflected fundamental differences within the party, managed to maintain unity in voting. Professor Lamb emphasizes the profound impact of the *Baker* v. *Carr* decision. It persuaded the Republican majority to change its tactics and adopt an apportionment formula that was a substantial improvement over the old constitution and over the plan that the Republicans had intended to adopt. On the other hand, *Baker* v. *Carr* encouraged the Democrats to oppose the compromise plan and to fight popular endorsement of the new constitution in the belief that they could win a better apportionment from the courts, particularly if the compromise embodied in the new constitution could be defeated.

Professor White's study of the apportionment plan adopted in the convention is a model demonstration of how careful analysis can reveal the fallacies in political clichés and folklore. He demonstrates that the use of a "seven-tenths" moiety clause in the House does not, in fact, diminish the population factor (as long as county lines are retained) and that the use of the "80–20" population-area formula for the Senate, though difficult to justify in theory, has the practical effect of assuring an index of population representation between 80 and 85 for the metropolitan counties no matter how rapidly their proportion of the state population increases. He asserts that there are few states in which apportionment so closely approaches a population standard. White's most significant finding is that the new apportionment formula almost completely corrects the discrimination against the Democratic party in the legislature, even though it will not make possible Democratic control of the Senate. The Democrats are doomed to remain a minority in the Senate as long as the party strength remains concentrated largely in a few metropolitan counties.

This study surpasses most such case studies because Michigan is such a rich source of analysis concerning apportionment and because the authors have focused on the political elements of the question, which deserve similar attention in many of the other states.—MALCOLM E. JEWELL, *University of Kentucky.*

Urban Renewal Politics: Slum Clearance in Newark. BY HAROLD KAPLAN. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963. Pp. 219.)

"Critics," Jackie Gleason has said, "report accidents to eye witnesses." In this statement, he neatly jabs at the performer's traditional enemy and reopens the legitimate question of the social utility of the reviewer. Obviously, specialists in local politics should be qualified to evaluate for themselves the scholarly contribution and classroom utility of a book such as this. A single opinion necessarily reflects the interests and values of the individual and can say relatively little about the utility of the book to another individual or even about its intrinsic worth. What readers of reviews can reasonably expect from the reviewer is some indication of whether or not the book is worth reading. This one, I think, is.

Kaplan, in studying the politics of urban renewal in Newark, reports findings that are supportive of contemporary theories. His conclusions are not iconoclastic in character. He reconfirms through empirical evidence a number of hypotheses concerning cooperative federalism, community power, and the characteristics of bureaucracy. We already have considerable evidence to indicate that in cities of more than 100,000 population (the Newark population in 1960 was 405,220) the political power complex tends to be competitive more than conspiratorial, and functionally specialized more than generalized. Similarly, indications are that in the larger cities the local government serves principally as a center for negotiations among the representatives of effective interests. We also have information indicating that a bureaucracy's power increases as it approaches a monopoloy of knowledge and that, other things being equal, power is inversely proportional to the visibility of the bureaucratic function.

Although Kaplan does not make explicit his theoretical framework, these propositions seem to be central. All are given at least general support by the empirical evidence. The role of the bureaucracy in a loosely integrated power system is clearly described and documented by him. This is only a case study, however, so we cannot learn if the looseness of organization is really a critical variable. But certainly it made possible considerable maneuvering by the Newark urban renewal professionals. The development of this theme makes the book particularly worthwhile to theory builders and to classroom teachers in search of illustrative material. We learn little about the relative importance of sources of power—of technical knowledge as compared to low visibility of operation, but both seem to have been important. The bureaucrats apparently thought so. They cultivated the image of themselves as knowledge monopolists and discouraged attempts at raising the threshhold of visibility.

Kaplan concludes that:

(1) Citizen participation may be detrimental

to the progress of an urban renewal program rather than indispensable to it.

(2) Only a few persons, principally professionals, "interact with each other on a daily basis" in urban renewal activities.

(3) "The behavior of the regular participants toward each other . . . is highly structured and predictable."

(4) The participants are more concerned with procedures—the way in which conflicts are resolved—than with the details of the actual settlement. In particular, they desire that conflicts be settled through informal bargaining and not through public attacks upon opponents or through random agitation.

As to the future, Kaplan anticipates what has been foreseen by observers in other cities. The "political environment will become more vocal as the program matures, as population movements stabilize, and as the Negroes become better organized."—CHARLES R. ADRIAN, *Michigan State University.*

Censorship: Government and Obscenity. BY TERRENCE J. MURPHY. (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1963, Pp. x, 294. $5.50.)

This is an extremely competent book about a very complex legal problem with the resolution of which our courts, state and federal, are now deeply concerned. If any proposition of constitutional law is now well established, it is that the state and federal constitutions do not protect the publication, distribution or sale of obscene literature. It is hornbook law that the constitutional guaranty of freedom of the press is no more absolute than any other right. In fact, as Father Murphy points out in great detail, that Congress and all of the state legislatures have adopted all sorts of legislation aimed at obscene literature is proof enough that the American national community is opposed to the dissemination of obscene literature. I think this is sufficient to establish the reasonableness of such legislation in determining the due process issue which censorship raises. Father Murphy is also convinced that obscene literature is very harmful, and that it leads to anti-social conduct, and he cites a number of studies by various sorts of specialists to support his position. In addition, Father Murphy has studied with very great care the opinions of the United States Supreme Court on this subject, and points up very well indeed the ambiguities and problems which on careful analysis remain as yet unresolved. In telling this story in such meticulous detail, Father Murphy has performed a very great service.

Unfortunately, this book does not succeed in resolving the reader's perplexity as to just what literature is obscene. I think I understand what hard-core obscenity is, and I think it is clear that such vile stuff is illegal under any definition of the law. Father Murphy's further observation, however, that if it were ever conceded that obscenity refers only to hard-core obscenity, libertarians would then object to the test, I found wholly gratuitous. No doubt some civil libertarians might take that position, but many do not, and the author paints with a pretty crude brush in lumping so many people together.

Father Murphy's whole view on this subject is based on his theory of democracy, which he describes as majoritarian. That is to say, since legislatures are elected by the people, and they clearly desire to suppress obscene literature, libertarians, in opposing such legislation, are anti-democratic. I read this to mean that what Father Murphy believes is that the scope of our rights depends upon the will of the popular majority. Of course, this concept of majoritarian democracy is a perfectly legitimate one; it has ancient roots and is supported by weighty authority, but unfortunately for Father Murphy's thesis, it just isn't the American brand of democracy. In this connection, I cannot refrain from speculating as to what Father Murphy's views are with respect to the decision of the Supreme Court in *Pierce* v. *Society of Sisters*, 268 U. S. 510 (1925). In this case the Supreme Court held unconstitutional an Oregon statute which put the parochial schools through the eighth grade out of business. As a matter of fact, this particular statute was actually adopted by the people of Oregon through the initiative and referendum. Clearly the statute was a direct expression of the will of a majority of the people of the state. Would Father Murphy say that the Supreme Court's decision was a bad one because it went against the will of a majority of the people? On his assumptions, I think he would have a bad time defending the Court's decision. I happen to think that the Court's decision was a proper one, and that it was wholly consistent with the basic principles of our American democracy. The scope of religious freedom or of parental freedom in our constitutional system simply does not depend upon the wishes of a current popular majority. I think this is equally true for the freedom of the press.

I do not believe that Father Murphy has solved the basic issue, which is not whether statutes prohibiting obscene literature are unconstitutional, but rather how the term obscenity is to be defined. He seems to think that the important thing is to leave this matter to the jury. This is apparently an outgrowth of his basic views about majoritarian democracy. The freedom of the press extends, in his view, as far as a jury will permit.

He prefers this formulation to any formulation which leaves the decision in concrete cases to appellate judges. He repeatedly expresses his doubts about the competence of judges to decide these cases. I have grave doubts about the competence of juries. And the notion that our liberties should extend only as far as juries are willing to go strikes me as wholly novel and insupportable.

Basically, Father Murphy believes in censorship. Thus he would not limit the concept of obscenity to sexual matters, as the courts now do, for he is willing to include stories of violence within the definition. I reluctantly conclude that what Father Murphy's position adds up to is that he believes not in freedom of the press, but only in the freedom to print what is good for us, the good being defined by policemen and prosecutors, who make the arrests and the initial decisions, and by juries who sit in judgment. The notion that freedom is really the freedom to do the right things, or think the right thoughts, or write the proper things that are good for us, is of course a very ancient idea which has always had supporters. But I cannot square this notion with the basic principles of American constitutional law.

Father Murphy is privileged to write that sex is a mystery of which the less said the better, but erecting this view into a principle of public law is another matter. The Constitution, as we have construed it in our history, does not command us to refrain from discussing one of man's most absorbing and interesting preoccupations. Freedom of speech is not and should not be limited to the discussion of matters which twelve jurymen happen to find comfortable. If it does not extend to matters of great importance on which people differ passionately, if it does not extend to matters which stir people to anger, then it isn't free speech, not at least as we have understood the term.

Father Murphy seems to believe that the free speech guaranty was intended to extend and should extend mainly to political speech. I think this is a most extraordinary and wholly insupportable limitation upon the concept. He also repeatedly makes the familiar point that liberals have always insisted that courts show deference to legislative judgment in ruling on the constitutionality of legislation which regulates the economy, the inference being that they are inconsistent in not ascribing the same strong presumption of validity to legislation which imposes restraints upon speech and press. But he neglects to make the equally familiar point that the Constitution does not guarantee laissez-faire economic policy; but it does guarantee freedom of speech and press.—David Fellman, *University of Wisconsin.*

Challenge to Affluence. By Gunnar Myrdal. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1963. Pp. viii, 172. $3.95.)

The Managed Economy. By Michael D. Reagan. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963. Pp. ix, 288. $6.00.)

The authors of these books share two common attributes. They explicitly reject the concept of a value-free social science and, having done so, profess similar sets of values. They criticize the American economy from the belief that economic democracy and political democracy are mutually related and necessary for either to survive. In the case of Myrdal, little time is wasted in considering the possibility of other perspectives on research. We are urged "not to hide illogically behind the pretense of false objectivity." (p. vi). Reagan, thankfully, has much more patience and is willing to justify his position in more detail. He argues that, while empirical theory should be encouraged, normative theory can use the products of empiricism in order to make certain that values are not rooted in incorrect perceptions of reality.

Indeed, Reagan's book might be described as an attempt to justify a more strenuous role in the economy for the federal government on the grounds that the ideal of the self-regulating economy is a myth based upon a false perception of the structure of American business. His analysis of the American political economy is hardly novel but his style is excellent and his arguments convincing (with exceptions to be noted later). Reagan describes the gradual drift of the power of economic decision-making into the hands of corporation managers and government agencies in a manner reminiscent (minus the conspiracy theory) of James Burnham.

Under these circumstances businessmen do not desire to prevent governmental intervention but rather to control the direction of public policy by "getting business into politics" (p. 8). The author judges this to be objectionable not because business corporations are necessarily less legitimately a part of the political process than other actors but rather because he believes their economic power is cumulative: it is directly responsible for political power. Since no other participants in the formation of policy could possibly match the wealth of corporations, big businesses have things pretty much their own way. Here the reader will have little trouble in recognizing Reagan's attack on the growing pluralism of American political science stimulated by Robert Dahl and his followers. I find the argument unconvincing. While Reagan brilliantly documents the methods whereby large corporations dominate the economic system—coercion on retail outlets by manufacturers and so forth—he is hard pressed to show the process through which general economic power is translated into general political power. There are numerous illustrations of explicit power situations but little evidence to link these situations into a case for the dominance of political life by the corporation. The author concedes that "the most immediate and central area in which business uses its power is on those issues which affect the corporations themselves" (p. 85). This point seems correct, but could any less be said of the American Farm Bureau Federation or the American Medical Association?

The reforms advocated by Reagan—while based upon his unsuccessful attack on pluralism—are more satisfactory because they take into account the possibility of using masses of voters to counter economic power, a point which the pluralists themselves would certainly find pleasing.

Myrdal finds American business much less sinister than does Reagan. The basic concern of the book is that the prosperity enjoyed in America by the upper, middle, and working classes has not filtered down to the lowest rungs of the social ladder, a position occupied by what Myrdal calls the "under classes." His depiction of the impoverished nature of the under classes is roughly the same as that of the Johnson administration but the remedies suggested by President Johnson would not be far reaching enough to satisfy Myrdal who, like Reagan, would like to see more long range economic planning. Myrdal would also seem to support Reagan's assumption that power follows property, for he points out that the under classes are ignored because they are powerless. Who is responsible for poverty? The culprit, according to Myrdal, is certainly *not* the corporations. He believes that industry is a "progressive force" in providing vocational education to help overcome problems created by automation and that "it is the government in America, not private business, which has fallen behind" (pp. 27–28).

Myrdal's solution, which is stated only in tentative terms, is for more economic planning according to the Swedish model and less blind adherence to the belief in freedom from regulation. The solution itself is not as interesting as Myrdal's claim that the proposals are "objective." This is so because they "logically follow as inferences from the facts *as we see them* . . ." (p. 66, my italics). I find it hard to think of values as objective and opposing sets of values as "irrational" in the Myrdal manner. Which description of business is the correct one? Are corporations a progressive force (Myrdal) or are they arrogant (Reagan)? It would seem to depend on the facts as one sees them and unless one sees them through the restrictions of a careful method of inquiry, he is likely to let his values shape the nature of the facts.—HARMON ZEIGLER, *University of Georgia.*

The Decision-Makers: The Power Structure of Dallas. BY CAROL ESTES THOMETZ. (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1963. Pp. xiii, 141. $4.00.)

Curiosity about the politics and civic culture of Dallas, Texas, must surely be at an all-time high. Since President Kennedy was assassinated there and his assassin was in turn killed in the Dallas police station, since Ambassador Stevenson and Vice President Johnson on two different occasions were jostled there by hostile crowds, people have quite naturally been wondering about Dallas.

Is Dallas a hot-bed of right-wing reaction, as its Mayor seemed to suggest on television during the night of November 22? Of die-hard segregationist sentiment? Why does Dallas, virtually alone among America's big cities, have a conservative Republican congressman? Is it true that the Texas legislature purposely over-populated this district for fear that splitting it would elect *two* Dallas Republicans and endanger the safety of Sam Rayburn's adjacent seat?

The answers to these, and many other questions, will not be found in *The Decision Makers,* by Carol Estes Thometz. Why not? The book's subtitle, *The Power Structure of Dallas* provides a clue to the *au courant* academic. As in so many other community studies using the same vocabulary, the scholasticism of "power structure" analysis overpowers any attempt to convey a sense of community politics.

The author asks the familiar questions: Is there a "general" power elite? (Her answer: Yes); How is it differentiated? (By "strata," of key leaders, top level leaders, and second echelon leaders); Are the elite socially as well as politically homogeneous? (Yes, as regards associations, less so as regards personal styles). Her methods of investigation are also familiar. Eight informants, well placed in "different sectors of community life" listed names of leaders—65 of them—later increased to 67. A random sample of 28 of these was selected for interview, and 17 complete and usable interviews were actually conducted. These interviews, supplemented by the newspapers, form the backbone of the study.

Mrs. Thometz makes some attempt to meet objections to this approach to studying community politics; she several times insists that in her interviews she directed conversation to specific and actual—not general and hypothetical decision-making events. But she gives only a meagre descriptive account of what she found—not enough for a reader to figure out what went on in any specific set of decisions. The most we get is two pages (63–4) on the establishment of a United Fund.

Her general conclusion, that Dallas is to an unusual degree dominated by businessmen, echoes the lively impressionistic account of the community given by *New Yorker* writer John Bainbridge in *The Super-Americans*. But she neither enlarges nor particularizes on this conclusion.

The critical reader will also wonder if the thirty interviews, more or less, that she conducted in the community are enough first hand work to sustain a book-length characterization of the political activity of an entire metropolitan community. Something less than a sure grasp of her materials is indicated in the author's treatment of party politics, which on page 22 are held to be muted and irrelevant, on page 68 to be "out of bounds" and on pages 83–84 to be productive of real dissension and conflict. And a kind of distance from the real world is reflected in statements such as (page 61) that "the living conditions in much of the housing occupied by Dallas Negroes were *reported* to be very poor" (italics added). Surely this report could have been verified by reference to census information.

This book was originally an MA thesis in sociology at Southern Methodist University. Seen in this light, the laborious derivativeness in the conception and execution of the study are neither unexpected nor inappropriate. In fact, the book's virtues of care, modesty and clear writing mark *The Decision-Makers* as an unusually worthy example of middle-level graduate work. But like much of the community power literature, it contributes precious little to the common understanding of local politics.—NELSON W. POLSBY, *Wesleyan University*.

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AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE
University of Maryland

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FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

Amateurs and Professionals in British Politics 1918–59. By Philip W. Buck. (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1963. Pp. xii, 143. $5.00.)

The virgin lands of British political science are still extensive; for this, we must thank partly the air of secrecy enveloping so much of British political practice, which defies the most acute and patient of investigators; and secondly, to some degree, we must blame the inertia of British political scientists themselves. Generalisations are often made on the basis of journalistic impressions and little attempt is made to see whether these assertions are supported by quantitative evidence. The backgrounds and careers of British parliamentary candidates provided a notable example of this inertia. Some crucial questions about the recruitment and fortunes of Members of Parliament were left unanswered. What expectation has the average backbencher of achieving office? How often do candidates change their constituencies—or, indeed, their parties? At what ages do candidates begin? To what extent do unsuccessful candidates persist in their attempts to win election? These questions are the kind that Professor Buck seeks to answer, and in one sense he answers them successfully. Where the book fails is in the presentation and development of the material.

Professor Buck has traced the careers of the 7500 candidates who contested parliamentary elections between 1918 and 1955. He shows that many of them must have been political dilettantes; little more than a third of those who stood were actually elected, and two-thirds of the remainder gave up trying after one attempt. He explores, with precision and in great detail, such features as the mobility and continuity of the membership of the House of Commons, loyalty to party, the success of women and the educational and occupational backgrounds of M.P.s and Ministers. Yet in spite of Professor Buck's arithmetical rigour, the exercise is a partial failure. This reviewer has as much cause as anyone to feel impatient with the loud and foolish criticisms of those (and they are many in Britain) who resent the use of quantitative methods in political science. The application of these methods arouses amongst British politicans, journalists and perhaps some academics the same sort of irritation as an attack on the book of Genesis would at a fundamentalist meeting. Precise statistical data are suggestive, illuminating and often necessary; but unfortunately, Professor Buck fails, with one exception, to pursue with other techniques the clues thrown up by his statistics. Many of his figures would be a valuable complement to a rounder study of candidates and Members. In isolation they bemuse as well as inform.

Professor Buck does try to give greater depth to one aspect of his researches by questioning 82 former M.P.s about their reasons for entering Parliament, and their early withdrawal from political life. The findings on this score are amongst the most interesting in the book but the effect is simply to whet the appetite for more.

A second criticism may seem to contradict the first. Occasionally, Professor Buck does not push his statistical analysis as far as he might. Thus he shows that it is not true that most M.P.s have to fight hopeless or difficult seats before being chosen for favourable constituencies. Two-thirds of the 2200 M.P.s elected since 1918 were successful at the first attempt; yet the author does not examine the remaining third in order to find out whether they came from distinctive social or occupational backgrounds.

In spite of its limitations, and the disappointment it engenders this book is a useful beginning. Let the author—or somebody—continue.—HUGH BERRINGTON, *University of Keele.*

The Fascists in Britain. BY COLIN CROSS. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963. Pp. 214. $5.00.)

Fascism as an organized movement has never held much appeal for the British, and any history of its manifestations since the first World War is bound to turn into a recitation of events on the fringe of political life: scattered violence, pathological posturings, and comic-operatic impotence. Mr. Cross's dispassionate account, which is factually sound but almost wholly lacking in political or psychological analysis, underlines the immense difficulties facing anyone who would remake British society from outside the existing centers of power.

This is the lesson of the strange and tragic career of the most famous figure in British fascism, Sir Oswald Mosley, who dominates this chronicle. Scion of an ancient and rich landed family, Mosley began his political career, in a manner reminiscent of the young Churchill and Macmillan, as an independent-minded member of one of the traditional ruling parties. It is sometimes forgotten that he was twice elected to the Commons as a Conservative and that his marriage to Curzon's daughter put him well up into the Establishment in the early 1920's. Impatience with Tory doctrine propelled him shortly thereafter into the Labour Party, where his uncommon oratorical skill and his advanced ideas on economics and welfare impressed both leaders and party activists. He was perennially elected to the National Executive in the twenties, became a Minister in the second MacDonald Government at the age of 32, and was seriously tipped as a future Prime Minister. By this time, however, his flirtation with the Mussolini version of fascism had grown to full passion, and after his failure to crack the fiscal orthodoxy of MacDonald and Snowden he washed his hands of the "old politicians" and embarked on the task of pulling together various small, weakly-led, rather quaint fascist groups into a para-military phalanx, the British Union of Fascists, with himself as a Führer loyal to King and country.

The bulk of the book is devoted to the movement in the thirties, when it reached its maximum strength and notoriety, and to its rapid decline and fall on the eve of the second World War. The dustjacket claim that the book "shows how close Fascism came to being a serious political force in Britain . . . and how many influential people gave it support" simply is not borne out by Mr. Cross's narrative, which shows, if anything, quite the opposite. Neither by traditional political action nor by terrorism did the fascists succeed. Their sole impact on public policy came, negatively, in the passage of the Public Order Act of 1936, which was used effectively by the government to prevent or break up fascist demonstrations and to imprison their leaders. While Mosley did attract a small handful of public figures in his early days, no one of importance remained for more than a year or so; when Hitler began to show his hand most of the retired generals and admirals found other outlets for their patriotism. Among the top fascist leaders the turnover was almost as rapid. No wonder, then, that Hitler and Mussolini barely acknowledged British fascism and preferred to concentrate on weakening the resolve of those actually in power. Equally important, the fascists never were able to get beyond their fluctuating base of a few thousand fanatics; they failed completely to gain the support of any major organized group in Britain. How it can be asserted that a movement frozen out of the Establishment, unrepresented in any important political institution, devoid of links with business, trade unionism or the military, and wholly dependent upon police protection for its activities, approached being a "major political force" is a mystery to this reviewer.

This case of deviant political leadership is nevertheless of interest because it reveals once again the limits within which effective change can occur in modern Britain. For a man who made such a cult of power, Mosley was hopelessly naive in supposing that he could dispense with the long and patient process of molding opinion within one of the established political parties; and for a man who hitched his movement so firmly to nationalism and ethnocentrism, he erred fatally in supposing that the alien values of continental fascism could provide a short cut to his objectives. By the time he was carted off to Brixton prison in 1940 he had lost all contact with the realities of British life. Though no longer imprisoned, he and his fellow fascists still do not understand.—James B. Christoph, *Ohio State University*.

The Italian Prefects: A Study in Administrative Politics. By Robert C. Fried. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1963 Pp. xii, 343. $7.50.)

The government of republican Italy has, until quite recently, been sorely neglected by American political scientists. To be sure, there have been several valuable studies of Italian political parties, as well as a few interesting and fruitful analyses of the Italian constitutional framework. But the actual operation of Italian political and administrative institutions has been virtually ignored.

This neglect may be attributed, in large part, to the fact that Italian political science is just beginning to emerge from the catacombs of historicism and legal formalism, and that American scholars have, consequently, often been compelled to do their own spadework in attempting to uncover the operational realities which lie behind the legal facade of Italy's constitutional and administrative structure. But despite these difficulties, there have appeared, in the last few years, several significant contributions to a clearer understanding of the Italian governmental process. Professor Fried's book is one of the most interesting and penetrating of these recent contributions.

The author provides us with an exhaustive and well-documented account of the historical development of Italian prefectoral institutions. He shows how the Kingdom of Sardinia, in the 17th century, erected a system of central government agents (the Intendants) to supervise the provinces. He discusses the influence of the Napoleonic prefectoral system on local administration in Piedmont and elsewhere in Italy. And he describes the strengthening of the Piedmontese Intendants after the constitutional reforms of 1848, and the extension and adaptation of Piedmontese administrative institutions to the other parts of Italy during the period of national unification under the House of Savoy (1859–1870). It was during this latter period that the Prefect emerged as the new representative of the national executive power in the province.

Professor Fried goes on to analyze the crystallization of the prefectoral system after the unification of Italy. His account of the defeat of various pressures for local and regional autonomy is particularly intriguing: despite a liberal reaction against Napoleonic centralization, the exigencies of national unity, the "problem of the South," and the conservative predilections of the new ruling classes resulted in the establishment of a highly centralized form of government. The Prefect, however, unlike his French counterpart, did not acquire a high degree of administrative control over the field services of the various national ministries. His functions were primarily political—to supervise local government, maintain public order, and attempt to influence elections.

So firmly entrenched were Italian prefectoral institutions that they were retained and strengthened under the Fascist dictatorship. And after the Liberation, the exigencies of power and the Communist threat helped to induce the Christian Democratic rulers to repudiate their regionalist principles and attempt instead to expand prefectoral powers over local governments and, more recently, over national field services as well.

Professor Fried has assembled a vast amount of empirical data and cast a great deal of light on Italian administrative history. But his book is more than a mere work of description. In his exploration of causal factors underlying the various trends in Italian local administration, he provides us with insights that can be of great value in further investigating the relationship between public administration and the political and historical environment. Moreover, in a concluding chapter, he discusses certain broader questions, including the various traits of prefectoral systems; the differences between prefectoral systems and functional systems; the advantages and disadvantages of the two major types of prefectoral systems; the major challenges to the stability of prefectoral systems; and the relationship between prefectoral systems and political systems. This concluding chapter, offering schemes of classification and suggestive generalizations which may be tested in other contexts, does much to enhance the value of this striking addition to the field of comparative government.—Raphael Zariski, *University of Nebraska*.

Norwegian Democracy. By James A. Storing. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963. Pp. 246. $1.95.)

James A. Storing has been a student of Norwegian constitutional development and politics for well over twenty-five years. In *Norwegian Democracy* he has provided the best introduction to Norwegian government available in either English or Norwegian. His emphasis is upon the development, powers, organization and operation of institutions and upon the most prominent areas of public policy. There are chapters on each of the branches of government, on local government, the political parties, the social security system, the role of the state in the economy, and the guiding principles of foreign policy. Storing facilitates understanding by including comparisons to English and American institutions and practices. His book is up-to-date, well-written and admirable for its historical overviews.

There are, however, some errors. It is not correct (p. 66) that "parties particularly of the political center are usually more inclined to consider possibilities offered by joint lists than are parties on the right and left." This is so only for the cited 1961 election, in which an attempt was made to present a three-party center alternative. The initiative in seeking electoral cooperation has usually been taken by the Conservative Party, which has sought a bourgeois front against the Labor Party, and no party has engaged in electoral cooperation more often than has the Conservative Party. The traditional party of the center, the Liberal Party, has throughout its history been reluctant to cooperate both for ideological reasons and because of fear of schism. Nor is it correct (p. 69) that the system of allowing cooperation through the combining of vote totals was given up because it offered "few advantages not available under the joint list procedure." The old system provided a greater inducement to cooperation in that the partners presented independent lists. The Labor Party, which had suffered from its operation, voted the system out, and the bourgeois parties have repeatedly sought to have it re-introduced.

It is too strong a statement (p. 77) that it is "inconceivable" that the political viewpoints of the member of parliament and his alternate will be "significantly at variance." It is not likely that there will be a significant difference, but nearly every successful joint list produces a situation in which member and alternate are of different parties. Indeed, the official reason that Hedmark's Wollert Konow did not enter Gunnar Knudsen's cabinet in 1908 was that if Konow were to vacate his parliamentary seat, as one must to enter a Norwegian cabinet, the opposition would gain a vote in the parliament.

It is misleading (p. 124) to state that the Patriotic Society (Fedrelandslaget) "championed the fascistic cause." True, it was a nationalist reaction against the expansion of socialism and communism, and it did promote knowledge of arms. But the purpose of its founders, former prime minister Christian Michelsen and former League of Nations President Fridtjof Nansen, was to unite the democratic bourgeois parties, and perhaps most of Fedrelandslaget's energies were expended as a pressure group seeking to influence the policies of the parties on cooperation. Fascists were ousted from the organization, and Vidkun Quisling was hostile to it. Some of Fedrelandslaget's leaders have been active in post-war party politics.

After noting that since 1905 only one cabinet has been forced to resign as a result of a positive vote of no-confidence, Storing comments (p. 57) that "lack of confidence resolutions . . . are not likely to be much used in the immediate future." No one would have guessed that the Labor Government was to fall on just such a vote in 1963 (a few months after the completion of Storing's mansucript), though some might have anticipated that the "seriously divided opposition" would agree to form a four-party non-socialist coalition government, as it did.—Sven Groennings, *Indiana University.*

The Future of Russia. By Harry Braverman. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963. Pp. 170. $5.00.)

Certainly there is no greater need today in Soviet studies than for a balanced evaluation of Soviet development since Stalin and a perceptive projection of emergent trends. Unfortunately this extended essay by Harry Braverman—editor from 1954–1959 of *The American Socialist*—does not fulfill the need. Heavily influenced by the writings of Issac Deutscher on Russia's future prospects, Braverman's analysis suffers from the same difficulties as those that plague the biographer of Stalin and Trotsky. Both operate with an economic deterministic framework that factors out the key role of the "political" in shaping the Soviet system. The author's main concern in this volume is the kind of society that is likely to emerge in the USSR in the next few decades; he contends that the Soviet Union will soon confront the problems of the affluent society, which are primarily distributive not productive issues. Using Deutscher's notion of a "Khrushchev Interregnum" between Stalinism and the projected Communist society, he stresses the incompatibility between the political institutions used to drive

Russia through industrialization and the new social forces and affluence unleashed by this transformation. Braverman envisages the new socio-economic base reacting on and shaping the political system and creating the real possibility for democracy in the Soviet Union.

In his early chapters, the author provides a useful discussion of Soviet growth rates and concludes that it is reasonable to expect the high growth rates to continue; continued growth will provide the possibility for the regime to satisfy consumer demands while simultaneously solving problems in industry and agriculture. Since problems of production are to be easily solved and new levels of affluence are soon to be reached, the major problem in the future will be one of distribution. Braverman contends that Soviet emphasis on communal services and equalitarian distribution will play a decisive role in shaping a unique societal context that will contrast sharply with Western capitalist societies. Like Deutscher, the author fixes on the successful industrialization experience as providing the conditions for the emergence of a communal oriented distribution pattern and for throwing off the political dictatorship. Perhaps the major failing of this analysis and prognosis, aside from the narrow economic perspective, is an inadequate recognition of the by-products of industrialization and the prerequisites for sustaining a complex industrial structure. Braverman himself poses the problem when he juxtaposes the Soviet social class system with its inequalities of income and prestige to the equalitarian drive of Soviet ideology and the "transition to Communism" outlined in the new Party Program (pp. 101–13). Soviet industrial progress has spawned its own social class structure paralleling those found in other industrial societies; a differential pattern of rewards based on distinctive competence and expertise is unlikely to produce an equalitarian distribution of goods and services. Braverman thus passes off with inadequate consideration what is probably Moscow's major problem in this area: the conflict between the elite or intelligentsia-oriented pattern for producing industrial maturity and the professed Communist character of the emergent Soviet society.

It is certainly true that the Soviet Union has reached that stage where the problems associated with primitive capital accumulation have been overcome; but that many major problems remain before the stage of affluence is reached is confirmed by recent events: the crisis in Soviet agriculture vividly illustrates that the USSR is both a backward agricultural country and an advanced industrial system. Braverman's optimism regarding a windfall for the consumer must be considered against this background highlighted by the recent cutback in construction of new housing that is linked to the projected massive investment in the chemical industry.

The main problem with Braverman's analysis, however, is his failure to deal directly with the political system and instead to view it as an epiphenomenon that although playing an important role in the Stalinist phase is suddenly now to wither away in the face of irresistible economic forces. The disappearance of the terror is a significant break with the Stalinist past, but the one-party dictatorship remains. Nor is the Communist Party likely to become the arena for diverse and contending forces as the author suggests, although it must recognize and consider the context in which it functions and the societal interests that the system seeks to contain. Among these major social forces is the Soviet managerial and technical intelligentsia; but the Soviet leadership's recognition of its dependence on a satisfied intellegentsia may in fact prove incompatible with the satisfaction of equalitarian aspirations however much it might suggest caution, relaxation and moderation in domestic and foreign policy. It may tend to strengthen those trends reinforcing social differentiation in income and prestige. One cannot, as Braverman has, factor out the "political" from the Soviet equation and expect to get to the root of Moscow's difficulties or to evaluate Russia's future prospects. Only a politically conscious analysis will illuminate change and continuity in the Soviet system and provide the basis for a cautious though perhaps optimistic projection regarding the future of the USSR.—DONALD S. CARLISLE, *University of Wisconsin.*

Eastern Europe in the Sixties. EDITED BY STEPHEN FISCHER-GALATI. (New York-London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963. Pp. 242. $6.00. ($2.25, paper.)

The new symposium on East Central Europe represents an attempt to apply an "area" approach to one of the most heterogenous regions in the world in a period of reassertion of national differences. Instead of the traditional focus on national compartments of Communist Middle Europe the emphasis is on themes and problems which East Central Europe has in common.

When applied to a region of small nations traditionally resistant to amalgamation, the area approach has some inevitable limitations. This is of course, true in the case of most area studies. Any generalization or uniformity has constantly to be refined and qualified to the point that the authors finally use a country-by-country approach within their respective functional chapters. This is also the case of Fischer-Galati's new volume, which in addition, in five out of eight chapters has to sever Yugoslavia completely from the rest of the narrative; it describes its problems in subchapters or appendices under the symptomatic heading: "Yugoslavia (or Albania, or Poland)—A Special Case." In a sense, as the book demonstrates, the seven small Communist nations and the Communist half of a large one (East Germany) are indeed all special cases. The symposium describes with skill how intricately the area uniformities are interlaced with national variations, ideological deviations and local antagonisms. The present state of Communist Middle Europe may perhaps be best summed up as "polyform uniformity."

The uniformity seems to be the result of two major factors: 1) the leaders of all eight people's or socialist democracies are personally or ideologically committed to the Communist model of centralized manipulation of national economy, public administration, people's culture and individuals' private lives; 2) the Soviet immediate neighborhood, power and direct interest (in contrast to the United States' distance and limited interest) has a paralyzing effect on many men's minds and actions.

The malfunctioning of Communist economy (the merits and pitfalls of Communist planned economy are well described by Dellin, Zyzniewski and Wszelaki) coupled with efficient functioning of Communist modern dictatorship result in another area uniformity so conspicuous in Middle Europe in the sixties: popular apathy toward Communist creed and practice. Stephen Fischer-Galati calls the general apathy combined with opportunism "the Achilles' heel of each of the regimes."

While Fischer-Galati successfully explodes the myth of publicized enthusiasm and dedication on the part of the "builders of communism," Wayne S. Vucinich similarly destroys the legend and utopia of Communist classless society. Actually, the disintegration of old classes has been accompanied by crystallization of four new ones: the underprivileged peasants, the slightly favored workers, the technocratic and administrative middle class ("with its status symbols such as cars, special schools, shops, undisclosed salaries, servants and vacation"), and the ruling class. The line which divides the ruling class from the new middle class is necessarily a blurred one. Vucinich's interesting analysis goes beyond, and deeper than, the original thesis of Milovan Djilas.

Professor Gyorgy's chapter on the internal order—and the causes and manifestations of ferment—is most thought-provoking. In his words the "most intriguing feature [of Eastern European rebellions] has been the clear-cut causal connection between the explosion itself and a genuine, nationwide political and economic spirit of relaxation. These revolutions were not born in the midst of deepest misery and a concentration camp atmosphere." A similar conclusion was reached by Crane Brinton in his study of the English, American, French and Russian revolutions: "Revolutions are not started by down-and-outers, by starving miserable people. These revolutionists are not worms turning, not children of despair. These revolutions are born of hope. . . ." As Gyorgy convincingly demonstrates most of the rebellious ferment in East Central Europe did not precede but followed the fall of the tyrant which had generated resentment against the past, hopes for the future, and therefore action for the present.

If these observations are correct and apply also to future developments in the area, the conclusion may imply the following near-sophism: as the present apathy, resulting from the economic malfunctioning of communism, is one of the barriers to further liberalization, will then an economic success of communism (with accompanying relaxation and hopes) prove to be the best way to the inevitable doom of totalitarian communism?
—Ivo D. Duchacek, *City University of New York.*

The Strategy of Deception: A Study in World-Wide Communist Tactics. Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick, Ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Company, 1963. Pp. 444. $6.00.)

This book of essays is dedicated to the memory of the late S. M. Levitas to whom the readers of *The New Leader* owe a great debt of gratitude for his decisive role in making this magazine one of the best Western political periodicals.

The essays deal with a great variety of subjects such as the theory of class warfare, the nature of the Communist party, the role of the intelligenstia within the Communist movement, the Chinese Communist Revolution, the Czechoslovak Communist coup, the Spanish Civil War, the Soviet policies in the United Nations, the Communist parties in India, Burma, Africa, France, Italy, Britain, the United States and Latin America.

One of the authors, Benedict Kautsky, reopens the old controversy: ". . . it appears justified to raise the question whether Lenin can correctly be called a Marxist. . . ." (p. 36) This question takes us back to the famous debate between Lenin and Karl Kautsky as to which of the two was a truly orthodox Marxist. A bystander can ask a different question whether any political party of today, be it Communist or Western socialist, can correctly call itself Marxist, as all of them deviated in various directions from the original doctrine of their teacher. Lenin might have been an early deviationist, but two of his distortions of Marxism, the concept of an elitist and highly disciplined party and the thesis that a "socialist" revolution could take place in any country, developed or underdeveloped, were strokes of political genius. This unorthodoxy made of Lenin the founder of a worldwide and dynamic movement of social change.

An idea that binds together all the essays is that Leninism appeals to frustrations of all sorts, individual and social, because it is a challenge to the status quo. The social frustrations are widespread in the underdeveloped countries and are the least serious in the prosperous West. It is not surprising that Leninism has triumphed in the under- or semi-developed countries and retains a strong appeal in other underdeveloped areas, while it has dismally failed in the West.

In spite of their large membership and a wide electoral support, even the Communist parties of France and Italy have no prospect of becoming the masters of their countries. Their role is negative; they hinder the smooth functioning of democratic regimes by immobilizing a large segment of the electorate in the posture of sterile opposition. Michel Collinet, who writes about the French Communist party, remarks that this is ". . . a new kind of party, alien to all French political traditions." (p. 266) It is a new kind of party, being strictly conformist and no less strictly disciplined. It has obeyed, throughout its history, its own leaders who, in turn, have never failed to obey the Kremlin. Yet this disciplined party, which does not think for itself, has always found many recruits and sympathizers in the country which prides itself on its dislike of conformity and discipline. The large percentage, on the average one-fourth of the total, of pro-Communist ballots in the general elections is not a measure of the power of the Party but rather of the traditional French discontent with what they have. The same voters would not support the Party in any revolutionary venture; this was proved during the great crisis of 1958 when the Communists were unable to influence the events in any visible way.

The Italian party, intellectually the most alert in the West, gropes for a new strategy adjusted to the Western post-war evolution and remains uncertain as to what role it should play. Pio Uliassi, the author of this essay, writes: "Unable or unwilling to make a violent attack on the country's institutions, increasingly skeptical about an eventual collapse of the Western capitalist system under its own 'contradictions' or under the Soviet pressures," (p. 303), the Party is confined to a barren opposition for lack of a better policy. Abandoned by the majority of its former allies, Nenni's socialists, and gradually loosing its appeal to the young, the Party has not yet found a way out of its present impasse. This crisis of the Italian party, which is "far less crudely dogmatic, far more sensitive to the realities of its immediate situation" (p. 306) than the French party, raises the question whether any Communist party can retain its vitality in the face of the Western contemporary realities. The Communist party cannot evolve into a reformist party without *ipso facto* repudiating Leninism.

The essays which describe the situation in the underdeveloped countries, bring forth a much less encouraging picture. All these countries are or may be confronted with a crucial problem which R. J. Alexander ably summarizes in his essay on Latin America: "Latin America is in the midst of a profound social revolution. The future of the Western Hemisphere depends largely on whether the leadership of that revolution remains in the hands of the indigenous political groups or is seized by Communist parties." (p. 377) This and the following observation can be extended to all underdeveloped countries: "The only groups in Latin America which can really effectively fight the Communists for any long period of time are the indigenous groups seeking social change." (p. 383) The successes of the Communist infiltration in Southeast Asia are largely due to the fact that these groups are feeble and ineffective. By contrast, the current history of the North-African and several Subsaharan countries so far bears out the statement by I. W. Zartman: "Communism does not lead national revolutionary movements in Africa; it follows them. The bigger—more 'national'—such a movement grows, the less susceptible it is to Communist control." (p. 188)

Another author, R. L. Walker, is right in saying that: "The intellectuals [rather the intelligentsia] and students have tended to be a key group in the political life of societies striving to adjust to the technological age." (p. 91) This is fully understood by the Communists who remain faithful to the Leninist elitist concept of political leadership.

All these essays are useful but all share in the same deficiency. They do not mention the Soviet-Chinese dispute and its effect on the Communist movement which is no longer monolithic. It suffices to compare the statements by the Chinese and the Italian parties, these two antipodes of the movement, to realize that Communism now speaks with dissonant voices. However, these dissonant voices, quarelling with each other, are all anti-Western and all find a resonant echo amidst the frustrations of the underdeveloped world. Communism remains there a serious challenge to the West, but its nature is now more complex than these essays would make one believe.—W. W. KULSKI, *Duke University*.

The New Face of Soviet Totalitarianism. By Adam B. Ulam. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963. Pp. 233. $4.95).

Soviet Union: Paradox and Change. Edited by Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962. Pp. xv, 240. $4.50, cloth, $2.50, paper).

Both of the volumes under review are devoted primarily to the first decade of the post-Stalinist Soviet Union. Professor Ulam's is a collection of very readable interpretive essays dealing with domestic developments and foreign policy issues. Several of the essays were published in the journal *World Politics* between 1955 and 1962; two appeared in symposia, and two were not published previously.

Specifically, the essays deal with the historical role of Marxism, with Stalin and the theory of totalitarianism, and with the role of ideology in Soviet foreign policy. There is also an essay—from which the collection takes its title—devoted to Soviet politics based on the Khrushchev model. Other essays deal with the question of continuity in Soviet foreign policy and the vagaries of Soviet historiography in its treatment of socialism. A concluding essay, entitled "Khrushchev and Boccaccio," provides an account of the Twenty-second Party Congress of 1961 and deals with the new Party program, the removal of Stalin's remains from the mausoleum, the excommunication of Albania, and the growing Sino-Soviet controversy.

In discussing ideology and foreign policy, Professor Ulam advances the hypothesis that the development of an industrial society often conflicts with ideological requirements and makes ideology less relevant in Soviet domestic politics but at the same time leads to greater ideological commitment in foreign relations in order to preserve and justify the regime and prevent the "withering away" of Communism. This process is seen as being reinforced by the policies of a "retreating West" and by the emergence of a new Soviet brand of "containment" policy which denies to capitalism the right to liberate any country which has adopted the Communist brand of "socialism." Yet in minimizing the impact of ideology on domestic policies one must largely ignore the question of why the Soviet regime has intensified the propagation of atheism or why state farms are preferred over collective farms or why collective farms are regarded as preferable to individual farming. Although recognition is given to the fact that abolition of collective land ownership would undermine the regime's "absolute control" can one really distinguish in practice between absolute control and the ideological commitment which demands it?

Although considerable attention is given to the competitive and manipulative aspects of Soviet politics, recognition is accorded to many "social forces" and "social pressures" such as the peasantry and the desire for individual security and for protection against arbitrary acts by the state; they are alluded to but are not given the author's undivided attention. For Professor Ulam sees the Soviet leaders confronted with a series of profound dilemmas resulting from a conflict between the totalitarian nature of the regime and its "new face." Thus the regime can create conditions and adopt policies leading to increased agricultural production but at the same time abandon the last hope of truly communizing the peasantry. It can create more normal conditions of work and life by reducing tension but then see the system develop "ideological agnosticism," lose some of its dynamism and its ability to exact sacrifices from its subjects. If it endeavors to make world communism a genuinely international movement of equal states and parties it must sacrifice its desire to dominate the movement.

Professor Ulam is in no sense a determinist but cautiously employs an open-ended treatment. He warns that the scholar should eschew prophecy as well as policy-making and notes that "often in our analyses we tend to be more deterministic than our antagonists are." He readily labels certain of his statements as conjecture and employs extreme parallels in an attempt to clarify issues. These are the subtle, sophisticated and occasionally ironic reflections of a judicious observer of the Soviet scene. They can be pondered with profit.

The collection of papers edited by Professors Holt and Turner was prompted, in part, by a visit to the Soviet Union made in 1958 by present or former members of the faculty of the University of Minnesota who do not deal primarily with Soviet affairs but who view particular sectors of the system in terms of their respective academic disciplines. As one of the editors put it, the volume consists of a series of "depth soundings" of certain significant aspects of the Soviet system. Although devoid of documentary footnotes for the most part, the volume is far more than a series of travel accounts for it includes much basic information in addition to the personal observations of the authors.

The initial chapter by John E. Turner presents an overview of Soviet politics and policies both Stalinist and post-Stalinist. A sensitively written chapter on the Soviet city by John R. Borchert provides a colorful description of the physical rather than the demographic features of the Soviet urban milieu and contrasts it with the village. Francis M. Boddy has a chapter dealing with economic growth rates and problems of planning. The agricultural problem is dealt with thoroughly and concisely by Philip M. Raup and includes a treatment of the influence of politics on agriculture. The chapter on Soviet science and technology by Victor Cohn and J. W. Buchta indicates a generally high but varying level of achievement in various fields. The treatment of education by Robert H. Beck deals largely with Khrushchev's reforms and his efforts to enhance the role of vocational training and factory work. A chapter on youth by Thomas F. Magner is devoted to organizations and to various manifestations of resistance to the image of the soviet model youth. Television and radio are discussed by William S. Howell and E. W. Ziebarth in terms of facilities, programming, and foreign broadcasting operations—especially Radio Moscow's Pacific Coast and North American Services. In a concluding chapter the editors examine alternative lines of future soviet development in the light of recent changes and the system's basic structure.

There are very few errors and these are of a minor nature. It would have been preferable had the authors not confined themselves entirely to the old ruble in view of the 1961 currency reform. Although the chapters are almost inevitably of varying quality they provide much useful information along with evaluations which will be of value to the non-specialist and to students taking a general survey course on the Soviet Union. *Soviet Union, Paradox and Change* can serve as an excellent companion volume to Kenneth R. Whiting's *The Soviet Union Today; A Concise Handbook.*—JOHN S. RESHETAR, JR., *University of Washington.*

Arab Rediscovery of Europe; A Study in Cultural Encounters. BY IBRAHIM ABU-LUGHOD. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1963. Pp. vii, 188. $4.75.)

It is only recently that determined efforts are being made to modify the onesidedness of Western studies in comparative politics and theory. This contribution was originally a doctoral dissertation for Princeton's Department of Oriental Studies, one of the major centers which have been developing a more rounded scholarship in, especially, Middle Eastern affairs. Dr. Abu-Lughod traces the impact of Western Europe upon the centuries-long stagnant Arab culture and society. He begins his study with Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798 and carries it to about 1870. During this entire period, Dr. Abu-Lughod finds that Franco-Egyptian cultural relations remain the most significant basis for Arab involvement with Western ideas and institutions. The Egyptian leader, Muhammad 'Ali Pasha, provided the means and incentive for translation of European books, establishment of a School of Language, and the dispatch of students to European centers of learning. Perceptive Arab travellers wrote books describing their experiences in Europe. The most important of these works were by the pioneering R. R. Tahtāwi, Ahmad Fāris al-Shidyāq, and Khayr al-Dīn al-Tūnisi. Generally, the visiting Arabs were favorably and deeply impressed by political systems based upon representative government, equality before the law, and comparatively equitable tax collection and public administration. They also responded positively to the educational systems they encountered as well as to private organizations such as hospitals and commercial corporations. There were mixed reactions to the social mores of the Europeans. Thus, Tahtāwi could observe: "It is well known that purity of the women exists only in the middle class, but not in the upper or lower classes." But on another level, the same observer was impressed by the freedom of women to acquire educations, and he later took steps towards this end in Egypt. Shidyāq, primarily a social observer, was especially critical of the English, about whose class system he wrote an interesting analysis. He found the great majority—that is, the lowest class—of the English to be apathetic, docile, ignorant, and immoral.

An outstanding contribution of this book is the topical arrangement of these subjects, thereby providing the reader with clearer insights concerning the impact of the literature upon the Arab intelligentsia. Dr. Abu-Lughod is methodical and careful throughout, and his conclusions are conservative and realistic. The generally favorable picture of the West presented during this period was modified considerably by increased contacts after 1870 as the Western countries stepped up their commercial and political infiltration of the Middle East. The third phase in the relationship, marked by the substance of Arab economic and political independence, dates from about the end of World War II, and has been characterized by the flood of communications associated with the radio and the cinema. Quite correctly, the author stresses the distorting effects of Arab defensiveness, caused in part by the certainty of theological superiority and awareness of a glorious past. Convincingly, Dr. Abu-Lughod contends that certain characteristics of the present period—*e.g.*, the modest development of nationalism among the peoples in the Arab states is consistent with the failure of early Arab observers to note or publicize this characteristic of Western countries—are traceable to the image of the West which emerged from 1800 to 1870. This excellent study is an indispensable base for similar researches into the more hectic and tangled later periods.—ABRAHAM YESELSON, *Rutgers, The State University.*

Israel: The Making of a Nation. BY D. R. ELSTON. (London: Oxford University Press, 1963. Pp. 159. $5.00.)

Government and Politics in Israel. BY OSCAR KRAINES. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1961. Pp. 246. $1.95, paperback. Cloth edition, 1962, $3.50.)

These two volumes are useful compendia of essential facts concerning Israeli problems and politics. They explore no hypotheses and offer few generalizations.

The purpose of Mr. Elston's book—set forth in a "Foreword" by its sponsors, the Anglo-Israel Association—is to provide a "factual and really objective account . . . of the State of Israel as it is today," and to "summarize the way in which the principal organs of a new State have been created and developed. . . ." These goals are pursued in six well-written chapters as follows: (1) "The Historical Background," from ancient times to the first general election. This excellent summary accounts for one-third of the monograph. (2) "Israel Today," covering geography, climate, flora and fauna, population and immigration, the Arab community, governmental structure, and national defense. (3) "Education, Health and Welfare Services." (4) "The National Economy." (5) "Cultural Activities and Social Customs." (6) "Conclusion." There is no bibliography, and only about six references (mostly secondary sources) are cited in the text.

Some passages in Mr. Elston's work seem to be designed for the tourist: *e.g.*, a description of the view from the Knesset restaurant, information concerning the highway system, and a list of airlines serving Israel. Nevertheless, the author has provided an impressive store of basic information concerning the nature and problems of Israel's government. For those who are interested in more than surface-level material, however, it will be necessary to search elsewhere. There are few insights into how the political system actually operates. Treatment of the national economy ignores fiscal policy and supplies no data bearing on acute balance of payments and capital formation problems. There are no quantitative data concerning the extensive foreign aid programs, public and private, which account for the creation and maintenance of Israel. Aid supplied by the American government, totaling $877.7 million by June 30, 1962, is not even mentioned, and specific information concerning other external income is also lacking. The four pages dealing with social customs are illuminating but do little more than scratch the surface of that important subject.

Oscar Kraines' work suffers from many of these same defects. The more limited aim of his study is "to present an objective analytical picture of government and politics in Israel, emphasizing the constitutional and legal foundations and the political processes." The product of his labor, although a valuable outline of legal foundations and the formal structure and procedure of government, is woefully deficient in analyses of political processes. The inner workings of the decision-making process are virtually untouched. For example, in discussing the budget, national defense, and foreign policy, the dynamic role of the Prime Minister is totally ignored.

Although generally clear and informative, the Kraines book is sometimes confusing on important points of fact. We are told, for example, that "Fundamental" laws can be amended or repealed by simple majority vote (p. 30), although it is later reported that "amending or suspending the Basic Law" requires at least 80 votes in the 120-member Knesset (p. 42). Likewise, the reader will find it difficult to understand Israel's accounting and auditing system. We read in one place (p. 199) that the Ministry of Finance is charged with "maintaining Government accounts," although it later appears that the quasi-independent State Comptroller's Office performs the accounting functions (p. 215). Meanwhile, several references to the State Comptroller compare his duties with those of the American Comptroller-General, although it is finally revealed that the former is actually confined to post-auditing functions.

Other weaknesses of Mr. Kraines' work concern his value judgments. His chapter on local government makes a plea for greater "home rule" while also deploring the existing degree of autonomy and diversity. His suggestion that the government's many economic enterprises be brought "into the area of executive and legislative control," and their budgeting be "included as part of one overall budget of the Government," would frustrate heroic efforts at economic planning in a nation where (according to Elston, pp. 104, 119) 90 per cent of the land is owned by the state or by the Jewish National Fund, and the government holds from 90 to 100 per cent interest in most of the development corporations responsible for mineral exploitation.

Another serious inadequacy of these two works concerns their analysis of Israel's problems with her neighbors. Arab intransigence appears to be regarded as the principal obstacle to peace, although both authors present a partial account of the Arab case against Israel. Objective analysis, however, will require more than is to be found in either book. Discussions of the Suez transit problem should not ignore the precedents relating to the Canal and a status of belligerency set by

Great Britain in two World Wars. Responsibility for raids along the borders cannot be assessed without considering the findings by UN mixed armistice commissions which are so unfavorable to Israel that she has long boycotted them. Discussion of the refugee question must at least note the annual UN resolutions that affirm the right of displaced Arabs to repatriation, and the right to compensation for lost property if they choose to live elsewhere. Those who assign responsibility for breaches of the peace must weigh the several Security Council resolutions that have condemned Israel for various massive raids into Arab territory during the past fifteen years. Even the authors' discussions of water disputes provide no hint of Israel's construction projects designed to divert water from the Jordan to the Negev region during 1964, a provocative move of dubious legality. Understanding the preconditions and prospects for peace in the Middle East thus requires still more of what is promised on the dust jacket of Mr. Kraines' book, *viz.*, an effort that "penetrates deeply into . . . current political processes . . . and Israel's position in world affairs."—H. PAUL CASTLEBERRY, *Washington State University.*

Turkey Today—And Tomorrow; An Experiment in Westernization. BY NURI EREN. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963. Pp. 276. $6.50.)

The First Turkish Republic; A Case Study in National Development. BY RICHARD D. ROBINSON. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963. Pp. xvi, 367. $5.95.)

These two volumes are the latest in a spate of recent books on Turkey, both popular and scholarly. There are good reasons for such lively interest in this southeastern bastion of NATO. In the first place, Turkey is plagued by the familiar problems besetting all of the so-called transitional societies. Secondly, Turkey has had a longer history of attempts to deal with these problems than most of the other Afro-Asian nations. Indeed, the name of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk is still a byword for one of the most effective (and certainly the most dramatic) effort at forced-draft reform and development outside the Communist orbit. Like India, Mexico, and perhaps Japan, the Turkish case has now become an acid test of the proposition that rapid economic and social change can be accomplished without resort to totalitarianism. For most of the past twenty years, the country has operated with a free competitive party system, thus presenting a relatively open book for the student of radical social change. Notably, it is the only Middle Eastern country, other than Israel, of which we can say this. Moreover, as a close ally of the United States and a recipient of massive foreign aid Turkey is one of the few countries where Americans have been welcomed with open arms. Here, then is a living laboratory for the student of rapid and radical social, economic, and political change. Indeed, the student himself has a role to play, for to the extent that he can throw light on the process of social transformation, he can enhance the possibility of further favorable development (provided, of course, that the policy makers are alert and receptive to the information thus provided).

The two works under review do not, unfortunately, greatly extend our knowledge or understanding of the Turkish transformation. They present some rather interesting contrasts, beginning with the fact that one has been written by a Turk the other by an American. One tends to be highly critical, the other somewhat more understanding. One takes a relatively broad, topical approach, the other attempts a more specialized analysis using some of the latest concepts of the social sciences set within an essentially historical framework.

Although not written for the expert, Eren's work contains much useful information and sound analysis. In assessing the problems of modern Turkey, the author consistently uses contemporary Western society as a standard of judgment. Inevitably, he finds the Turks woefully lacking particularly in such areas as the development of individual initiative and respect for the rights of fellow citizens, which are indeed the ideal hallmarks of modern democracy. In this, Eren himself typifies a common Turkish variation of the revolution of rising expectations, comprised of an idealization of the most advanced nations in the free world and intense dissatisfaction with the fact that Turkey seems to remain so far behind. It goes without saying that in Turkey as elsewhere this dissatisfaction must continue to be tinged with hope, for if it ever gives way to despair, the already strained fabric of the society may indeed be ripped to shreds. Eren has caught the essence of this aspect of the Turkish transformation in citing "sociological research" (though unfortunately here as elsewhere he fails to give his source) which indicates that "*medeni olmak*, to be civilized, has replaced *cesur olmak*, to be brave, as the prime virtue." (p. 30) Anyone who ventures into the Turkish provincial town or rural village can testify to the accuracy of this assertion.

On other points, a reading of this work creates a sense of disappointment that the author was unable to bring his great experience and knowledge to bear more effectively. Thus, in the three chapters on government and constitution, political parties, and political ideology, he does not go far beyond the formalities of historical and legal facts, most of which have already been published elsewhere. On the other hand, the sections on agriculture, industry, labor, and (for a curious contrast) literature are marked by sharp analysis and the sure grasp born of close familiarity. One gets the feeling that Mr. Eren is at his best when dealing with matters of which he has first hand knowledge, but that he is less skillful in dealing with the testimony of others on subjects less familiar to him. The resultant uneven quality of the work distracts from what might otherwise have been a serviceable resume of the major accomplishments and problems of Turkish society.

Robinson applies a much sharper focus to his work, and significantly tends to be far more understanding of the Turks. Indeed, the two authors differ markedly on a number of points, and in an ironic way. Thus, where Eren tends to treat the transition from the Young Turks to the Kemalist republic as an inexorable step on the road to modernization, Robinson emphasizes the personality of Atatürk as a decisive factor, arguing that without him Turkey might well have missed the boat altogether. In fact, he goes so far as to argue not only that Atatürk seized convenient opportunities, but that he created them; moreover that he had the ultimate goal of a secularized republican regime clearly in mind even before he set foot on Anatolian soil in the spring of 1919. Here, the usual position of the Turkish and non-Turkish observers have been completely reversed. The great weakness in both Western and Turkish literature to date has been an almost complete failure to assess Atatürk objectively. Unfortunately, Robinson does not carry his analysis as far as he might, although he does offer some interesting perspectives. There remain legitimate doubts as to whether the course pursued by Atatürk was the only logical one for Turkey, or whether it was in all respects a wise one. The definitive political biography of Atatürk remains to be written.

In other respects, too, Robinson and Eren have reversed the usual role of Turk and non-Turk. Eren is unremittingly critical of the statist economic policies pursued since the early thirties; Robinson offers some highly plausible justifications. Particularly significant here is the fact that Robinson refuses to be bound to the relatively narrow approach of the economist, but insists on assessing the achievements and failures of Turkish state enterprise from the broader perspective of political and social development. The result is a well balanced judgment set against the background of the modernization process viewed as a whole.

Like Eren, Robinson is at his best when dealing with subjects with which he is most familiar. His descriptions of the traditional rural village are both sound and authoritative, as is his emphasis on the crucial role of this social institution. Robinson is able to rely here on his uniquely extensive experience in the field. Moreover, he has put his finger on a problem which remains critical: the still yawning gap between the mass of relatively illiterate, tradition-oriented villagers and the small urbanized educated elite. Nor does he neglect to mention the provincial small town, which may well play a crucial role in filling this gap. Unfortunately, his treatment of this aspect is all too brief. The blame is not entirely his, for there has been practically no research on this all-important social entity (although recently foreign scholars have begun to turn their attention to it).

The last two chapters of Robinson's study are devoted to an analysis of developments during the last four years preceding the 1960 military coup. Here, again ironically, he seems to momentarily lose his objectivity, particularly by contrast with Eren who, in spite of personal involvement, has managed to avoid bitterness. Robinson effectively explains the conditions which pushed the Menderes regime into increasingly repressive actions. They were born of the determination to continue rapid development regardless of cost and without sufficient political courage to resist the popular pressure, particularly from the newly awakened villagers, for more consumer goods. Yet he is unable to refrain from bitterly denouncing the military junta which overthrew Menderes, concentrating on the legal and political inconsistencies to which it fell prey. As a result, the significance of the coup as an attempt to reverse certain apparent social (and on the surface, political) trends is overlooked or at least underemphasized.

Robinson and Eren's works suffer from one regrettable common flaw. Both include a chapter on foreign policy which seems to bear very little relation to the remainder of their studies and which, particularly in Robinson's case, includes some sweeping speculations and even some internal contradictions.

On balance, then, Eren's work stands as a commendable if highly critical attempt to evaluate contemporary Turkish society from the perspective of a Turkish layman. Robinson's study, though less critical, offers more insights and some challenging and even controversial interpretations. Significantly, both works conclude that the major problem for Turkey today arises from the attempt to continue rapid development under democratic auspices. Here again, the Turk and the American have reversed roles, for Eren is optimistic about the outcome. Robinson, on the other hand, declares flatly that "Turkey awaits its second Mustafa Kemal."—FRANK TACHAU, *Rutgers University, The State University.*

Brazil on the Move. By John Dos Passos. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1963. Pp. ix, 205. $3.95.)

Invisible Latin America. By Samuel Shapiro. (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1963. Pp. xii, 180. $3.95.)

During the past few years, there has been a notable increase in the number of books about Latin American government and politics and of political scientists who take an interest in Latin America. For this, we should be thankful to Fidel Castro and his fellows. True to some kind of law, it seems that the amount of attention granted by academicians to a given subject varies in direct proportion to the inches of newpaper space devoted thereto.

Outside of political science, there has been an even greater outpouring of publications on Latin America. While the books under review here make a contribution to the general literature on Latin America, neither of them can be said to fall within the realm of political science.

John Dos Passos, who has done much to enrich American social literature, would probably not regard his little collection of Brazilian impressions as among his greatest works. To that large body of people who know nothing about Brazil, the book can be an entertaining and pleasing introduction to some aspects of the country. Dos Passos says very little about Brazil's government and politics, but there is a useful chapter about a man who is worth watching: Governor Carlos Lacerda of Guanabara state (city of Rio de Janeiro), who was at violent odds with João Goulart and the whole Brazilian left wing.

John Dos Passos is a humanist, not a political scientist. One could hope, however, that so renowned a writer could turn out something that would be in keeping with the excellence of his own past contributions as well as with the importance of the country he treats. Unfortunately, this rambling, good-natured volume falls short of that goal. It ends abruptly, without any sort of evaluative conclusion, as though the author had to hurry to lunch. No definable thread of meaning runs through the book.

Despite the fine historical-geographical works by the late William Lytle Schurz, the sociological studies by T. Lynn Smith and Gilberto Freyre, and the perceptive surveys by Hernane Tavares de Sá and J. A. Camacho, there is no book in English on the government and politics of Brazil. Except for some narrow-gauge studies on presidentialism, federalism, political history, and the like, there is nothing in Portuguese. For a broad political study of Brazil, one must still turn to the excellent little volume by Jacques Lambert, *Le Brésil, structure social et institutions politiques* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1953). The Lambert volume has never been translated from the French, and very few Brazilians know of its existence.

Anything for literary effect! Just as it is incorrect for Dos Passos' title to claim that Brazil is "on the move," so Professor Shapiro's book is about a phase of Latin America that is anything but "invisible." Shapiro claims that visitors to Latin America seldom see the misery, agony, and medieval exploitation of its increasingly restless masses. The wretchedness of Latin America is almost everywhere in plain view, and it is hard to know how one could miss it.

In stronger words than usual, Professor Shapiro stresses a familiar theme: Most people in Latin America are very, very poor, Latin American economic and social conditions are going from bad to worse, Latin American ruling oligarchies are callous and socially unconscious even in the face of the *fidelismo* that is breathing down their necks, and unless a lot of us wake up soon we'll have much more to worry about than just Cuba.

One may quarrel with several of Professor Shapiro's sweeping and unusual generalizations, as when he equates Uruguayan and Mexican socio-political systems, waxes enthusiastic over the accomplishments of Cuba's revolution, overdraws U. S. responsibility for Latin American economic and political retardation, oversimplifies political history (Mexico, Cuba, Guatemala), and sees hope only where his brand of "social revolution" has occurred, thus putting Chile and Costa Rica low on the list of Latin American republics that have arrived, and giving high (though by no means unqualified) ratings to Cuba, Mexico, and Bolivia. Such statements as that "Under the PRI, Mexico has enjoyed more liberty and stability than any other Latin American government" are highly questionable. The charge that we are responsible for the rupture of diplomatic relations with Cuba is contrary to well known facts of recent history. However, no one who knows Latin America can find much to dispute in Professor Shapiro's basic plea for action, nor in his concluding seventeen proposals for reform (improvement of U.S.-Latin American trade opportunities, improvement in calibre of U.S. diplomats, no *abrazos* for dictators, assistance to Latin American education, more for economic aid and less for military assistance, encouragement to agrarian reform and population control, multilateralization of our aid, acceptance of Latin American predilection for managed economies, and the like).

The Latin American republics are galloping to a fate that gives the West little cause for comfort. Despite new land reform legislation in Chile, the flourishing social and political democracies of Costa Rica and Uruguay, the new social consciousness of Peru, the glimmerings of hope for Venezuela and Bolivia, the halting contributions of the Alliance for Progress, and so on, retrogression or further Soviet aggrandizement seem to be the alternatives for the immediate Latin American future. Old-fashioned military coups still influence the course of politics in altogether too many Latin American republics. Great nations may still slip into the cauldron of political demogoguery and irresponsible nationalism in lieu of meaningful social reform. Even the Mexican revolution is far from over.

Professor Shapiro's warnings are strident but earnest. His appeals for action echo many of the pleas of most other Latin Americanists.

It is now fair to ask: Who hears this chorus?—JAMES L. BUSEY, *University of Colorado.*

Brazil: People and Institutions. BY T. LYNN SMITH. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1963. Pp. xx, 667. $12.50.)

Brazil's Developing Northeast: A Study of Regional Planning and Foreign Aid. BY STEFAN H. ROBOCK. (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1963. Pp. xv, 213. $2.00 paper; $3.50, cloth.)

With each passing year it becomes more apparent that the phenomena of politics and government cannot be satisfactorily explained or understood without detailed reference to the insights of sociology, economics and psychology—the sciences of group organization and individual action. In the two books here under review, the political scientist concerned with the phenomena of Brazilian government and politics will find many an invaluable insight once dismissed as being beyond the scope of political science.

Professor T. Lynn Smith's *tour de force* and sociological masterpiece is here presented in the third edition since its first appearance in 1946. A massive and definitive work, it will unquestionably continue to hold its place as a *sine qua non* for all who would claim to understand the one third of Latin America which is Brazil. Well-written and eminently readable, the value of the book lies as much in its clear exposition of the historical development of Brazil's social institutions as in its treatment of the institutions themselves. Its liberal references to and quotations from the works of early visitors to Brazil call to mind the prescient observations of de Tocqueville and Bryce without which American political science would never have been what it is today.

In a fast-growing, fast-changing multi-cultured country like Brazil, any across-the-board scholarly work runs the danger of rapid obsolesence. It is thus gratifying that Professor Smith has included in this third edition much that is new and timely. His discussion of Japanese Nisei in Brazil impressed this reviewer particularly.

Professor Robock's book is an excellent analysis of a more limited area of study. Concentrating exclusively on the search for solutions to the economic and social problems of Brazil's Northeast, the book presents an encouraging and cautiously optimistic view of present and future conditions in this most significant economic and geographic region. Tracing the background of the Northeast's economic problems back to 1877, when they first came seriously to the attention of the central government in Rio de Janeiro, Professor Robock brings the story up to the last decade and focusses attention on a comprehensive program of economic and social aid for Northeastern Brazil known as SUDENE which has been in effect since 1961. Based on the 1959 Report to the Brazilian Congress of Economics Minister Celso Furtado, this program and its encouraging progress is of far more real significance to the future of the Northeast—Professor Robock reports—than the over-played activities of Francisco Julião and his relatively small Peasant Leagues. Whether the author's optimism is justified in the light of current rapid and aggressive Communist offensives elsewhere in the developing nations is a matter which may cause many readers to be justifiably skeptical. Nevertheless his analysis provides a most perceptive study of the politically feasible constructive courses of economic and social action which must constitute part of any successful Free World political counter-offensive in at least this one critical area.

One field of investigation is disappointingly lacking in the first of the two books under review. This is that there is no significant treatment of the structure of political power within the overall description of the Brazilian social structure. Where the book could make a valuable contribution to significant knowledge by answering such questions as "Who has power?" or "What economic and social groups have significant political influence?"—it must be recorded that *Brazil: People and Institutions* does not. *Brazil's Developing Northeast* on the other hand is much more sophisticated (to the mind of a political scientist, that is) and its integration of political reality with economic theory does much to give it validity. Granted that neither book answers all the questions a political scientist might ask, the fact remains that both works—one in a very broad way and the other in a rather specific way—constitute most valuable contributions to our knowledge of Latin America.—THEODORE WYCKOFF, *Arizona State University.*

South West Africa. BY RUTH FIRST. (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1963. Pp. 269. $1.25.)

Miss First's slim volume is the second full-length work in English on the territory of South West Africa to be published in the United States since the founding of the United Nations. *Brutal*

Mandate: A Journey to South West Africa (1962) by Allard K. Lowenstein was the pioneering work in this area. Despite the fact that the South West African dispute is the only one in the history of the United Nations ever to reach the International Court of Justice four times and to outlast the perennial Kashmir dispute, surprisingly little has ever been published on the imbroglio. Although neither Miss First's nor Mr. Lowenstein's books could be properly classified as scholarly contributions comparable to the classics of, say, Apter, Carter, Coleman, Duffy, Hodgkin, Thompson, or Kuper, they are the only substantial published works on the area so far, with the exception of several incisive pamphlets published in South Africa by Ballinger, Rheinallt Jones, and Goldblatt.

South West Africa is a significant contribution to southern African studies and contains considerable material of interest to scholar and general reader alike. Miss First has arranged her material around several critical topics: South Africa and the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, South Africa and the United Nations, the social ecology of the territory, the German colonial era, systematic governmental racial policies, and white and non-white political groups. She handles her subject matter in far greater breadth than any of her predecessors and has added an adequate bibliography as well as useful charts and maps.

Like Allard K. Lowenstein, Miss First is outraged at the treatment meted out to the wards of the South African Government in the mandated territory and favors United Nations interposition to prevent escalation of the dispute into armed violence. She clearly documents the considerable involvement of American business enterprise in South West Africa (a subject hardly ever explored except in two esoteric M.A. theses on the territory this reviewer has seen) and in so doing provides considerable grist for the mill of African nationalism. Moreover, her description and analysis of the African nationalist movement are without equal in the literature on the territory.

Unfortunately, the book is of uneven quality and is sometimes tendentious. Although adequate in scope, Miss First's *South West Africa* is clearly inadequate in depth and in systematic conceptualization. Her treatment of the white political parties in the territory was extremely shallow and, similarly, her study of the two African political parties in the territory—S.W.A.P.O. and S.W.A.N.U.—would have been improved had she drawn upon the findings of Hodgkin in his seminal work, *African Political Parties* (1961). Moreover, she might fruitfully have compared the African and white political parties in the territory with similar or analogous groupings in other southern and eastern African nations.

Although her style is refreshingly urbane and lucid, Miss First sadly neglects some of the more mechanical aspects of writing. She uses footnotes far too sparingly and only rarely identifies the sources from which she quotes, which impairs the value of her work for all but the general reader. Finally, *South West Africa* would have been a more valuable work had the author made fuller and more complete use of source materials in Afrikaans and German.—RICHARD DALE, *Northern Illinois University*.

The Politics of Partnership. BY PATRICK KEATLEY. (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1963. Pp. 528. $1.95.)

The flag has been pulled down on the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and the short-lived attempt to build a government in Central Africa on the foundation of racial partnership has come to an end. The creation of the Federation, with its pronounced policy of multiracialism, was supported by the moderates, and the opposition was polarized between those who believed in white domination or who thought that the interests of the Africans would be jeopardized. In the brief decade of the Federation's existence, African nationalism has dominated one country after another, and the concept of non-racialism has replaced the unpopular multi-racialism. At the end of its brief life, the Federation seemed to many to be a political anachronism, with no compelling theme to provide unity for its diverse population, and rejected by the African nationalists as an unsuitable basis for organizing political power.

Political development in other parts of the continent has outstripped that in the Federation, and Mr. Keatley, a political reporter for the *Guardian* (Manchester), attempts to find the reasons in the historical past and in the ideology propounded by such folk heroes as Cecil Rhodes. The background material is a bouillabaisse of historical incidents, loosely strung together, which help to explain the prevailing attitudes of the dominant white group and "the contention of the present generation of African politicians in the Rhodesias that the initial occupation by the white man of their territory was legally and morally wrong." The interesting flash-backs are often too disjointed to serve as explanatory history, and we are constantly jarred from a promising train of thought by partisan quips. Mr. Keatley rightly points out that much of the politics of the Federation is emotional and symbolic, that how people feel may be more important than the facts of the case. Good enough. But Mr. Keatley, a partisan in his thinking, would like the reader to share his stereotypes and reject the Federation, which for all its faults produced governments with African majorities in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and the nationalists were in striking distance of controlling the Federal government before the dissolution.

The Rhodesian case, with its uneasy background and disenchanting heroes, has no precise parallel, but it may be fruitful to consider it as another incident in the clash of cultures, where Western ideas of law and authority have both attracted and repelled, and have often dealt the old societies a shattering blow. Self-government changes the focus of the picture, it may to a degree transfer the responsibility, but it does not solve the problem, one of the most important of our time: that of accommodating the ideas of the West to this tremendous upheaval of values and social structures and of building a more stable order on the wrecks of the old societies.—ROLAND YOUNG, *Northwestern University.*

The African Presence in World Affairs. BY ARNOLD RIVKIN. (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963. Pp. xvi, 304. $3.95.)

The flow of new books on Africa continues to grow in proportion to the increasing problems facing that troubled continent. Arnold Rivkin, in contrast to some contemporary writers on Africa, is no stranger to the continent and brings to bear a perspective gained through years of experience.

In common with most contemporary works on Africa, the author seeks through a multidisciplinary approach to "describe, analyze and interrelate processes of political and economic change. . . ." In addition, however, he has set himself the task of showing the relationship between "internal dynamism" and "international behavior."

In our attempt to cope with the complexity and rapidity of change in Africa, we are inclined towards categorization of countries and systems. Though sometimes contributing to clarity, such generalizations suffer the danger of over-simplification as attested to by the rapidity with which events have worked the demolition of schemes and methodologies.

Arnold Rivkin accepts the Casablanca-Monrovia dichotomy as a basis for his analysis and seeks to show how radically differing domestic politics and economics contribute to radically differing international behaviors. Many African scholars, including this reviewer, have questioned the utility of the Casablanca-Monrovia dichotomy, even before the Addis-Ababa meeting of May, 1963, on the basis that it occasionally misleads and frequently over-simplifies.

Though he terms it "unique" among African states, Professor Rivkin postulates Nigeria as an illustration of the more desirable Monrovia group of African states. Ghana, on the other hand, is employed most frequently, as illustrative of the less desirable Casablanca group of states.

The good states as illustrated by "unique" Nigeria, are characterized by a concentration on internal development, strong local government, constitutionalism and civil rights, true neutralism or pro-western, multi-party democracy, de-centralized free economies, and non-intervention. The less desirable states as characterized by Ghana, on the other hand, concentrate their energies on African unity, are highly centralized and unitary in form, authoritarian, pro-communist bloc, single totalitarian party, socialistic and inclined to intervene in the affairs of their neighbors.

Surely all of these variables are present in contemporary Africa, but not as neatly arranged as Mr. Rivkin would lead us to believe. For example, federation in the case of Mali, the UAR, South Africa and Central Africa, has not contributed to democracy, free enterprise and moderation as Mr. Rivkin suggests has been the case in federal Nigeria. True, Nigeria's constitution has an extraordinary bill of rights, but it is also true that the constitution contains a clause which in effect can render these rights meaningless if the need should arise. It is not only the three "ideologically oriented left authoritarian" states that espouse socialism, prefer a single to a multi-party system or support Pan-Africanism; for in fact, these attributes are characteristic of nearly every sub-Saharan country.

The use of the Casablanca-Monrovia dichotomy tends towards over-simplification of the ends of nation-building as well. Mr. Rivkin sees political stability as the purpose of national development. From this it is concluded that Africa's new leaders promote economic growth, not for purposes of establishing human dignity, racial equality or national power, but to satisfy the expectation of their citizens so as to ensure political stability.

Africa is emergent and complex and it is unlikely that an analytical dichotomy will measure up to the task of comprehension required. It forces the writer to suggest that Tanganyika, for example, will likely adopt the Nigerian model—apparantly on the basis that as of the time of writing, it was considered, like Nigeria, politically moderate. However, Tanganyika is a proclaimed, single-party, highly centralized state; its president is a leading African spokesman for a socialist ideology and Pan-African unity—attitudes Professor Rivkin attributes to the Casablanca, "ideologically oriented left authoritarian" states.

—Fred G. Burke, *Syracuse University, Program of East African Studies.*

India: A World in Transition. By Beatrice Pitney Lamb. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1963. Pp. ix, 374. $3.50.)

During the first years of independence, India demonstrated a "national vigor under emergency conditions hard to duplicate in the history of any nation." India achieved what the author of this extensive survey describes as "an almost incredible list" of accomplishments, revealing "something of the mettle of the nation" (p. 345). They included the ending of anarchy, the establishing of a new government, the fighting of a war, the subduing of a Communist insurrection, the coping with millions of refugees, the absorbing of princely states, and the adopting of a new constitution. In her examination of a "world in transition," Mrs. Lamb describes how these accomplishments came to be. She presents the historical, social, religious, economic and political background against which these and subsequent events emerged.

In describing religious and social institutions, and in treating social change, Mrs. Lamb retains an admirable sense of balance. In assessing India's economic development, she concludes that India is "the key country to watch" because, among other reasons, "it seeks to progress within the frame-work of a series of well-considered, coordinated plans while remaining a democracy" (p. 267).

A chapter on the nature of Indian politics outlines the major characteristics of government and parties, and touches upon peculiarly Indian factors in the political process. In calling attention to unifying factors, the author suggests that highly divisive forces, prominent throughout the 1950's, "may not prove in the long run as great an obstacle to the fundamental unity of the nation as some Western scholars have predicted" (p. 342).

There are a few points with which this reviewer would take issue. The subtlety of Indian politics cannot be fully comprehended without the recognition that Gandhi was the greatest political leader of modern India. To treat him as "the greatest religious leader" (p. 120) and to equate *satyagraha* with civil disobedience (pp. 226 and 299) is to obscure Gandhi's contribution to politics and to underestimate continuing developments at one level of Indian politics. It would also have been well to note that India's extensive election laws provide recourse to candidates who suffer from abuses such as those described on pp. 227–228. The chapter on Foreign Policy does not do full justice to repeated Indian challenges of Chinese activities on the border.

Mrs. Lamb has given an incisive account of many of the complexities which constitute contemporary India. She has supported the text with an extensive bibliography. This book is one of the finest introductions to India yet to appear, and its value is enhanced by a warm and lively style.—Joan V. Bondurant, *University of California (Berkeley).*

India and Pakistan: A Political Analysis. By Hugh Tinker. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962. Pp. 228. $4.50 cloth, $1.75 paper.)

Increasingly social scientists have realized the central importance of the administrative and military services and the deficiencies and problems of representative democratic institutions in the newly independent countries of the world. This can lead, and in the case of the book under review, has led to an implicit invidious comparison between "the politician" and "the administrator" without recognizing sufficiently the different functions played by or problems faced by these separate actors. In part, this may be explained by Mr. Tinker's association with both the administrative and military services in India during the final years of British India.

The pattern of analysis is evident first in the author's interpretation of the events leading up to independence and partition, which he feels were more a result of administrative action and initiative than political forces and leadership—especially the leadership of the Indian National Congress. Despite the commanding presence of Lord Mountbatten, who appeared to the "politicians" as a "warrior prince, semi-divine," in Mr. Tinker's words, the collapse of administrative morale and Great Britain's inability or unwillingness to allocate sufficient resources to alter the situation was the fundamental cause of independence and partition. Congress's unrealistic intransigence on the partition issue caused their leadership to lose effective control of the situation which was "retrieved by the (Indian) constitutional experts" who assumed the initiative and convinced Congress that partition was the only realistic solution. Somewhat contradictory, but indicative of Mr. Tinker's conviction that politicians of the subcontinent have lacked vision, is his belief that the Congress ultimately accepted in 1947 what it could have had since 1942.

Since partition and independence, the markedly different political development of Pakistan and India are analyzed within this same general scheme. Although it is not entirely clear what Mr. Tinker's point of reference is, he sees a shift in Indian politics to an "American" model, replete with a multiplicity of interests, localism, and regionalism, which finds its structural support in local "Tammany Halls" but still presided over by the "Gladstonian" figure of Jawaharlal Nehru—removed, unrealistic, and out of contact—but still omnipotent. Below the Olympian heights commanded by the Prime Minister, a basic change in the composition of leadership has occurred with the rise of the party "Managers" to control and power. Although pork barrel legislation, alleged and outright corruption, casteism, nepotism and other assorted tactics of the machine politician have not yet produced disaster in India, the clear impression is that this is impending.

In Pakistan the politicians have already produced the disaster and the figure of Ayub Khan is cast in the role of the administrative leader—realistic and far-seeing (in marked contrast to Nehru)—attempting to re-assemble the constitutional and economic rubble caused by years of conflict between the politicians—be they religious, regionalist, or large landed interests—over the constitutional framework of the nation. "In tune with Lord Curzon" this "tweedy, ex-Sandhurst general" introduced the Basic Democracy scheme which based its support on the "natural leaders of the society", *i.e.*, the "rustic yeomen and squires" of the countryside, marking a return, Mr. Tinker feels, to the post-Indian Mutiny policy of British India and, despite its consequences in the past, the Basic Democracy scheme seems to meet the approval of the author.

Although not an overt protagonist of Pakistan, Mr. Tinker is more at home with the administrative-oriented politics of the bifurcated nation of the subcontinent than the machine-oriented politics of the united nation of the subcontent. In Pakistan no trend towards an American style of politics is apparent but rather there is a continued reliance on the administrative and military framework left by British India and which could be termed the "British Empire style of politics." It is the politicians' attack on the professional, rational, non-representative administrative and military institutions in both India and Pakistan which appears to concern the author most. Due to this perspective, his "political analysis" often misses the mood and tone of Indian politics and, more significantly, underestimates the importance of underlying political and social processes of change which are forming the new societies of the sub-continent.

Much of what Mr. Tinker says rings true, however, and regardless of the merit or accuracy of many of his points they are concisely and entertainingly presented. Knowledgeable readers will both enjoy and gain from reading this study and, for the lay reader, Mr. Tinker offers an adequate bibliography which, if utilized, will allow the non-expert to intelligently evaluate this study.—LAWRENCE SHRADER, *Mills College*.

Southeast Asia in United States Policy. BY RUSSELL H. FIFIELD. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963. Pp. xi, 448. $6.50.)

Regional political studies should be among the first sources consulted by the policymaker, but such studies, including this one, should not be the basis for policy. With rare exception they suffer from one of two deficiencies: the too-narrow focus imposed by the regional specialist's training, or a political analysis wrapped within a conceptual cloak, the author's habit of thought which jades his sensitivity to the very cultural and social traits that too frequently overwhelm the regionalist. Notwithstanding these two dangers, political scientists are obliged to continually reexamine regions *qua* regions, not only for the benefit of the policy maker or even the interested public, but because regional ties are increasingly significant as technology has its impact upon politics. Communications, modern defense, and industrial economics have combined to shake the nation-state out of complete sovereignty and into various interdependencies.

Professor Fifield is keenly aware of Southeast Asia's future interdependence. He considers the major factors affecting the area's future and presents a consistently American view of these factors, all of which is valuable. Further, Fifield demonstrates a general awareness of cultural differences and the evidence of these dissimilarities in the nationalist movements. He argues persuasively that "the best course of action for the United States in dealing with controversies among the non-Communist Southeast Asian countries is to pursue in the respective capitals a policy of adroit diplomacy." (p. 243) Diplomacy, rather than intervention or noninvolvement, two policies the author discards, suggests national equality and flexibility which to my view are indeed key criteria for a successful policy in the area. Other sections of the volume analyze the roles of Japan and India, SEATO, and residual colonial institutions in the region with generally sound, if not original, assessments.

However, the volume tends to slide towards the pole of a regionally bound analysis, not for the usual reasons but because of two basic (and popular) assumptions: that the People's Republic of China is determined to *dominate* Southeast Asia, and that the United States should prevent China from doing so, thus creating the central issue of U. S. policy in the area. For Fifield, it is in Southeast Asia where the United States and China will have their major confrontation. This assumption permeates the entire work. For example, we learn that "the multifarious threat of Communist China to Southeast Asia will give an impetus to U. S. aid programs not generally found in countries geographically remote from the Peking-Moscow bloc." (p. 273). Here, Fifield like Mr. Dulles in the fifties seems to regard geographic propinquity as an overweening factor in political relations; yet the evidence is now indisputable that the idea of communist revolution is persuasive whereever communist leaders can successfully identify with nationalist revolution, witness Chou En-lai's tour in Africa.

Unfortunately for the author, his research was completed before the Sino-Soviet split became apparent and the diversity in communism that is currently enabling Peking to gain support within factions of most communist parties outside Europe was not of great significance. To my mind, however, it is of extreme importance to the future of China's influence in Southeast Asia that Peking accommodates diverse national movements in a flexible foreign policy towards communist and non-communist states alike, otherwise nationalist leaders are likely to be as wary of China as they now are of the United States. Consideration of this problem is missing from the book which lessens the relevance of its prescriptions in a rapidly changing political environment.

The major contribution of this work rests in the chapters on the West's problem of cohesion and on Japanese and Indian roles in the region. Obviously the United States is not in a position to direct Europe or these other large states in their relations with Southeast Asia but constant weighing of the basic goals of a united Europe, India, and Japan provide a realism for American policy makers that has too often been missing in the past decade. Professor Fifield includes the important relations and issues that have developed since World War II to undergird a future cohesiveness between these diverse states.

This diversity raises another problem however that rests inherent in a policy study limited to one region. Although cultural similarities exist between Indonesia and neighboring states, inherent political problems are not necessarily of the same order. One policy for the region, even one based upon "diplomacy" is not adequate to deal with Indonesia and, say, Cambodia. Matters of dimension and complexity in the political process require the Washington policymaker to see the world as a whole and to compare the politics of states that are not of the same region. Indonesia is not as politically similar to any other Southeast Asian state as it is to Pakistan, Brazil, and even the Congo in size, ethnic and geographic problems, political leadership, inflationary pressures and, the Congo aside, population. In short, unless one focuses upon one particular problem in a region, may it not be better for the scholar as well as the policymaker to develop foreign policy prescriptions from a more useful theoretical base than "the region"?

Professor Fifield includes the most complete set of bibliographic notes relating to politics in Southeast Asia that I have come across. His comments are succinct and should be exceedingly helpful to the newcomer to the area.—JOHN BADGLEY, *Miami University (Ohio)*.

The Morning After: A Study of Independence. BY BRIAN CROZIER. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963. Pp. 299. $7.50.)

The author of this work is Brian Crozier—a journalist, lecturer, and member of the foreign staff of *The Economist*. His readable volume presents a survey of problems facing newly independent countries. It consists of three parts entitled respectively "The Myth of Independence", "The Frailty of Independence," and "Happy Though Independent". After examining the meaning and implications of independence, the author turns to problems of poverty, overpopulation, and political instability facing new nations. A chapter on "The New Leaders" is well written but superficial. In it the author has resorted to oversimplification in classifying and providing thumb-nail sketches of such diverse and complex personalities as Gamal Abdel Nasser, Sékou Touré, and Tunku Abdul Rahman.

While making extensive use of personal interviews, Crozier has neglected some of the best scholarly sources. This is especially so in his treatment of neutralism and Southeast Asian affairs. Pointing out that not all blame for difficulties in economic development can be traced to departing colonialists, he correctly stresses that in some cases blame must be attached to corruption, inefficiency, and irresponsibility among new rulers. In illustrating these points, he chooses examples of specific cases. Among his examples of the worst he includes Burma, Indonesia, Algeria, and the former Belgian Congo; while counting India, Cambodia, Malaya, Mali, and Nigeria among his examples of the best. Yet he stresses that at times even the best is not good enough. Crozier holds that the need which new leaders frequently feel to prove the reality of their independence often finds expression in the form of neutralism, acts of defiance, and in speeches made at international conferences. While he realizes that these leaders have recognized the threat to their independence posed by cold war tensions, he fears they have not always understood its nature. Noting that communists generally have enjoyed less success than many believe, he views the chief danger of communism as arising from its power as an expanding, proselytizing movement.

In view of recent Senate hearings and debates on the subject, the author's assertions concerning relative merits of Soviet and American aid programs hold special interest. A point deserving close attention is his conclusion that both American and Soviet aid efforts have been economically irrelevant and especially that American aid to Laos and Korea was "considerably worse than useless."

The time span chosen for any comparison of economic development in India and Communist China holds vital importance. Since Crozier's analysis stresses China's failures and India's relative progress during the limited period since 1959, the aptness of his analogy of China and India to the hare and the tortoise in the well-known fable remains open to question. Crozier suggests that "leaders of underdeveloped countries are watching Asia's giants." Yet, those responsible for economic policy in these countries probably know little about details of development plans and results achieved in China, India, and Japan.

Leaders of underdeveloped countries may find more to attract them in India's example than in China's. On the other hand, it is far from clear that efforts to imitate India will help them solve their own unique problems in seeking economic growth and political stability.

Certainly there are important lessons which developing nations may learn from those which have already attained higher levels of economic and political stability. These lessons rest not so much on ideology as upon factors such as important social change, continuity of effort, and unity among a country's top leaders.

In spite of the author's journalistic style, this volume makes a distinctive contribution in raising important questions. It should prove useful even to scholars who disagree with Crozier's treatment of his own provocative questions.—THEOPHILUS E. McKINNEY, JR., *Southern University.*

Law in Japan: The Legal Order in a Changing Society. EDITED BY ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963. Pp. xxxviii, 706. $15.00.)

The seventeen essays by Japanese law professors and jurists collected here are of unusual value to political scientists for the insight they give into the Japanese political process. This is not precisely the intention of the authors, some addressing themselves to very narrow legal problems, but others are concerned with law in action. Especially in the essays on dispute resolution and the legal profession, they present some striking data on the way traditional attitudes and practices persist in what appear to be legal institutions of purely Western origin.

The handling of disputes through courts or lawyers has never begun to approach the level found in England or America. Expense and inconvenience are not the main reasons. Universal standards of judgment, conflict in open court, assignment of moral fault have threatened the harmony of traditional social groups which prefer informal accommodation or mediation. While many traditional groups are breaking up and being replaced by more modern types, many of the latter seem to be reincorporating many of the old attitudes. It is true that a growing number of persons prefer to stand on their modern legal rights, but it looks unlikely that they will become typical. The Japanese approach here resembles modern social theory in the West inimical to socially destructive adversary techniques.

The roles of the judge, procurator, and lawyer illustrate such attitudes. The judge continues to dominate or lead the court. This follows from the French and German practice on which the Japanese has been modeled but also suggests the traditional official once wholly responsible for disposition of a case; the judge will urge out-of-court settlement by more harmonious techniques when possible. The procurator who represents the government dropped nearly half the criminal cases originally taken up in 1958; mainly in order to permit rehabilitation of the criminal or an informal settlement; he may legally decline to prosecute a person guilty of a serious crime at his own discretion. Apparently only guilty parties are tried as a rule since convictions have been running at about 99 per cent in recent years. The lawyer has little legal consulting work and still plays a modest role in court although attempts to utilize the American adversary trial techniques have been going on: such requires a more passive judge and active attorney. The lawyer may be little used as in 1959 in 91 per cent of the summary court actions and 63 per cent of the district court actions there was none to represent the litigants.

Protection of civil rights has been written into the Japanese constitution and laws under American leadership during the Occupation, but in the United States this approach depends upon the willingness of the citizen to go to court and upon an active legal profession which plays a leading if not dominant role in our political system. The Japanese is not litigious and when necessary depends on the official (the procurator or the judge) to insure fair treatment. As the authors are fully aware, the Japanese legal profession will have to be more active in assisting clients both in and out of court but is hampered by lack of popular support, the expense, and the small scale of the average attorney's work. The courts too, despite the explicit granting of judicial review, are inclined to find for the state by virtue of "the public welfare" rather than the individual in the few civil rights cases which have come up. It seems likely that the American legal style will not have a lasting impact in Japan and that civil rights will continue to rest on other sorts of political participation.—FRANK LANGDON, *University of British Columbia.*

North Korea Today. EDITED BY ROBERT A. SCALAPINO. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963. Pp. 141. $4.00.)

The divided status of Korea poses international political and military problems similar to those encountered in Germany and, most conspicuously today, in Vietnam. In the Asian countries particularly, the relative stability of the Communist (North) and non-Communist (South) regimes is a crucial factor in American policy decisions. Unfortunately, however, materials relating to the Communist regimes are scarce, and, when available, difficult to assess. Professor Scalapino has therefore performed a valuable service in making more widely available a series of articles which have previously appeared in the April–June, 1963 special issue of *The China Quarterly.* It is, however, disappointing that the volume suffers for the lack of a general introduction discussing policy issues which the editor is well qualified to provide.

The internal politics of North Korea receive treatment in two articles by Chong-Sik Lee (Pre-Korean War Stage) and Glenn D. Paige and Dong Jun Lee (Post-War Period) respectively. The complicated factional struggles which culminated in the triumph of the "Soviet faction" under Kim Il-song are deftly outlined by Chong-Sik Lee, who claims that the presence of Soviet troops and the support of the Soviet command were the crucial factors in Kim's ascent. Paige and Dong Jun Lee stress the harshness of North Korean Communist politics, which was in part a heritage of Japanese wartime control and of nineteenth century Korean Confucianism. They suggest that the deification of Kim Il-song may be a necessary correlate of the Communist transformation of an underdeveloped country such as Korea. The conclusion of the authors, that "a considerable degree of political stability has been achieved in contemporary North Korea" is supported by the findings of Kiwon Chung, who outlines and analyzes the development of the People's Army in relationship to the Korean Workers' Party. Like other revolutionary movements, the Korean Communist movement faced "the extra-revolutionary task of establishing a loyal and efficient military organization to consolidate its conquests." This led to the classical struggle between the professionals and the revolutionaries, which was resolved only after the purges of 1953–56, leaving the Party in solid control of the army today. Key P. Yang and Chang-Boh Chee, writing on the sweeping success of the educational system, attempt to distinguish the North Korean objectives from those of other Communist countries, especially China, by stressing the nationalistic content of the educational program and its attempt to redefine the cultural heritage as a means of moving toward Communism. It is questionable whether this is a valid distinction, inasmuch as similar tendencies are apt to be found in all revolutionary movements, Communist and non-Communist, within former colonial and semi-colonial areas, including China. Balanced appraisals of the land reform and collectivization programs by Chong-Sik Lee, and of agricultural development, by Yoon T. Kuark, indicate that severe strain has been experienced in this sector, and that the regime's self-proclaimed millenium has still to come. But all the evidence seems to point to gains, and not losses, under a system of "communes" from which the North Koreans, unlike the Chinese Communists, have not yet felt it necessary to leap backward. Meanwhile phenomenal industrial progress has been achieved, according to Yoon T. Yuark, largely owing to effectively planned use of foreign aid. He suggests that the unfavorable situation in South Korea, by contrast, may have important political consequences. Without reunification North Korea suffers from agricultural paucity and South Korea suffers from industrial stagnation. Ilpyong J. Kim, surveying the judicial and administrative structure of North Korea, deals with the problems posed by "revisionism," by de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union and its repercussions within the international Communist movement, and by the necessity of working out an administrative theory for a backward agrarian society emerging into an industrial stage. He argues that the development of the new social strata (managerial technicians, Party and governmental bureaucrats and a foreign-educated intelligentsia) has created a diversity of views which will have to be controlled, adjusted to, and utilized if the administration of North Korea is to be successful in the future. "The Foreign Policy of North Korea" by Robert A. Scalapino presents a broad survey of the problems faced by Korea in the East-West competition and in relation to the Sino-Soviet dispute. He summarizes the policy as 1) maintaining present alliances with Communist China and the Soviet Union, counting more heavily on China, however, against the United States and its allies; 2) maintaining a formal position of non-alignment within the Communist bloc, but conforming with Peking's hard line policies; 3) creation of a Peoples Front to strive for political and military unification of Korea (similar to policy of North Vietnam); 4) encouraging revolutionary movements in the non-Western world *à la* Communist China and Lenin; 5) designating the

United States World Enemy Number 1, and opposing any compromise with American policy at present. Thus Communist China appears to have emerged as the dominant external influence on North Korea. Current developments appear to support this thesis advanced by Scalapino more than a year ago.—STANLEY SPECTOR, *Washington University.*

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON
FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

HIRAM M. STOUT
The George Washington University

General

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INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW AND ORGANIZATION

Arms and Stability in Europe. By Alastair Buchan and Philip Windsor. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963. Pp. x, 236. $5.00.)

Although this study is the outgrowth of a conference involving representatives of the Institute for Strategic Studies, Le Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère, and Die Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, it is much more than simply a committee document. The report combines the rigor of authorship with the advantages of group expertise and criticism. No attempt was made to dilute the contents in an effort to obtain consensus, which is often the problem of such enterprises.

After exploring the relationship between military strategy and stability in Europe, the authors discuss measures of arms control and defense policy which might bring greater stability to Europe. The authors see little hope for either negotiated political or arms settlements. For example, they argue that political negotiations "could only follow from a reduction of tension and the achievement of a basic military stability." (p. 16) But the authors fail to recognize that with stability and a low tension level comes complacency which is probably an even greater impediment to successful negotiation because it takes the perceived urgency out of the situation.

Buchan and Windsor believe that disengagement in Europe is no longer feasible because of the rearmament of Germany and the Soviet stand on a divided Germany. Likewise they rule out the possibility of the creation of a nuclear free zone until what they call "functional arms agreements" designed to deter the possibilities of surprise attack in Europe are developed. Solutions for preventing surprise attack, requiring the development of extensive inspection and control systems, however, will be impossible to achieve without extensive disarmament. The Soviet position on this is unequivocal, despite the authors' assertion that the Soviets were interested in an "international alarm system" in 1955.

Some of the contradictions between Western armaments policy and disarmament were raised by one of the conferees in a reservation to the report. Thus Rear Admiral Anthony Buzzard rightly noted that Western "strategic nuclear superiority encourages tension and a strategic arms race, while its conventional inferiority makes it difficult to forgo this superiority." (p. 230) Although the Kennedy administration sought to overcome this conventional inferiority in Europe in order to keep open the option of conventional warfare, the authors of the report stress the necessity of using tactical nuclear forces in Europe as the major device for offsetting Soviet conventional superiority. They note that it is only because it is expected that the Soviet Union will disengage herself from a limited operation that tactical nuclear weapons can be used at all. The vulnerability of the two sides to each other's strategic weapons creates a situation in which both will hesitate to escalate to all out nuclear war even after tactical nuclear exchanges. It would seem to me, however, that once the Pandora's box of nuclear weapons is opened there will be little to prevent nuclear escalation. Even one of the early proponents of limited nuclear war, Professor Henry Kissinger, had second thoughts concerning the possibility of limiting war while using tactical nuclear weapons.

The authors' preference for emphasizing deterrent strategies over arms reduction possibilities is clearly illustrated by the final part of the book which has been titled "A Stable Western Defense." This section contains two chapters concerned with strengthening the deterrent capabilities of NATO. The discussion of the dilemmas presented by various proposals designed to reconcile national nuclear policy with the requirements of an effective and coordinated alliance is among the best in the book.

Buchan and Windsor see little value in the current NATO strategy emphasizing nuclear surface ships. At best it is only a facade for genuine nuclear sharing in NATO. A number of suggestions were also made with respect to improving the military and political structure of NATO. It is argued, for example, that no adjustment has been made within the organization to give expression to the European idea.

The book is an excellent summary of the military and political complexities confronting Europe, and as such is worthy of consideration. If nothing else it portrays European thinking on a vital and difficult question.—Lloyd Jensen, *University of Illinois.*

The Press and Foreign Policy. By Bernard C. Cohen. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963. Pp. xi, 288. $6.00.)

Cohen reformulates the "problem" of the relation of the press to the intelligence and appraisal stages of policy-making. Instead of adopting the conventional concern with whether reporters and papers fully report information for intelligent public use, the author asks functional questions about the actual foreign policy process in which the press plays varying roles. Who are the participants in the policy process? In what decision situations or occasions for decisions do they design alternatives for choice? How are they and their roles organized to process decisions? Rather than consider the subject in terms of the 18th century model of rational man, from which some observers derive their requirements that citizens be well-informed and that the press enlighten them, Cohen recognizes the limited possibilities of citizens and policy-makers. His realistic model of human capacities is similar to that of Lippmann and Almond (whom he cites) and Simon (whom he doesn't). This perspective is important both for the analysis of trends and conditions which it generates and for the policy alternatives it suggests.

The book is devoted more to understanding *how is the press influential*? than to *how influential is the press*? Not until we identify the mechanisms by which the press exercises its influence can we hope to measure that influence relative to other factors in policy-making. Cohen's typology of roles played by the press and his hypotheses about the uses of the press by government lay the ground work for future studies of the influence of reporters and their media.

There are "three major roles the press may be said to play in the foreign policy field—and, indeed, in almost any field of public policy" (p. 4). The *press as observer* informs, interprets, and serves as an instrument of government. The unavoidable policy implications of objective reporting are succinctly stated: "The more 'neutral' the press is—that is, the more it tries faithfully to transmit a record of 'what transpires' (including therein the policy statements of officials) and the more constrained it feels about making judgments concerning the meaning or importance of 'what transpires'—the more easily it lends itself to the uses of others . . ." (p. 28). The *press as participant* represents the public, criticizes government, advocates policy, and makes policy. The *press as catalyst* structures the attention of non-governmental publics, however limited in size of readership. In short, ". . . the press is significantly more than a purveyor of information and opinion. It may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think *about*" (p. 13).

The discussion of how the press is used by policy makers includes identification of the prestige papers and columnists, the presence of news agencies' tickers at key points in the policy process, and the ways in which policy makers (both executive and legislative) rely on press facilities. It is well-known that in the State Department the reading of the prestige papers often precedes the reading of diplomatic cables because the papers are published before the cables are decoded and distributed. Cohen cites special decision situations in which this may be the case, such as crises. He also offers hypotheses about organizational conditions under which reliance on the press increases. For example, ". . . the less a policy maker knows about a subject or an issue, and the more remote it is from his area of professional interest, the more likely he is to accept a news account as reasonably accurate, at least pending positive evidence to the contrary" (p. 163). And, ". . . the narrower a man's area of specialization, and the greater the distance between him and the staff level in the State Department, the greater is his dependence on the press for his larger view of the world" (p. 213).

I wish to add a word about the evidence underlying the analysis. Because of Cohen's sophisticated use of content analysis and opinion polls in his unusual case study of the Japanese peace treaty, I expected this book to contain more hypothesis-testing than it does. It is commendable for its explicit statement of propositions relating one variable to another, but the qualitative treatment of the extensive interview data defies rigorous analysis. Although Cohen interviewed the whole (and small) universe of foreign policy reporters in Washington, and thus avoided sampling problems (p. 9), the reader is not told how executive and legislative informants, who were drawn from a larger universe, were selected. The presentation of the data sometimes contains quantitative implications, as on p. 21, when the distribution of certain attitudes is enumerated in terms of "some," "others," "a few," "several," and "the large majority." Such quasi-quantitative language will make it difficult to fit this work into trend studies. Nevertheless, the basis is here for further systematic and rewarding investigations, including other policy issues in other capitals, state and foreign.—JAMES A. ROBINSON, *Northwestern University.*

Canada-United States Treaty Relations. EDITED BY DAVID R. DEENER. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1963. Pp. xiv, 250. $7.50.)

This volume grew out of a conference held at Duke University in the summer of 1961 under the auspices of the Commonwealth-Studies Center. This Center is devoted to the encouragement of research in Commonwealth affairs by members of the Duke University faculty and graduate students, and to the encouragement of similar research in economics, history, and political science by scholars and graduate students from various Commonwealth countries. The Canadian theme was emphasized in the summer program of 1961. The format of the Program was a four-day conference on Canada—United States Treaty relations, including formal addresses delivered by distinguished scholars and practitioners of international law and diplomacy and by round-table sessions at which scholars presented papers for discussion.

The papers delivered at this symposium, produced here under the able editorship of David R. Deener, attempted "a balance and a blend—a balance between depth and breadth, between sharp focus and panorama; a blend of diverse views, approaches, and perspectives" (p. vii) in the ambit of Canada-United States treaty relations. It is important to note that the "first" Canadian treaty (the Halibut Fisheries Treaty of 1923) was concluded with the United States, and it is perhaps true that among the mass of Canadian treatises those with the United States are most conspicuous. In turn, it may be fair to say that treaty commitments with Canada constitute a vital segment of the treaty obligations of the United States. The total number of treaties is most impressive, "As of January 1, 1961, there were no less than 187 separate bilateral instruments in force (p. 4) . . . and there were 153 multilateral treaties to which both the United States and Canada were parties, either as original signatories or adherents." (p. 5).

Eleven papers are included in the present volume written by such eminent scholars as Robert R. Wilson, G. V. La Forest, Charles E. Martin, John E. Read, Theodore Ropp, Charles P. Stacey, Green H. Hackworth, Edward McWhinney, Wesley L. Gould, Maxwell Cohen, and Charles R. Deener. The ambit of topics is impressive and ambitious, covering such fields as water problems, military cooperation, metals, oils, natural gas, international law and diplomacy, and the trends and future problems in treaty relations between the two countries.

This book makes a distinct contribution to the broad general field of treaty relations between countries, and it contains a wealth of material for those persons who are interested in treaty-making under international law and diplomacy in general and to those persons who are interested in Canadian-United States relations in particular. The fields of peaceful settlement of disputes, economic and commercial relations, and defense problems are admirably discussed on the basis of their historical significance and their possible influence upon the present world situation. A most valuable part of the book is a complete list of Canada-United States Treaties and Agreements from 1782 to 1960 (pp. 196–231). It points out the determination of Canada to maintain her national identity and her national sovereignty under trying conditions in her relations with the feared ambitions of her "big brother" to the South. It is not to be expected that Canada-United States treaty relations will remain unruffled during the period of the "Cold War and the tepid peace," but the two countries have much in common-law, political institutions, a democratic foundation, a tradition of peaceful relations, and others to smooth the flow of diplomacy as represented by treaty negotiations. As Deener quips, "It should come to mean co-operation between right-thinking Americans and left-thinking Canadians." (p. xi).—James A. Gathings, *Bucknell University.*

The Organization of American States. By Charles G. Fenwick. (Washington, D.C.: Organization of American States, 1963. Pp. xxxiii, 601. $5.00.)

The growing public interest in the activities of the inter-American regional system makes this volume, written by the acknowledged dean of Pan Americanists, all the more welcome. The Organization of American States is unique among international institutions for its age (it is now 74 years old) and for the confusing labyrinth of its respective organs. The special merit of this book is its healthy historical perspective and its clear and balanced account of the manifold activities of the regional organization. Mr. Fenwick's long and intimate association with the Organization of American States equips him, as no one else, to be the author of such a volume.

While the first three of the book's twelve chapters provide a historical background to the inter-American system, each of the subsequent chapters on the organization and functions of the system are presented in terms of their evolution and growth. The gloomy prophets who anticipate the imminent demise of the inter-American system have perhaps underestimated the importance of these historical traditions and the contributions they have made towards institutionalizing inter-American cooperation.

As an introductory text for the general student, this volume may be compared to the brilliant legal analysis of Ann and A. J. Thomas' *Organization of American States* (1963) which is addressed to the specialist. However, Fenwick's seasoned legal interpretations of the role of the OAS are more likely to stand the test of time than those of the Thomas', if for no other reason than that they are thoroughly based on the practice of states rather than on natural law which the Thomas' employ. While both books expand the legal role of the regional organization beyond the permissive limits of the UN Charter, the Fenwick volume is much more restrained.

Fenwick is right in calling the OAS a "regional agency" of the UN in matters relating to the maintenance of peace. It is unfortunate, however, that he does not discuss some of the important legal problems involved in this relationship. Article 51 of the UN Charter, for example, clearly restricts the inherent right of regional self defense to the advent of an armed attack (the curious and contrary reasoning of the Thomas', notwithstanding). Together with Article 53 of the UN Charter, which forbids regional enforcement activities without the prior authorization of the Security Council, Article 51 severely restricts the OAS right to employ force. The author also does not specifically address himself to the important question which relates to the priority of regional procedures of pacific settlement over those of the UN. Are the members of the OAS constrained by their regional treaties to submit all disputes to the inter-American system for settlement, or by virtue of the overriding authority of the UN Charter, does the Security Council (and through the Uniting for Peace Resolution, the General Assembly) have exclusive jurisdiction over such major disputes as involve a threat to peace, a breach of peace, or an act of aggression?

In letting the record of OAS accomplishments speak for itself, no judgments are given as to the inherent weaknesses and strengths of the OAS. Nor did this book intend to be a critical evaluation of the regional system. The excellent survey of the political, legal, economic, social, and cultural activities of the OAS, however, leaves the reader with the impression of monumental activity with minimum results. But through the years it has been patiently cultivating the habit of hemispheric cooperation.

Having contributed this much needed and useful introduction to the Organization of American States, it is to be fervently hoped that Mr. Fenwick will now feel impelled to write a thoughtful analysis of the regional system. His assessment of the inherent limits of regional accomplishment would provide a more realistic appreciation of the OAS than the wildly exaggerated expectations which have recently been held out for it. Such an analysis would also provide a criterion for selecting those activities in which the OAS is destined to achieve success from those which are foredoomed to failure and which, when undertaken, diminish the prestige of the system. Mr. Fenwick is eminently qualified for such an imposing task.—Martin B. Travis, *State University of New York (at Stony Brook).*

Limited War in the Nuclear Age. By Morton H. Halperin. (New York and London: John

Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1963. Pp. ix, 191. $4.95. Paper Ed. $2.95.)

To a degree unmatched by other nations in history we have possessed both great military power and the freedom to argue openly about how to control it. From this unique conjunction has stemmed the American science of strategy—at its worst a body of thought alternately maccabre and tedious, at its best another stage in man's ancient search for rational standards of conduct.

This slender volume represents the genre at its best. Halperin's purpose, narrower than his title suggests, is to examine how the two most powerful countries on earth may use power without undue risk that their confrontations will end in total nuclear war. His method is partly historical but largely speculative. Distinctions are made between the gradual *expansion* and the sudden *explosion* of conflict, between a nation's *declaratory* policy and its *action* policy (a needlessly ambiguous concept), between *local* wars and *central* wars. The former are fought outside the United States and the Soviet Union; the latter involve the two homelands but may be restrained in other ways, for example, by sparing cities.

Halperin begins by analyzing the motives for limiting war and the process by which limits are established. He then applies his hypotheses to the Korean conflict. One important finding is that the limits adopted by each side in that struggle were related in only the most general way to limits adopted by the other side. Moreover, although most Americans are still unaware of the fact, the Chinese exercised much more restraint over their air force than we did over ours.

Subsequent chapters analyze the role of nuclear weapons in local conflict, the relation between arms control and local war strategy, and the problem of restraint in central war. A 343-item bibliography comes as a substantial dividend. Aptly annotated, this supplements the author's brief but suggestive history of the case for tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

In manner Halperin's argument is wholly devoid of shrillness or special pleading. In substance he ends by supporting many security policies of the present Administration: its emphasis on conventional forces, its readiness to conclude a test ban treaty, and its stated reliance on a second-strike counterforce strategy. A strong case is made for the paradoxical thesis that we ought to welcome the day when Russia's nuclear forces become sufficiently well protected to convince her leaders that they can survive an initial American strike. Other points provide minimum comfort, *e.g.*, central war may be slower and more restrained than we suppose. These are matched by observations that generate something less than wild alarm, *e.g.*, arms controls, by decreasing the danger of central war, may "make the world safe for local war."

On the negative side it can be noted that there is some pretty lumpy prose here and that political variables are treated less carefully than military ones. Not much space is given to the role of the United Nations, to the influence of neutral or world opinion (surely a restraining factor in the Bay of Pigs episode), or to the impact of Soviet domestic politics or of the Sino-Soviet conflict on the USSR's limited war policies. Nor do I find wholly convincing the treatment of images of force held by Americans and Russians.

But these are small points. It is incontestably more significant that a strategic study of such logical power, judicious temper and practical import should be produced by a young civilian rather than by a seasoned warrior. One suspects that this kind of achievement can only deepen the crisis of identity that has afflicted our military profession in recent years.—LAURENCE RADWAY, *Dartmouth College.*

Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations between States. BY F. H. HINSLEY. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963. Pp. 416. $6.95.)

It is not as widely recognized as it should be that proposals for international government have been advanced at least since the seventeenth century, but they have been proved inefficacious by both international theory and international practice since that time. Integrationist schemes for peace did not emerge suddenly and apocalyptically with the first and second World Wars; they had existed and had been discredited long before. Rousseau and Kant were quite aware that an international government could not be created, and the history of interstate relations confirmed the point. The League and the United Nations merely provide additional evidence for a proposition long since authenticated. On the other hand, as Mr. Hinsley tells us, we need not despair. An equality in the distribution of effective power between leading states of the world has in the past assured long periods of peace, and there is no reason it will not do so in the future. In fact "the world distribution of power has been more stable since 1945 than it has been at any time since about 1902." (349) A state of 'deadlock' has emerged "which renders large-scale war unlikely for a considerable time to come." (346)

Underlying this optimistic conclusion is a theory of international relations (or at least a theory of international history) which takes its departure from the hegemonic ventures of Charles V, Louis XIV, and Napoleon I. Until the eighteenth century, it had been accepted international practice for a single state to seek predominant power in Europe. The myth of a unified body of believers rationalized this quest in terms of a single defender of Christendom. The eighteenth century, however, witnessed the evolution of a balance of power system in which no one of the five Great Powers could hope to prevail against the rest. In addition, after midcentury the increasing competence of the Powers as state organizations led them to pursue a more cautious policy in external relations. The state became, as it was not before, a unitary mechanism whose substance could not be hazarded on superficial grevance. As state resources were centralized, bankruptcy became an evil to be avoided at almost all costs. Partly in consequence, there developed a feeling of collectivity in Europe which even Frederick II came to share. Diplomacy took place within straitened limits.

The paradox of Napoleon was that he did not recognize that the hegemonial system had already passed out of existence. When his bid for dominance failed, the Great Powers sought to install on a more regular basis the newer premises of the *ancien régime*. The ensuing Congresses demonstrated clearly that Castlereagh's conception of European cooperation had triumphed over the unrealistic and federative notions of the Holy Alliance. Hence, 1822 did not mark the collapse of the Concert, but rather its realistic renewal and rebirth. Until 1854 the European balance restrained aggressive activity and a fear of revolution held precedence of place. War only occurred when governments were willing to ally with the revolutionary nationalist cause, and even such conflicts were limited by a continuing balance of power. The international system functioned unimpaired. For much the same reason, large-scale war did not occur until the twentieth century, when the instability of the balance permitted Germany to aim at hegemony. Imperialism was also occasioned by a failure in power equilibrium which sanctioned European partition and control of extra-European areas. World War I emerged not because Germany was "guilty" in the month of world crisis in 1914, but because her ambitions and position had upset the balance long before. Versailles was not a stable peace because Germany retained or even improved her position of dominance in Europe, while Japan was preeminent in Asia. With the absence of Russia and the United States from the world balance, World War II was foredestined by sheer power calculations. On the other hand, World War II has given rise to an overarching stability in which the United States and Russia have enormous absolute power, counterbalancing each other, while at the same time, neither is powerful enough relatively to impose its will on the rest of the world. The weakness of the extra-European world is not sufficient to bring forth neo-imperialism analogous to that of the nineteenth century. Hence, entrapped in balance, the world will eschew war for a long period. Nuclear weapons did not confer the balance, but merely confirmed a balance already in existence. In addition, the domestic and popular restraints on all governments: liberal, authoritarian, and totalitarian, strengthed the balanced established externally. Popular convictions against violence have been a signal and unique characteristic of the twentieth century. They both limit conflict and make it seem less limited than it is. Even World Wars I and II were not more unlimited than wars of other periods, nor was human bellicosity and depravity any more gross. The weapons of war made normal human anxieties and aggressions seem worse than they were. In fact in the period 1900–1945 there were fewer wars than in any previous period of of the same duration, and, except for the nineteenth century, there were fewer major wars involving leading Powers.

The foregoing brief summary of Mr. Hinsley's study will make two points quite clear: first, that he has written an immensely stimulating book which will strongly influence future studies of war in its relation to historical diplomacy; second, that he has given us a profoundly irritating book which is ultimately unsatisfactory and implausible. He gives little credence to the power of ideological movements, whether as unifying force or as a fundamental cause of diversity, and even his balance calculations are far from being straightforward. He admits that the second quarter of the nineteenth century was a period of British supremacy, and yet offers the insufficient reason that Britian was an insular Power to explain her failure to assert primacy. America is in this sense an island Power, but this does not preclude exertion in Europe as well as in other places. The United States was coming to be dominant at the end of the nineteenth century, yet absented herself from world diplomacy both before and after the Great War. Even Russia remained on the sidelines when her power by no means required it. What we need, in short, is an explanation of those factors which impel a nation to assert its power; power factors themselves cannot provide this account.

Aside from power calculi, the role of weapons and military technology is rather superficially plumbed. Hinsley admits (279) that the wars of the first half of the twentieth century were more destructive than previous conflicts because of the nature of techology employed. After 1945, however, weapons technology is viewed as a fundamentally benign factor which rules out war through the horrendous threat of nuclear retaliation. But if the threat of war has become so grandiose that it cannot be engaged in, it is because retaliation is both certain and outlandishly costly. If retaliation itself is impossible (348), then the deterrent effect of weapons disappears and we are back to World War I. Hinsley also views with remarkable equanimity the spread of nuclear weapons to other Powers. He apparently concludes that if nuclear weapons add solidity to the central balance, they will also enhance the local equilibrium. Since the presumed human disposition to use weapons is everywhere the same, the distribution of those weapons to new states will produce the same result as in the case of the bipolar nuclear confrontation. Indeed, within the confines of his theory, Hinsley must argue that nuclear weapons are a major means to international stability. Once over a given nuclear threshold, a state achieves parity with other Powers; the resulting balance ensures peace. Then "the only defeat that can be inflicted by one upon another is a diplomatic defeat in a war of nerves. . . ." (354–355). It is precisely the failure to take account of ideological or revolutionary currents which inclines the author to this conclusion. But, surely there *are* differences among states as among individuals in revolutionary *élan*, willingness to engage in aggressive action, and suicidal mania. If policeman can, by and large, be trusted with murder weapons, all individuals cannot.

Nor is Hinsley's treatment of the underdeveloped world more convincing. He claims that the disparity between developed Europe and the backward areas elsewhere led to the imperalist drive after 1880. Today the disparity between developed and undeveloped portions of the globe is as great or greater than it was then, and the deadlock among developed states just as acute. The conditions for a new outburst of political imperialism are now being replicated, and yet the writer remains sanguine. Since imperialism had nothing to do with the war in 1914, a twentieth century counterpart would hold no drastic portents. But it is at this juncture that the logic of the argument falters. If disequilibrium in power brings war, then imperialism was directly related to the ensuing conflict of 1914. If disequilibrium now exists between developed and underdeveloped fragments of the globe, it is a theoretical cause for far-reaching conflict. If war does not follow, then power imbalance cannot be the sufficient cause for international conflict.

Finally, Hinsley's book is exasperating in that it fails to take account of the many subtleties of peace, war, and military theory which reside in the existing literature. The role of ideology, the relevance and application of psychological factors, the difficulties of erecting a deterrent balance, and the imponderables of the Nth Country Problem have all been extensively treated in the past ten years, yet no mention is made of them, nor does the work reflect a careful assessment of their weight. The sole exception to this catalogue is Dr. Kenneth Waltz's, *Man, the State and War* which, unfortunately, is cited merely for purposes of refutation. Dr. Hinsley's attempt is entirely praiseworthy, but it would have been improved by attention to the work that has gone before.—R. N. ROSECRANCE, *University of California (Los Angeles).*

Change, Hope, and the Bomb. BY DAVID E. LILIENTHAL. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963. Pp. viii, 168. $3.50.)

The author, first Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (1946–1950), believes that until recently to have questioned the basic assumptions about nuclear weapons ". . . would have brought down upon oneself a cloud of recrimination" (p. 15). Evidently times have changed and Mr. Lilienthal is prepared to speak out forcefully. He does not mince his words.

Lilienthal charges us with failure to place the Atom in proper relation to the rest of human affairs, and with a pursuit of the illusory path to total solutions while ignoring the more "manageable," if mundane, paths to international harmony. The author contends that we have erroneously assumed that "because the Atomic Bomb seemed to be the ultimate breakthrough in scientific achievement, in the control of physical matter, we could make a similarly radical departure in dealing with those problems in human affairs which the Bomb so greatly intensified" (p. 20).

Lilienthal is critical of those who would establish a special set of rules to deal with the Atom, at those who are preoccupied with atomic weapons either as a key to national security or to disarmament and world government. He contends that we should focus our attention, not on weapons, but on methods for eliminating *causes* of international disharmonies.

Lilienthal is alarmed by what the Atom has done to science and the scientist. The Manhattan Project, the greatest scientific "success story," has given rise to "team research" tied to government contract, transforming universities into "scientific dukedoms rather than institutions of higher learning" (p. 62). The author believes that scientists have all too successfully espoused the "doctrine of panacea;" that they have revived "the old technocrat dogma: that all problems are basically technical" (p. 66). A parallel and no less harmful development plagues the social scientists, some of whom he finds ". . . cozily clubbed together in government financed 'corporations' or 'institutes,' " where as ". . . seers who by gazing into their crystal ball of 'empirical inquiry' find therein reason to support strategic doctrines that are pleasing to the then prevailing views of the government Establishment" (p. 81).

Similarly hard and often telling jabs are taken at the Atomic Energy Commission and the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, institutions which the author feels have abandoned their responsibilities as guardians of the public welfare and are symptomatic of the dangerous and artificial separation of atomic policies from other aspects of national security and foreign policy.

The final chapter is an affirmation of Lilienthal's hope for the future. He argues that we should pursue the "manageable possibilities" which lie in the incremental advances toward "world community" (*not* world government). The harmonies of common interest are expected to be catalyzed by the ". . . life-giving imagination-stirring waves of change . . ." (p. 142) that are presumably bound to come if we can abandon our preoccupation with grand solutions.

Change, Hope, and the Bomb is a refreshing antidote to the single-solution fallacy that pervades the literature of disarmament. Yet the book suffers from over-statement, especially with regard to the value of scientists, natural or social. What may have been telling rhetoric for a public lecture (the book is a revised version of the 1963 Stafford Little Lectures given at Princeton University) appears unjustly harsh in print. This may explain why Lilienthal tells us that an agreement to undertake an overall reassessment of American national security policies was but a "gesture of conciliation" (p. 34) to gain his acquiescence to the decision to produce the hydrogen bomb and that the matter was promptly thereafter "put on the shelf" (p. 35), even though other sources[1] indicate that the reassessment was indeed undertaken, emerging as a significant policy paper (known as NSC-68) which served as a guide for rearmament after the outbreak of the Korean War.

Our alleged preoccupation with the Atom is undoubtedly a source of difficulty. While others have also made this charge, it is particularly pointed when it comes from a former chairman of the AEC. Although it is easy to agree with Lilienthal that the future holds for us unpredictable changes, it is difficult to share with him the conviction that these changes will produce, through a series of discrete and undramatic acts, a world community of harmony and peace.—David W. Tarr, *University of Wisconsin.*

Can American Democracy Survive Cold War? By Harry Howe Ransom. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1963. Pp. 270. $4.50.)

The Cold War is a much more prolonged, more subtly complex and comprehensive sort of conflict than Americans have ever before been called on to support and endure. Noting this, a number of observers have concluded that we are in considerable danger of sacrificing our most cherished values in the very act of trying to protect them through participation in this continuing international struggle. We may, in short, "win" the battle of the Cold War only to find that we have lost its main point. A result of some of the worrying about this possibility is that we now have in common currency such scary terms as "the garrison state," "the warfare state," and "the military-industrial-scientific complex."

Harry Howe Ransom's book is clearly a part of this growing body of anxiety literature, but it differs from its predecessors in several commendable respects. First, he limits his focus to several carefully selected and concrete problems, rather than to meditate about diffuse and vaguely disturbing questions. (The title of the book misleadingly suggests a much broader scope, but the author quickly gives his faith-judgment answer to the title question in a single sentence in his prefacing remarks on p. xvii, and then goes about his main purposes.) Second, he is a man with impressive substantive knowledge concerning those selected questions to which he addresses himself. Third, the questions themselves, although frequently raised in many other contexts in recent years, have not previously been approached in precisely this context by a scholar of Professor Ransom's stature. Fourth, he courageously attempts to offer some solutions to the problems as he sees them. This is no mere hand-wringing treatise.

The book focuses on two main sets of factors: (1) the organizational apparatus for making national security policy, i.e., the National Security Council, the Defense Department, the CIA, the budget-making machinery, etc.; and (2) the secrecy and information policies of these agencies. Regarding these two sets of factors, the book then poses two main questions: (1) are this apparatus and the policies which it produces "efficient" in terms of furthering the external goals of the United States; and (2) are the apparatus and its policies internally compatible with America's democratic values? After giving a usefully succinct background history (drawn primarily from publicly available or secondary sources) of the various aspects of this complex of factors and issues, Professor Ransom answers no to both of his two basic questions and then proposes his own preferred solutions.

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[1] See, for example, Paul Y. Hammond, "NSC-68: Prologue to Rearmament," in Warner R. Schilling, *et al, Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 290 ff.

This reader's reservations about the book primarily have to do with the proposed solutions. First, they are quite uneven in quality, ranging from the very general to the very specific. The President, for example, is generally encouraged to be more "innovative" in his use of the National Security Council (p. 57), while on the other hand it is very specifically recommended that the separate military services be gradually abolished in their present traditional forms (pp. 86–87). Second, there is room for considerable disagreement as to what are the facts on which these recommendations are based. Whereas Professor Ransom, at one extreme, calls for elimination of the separate services, Professor Samuel Huntington at another extreme has written that these services for all practical purposes have already disappeared and now remain mere archeological ruins like the functionless medieval castles dotting the European landscape. As for defense budget-making and other areas in which changes are said to be required, intensive on-site study in Washington and the Pentagon since 1960 might suggest that reforms going quite far along the lines proposed by Professor Ransom have already been implemented.

A more important reservation about the book, however, goes beyond quibbling over interpretations and the reformist proposals. Most if not all of these so-called solutions have been widely circulated in the debates among interested officials and scholars since World War II, and stock arguments and counterarguments have long since emerged. Any given individual is therefore presumably free to take his choice, depending on his personal priority of values and his level of anxiety tolerance. The more important point—and the most important reservation—is that Ransom never seems adequately to explain (at least, not to this reader's satisfaction) precisely how his solutions would maintain or improve the quality of American democracy. Democracy is a difficult term to define, as any political scientist can testify, but in the absence of a working operational definition and some hypothesized causal relationships, it is almost impossible to say how a more centralized Defense Department or more innovation from the President or less secrecy from the CIA would result in more or better democracy, much less to say how they would result in more "efficient" decision-making or "better" policies. Perhaps it is precisely because of this difficult if not impossible task that Professor Ransom really did not attempt it, but that leaves us pretty much where he started with the faith judgment in his prefacing remarks. There he says that "having the will" will save us, but it may be the case (among a wide variety of other possible outcomes) that only luck will save us or that nothing can save us. We still seem to be a long way from the rational management of human affairs which most scholars, at least, would like, but even if we had it there is no guarantee that it would be democratic.

Turning from reservations back to credits, the merits of Ransom's book remain quite extensive and impressive, especially along the following lines. First, it is well written, and this is a virtue scarce enough these days to deserve our applause whenever we find it. Second, he tries fairly and honestly to lay out the counterarguments to most of his proposals. Third, the book deftly sketches the historical background for the issues raised. Fourth, and most importantly, the issues themselves are of critical importance; Professor Ransom cannot be charged with having chosen a trivial subject or having treated it trivially. It is a thankless (and professionally unrewarding) task to defend the status quo, but Ransom has now obliged his critics—if they accept the existence of the issues he has raised—to do just that or to propose other solutions.—VINCENT DAVIS, *Social Science Foundation—Denver.*

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NEWS AND NOTES

1964 ANNUAL MEETING AND SLATE OF OFFICERS FOR 1964–65

The 1964 Annual Meeting of the Association will be held September 9–12 at the Pick-Congress Hotel in Chicago, Illinois. Professor Leon D. Epstein of the University of Wisconsin is Chairman of the Program Committee.

At the Annual Business Meeting the Nominating Committee (comprised of J. Austin Ranney, University of Wisconsin, Chairman; Rupert Emerson, Harvard University; Robert Scalapino, University of California (Berkeley); Avery Leiserson, Vanderbilt University; James W. Prothro, University of North Carolina; and Ruth G. Weintraub, Hunter College, will propose the following officers for 1964–65:

President Elect: Gabriel A. Almond, Stanford University
Vice Presidents: Samuel H. Beer, Harvard University
Marian D. Irish, Florida State University
James L. McCamy, University of Wisconsin

Secretary: Malcolm E. Jewell, University of Kentucky

Treasurer: Max M. Kampelman, Washington, D. C.

Members of the Council for two Years: Marver H. Bernstein, Princeton University
James S. Coleman, University of California, Los Angeles
David Easton, University of Chicago
Charles D. Farris, University of Florida
Ernst B. Haas, University of California, Berkeley
Warren E. Miller, University of Michigan
Joseph Tanenhaus, New York University
John C. Wahlke, State University of New York, Buffalo

PROGRAM COMMITTEE: 1965 ANNUAL MEETING

The 1965 Annual Meeting of the Association will be held in Washington, D. C. at the Sheraton-Park Hotel, September 5–11. Early appointment of the Program Committee for the meeting makes it timely now to invite anyone having program suggestions for the occasion to convey them as soon as may be convenient, and prior to October, 1964, to the Chairman or an appropriate member of the Committee. Members of the 1965 Program Committee are:

H. Field Haviland, Jr., The Brookings Institution, Chairman
Alan K. Campbell, Syracuse University, State and Local Government and Politics
Robert A. Dahl, Yale University, Political Theory
Gerald Freund, Rockefeller Foundation, International Relations and Foreign Policy
Arthur Maass, Harvard University, National Government and Politics
Steven Muller, Cornell University, Comparative Government and Politics, Western Areas
Fred W. Riggs, Indiana University, Public Administration
John P. Roche, Brandeis University, Public Law
Bryce Wood, Social Science Research Council, Comparative Government and Politics, Developing Nations

The Program Committee invites younger members of the Association to submit papers for consideration to the appropriate section chairmen listed above. This procedure replaces separately organized selected-paper or volunteer-paper panels but is designed to afford the same opportunity. To be considered, papers should be submitted no later than December 1, 1964.

WASHINGTON OFFICE ACTIVITIES

Legislative Operations Roundtable—Some 25 career civil servants, Grades 15 to 18, attended the third in a series of week-long legislative operations seminars co-sponsored by the Association and the Civil Service Commission. The program, from April 27 to May 1, included the following discussion topics and seminar leaders:

Congress and the American System—Max M. Kampelman, Association Treasurer and Counsel.
The Organization of Congress—Frederic N. Cleaveland, University of North Carolina.
Representing and Informing the People: The House—Rep. William B. Widnall, R-New Jersey.
External Pressures on Congress—Andrew Biemiller, Director, Department of Legislation, AFL-CIO.
The Congressman and His Constituency—Kenneth G. Olson, Washington research and consulting firm.
Representing and Informing the People: The Senate—Sen. Lee Metcalf, D-Montana.
The Legislative Process: A Case Study—Nelson P. Build, Hamilton College.
Central Legislative Clearance and Legislative Liaison—Col. Clyde M. Dillender, deputy director, Office of Legislative Liaison, Department of Defense; and Philip Sam Hughes director, Office of Legislative Reference, Bureau of the Budget.
The Executive Side—Bradley H. Patterson, Jr., national security affairs advisor, Office of the Secretary, Department of the Treasury.
Financial Policy Determination and the Appropriations Process—Ross P. Pope, professional staff members, House Committee on Appropriations.
The Congressional Staff System—Charles L. Clapp, legislative assistant to Sen. Leverett Saltonstall; and Micah H. Naftalin, deputy staff director and counsel, House Select Committee on Government Research.
Congress and the Courts—Rowland A. Egger, University of Virginia.
Legislative-Executive Branch Relations—Ralph K. Huitt, University of Wisconsin.

The purpose of the Legislative Operations Roundtable project is to enhance the federal career executive's knowledge and understanding of executive-legislative relations through an examination of Congressional functions and processes. Participants are nominated for attendance by their respective agencies.

Congressional Fellowship Program—The Association in March announced 16 winners in the annual, national competition for Congressional Fellowship Awards. The recipients—eight political scientists, seven journalists, and one law school faculty member—will be brought to Washington for a year of work and study in the offices of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives.

Sponsored by the Association since 1953, the program gives outstanding young academicians and political journalists an opportunity to further their knowledge of the national legislative process. It is supported by a Ford Foundation grant.

The Fellows are scheduled to arrive in Washington in mid-November for a six-week orientation period. They begin working in Congressional offices of their choice about January 1, 1965, and the program ends on August 15, 1965.

Journalist winners are:

Robert O. Blanchard, 30, Ph.D. candidate in mass communications, Syracuse University.
Miss Geraldine A. Collier, 25, health and welfare reporter, Worcester (Mass.) Evening Gazette.
John M. Cornman, 31, city editor, Daily Local News, West Chester, Pa.
Henry L. Feuerzeig, 25, city hall reporter, Madison (Wisc.) Capital Times.
Frederic J. Johnson, 27, northwest editor, Minot (N.D.) Daily News.
Bruce C. Ladd, Jr., 28, associate editor, Paddock Publications, Inc., Arlington Heights, Ill.
Garrett W. Ray, 28, news editor, Littleton Independent & Arapahoe Herald, Colorado.

Political science winners are:

Miss Santa M. Algeo, 24, Ph.D. candidate, University of Michigan.
Robert E. Cleary, 32, assistant professor, George Peabody College for Teachers, Nashville, Tenn.
Eugene Eidenberg, 24, Ph.D. candidate, Northwestern University.
Carl C. Hetrick, 27, Ph.D. candidate, University of Washington.
Thomas Paul Jahnige, Ph.D. candidate, Claremont Graduate School, California.
Roy D. Morey, 27, Ph.D. candidate, University of Arizona.
Hoke L. Smith, 33, assistant professor, Hiram College, Ohio.
Paul R. Tennant, 26, Ph.D. candidate, University of Chicago.

Law school faculty member winner is:

Harold S. Trimmer, Jr., 26, instructor of law, University of California, Los Angeles.

Alternates are:

Ken A. Bode, 25, Ph.D. candidate in political science, University of North Carolina.

Robert W. Cooke, 29, Associated Press, Los Angeles.

John P. Crecine, 25, Ph.D. candidate in industrial management, Carnegie Institute of Technology.

Ronald P. Richards, 30, lecturer, School of Journalism, Montana State University.

Stephen L. Wasby, 27, assistant professor of political science, Southeast Missouri State College, Cape Girardeau.

Congressional Staff Fellowships—Nine Congressional staff members were selected as recipients of the Association's 1964–65 Congressional Staff Fellowship awards announced in April.

This is the second year awards have been made in this program, supported by a grant from the Ford Foundation. The competition designed to encourage the further development of a highly professional staff system, is open to all professional House and Senate office and committee staff employees.

The winners were selected by a bipartisan House-Senate Advisory Committee, composed of Sens. Hubert Humphrey and Thomas Kuchel; Reps. Leslie Arends and Hale Boggs; and Claude Hawley, Associate Dean of Graduate Studies, City University of New York.

Recipients undertake study and research at the college or university of their choice for periods ranging up to one year. Winners of the 1964–65 awards are:

Joseph H. Macauley, 39, administrative assistant to Rep. Charles B. Hoeven, R-Iowa.

John P. Carlson, 49, minority counsel, House Government Operations Committee.

John P. Baker, 34, professional staff member, House Ways and Means Committee.

John T. Calkins, 38, executive assistant, Rep. Howard W. Robison, R-New York.

Vic Reinemer, 40, executive secretary to Sen. Lee Metcalf, D-Mont.

ArDee Ames, 32, legislative assistant to Sen. Harrison Williams, D-New Jersey.

Jonathan Lindley, 32, professional staff member, Senate Banking and Currency Committee.

Mrs. Helen M. Scheirbeck, 28, professional staff member, Senate Constitutional Rights Subcommittee.

Stephen Strickland, 30, professional staff member, House Select Committee on Government Research.

Study of Congress—In mid-May, the Association sponsored the first in a series of conferences scheduled as part of the major Congressional research project announced last February. The Conference on the Study of Congress was chaired by Ralph K. Huitt, who is director of the group research effort made possible under a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

Invited to participate in the conference, held May 14–16, at Airlie House, Warrenton, Virginia were:

Holbert N. Carroll, University of Pittsburgh; Frederic N. Cleaveland, University of North Carolina; Charles Clapp, legislative assistant to Sen. Saltonstall; Wilder Crane, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee; Milton C. Cummings, of The Brookings Institution; Richard F. Fenno, University of Rochester; Alan Fiellin, The City College of New York; Lewis A. Froman, Jr., University of Wisconsin; Charles Hyneman, Indiana University; Charles O. Jones, University of Arizona; Max M. Kampelman, Washington, D. C.; Theodore J. Lowi, Brookings; Duncan MacRae, Jr., University of Chicago; Harvey C. Mansfield, Ohio State University; Nicholas A. Masters, Pennsylvania State University; Warren E. Miller, University of Michigan; Samuel C. Patterson, State University of Iowa; Robert L. Peabody, Johns Hopkins University; Nelson W. Polsby, Wesleyan University; H. D. Price, Syracuse University; Randall B. Ripley, Brookings; James A. Robinson, Northwestern University; John Saloma, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; David B. Truman, Columbia; Raymond E. Wolfinger, Stanford University.

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

The seventh annual conference of the District of Columbia Political Science Association was held on December 14, 1963, at the George Washington University. The principal speakers, addressing themselves to the theme, "Public Policy and Its Problems," were: Laurin L. Henry, Brookings Institution; Richard M. Scammon, Director, Bureau of the Census; William Prendergast, Republican National Committee; Representative Morris K. Udall, Democrat, Arizona; Daniel P. Moynihan, Assistant Secretary of Labor; Kurt London, George Washington University; Howard Penniman, Georgetown University; David Broder, The Washington Star; Jerry

Eller, administrative assistant to Senator Eugene McCarthy; Paul M. A. Linebarger, Johns Hopkins University; John Plank, Department of State; Majid Khadduri, Johns Hopkins University; William Roberts, The Catholic University; and others.

New Association officers elected at the business meeting were: president, Richard M. Scammon, Bureau of the Census; first vice-president, Miss Edna Fluegel, The Catholic University; second vice-president, William J. Nagle, Department of State; executive council member, Walter D. Jacobs, the University of Maryland. Walter I. Giles, Georgetown University, and Nathaniel Preston, American University, continued as members of the executive council. Richard T. Greer, Operations & Policy Research, Inc., was reappointed secretary-treasurer.

Kenneth G. Olson of K. G. Olson & Associates served as chairman of the conference, assisted by Benjamin Nimer, George Washington University.

The National Institute of Social and Behavioral Science, in collaboration with the Section on Social and Economic Sciences of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, will hold sessions for contributed papers at the annual meeting of the A.A.A.S. in Montreal, Canada, December 26–31, 1964.

Association members interested in presenting a paper at these sessions should forward titles *and* abstracts of 300 words not later than September 1 to Donald P. Ray, Director, National Institute of Social and Behavioral Science, 863 Benjamin Franklin Station, Washington, D. C. 20044.

Papers should be based on research currently or recently completed by the author. Subjects may concern any aspect of national political science or international studies. Topics of a multidisciplinary nature are also of interest.

Selected papers of the sessions will be published by the National Institute. The American Political Science Association is an affiliate member of the Section on Social and Economic Sciences of the A.A.A.S.

The new officers of the New England Political Science Association for 1964–65 are: president, Albert A. Mavrinac, Colby College; vice-president, Laurence I. Radway, Dartmouth College; secretary-treasurer, Gerald J. Grady, University of Massachusetts; executive council. Robert O'Hare, Boston College; Cecilia M. Kenyon, Smith College; Robert C. Wood, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

A Conference on "Mathematical Applications to Problems in Political Science" will be held at Southern Methodist University, July 20–29, 1964. The conference is sponsored by the National Science Foundation. Stipends for the conference will be awarded to 30 participants, drawn from college and university political science faculties.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

In recognition of the increasing demand for survey research materials collected in the developing nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, the Survey Research Center of the University of California, Berkeley, has established an International Data Library and Reference Service. Under a grant from the National Science Foundation, the Library is organizing itself to perform two services: 1) Existing survey materials—IBM cards and codebooks—are being obtained, prepared, and will be made available to scholars for purposes of secondary analyses. These data will be made available for the very small cost of their duplication; 2) Information on the research capabilities of overseas research agencies and on the methodological problems encountered in overseas research will be collected and made available to scholars.

Scholars and research agencies possessing overseas survey materials are requested to deposit such data in the Library. The Library will cover the costs of reproduction and mailing of the materials.

Requests for information and services should be addressed to: International Data Library and Reference Service, Survey Research Center, University of California, Berkeley, California, 94720.

The YIVO for Jewish Research (1048 Fifth Avenue, New York 28, N. Y.) announces the establishment of a clearinghouse and index to Jewish subjects in current American humanistic and social research. All scholars engaged in research (including doctoral dissertations and M.A. theses) in which Jewish topics or materials are separately identifiable are invited to fill out a brief questionnaire which will be supplied upon request. Cooperating scholars will receive an annual list of studies registered with the clearinghouse as either completed or in progress.

The political science department at the University of Pittsburg has received a grant of $500,000 from the Maurice and Laura Falk Foundation to establish an endowed chair in the field of American politics.

The department of political science at the University of Georgia has been authorized to grant the Ph.D. degree.

The department of international relations and the Social Science Foundation, University of Denver, have inaugurated a new *Monograph Series in World Affairs.*

Henry J. Abraham, professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, served as a member of the Philadelphia Board of Education's Special Committee on Non-Discrimination during the spring and summer of 1963.

T. W. Adams, formerly of the University of Oklahoma and now with the U. S. Army Research Office, Washington, D. C., has been temporarily assigned to the Foreign Areas Studies Division of the Special Operations Research Office at American University. He will be the chairman of a four-member team preparing an area handbook on the Republic of Cyprus.

Desmond L. Anderson, associate dean of the school of public administration, UCLA, was elected chairman of the University Senate for the year 1964.

Stanley V. Anderson, assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, is on leave of absence for the 1963–1964 academic year to serve as an APSA congressional fellow.

Totten J. Anderson, University of Southern California, has been appointed to the executive committee of the California Citizens' Advisory Commission on constitutional revision.

Charles S. Ascher of Brooklyn College has been elected president of the Citizens Housing and Planning Council of New York.

John H. Badgley, department of government at Miami University (Ohio), has been granted leave for 1964–65 to serve as the first visiting professor in the Kyoto University Center of Southeast Asian studies. Following nine months residence in Kyoto, Japan, he will go to Thailand for research under a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation.

Clarence A. Berdahl, visiting professor of government at Southern Illinois University, was chosen chairman of the State Department Advisory Committee on Foreign Relations in November, 1963.

Bernard C. Borning, chairman of political science at the University of Idaho, was granted leave of absence for 1963–64 to serve as Fulbright lecturer at Seoul National University and Korea University in Seoul, Korea.

Eugene Burdick, University of California, will be on leave for the spring and fall terms, 1964.

Ben G. Burnett, associate professor of political science, Whittier College, is spending the school year 1963–64 in Santiago, Chile, under a grant from the Social Science Research Association.

Lynton K. Caldwell, Indiana University, represented the United States at a symposium on management training for public administration sponsored by the Central Treaty Organization in Lahore, Pakistan, in January. In returning he visited a number of European research institutions for development studies on behalf of the American Society for Public Administration.

Mark W. Cannon, who has been given a leave of absence from the department of political science at Brigham Young University, has been named to a committee on municipal advisement by the Institute of Public Administration in New York City. He will be working in Venezuela as an advisor to the Venezuelan government.

George E. Catlin was elected a member of the World Academy, Rehovot, Israel, and a member of honor of the Institute of Political Studies, Spain.

Carl Q. Christol, chairman of the department of political science, University of Southern California, has been elected vice-president of the United Nations Association of Southern California.

Hugh McDowall Clokie of the University of California, Berkeley, is visiting professor in the department of government, Louisiana State University during the spring semester of 1964.

Patrick J. Conklin is on leave from his position as assistant professor of political science, University of Missouri, to serve on the research staff of the Missouri State Reorganization Commission until December 15, 1964.

Morton H. Cowden resigned his teaching post at Columbia University in March to become executive director of the New York Metropolitan Committee of the United World Federalists.

Richard F. Crabbs has been appointed executive secretary of Indiana University's international relations committee.

Derek Crabtree, University of Exeter, England, has been a visiting lecturer in the department of political science at the University of Oregon during 1963–64.

David Daube, All Souls College, Oxford, will serve as Ford Rotating professor in the department of political science at the University of California, Berkeley, for the 1964–65 academic year.

VLADIMIR DEDIJER, Harvard center for international affairs and the University of Manchester, England, served in January and February as a visiting professor in the department of international relations, University of Denver.

JOSEPH DUNNER is a visiting professor at the University of Freiburg, Germany, during 1963–64, under an award from the German Research Council. During the second half of the year he will be a Fulbright senior professor at the university.

ROBERT E. ELDER, professor of political science at Colgate University was on sabbatical leave during the fall semester, 1963.

HERMAN FINER was visiting professor of political science, spring quarter, 1964, Michigan State University.

WESLEY FISHEL, department of political science, Michigan State University, has been appointed a consultant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. He was also appointed lecturer at the Foreign Service Institute, Department of State.

WILLIAM GABLE, associate professor of political science at the University of Michigan, has returned to Ann Arbor after two years as chief of party of the University of Michigan advisor team at National Chengchi University, Taiwan.

GANTCHO G. GAVRILOFF has been granted leave of absence from Christian College, Columbia, Mo., to do research in England.

LYMAN A. GLENNY, who has been on leave since 1962 serving the state of Illinois in the drafting of a master plan for higher education, has resigned his position as professor of government at Sacramento State College in order to continue his work in the field of higher education studies.

MERRILL R. GOODALL has returned to the Claremont graduate school upon completion of a twenty-month United Nations assignment as senior public administration advisor to the government of Nepal.

HILTON P. GOSS, senior political scientist with the General Electric Company's Santa Barbara operation since its establishment in 1957, served as lecturer in political science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, for the spring semester.

WESLEY GOULD, professor of political science at Purdue University, was visiting professor at Northwestern University during the academic year 1963–64.

H. ROSS HAMMOND, Brigham Young University, was a visiting professor at Whittier College in Latin American studies during the second semester, 1963–64.

ERIC HOFFER will serve as associate research political scientist at the University of California, Berkeley, effective February 1, 1964.

ROBERT J. HUCKSHORN has resigned from the political science department at the University of Idaho to accept appointment as the associate director of the National Center for the Education of Politics.

RICHARD HUGHES, doctoral candidate at the Claremont graduate school, served as a lecturer in political science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, for the 1963–1964 academic year.

WHITTLE JOHNSTON of American University served as visiting lecturer in political science at Swarthmore College, spring semester, 1964.

HANS KELSEN, professor emeritus, University of California, Berkeley, received an honorary doctorate from the University of Paris, November 7, 1963.

JOHN H. KESSEL is serving as director of the arts and sciences division of the Republican national committee during the 1963–64 academic year.

FAN KUANG-HUAN, who received his Ph.D. from New York University in 1963, has been appointed visiting assistant professor of political science at the University of Idaho for the academic year 1963–64 to replace Bernard Borning while the latter is on leave.

GEORGE A. LANYI will be on research leave from Oberlin College in 1964–65 under a Rockefeller Foundation grant. He will spend the latter half of the year as a research associate at the Harvard center for international affairs.

JOSEPH LAPALOMBARA, department of political science, Michigan State University, was named to the board of advisors in political science by Appleton-Century-Croft Book Company.

DAVID L. LARSON, assistant professor of government at Tufts University, has been appointed as lecturer and consultant in international relations at the Naval War College for the fall semester ot 1964.

WALTER H. C. LAVES, chairman of the department of government at Indiana University, has been appointed to the United States National Commission to UNESCO. He has also been given a three-year grant by the Carnegie Corporation to study the United Nations assistance in political development.

Rene Lemarchand of the University of Florida was a visiting lecturer in African studies at Chatham College for the semester beginning February ary 3, 1964.

John C. Livingston, professor of government at Sacramento State College, has been appointed to a committee to advise the California State Board of Education in the teaching of the bill of rights in the public schools.

Stuart A. MacCorkle of the University of Texas was on leave of absence during the spring semester 1963–64 to serve as visiting professor at the University of Europe at Bruges. Professor MacCorkle lectured at Burges on the administrative problems of municipalities.

Herbert McClosky, professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley, will be on leave for the 1964–65 year.

Charles E. Martin, for many years chairman of the department of political science, University of Washington, and recently with the American studies program, University of the Phillippines, was a visiting professor at Whittier College during the second semester, 1963–1964, under a grant from the Haynes Foundation.

Douglas H. Mendel, formerly of UCLA, was a visiting associate professor at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee in 1963–64. Prior to accepting this post, he spent a year as a Fulbright professor in Taiwan, followed by a year on research in Japan and as visiting lecturer in Asian studies at the University of Melbourne.

Peter H. Merkl, assistant professor of political science, University of California at Santa Barbara, began a year's research leave of absence in February. He will work under a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation.

W. H. Morris-Jones, Durham College, Durham, England, will serve as visiting professor in the department of political science, 1964–65, at the University of California, Berkeley.

Philip E. Mosely, director of Columbia University's European Institute, has been reappointed to the board of trustees of The Rand Corporation; he served previously on the board from 1951 to 1961.

Martin C. Needler, assistant professor of political science, University of Michigan, has been elected a corresponding member of the Bolivarian Society of Ecuador.

Charles B. Neff, assistant professor, University of Hawaii, has taken a leave of absence in order to accept an administrative position with the Peace Corps. He will be stationed in Latin America.

Robert Osgood, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, succeeded Leland Goodrich in November, 1963, as APSA representative on the State Department Advisory Committee on Foreign Relations.

George S. Parthemos, head of the department of political science at the University of Georgia, has been appointed vice-president of the University in charge of the educational program, effective July 1, 1964.

D. N. Pathak, head of the department of political science, University School of Social Sciences, Gujaret University, India, is serving as visiting lecturer and researcher in the department of international relations, University of Denver.

Ernest R. Perkins, chief of the Foreign Relations Division of the Historical Office, Department of State, and editor of the series, Foreign Relations of the United States, retired on December 30, 1963, after thirty-three years of government service. On the occasion of his retirement he was presented with letters of appreciation from Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and from Clarence A Berdahl, chairman of the Advisory Committee on Foreign Relations.

Ira Polley was visiting lecturer of political science, winter quarter, 1964, at Michigan State University.

C. Herman Pritchett, University of Chicago, attended the third annual convention of the Puerto Rico Political Science Association in February, and addressed the closing banquet of the convention.

J. Harris Proctor, associate professor of political science at Duke University, will be on sabbatical leave during 1964–65. He will teach at the Royal College, Nairobi, Kenya, and conduct research under a grant from the African and American Universities program.

Laurence I. Radway has been appointed co-director of the comparative studies center at Dartmouth College.

Harry H. Ransom has been granted a 1964–65 leave of absence from the department of political science, Vanderbilt University, to engage in research in London and Washington, D. C. under a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation.

Knud Rasmussen has been appointed director of Colgate University's Washington Study Group to succeed Robert E. Elder who directed the Group from 1952 to 1963. This project celebrates its 25th anniversary this year.

Ralph H. Retzlaff, assistant professor of political science, Berkeley, will be on sabbatical leave in India for the 1964–65 academic year.

Rudolph J. Rummel, assistant professor of government at Indiana University, has received a research grant from the National Science Foundation.

Marshall Singer of Brooklyn College has accepted a post as adjunct professor for the spring semester in the department of political philosophy and government at Fordham University.

Robert Strausz-Hupe has been appointed a director of the Atlantic Institute of the United States.

Morton J. Tenzer has been appointed assistant director of the Executive Seminar Center of the U. S. Civil Service Commission located at the U. S. Merchant Marine Academy.

Hans B. Thorelli, professor of business administration, University of Indiana, will be on leave during 1964–65 to serve as professor of marketing at the Business Management Methods Institute (IMEDE) in Lausanne, Switzerland.

James V. Toscano, assistant professor of political science, University of Pennsylvania, has been appointed associate director of the World Press Institute, Macalester College, St. Paul.

Henry A. Turner, professor of political science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, has returned from a year's leave of absence spent at the University of Khartoum (Republic of Sudan) and has resumed the chairmanship of the department.

Dwight Waldo will be on leave for the fall semester from the University of California, and will serve as the Ford Rotating professor for the spring term, 1965, at the University.

Herbert Waltzer, associate professor of government at Miami University (Ohio) has been granted leave of absence for the year 1963–64 to do research in Italy under a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. He has also been named a national convention fellow by the Eagleton Institute of Politics and the National Center for Education in Politics.

Maurice Waters was a visiting fellow at United Nations headquarters and also conducted a two-year survey of international relation programs in higher education during his three-year research leave from Wayne State University.

Peter Woll of the University of California at Los Angeles has been appointed visiting associate professor of politics at Brandeis University for the year 1964–65.

James R. Woodworth, Miami University (Ohio) has been granted a leave of absence February-September, 1964 in order to join the Public Administration Service to assist in their study of state and local food and drug regulatory programs.

Roland A. Young, professor of political science at Northwestern University, is serving during the academic year 1963–64 as acting director of the program of African studies, following the death of Melville J. Herskovitz.

APPOINTMENTS AND STAFF CHANGES

Virginia Adloff has been reappointed lecturer in political science for the spring semester, 1964, at the University of California.

Robert L. Anderson of the University of Florida has been appointed an assistant professor at the University of Mississippi.

Donald D. Barry has joined the department of government at Lehigh University as assistant professor.

Theodore L. Becker of Okaland University has accepted a position as assistant professor in the University of Hawaii.

Thad Beyle, 1963 graduate of the University of Illinois, has joined the staff of Denison University as an assistant professor of political science.

George I. Blanksten is serving as acting chairman of the department of political science at Northwestern University during the academic year 1963–1964.

Glenn E. Brooks has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of political science at the Colorado College.

Dwight M. Carpenter, 1963 graduate of the University of Illinois, has joined the political science department at Oklahoma University.

Gwendolen M. Carter of Smith College has been named professor of political science and director of the program on African studies at Northwestern University, effective September 1964.

Gerhard Casper of the University of Freiburg, Switzerland, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley, effective fall semester, 1964.

Francis Collinge, formerly of the University of Washington, has been appointed an assistant professor in the department of political science, San Francisco State College.

Stephen A. Crouse, chairman of the department of political science at Washington and Jefferson College, has been designated professor of political science on the Edward Martin Foundation.

James Frederic Davidson, associate dean of the college of liberal arts and professor of political science at the University of Tennessee, has been named dean of the faculty at Concord College.

James C. Davies has been appointed head of the department of political science at the University of Oregon, succeeding Egbert S. Wengert who died on February 22, 1964.

William M. Dickson has been appointed dean of the college of business, economics and government, University of Alaska.

Patrick Dougherty has been promoted to assistant professor of political science at St. Louis University.

Edward C. Dreyer, doctoral candidate at the University of North Carolina, has been appointed an assistant professor in the department of political science, San Diego State College.

Ernest A. Duff has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Randolph-Macon Woman's College beginning September, 1964.

Thomas Dye, formerly at the University of Wisconsin, has joined the department of political science at the University of Georgia as assistant professor.

Howard L. Erdmann of Harvard University has been appointed assistant professor in the department of government at Dartmouth College beginning the fall of 1964.

Werner J. Feld, associate professor of political science, has been appointed chairman of the department of political science and economics at Moorhead State College.

Russell H. Fitzgibbon has left UCLA to join the staff of the University of California, Santa Barbara, as professor of political science, effective spring semester, 1964.

Donald M. Freeman has joined the political science department of Charlotte College, N. C., as an assistant professor.

Dante L. Germino has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of political science at Wellesley College.

Rudolph Gomez has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor of political science at the Colorado College.

Brent H. Gubler, formerly of Harpur College, was appointed to the position of instructor in the department of government, Sacramento State College in September, 1963.

Michael Haas of San Jose State has accepted a position as assistant professor in the University of Hawaii.

Gerald Hallworth, formerly of the University of Texas, has accepted a position for 1964–1965 as instructor in government at North Texas State University at Denton, Texas.

Erwin C. Hargrove, Brown University, has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor, effective July 1, 1964.

Illiya Harik has been appointed assistant professor, department of government, Indiana University, effective September, 1964.

Robert D. Heidorn, 1963 graduate of the University of Illinois, has accepted a position at the University of Maine.

Ray C. Hillam of the department of political science at Brigham Young University has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor.

Warren F. Ilchman, formerly of Williams College, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley, effective fall semester, 1964.

William E. Jackson, Jr., formerly on the staff of the Bureau of the Budget, has been appointed instructor in politics at Charlotte College, N. C.

Paul S. Jacobsen, chairman of the department of political science at Colgate University since 1936, retired in June, 1964.

Harold S. Johnson has joined the department of political science, Michigan State University, as an assistant professor.

Robert N. Johnson, department of history and government, Adelphi University, was promoted to the rank of assistant professor, effective September, 1964.

Henry A. Kariel of Bennington College has accepted a position as associate professor in the University of Hawaii.

Lyman Kellstedt, doctoral candidate at the University of Illinois, has joined the staff of Georgetown University as an instructor in poltical science.

Frank G. Kendrick, formerly at Drury College, is now assistant professor of political science at Moorhead State College.

King Chen, formerly of Brooklyn College, has been appointed assistant professor in the social studies department of the State University College, Oswego, N. Y.

Julie Klein has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Alaska.

Ivan J. Kubanis has been promoted to the rank of associate professor in the department of political science, San Diego State College.

Wladyslaw W. Kulski has resigned as professor of political science at Syracuse University to accept an appointment as James B. Duke professor of Russian affairs at Duke University.

Jacob Landynski has been appointed assistant professor by the New School for Social Research and will assume his duties in the 1964 academic year.

Nancy B. Leis has joined the political science department at Brown University with the rank of lecturer.

John W. Lewis has been promoted to associate professor of government at Cornell University.

John C. Livingston has been promoted to the rank of professor of government, Sacramento State College.

Norton E. Long of Northwestern University has been appointed as the first occupant of the James Gordon chair in community government and professor of politics at Brandeis University.

Noah Lucatz, formerly of Washington University and Southern Illinois University, has been appointed research associate at the Hebrew University of Jersusalem, effective October, 1963.

Gene M. Lyons of Dartmouth College has recently been appointed Orvil E. Dryfoos professor of public affairs. At the same time, his appointment as associate professor of government with tenure has been confirmed. In his new position Professor Lyons serves as director of the Dartmouth public affairs center.

Gerald R. McDaniel has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor in the department of government, Sacramento State College. He received the doctorate in political science in 1963 from the University of California, Berkeley.

C. Peter Magrath, Brown University, has been promoted to the rank of associate professor, effective July 1, 1964.

John E. Moore, formerly research assistant at The Brookings Institution, has completed his Ph.D. degree at Princeton University and has accepted an appointment as assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, effective fall, 1963.

John A. Morgan, Jr., has resigned his position at Duke University to become an assistant professor in the department of political science, George Washington University.

Robert Noel has completed the Ph.D. degree at Northwestern University and has accepted an appointment as assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, effective September 1963.

Arthur A. North, S. J., has retired from the post of dean of the graduate school at Fordham University. He will assume full duties as a professor of political science in the department of political philosophy and government.

Vincent A. Ostrom has been appointed professor in the department of government, Indiana University. He will spend the first semester with Resources for the Future, Washington, D. C.

Dennis J. Palumbo, University of Hawaii, joined the department of political science at the University of Pennsylvania in July, 1963, as an assistant professor.

Lois Pelekoudas, 1963 graduate of the University of Illinois, joined the department of political science at Antioch College in September, 1963.

Adamantia Pollis has been appointed associate professor at the New School for Social Research effective September, 1964.

Jesse W. Reeder, who was recently promoted to a full professorship in the department of political science at Brigham Young University, has been appointed chairman of the department.

Edward B. Richards, formerly assistant professor of political science in the department of social studies, University of Southwestern Louisiana, has accepted appointment to the Armstrong chair of government, with the rank of associate professor in Texas Wesleyan College.

John B. Richard, doctoral candidate at the University of Illinois, has accepted an assistant professorship at the University of Wyoming.

THOMAS W. ROBINSON has been appointed instructor in the department of government at Dartmouth College for the academic year 1964–65 to replace Professor Charles B. McLane who will be on a sabbatical leave in Sierra Leone during the year 1964–65.

CYRIL B. ROSEMAN, formerly of Princeton University, has been appointed an assistant professor in the department of political science, San Francisco State College.

LEONARD ROWE, visiting associate professor of political science at the University of Michigan, has been appointed to the faculty of social science, Bennington College, Bennington, Vermont.

I. MILTON SACKS, associate professor of politics at Brandeis University, was appointed dean of undergraduate studies on July 1, 1963.

EDGAR L. SHOR has been appointed associate professor of political science at Colgate University and assumed the chairmanship of the department in June, 1964.

BALJIT SINGH has rejoined the department of political science, Michigan State University, as an assistant professor.

JEAN E. SMITH has been appointed an assistant professor in the department of government at Dartmouth College for the academic year 1964–65 after having served as instructor during the winter and spring terms of the academic year 1963–64.

FRED A. SONDERMANN has been promoted to the rank of professor of political science at the Colorado College.

VINCENT E. STARZINGER of Dartmouth College has been promoted to associate professor. He is spending the 1963–64 academic year in England on a faculty fellowship.

DAVID J. STERN, has been appointed instructor in political science at Colgate University.

HARRY STUMPF has resigned his post at Colorado State College to accept an assistant professorship in the department of government at the University of New Mexico, effective September, 1964.

KURT TABOR of Williams College has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of political science.

STANLEY A. TAYLOR has joined the faculty of Bentley College, Boston, as assistant professor of political science.

HANS B. THORELLI resigned as professor of business administration at the University of Chicago to accept appointment as professor of business administration at Indiana University.

S. SIDNEY ULMER resigned from Michigan State University as of September 1, 1963, to become professor and chairman, department of political science, University of Kentucky.

NICHOLAS WAHL resigned his position at Harvard University to accept an associate professorship in politics at Princeton University, effective February 1, 1964.

GILBERT WARE, Morgan State College, joined the political science department of the University of Pennsylvania in July, 1963, as an assistant professor.

STEPHEN L. WASBY has resigned from Southeast Missouri State College to accept an appointment as assistant professor of political science at Moorhead State College.

ROBERT G. WESSON has resigned his position on the staff of Bates College to accept a position as assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, effective September 1964.

HOWARD WHITE, University of Miami (Ohio), retired in June after 36 years on the teaching staff. Professor White was chairman of the department of government from 1927 to 1958.

DEAN YARWOOD, doctoral candidate at the University of Illinois, has joined the staff of Coe College, Cedar Rapids, as an instructor in political science.

DAVID ZIBLATT has joined the department of political science, Michigan State University, as an instructor.

IN MEMORIAM

Morton Grodzins, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago and Vice-President of the American Political Science Association, died in Chicago on March 7, 1964.

Grodzins was born in Chicago on August 11, 1917. He did his undergraduate work and took an M.A. degree at the University of Louisville. He served there for three years as director of public relations and student publications, manifesting an interest in publishing which he maintained throughout his life. In 1941 he went to the University of California at Berkeley, where he secured his Ph.D. in 1945.

In that year he came to Chicago, at first as research director of the State-Local Relations project of the Council of State Governments; he was the principal author of the report, *State-Local Relations*, published by the Council in 1946. He accepted a part-time appointment at the University of Chicago, too, which shortly became full-time. From 1947 to 1951 he was also chairman of one of the undergraduate Social Science general education sequences, contributing vitally to the dynamism and drive of the College of the University of Chicago in the years when it was known as the Hutchins College.

In 1951 he took leave from his academic duties to become Director of the University of Chicago Press, and from this post he was appointed Dean of the Division of the Social Sciences in 1953. He was forced to resign this position in 1954 for reasons of health, but he made a fortunate recovery, and in 1955 became Chairman of the Political Science Department for a three-year term. He was Ford Research Professor in Governmental Affairs from 1956 to 1958, and spent the following year as a fellow of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences.

His major contributions to political science were made in three fields. His initial interest in state-local relations developed steadily into a comprehensive and imaginative study of the American federal system. He was a member of the First Hoover Commission Task Force on Federal-State Relations and principal contributor to its report in 1949. A few years later he organized a Federalism Workshop at the University of Chicago to which he devoted major attention for the last ten years of his life. In this workshop he directed the study of a highly promising group of graduate students.

While Grodzins did not complete the major work on American federalism on which he was engaged, he developed his theory of "sharing of functions" and his view of the American federal system as a "marble cake" in a number of articles, including the chapter on "The Federal System" in *Goals for America*, the report of President Eisenhower's Commission on National Goals, published in 1960. His views were also well summarized by his paper, "Centralization and Decentralization in the American Federal System," appearing in *A Nation of States*, edited by Robert A. Goldwin (1963).

Grodzins' special interest in the social problems of metropolitan areas led him to write, with Edward Banfield, *Government and Housing in Metropolitan Areas*. His pamphlet on *The Metropolitan Area as a Racial Problem* was very widely distributed and quoted.

A second major focus of his work was on the problem of political loyalty. At Berkeley he was a member of the group under Dorothy S. Thomas studying the wartime evacuation of Japanese-Americans from the west coast. His first major book, *Americans Betrayed* (1949), was a brilliant and intensively researched study of regional pressures and their impact on the formation of national policy on the evacuation. This work led him to write a more general and theoretical book, *The Loyal and the Disloyal* (1956), dealing with what he called the "social boundaries of patriotism and treason."

A third major concern for Grodzins during his more recent years was nuclear policy. He joined the Board of Editors of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* in 1957, and quickly became one of the most faithful and dedicated members of that group. He was one of the few social scientists to attend the famous series of Pugwash conferences with Soviet scientists. His last book, *The Atomic Age*, which he carried through to completion in 1963 in spite of his failing health, was a collection of the most significant articles from the *Bulletin* edited by himself and Eugene Rabinowitch.

Grodzins' active temperament led him to participate in a number of professional and citizen organizations. He was a consultant to Public Administration Clearing House (1948–49), the ACTION organization (1956–57), the National Manpower Council (1957–58), the President's Commission on National Goals (1960), and the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1961–64). He was a member of the Board of Trustees of the National Opinion Research Center (1957–64), the Board of Directors of the Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science (1958-64), and the Board of Editors of *Ethics* (1958–64).

Grodzins was a dynamic and independent person who profoundly influenced colleagues, students and others with whom he was associated.

His wide range of interests led him to form friendships across the lines of many academic jurisdictions. A highly original mind, he attracted students and colleagues with imagination and curiosity. He was a forceful speaker, an effective administrator, a pungent writer, and an intense and devoted scholar.

Living the last thirteen years of his life in the shadow of recurrent health crises, he carried his fateful burden with unfailing courage, so that sorrow for his loss is tempered by admiration for a gallant spirit.—C. HERMAN PRITCHETT

(Note. Contributions for the Morton Grodzins Fellowship Fund will be accepted by the University of Chicago, Office of the President.)

PERCY THOMAS FENN, professor emeritus of government at Oberlin College, died at Oberlin, Ohio, on January 25, 1964. Born in 1892, he was a graduate of Hobart College. He received a B.D. from Episcopal Theological School in 1918; an M.A. in politics from Princeton in 1920; an M.A. and Ph.D. from Harvard in 1922 and 1924; and an honorary L.H.D. from Hobart in 1951. He taught at Washington University (St. Louis), 1924–27; at Oberlin he served as professor of political science, 1927–51; professor of government from 1951 until his retirement in 1958; and chairman of the department, 1944–47, 1950–53. He was the author of a book on the origin of the right of fishery in territorial waters, of a case-book on the development of the American constitution, and of articles in professional journals. His particular interest in the later years of his teaching career was American constitutional law. Many of his former students who are now political scientists or lawyers have a lasting respect and gratitude for the rigorous training in critical analysis they received in his courses. His colleagues will miss his seasoned wisdom, his fairmindedness, his perceptive kindness, and his urbane wit.—JOHN D. LEWIS.

The death of EGBERT SEMMANN WENGERT, from cancer, at Eugene, Oregon, on February 22, 1964, brought an untimely end to the work of a political scientist as he was about to take up that craft single-mindedly again, after sixteen years as a department head at the University of Oregon. He was born in Bloomington, Illinois, July 7, 1912; attended Concordia College in Milwaukee, 1928–30, Concordia Seminary in St. Louis, 1930–31, and took his degrees at the University of Wisconsin: B.A. in 1933, LL.B. in 1935 and Ph.D. in 1936. He taught successively at the University of Wisconsin, at Wayne University and at Sweet Briar College before the war, and after the war for a year at the University of Wyoming before coming to Oregon in 1948. During the war he served in the Office of Price Administration in Washington; thereafter, for varying periods he was a consultant for the Atomic Energy Commission, the National Security Resources Board and other federal and state agencies, and more lately on a Ford Foundation project.

He was the author of *Financial History of Detroit during the Depression* (1940), *Problems of Housing and Rehabilitation in Detroit* (1941), and a contributor to this REVIEW and to other professional journals and books. He left incomplete an abundance of research and writing he had planned for the years ahead.

As an administrator at Oregon he eased the life of teachers and researchers and drew the best from both. As a man of strong and generous mind he contributed more than anyone else to the development of an independent-minded staff.

As a citizen, public servant and friend he gave his time and energies without stint. He believed giving is better than getting and so was better rewarded than all those he helped.—JAMES C. DAVIES

EARLE H. KETCHAM, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Syracuse University, died February 11, 1964, at the age of 71. A member of the Syracuse University faculty since 1925, Professor Ketcham served as chairman of the political science department from 1956 until his retirement in 1959. He was born in Grand Rapids, Michigan, on April 13, 1893. and served as a first lieutenant in the 37th division in France and Belgium during World War I. He received his Ph.B. from the University of Chicago in 1921, an M.S. from the University of Michigan in 1923, and his Ph.D. from the University of Illinois in 1925. Before coming to Syracuse, he taught at Illinois and the University of Oklahoma.—FRANK MUNGER

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Professional Placement Service at 1964 Annual Meeting

(September 9-12, 1964)

A professional placement service will again be available to members of The American Political Science Association attending the Chicago meeting. The placement service will be provided by the U. S. Employment Service. The primary purpose is to provide an efficient means for employers to meet prospective employees and vice versa.

A staff of experienced Employment Service interviewers will be available at the Annual Meeting Placement Center to review employers orders, interview applicants, and arrange for an interview between prospective employers and employees.

If you are planning to attend the 1964 Annual Meeting and wish to utilize the Placement Service, this is how to proceed:

ADVANCE REGISTRATION: Both prospective employers with personnel needs and employees seeking a position are urged to make application before August 21 at the nearest local office of their State Employment Service and ask that the forms be forwarded to the Illinois State Employment Service. There are over 2,000 local Employment Service offices throughout the country, including 122 urban professional placement centers. Personnel at these offices will have the appropriate forms and will assist employers and applicants to prepare them. Employers should take detailed job specifications and applicants should take a brief (preferably one page) vita when they visit the local office. The APSA National Office will send additional information on this service to department chairmen.

With the exception of instances in which a satisfactory placement has been effected before the Annual Meeting begins, the local Employment Service office will forward all applications and orders directly to the Annual Meeting Placement Center after the registration deadline, August 21. The Center, located at the Pick-Congress Hotel, is manned by a staff of experienced professional placement interviewers who conduct the matching process of bringing together qualified personnel and interested employers.

The Professional Placement Service is entirely separate from the APSA's Personnel Service and requires separate registration. There is no fee for use of the Professional Placement Service by employers or applicants at the Convention.

ACTIVATING REGISTRATION AT THE CENTER: Immediately upon arrival, the employer or applicant should check in at the Annual Meeting Placement Center so that earlier local registration can be activated.

REGISTRATION FOR EMPLOYMENT AT THE CENTER: While initial registrations will be taken at the Center, you will get quicker service if you register in advance at the local Employment Service office.

FOLLOW UP: Orders and applications will be returned to the local Employment Service Office after the Annual Meeting. The office will determine if a satisfactory placement occurred and, if not, will make further recruitment or placement efforts.

All State Employment Service local offices accept orders and applications in the field of political science on a year-round basis as a regular part of their professional service.

International Political Science Association

SIXTH WORLD CONGRESS

GENEVA, 21-25 SEPTEMBER 1964

The International Political Science Association, composed of the political science associations of 27 countries, many teaching and research institutions, and several hundred individual members, will hold in Geneva, from September 21 to 25, 1964, its sixth triennial Congress. Like the Congresses held previously in Zurich (1950), The Hague (1952), Stockholm (1955), Rome (1958) and Paris (1961), the Geneva Congress will be open to all persons interested in the study of politics.

The Congress is being held in Geneva at the invitation of the Swiss Political Science Association, of which Professor Roland Ruffieux of the University of Fribourg is the President, under the auspices of and with assistance from the Swiss Federal Council, the authorities of the Canton and the City of Geneva, and the University of Geneva. Local arrangements are placed under the responsibility of Professor Jacques Freymond, Director of the Institut universitaire de Hautes études internationales.

PROGRAM

1. **New trends in the theory and practice of federalism.**
   General rapporteur: Prof. Carl J. FRIEDRLCH, Harvard University
2. **Youth in Politics.**
   General rapporteurs: Professors Georges LAVAU, Faculté de Droit et des Sciences économiques, and Fondation nationale des Sciences politiques, Paris, and Roy C. MACRIDIS, State University of New York at Buffalo.
3. **Decentralisation: political, administrative and economic.**
   General rapporteur: Prof. A. H. HANSON, University of Leeds.
4. **Political leadership.**
   General rapporteur: Prof. R. BHASKARAN, University of Madras.
5. **International organizations.**
   General rapporteur: Prof. Inis L. CLAUDE, Jr., University of Michigan.
6. **The concept of human rights in political theory.**
   General rapporteur: Prof. M. D. RAPHAEL, University of Glasgow.

OFFICIAL LANGUAGES

Discussions will be held in English and French, with simultaneous interpretation.

WORKING PAPERS

The six general reports will be produced in both official languages. Other reports will be produced in either English or French, with summaries in both languages. As at our previous congresses, only papers invited or accepted by the general rapporteurs will be circulated. All those interested in a particular topic are requested to write directly to the general rapporteur.

FEES

1. General registration fee:
   (a) For paid up individual members of IPSA: $5 (French francs 25, £1.15.0, Swiss francs 19);
   (b) For all other participants: $10 (French francs 50, £3.10.0, Swiss francs 38).

Registration cards, hotel reservation forms, and further information may be obtained from

The American Political Science Association
1726 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

The International Political Science Association

Invitation to Membership

The International Political Science Association, founded in 1949, has three categories of membership: (1) national associations, such as the American Political Science Association, of which at present 27 are members; each association is represented on IPSA's Council which meets every three years at the time of the Congress, and which elects the President and the Executive Committee; (2) associate members consisting of universities, colleges, departments of political science, research institutes, libraries; and (3) individual members.

The Executive Committee has recently reviewed the terms for individual membership, partly in order to deal with rising publishing costs, and partly with a hope of making membership more attractive. As of 1 January 1964, there are two rates of individual membership fees—one at $3 and one at $8, per year.

The basic rights of the individual member are the same at whichever level he belongs to the Association. Membership entitles him to receive the Newsletter giving information about IPSA activities and meetings; to buy books published under IPSA auspices—including the *International Bibliography of Political Science,* published annually by Stevens in London and sets of the papers submitted at IPSA meetings, at a substantially lower price; and to pay a lower registration fee at the triennial congress. During the next congress, a business meeting is to be held at which individual members will have the opportunity to learn at first hand about the policy and programme of the Association, to present suggestions and to question the President and other officers.

Individual members who pay the higher membership fee are, in addition, entitled to receive either the *International Political Science Abstracts,* published quarterly by Basil Blackwell, at Oxford, or the *International Social Science Journal,* the quarterly organ of the Department of Social Sciences of Unesco, published in Paris.

To join the International Political Science Association, you need only fill in the membership form and send a cheque for the membership fee at the level which you wish to choose. The officers of the American Political Science Association hope that a large number of American political scientists will wish to join IPSA, not only to avail themselves of the advantages of individual membership, but also to make a contribution to international co-operation in our field.

(Application Form, Following Page)

MEMBERSHIP FORM

to be returned to

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Full address ....

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Institution ....

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Special Flight to International Congress of Political Science in Geneva

FARES—Round-trip fare New York/Geneva will be approx. $379.
Round-trip fare Chicago/Geneva will be approx. $454.

TIME SCHEDULE
Sept. 14, leave Chicago (New York)
Sept. 15, arrive Paris
Sept. 21, leave Paris, arrive Geneva
Sept. 29, leave Geneva, arrive New York (Chicago)

The Association will arrange hotel reservations and provide other necessary services for members wishing to participate. For further information regarding hotel rates, hotel reservation forms, etc., contact Association offices in Washington.

Summer Charter Flights to Europe

FARES
Flight A, round-trip fare is $213.62
Flight B, round-trip fare is $234.07

TIME SCHEDULE
Flight A, June 12–September 7
Flight B, July 31–September 3

Both flights depart New York and arrive London. Each flight is filled, but due to expected cancellations of reservations, we are still accepting applications for the waiting list. To participate, members must have joined APSA six months prior to departure date, and must deposit $100.00 per seat requested. For further information write to:

Charter Flight Program
American Political Science Association
1726 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.

GRANTS FOR ASIAN POLITICAL SCIENTISTS

The American Political Science Association again has received from The Asia Foundation a grant for encouraging closer relations between Asian and American political scientists. The funds will be used in three ways:

1) To enable Asian political scientists to become members of The American Political Science Association for a three-year period at greatly reduced rates. Membership includes subscription to *The American Political Science Review.*

2) To enable libraries, university departments, and research institutes in Asia, who have heretofore been unable to do so, to subscribe to *The American Political Science Review* at greatly reduced rates.

3) To supplement travel expenses of Asian political scientists who are in the United States and who wish to attend meetings of The American Political Science Association. The next meeting will be held September 9-12, in the Pick-Congress Hotel, Chicago.

(Applicants must be at least at the graduate student level and may come from any Asian country from Afghanistan eastward. Applicants who have not previously received grants will be given first consideration. Application forms may be obtained from The American Political Science Association, 1726 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington 6, D. C.)

Notice

Resolutions at Annual Business Meeting

In accordance with ARTICLE VIII of the Constitution, this is to call attention of members of the Association to the provision of the APSA constitution that:

> "All resolutions shall be referred to the Council for its recommendations before submission to the vote of the Association at its Annual Business Meeting."

The Council of the Association will meet all day September 8, 1964, in the Belmont Room, Pick-Congress Hotel, Chicago, Illinois.

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Special New York City Hotel Rates For APSA Members September 12-20

As a special service to Association members who may be enroute to the International Political Science Association meeting in Geneva, Sept. 21-25 or those who may wish to attend the World's Fair after attending the Chicago meeting, the national office of the Association has arranged with the Commodore Hotel in New York City specially reduced room rates for Association members from September 12 through September 20. The Commodore is offering the flat rate of $11.00 for singles and $16.00 for twins for all Association members during the period of September 12-20, providing reservations are made prior to August 12. Reservations at the flat rate cannot be guaranteed after that date.

Airports may be reached from the Commodore via the free front door (42nd Street) airport shuttle service to East or West Side Terminals where the coach may be taken for $1.50 to La Guardia or Newark airports or $1.75 to Idlewild. Also, within the Commodore is a special subway platform at which will stop a World's Fair express subway and then continue directly to the World's Fair grounds non-stop in 18 minutes at a cost of 15¢ each way.

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

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

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